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


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THE
DANVILLE
QUARTERLY REVIEW,
FOR THE YEAR 1862.

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VOL II.

Φωτίσ αὐτοὺς δὲ ζῶν καὶ ἁφθαρσίαν διὰ τοῦ εὐαγγελίου.—2 Tim. i: 10.

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DANVILLE REVIEW.

No. 1.

MARCH, 1862.

ART. I.—*Reason and Faith: or, the right use of Reason with regard to Revelation.*

ON no subject is there put forth more confused and crude thought joined to arrogant pretension, more ignorance and superficiality united with presumptuous claims to superior wisdom, than on that of Reason and Faith—their relation the one to the other, and the nature, limits and legitimate sphere and use of each. By a certain class of persons, not few in number, the independence and almost, or quite, divinity of reason is boastfully asserted, and set over against an unquestioning faith in the word of God. They set reason up above that Word, put it in the stead of the Spirit of God himself, and make it the supreme arbiter of truth—forgetting that its only legitimate province is to find out and deal with the facts that are, and as they are. To know the truth is to be free. John viii: 32. What a man may assert, however boldly, is nothing to me. I want—not his opinion, not what, in his judgment, ought to be—I want to know what is the fact. Fact, and not opinion, or the pretended oracular utterances of deified reason, is that which will stand. Notwithstanding some men may affect to despise it, and no matter though it may seem humble and unpretending, as did the Truth himself when he appeared the Word made flesh, fact,

and it alone will stand and abide steadfast, when the boldly advanced opinions—the boasted triumphs of reason—shall have vanished like the empty, painted soap-bubbles—the gaudy, glittering nothings—which they resemble and are.

We propose to inquire a little into the real province and the limits of reason, with special reference to things revealed. The importance of this inquiry in a day when reason is, by many, unduly exalted, and forced from its proper place of subjection to the Divine mind and will into the place of supreme authority which belongs to the Divine mind alone, will, we do not doubt, be regarded as a sufficient excuse for this inquiry, notwithstanding the numerous abler and more elaborate discussions of the subject which have been put forth and are frequently appearing.

We are far from indulging the disposition or purpose to degrade or revile reason—for it is a high and noble faculty. Our purpose is to try to find out its place and use. It is not to degrade or revile it to say that out of the place assigned it by its and our Creator, it is weak and helpless. Within its proper sphere it can do marvelous things. And joined to faith, and held in subjection to the word of God, it can do more by far than when it is sought to be made supreme. What we propose is to show that it has simply to find out and deal with facts, and not to say to the fact, "Thou art not so—thou art otherwise!" It has to deal with two classes of facts, viz: those of nature and those of revelation. Of the latter, and its manner of dealing with them, we are to speak. And allow the remark here, that whereas we say it has simply to find out and deal with facts, this is not to confine it within straitened limits and to impose on it only an easy and ignoble work. As will more fully appear herein-after, it has here ample room wherein to exercise itself, and a work to do which will task it to the very uttermost of its power. It is here it has gathered all its substantial treasures, achieved all its real triumphs, and secured all that will abide as lasting monuments of its great excellence. The universe is its.

In a day when denials are made, on grounds of pretended reason, of many or all of the great cardinal truths of revelation,—as, for example, in regard to sin, its nature and punishment, the total depravity of the heart of man, the necessity of an atonement and its nature, regeneration by the Holy Spirit, the tri-personality of the Godhead, the resurrection of the body, the general judgment, the future punishment of the wicked, etc.,—it is of the last importance that we should understand what is the real province of that reason, or wisdom of man, of which the Scriptures thus speak: “The world by wisdom knew not God.” “Hath not God made foolish the wisdom of the world?” “I will destroy the wisdom of the wise.” “Oppositions of science—gnosis—falsely so called.” “That your faith should not stand in the wisdom of men.”

Those persons who exalt reason to the place of supreme authority, are loud in their boast of having attained to a peculiarly large measure of liberty, on the ground of having emancipated themselves from a childlike—which they are pleased to confound with a childish—faith in the Bible, on the teachings of which they assert the right of reason to sit in judgment. They contradict the great Teacher in regard to that declaration of his: “If ye continue in my word, ye are my disciples indeed, and ye shall know the truth, and the truth shall make you free. . . . Verily, verily, I say unto you, whosoever committeth sin, is the servant of sin. . . . If the son therefore shall make you free, ye shall be free indeed.” John viii: 31, 32, 34, 36. True independence consists in knowing things as they are, and in acting in entire agreement with their known nature. In regard to natural things, liberty consists in knowing them and in the power to act according to the known laws which govern them. In regard to things social and political, liberty consists in having knowledge of them and in the power to act according to the known relations and duties they involve. Many who confess this, no sooner turn to the great subject of revealed religion, of the nature, attributes and claims of God, and of the spiritual

and moral state of man and his relations to the law of God, and of the way of salvation, than they adopt the very elements of bondage in theory and practice, and, while boasting they are free, become slaves, by substituting their own prejudices and lusts, and baseless assertions—miscalled reason—for the discarded sure word of God, which is a collection of truths, shown to be so by evidence most abundant and satisfactory. They reject the infinite truth, and yield willing obedience to the feeble creation of their own perverted understanding, calling it God, and putting it in the place of God—and glory in this as independence. They will not have a God within whose thought eternity lies comprehended, and whose being fills immensity, but they will have a God whom their reason can comprehend, and whose word and work they can subject to their understanding; a God born of their own brain, and knowing no more than they can know. They will have for, and worship as God, their own thought, or idea, or conception, externalized, or projected outwardly, and given by them his being and qualities, and they will receive as his word, only what they have given, or permitted him to speak. And this is independence! And as for man, so far from human nature being what the Scriptures represent to a simple, plain-minded, unsophisticated reader, to one reading while he runs, to a wayfarer who may be a fool, it is anything which their closet-dream, or romantic philanthropy, may choose to have it. Instead of being altogether vile, totally depraved, enmity against God, as the word of God declares it is, it is essentially good, lovely, and loving, only too often overlaid with vices and wickednesses, the incidental consequence of surrounding evil influences, or temptations, which are to be rejoiced at, because they exercise inherent virtue for its advantage and for its development through conflict unto a more robust strength. This discovery they have made—not, as we have said, in the word of God, nor yet by going out among men and collecting the facts of human conduct, nor yet by careful examination of their own hearts, but by sentimental theorizing,

which they call reasoning, and on which they build their claim of independence.

The boasters of the supremacy of reason, beginning with calling in question the truth of some certain facts, or doctrines, of revelation, are in danger of ending with calling in question, or plainly denying, the existence of God—which is the logical result of their theory. The atheism which prevailed so largely during the latter part of the last and beginning of this century, in France especially, was the consistent result of the dogma, that all things are to be tested by reason, in order to ascertain their truth, or whether they are what they assume to be, and have a right to be so accepted: that belief is not to be admitted until reason, made supreme judge, has delivered its decision upon the merits of the matter proposed for our believing assent; not upon grounds of experiment and demonstration, or testimony, but accordingly as it harmonizes, or otherwise, with our preconceived notions of the fitness of things. Atheism is the consistent result, we say, of such a dogma. For there is nothing so incomprehensible, so incapable of being grasped by our reason, as the eternal self-existence and omnipresence of God, as an intelligent, independent Being, without any reliance upon the visible world or universe, of which he is the creator and upholder by the word of his power, the existence or annihilation of which leaves him unaffected by increase or diminution.

The legitimate use of reason is to discover truth, not to create it. This is very important to be remembered, for, if we mistake not, the want of a clear conviction of this very obvious proposition, is the point of departure toward much fatal error. Reason can not make anything, nor unmake anything; nor make anything that is other, in the very least measure, or kind, than it is. It is not a creator at all. Reason is simply an explorer and discoverer, a finder of things that are already. Its use is to lead us to the fact, to bring us where the fact is, to lift up the veil behind which the fact dwells, and to place us in its presence; and not to make that fact, not to dispute with it, not to contradict it, not to deter-

mine whether it is what, and as, it ought to be, but simply to find it, and to find that, and what, it is quite independently of us, and of any notions that may have been entertained by us, and that may be lying in our minds—lying there, it may be, in more than one sense.

What, for example, is the use of reason in regard to writings that may be presented to us, with the claim made in their behalf that they are a revelation from God? Simply to decide upon grounds of legitimate evidence, whether they are what they claim to be. If they are found to be so, then reason has nothing to do in the way of sitting in judgment upon the wisdom, or suitableness, or truth of their contents, farther than to seek to find out by the application of the proper, recognized methods, what the contents really are. God can not lie, nor can he err, and our highest wisdom, and the noblest use to which our reason can be put, is just to try to find that he has spoken, and what he has said, and then take for granted, with implicit confidence, that it is true and right, precisely what is best and ought to be. Its agreement or not, with our notion of right and propriety, or fitness, is not to be made the test that anything is, or is not, from God. If anything that purports to be from him strikes us as being unjust, or unrighteous, or unwise, we are not on that account to reject it—but have we the necessary proof that it is from him? If so, it is our place to accept it, not as unjust, or unwise, but as just, and wise, and good, our own notions being found by it to be erroneous.

There are those who seem to admit, who profess in general terms, that the Scriptures of the Old and New Testament are the word of God, who nevertheless take back, in effect, the admission, or deprive it of practical force, by asserting the right to bring each word or fact to the test of their reason, not to inquire, proceeding according to the just laws of evidence, or criticism, whether it really belongs to the Scriptures, but to be received or rejected, accordingly as it seems to them to be right or not right. Thus, while they profess to receive the Bible as the word of God, its several parts

have no authority for them, until they receive it from their own reason. Their reason gives to the word of God all its authority, and until it so gets it, it has none. It has not authority for them, therefore, as, and because it is the word of God, but because their reason approves it. Such a doctrine, or this doctrine, if it is not against the idea of a revelation altogether, certainly deprives revelation of the chief part of its benefit, and of all its authority. It leaves each person at liberty to judge for himself what is, and what is not revealed, to judge, not upon the ground of the application of the rules of evidence, internal and external, but upon the ground of the agreement, or not, with his opinion of the thing declared, whether or not that thing ought to have been declared, whether or not it agrees with his notion of right, or is consistent with some theory he happens to hold. He is left to try the truth of a word, or asserted fact, and therefore its right to be regarded as a revelation, by its accord with his opinion, instead of trying his opinion by the declaration of Scripture. On this we will have more to say directly.

It is obvious that a consequence of this asserted liberty must be, that each person will, in point of fact, have a different Bible, or rule of faith and practice, from every other person, even though all may profess to hold the same Scriptures to be the Bible, the word of God. What is with one authoritative as the voice of God, is not so with another, yet each has the, for him, genuine Bible. And, also, what is of no authority with one has full authority with another. And according to the theory on reason we are considering, both must be right. For reason, the reason of each for himself, is supreme judge of truth, and for him there is no appeal from its decision. For him some certain word or sentence, is the voice of God. But for another the voice of God is not heard in it, and therefore it is not the voice of God for him. This results necessarily from the theory that no word of the Scriptures has authority, as from God, until reason, the individual reason of each man for himself, has sat in judgment on it, and given in its decision. One person will put a certain,

another a different, meaning upon a certain passage, and still another will reject it altogether; not upon any fixed principles of criticism, or of interpretation, but accordingly as it consists, or not, with his preconceived views, his prejudices. Yet each is right—all are right. Each has, for himself, the very truth—the voice of God.

Thus the Scriptures are a sort of chaos of unformed, undigested materials, meaning nothing authoritatively, in particular, until each man has for himself, asserting the independence of his reason, used his liberty to select and refuse and arrange them, and has constructed a world for himself such as pleases him. It is less God's world than his. Notwithstanding God has said, by his spirit, "Let there be light!" the light is darkness, and the world abides still in darkness, until the reason of each man has said, "Let there be light," or has pronounced upon the light which God created, saying, "It is light!" or has so pronounced upon portions of the whole, the portions upon which it has not so pronounced continuing to be darkness. This is the legitimate result of the theory—for the theory is that reason must determine in regard to the merits of the fact itself, and the determination of reason is for each man to him the law of God. But my reason and its determination is not a law for you, nor yours for me. And almost inevitably they will differ, and so each of us will have a different Bible. The theory is, "No creeds! Away with confessions of faith! Man independent of man, reason of reason, and reason of revelation!" Is it not evident, then, that the Bible is anything, all things, or nothing, capable of being made into ten thousand, all equally Bibles, each equally the word of God, yet each differing from all the rest, and no one the word of God, having authority, but not the word of God and without authority—to all except the one whose reason has vested it with divine authority—but the very word of God, having full Divine authority to him? Nay, more than this—when a man has gotten his Bible, it must not be taken for granted he has that which will be his Bible all his life, nor even that he will be found to-morrow in possession

of the very same, which he to-day acknowledges to be his Bible. It is true it is to-day the voice of God, his revealed and authoritative will to him. To-day God speaks to him in some certain form of words which have a certain understood meaning. But to-morrow the voice of God will have ceased to be heard in that form of words, or he will speak them with a different meaning. The revealed will of God will not be the same to-morrow that it is to-day. For reason—the individual reason—each man's own reason—will not abide stationary, immovable. It must progress and change its judgments, and as it progresses and changes its judgments, so must the Divine mind as revealed. The revelations made by the Holy Spirit will not remain fixed. They must declare what reason dictates, and adapt themselves to all its varying moods. Hence the person will have the very same Bible not long at a time. It speaks such and so now, but no other person, nor he himself, can possibly tell or guess what or how it will speak at any future time. He exalts his reason above, or unto the place of God. Asserting for it independence he denies, in effect, that God has or can have an independent revealed will. That is, he denies that it is possible for God so to make known his will to men, that it shall be and speak, the same, and have the same full authority, to all men, every-where and every day. In other words, while he may profess to believe in a revelation from God, and that the Scriptures of the Old and New Testament are that revelation, he deprives his professed belief of all its practical value by the kind of liberty and independence he asserts for his reason. For of what use is a revelation which can make known for our faith and practice only that which our reason first dictates, or permits? If it is agreed that it is of important benefit as communicating matters which reason would not by itself have discovered, still even such matters are without authority until reason has sanctioned them, while if they are such as it can not comprehend, they are rejected; perhaps to be restored to their place among things revealed at some future period. For the theology we are opposing is such as

to give as one of its results the rejection now from revelation of that which hereafter will be restored ; and, it may be, regarded as particularly important and especially obvious. For something which during the infancy of reason, and while one has little acquired knowledge, seems mysterious, and in fact quite incomprehensible, may after a little while appear very plain and easily intelligible. Now, according to the theory of the supreme authority of reason, as long as a person is in the former state, the thing is no part of revelation, and is destitute of authority over him. But as soon as he passes into the latter state it becomes a thing revealed, and its authority over him is complete. The reverse process may take place. Something claiming to be revealed may, during his mind's childhood, seem to him right and wise and good, and may be unhesitatingly accepted for what it claims to be, which, as his knowledge increases and its relations to other things become apparent and complicated, he will feel compelled by the application to it of his theory to reject. The consequence will be that his Bible will be growing in one direction and becoming less in another—increasing in regard to certain matters, and diminishing in regard to others. New branches will be starting forth from the trunk, and old falling off. Falsehoods and fables and myths will be forming into truthful statements and narratives and histories, while the true will be changing into false. His Bible is composed of dissolving views—the former things of faith passing away, new things appearing.

Now we consent most cordially, and hold most firmly, that each particular part of the Scriptures as well as the entire Scriptures may be tried, and ought to be, whether it is the very word of God, or to determine upon the validity of its claim to be so. But we hold and insist that it must be tried by some other rule than that which gives as its result to each man, as the authoritative word of God to him something which all other men reject, and which has for them no binding authority ; some other rule than that which gives to no two men the same law ; which speaks to

no two men the same voice of God ; which makes that Divine voice and authority to you which is not such to me ; and which gives to you and to me to-day as very truth to be believed and obeyed with the whole heart and mind and strength what to neither you nor me will be truth, but will be falsehood to be repudiated, rejected and hated to-morrow. The claim is set up by the boasters of the independence of reason, of the right of each person to judge whether the Scriptures in whole or in part are from God, and what they teach ; not by well-established rules touching evidence, criticism, interpretation, etc.—for this is the right of all, contrary to the teaching of the Papal church—but by forcing each several part and word to utter what, and only that, his reason can accept without repugnance, no matter at how great soever cost of violence done to the just laws of language. If by any means any particular passage should utterly refuse to be so constrained as to speak the meaning their reason requires—and it must be obstinate indeed if it will not yield to their compulsory and conveniently lawless method—then this affords the sufficient proof and ground for casting it out as an interpolation, or for declaring it to be a corruption.

It is obvious that on this principle there can be no certainty as to the real meaning of Scripture, but that it is a different book to each several reader. Thus the great, chief importance of a revelation—which is that we may have something sure, and that speaks the same word with the same meaning to all persons at all times, and in all states of mind and feeling in regard to the subjects appropriate to a revelation, and that call for it—is taken away. Reason is infallible church : always infallible, though Pope is against Pope and council against council.

Such a rule can not be correct. Truth never changes. Truth is eternal. "The word of God liveth and abideth forever." Reason changes—it changes, and often reverses, its judgments. Therefore, reason can not, rightfully, sit in judgment upon truth. Its judgments must be judged by the truth. We consent that the Scriptures, or any given part

or passage thereof, may be tried, whether they, or it, are, or is the very word of God. But not by a rule that leads to such results, and which its advocates themselves would be ashamed to apply to any other document with a view to find out whether it is what it purports to be, and what is its meaning. The Scriptures—as a whole, or any portion thereof—is to be tried, just as we try any other writing, upon the ground of the evidences, external and internal, which exist in independence of our reason, and are ever the same without regard to its judgments. Our reason dwells and moves and acts within its only proper sphere when it is occupied with those evidences, finding out what they are and what they establish—and not when it is trying the truth itself, without respect to them, by its consistency or not, with their notion of right and wrong. When it is occupying itself with the evidences by which the truth is to be found, it is occupied legitimately, nobly, and gets worthy and glorious results. When it occupies itself otherwise, it is occupied dishonestly, and produces puerilities, and doltings, and fables, by whatsoever sounding names their deluded authors may call them. And so far are we from denying the right to exercise our private judgment upon the evidences, and so far from requiring a superstitious faith—a faith for which we can not render a reason to him who asks—we invite and demand the most rigid application of all the established rules that are used for determining the authenticity and meaning of any other document. Let it be understood, then, that the Scriptures require, and call upon all who believe them to be the word of God to require, that they be tested whether they are the very word of God they claim to be, by any, and by all, means the most rigid and exacting which may be properly applied to any other writing of importance—as for example, a will, or a title to an estate. Any method which would be recognized as fair and legitimate to determine whether a certain writing claiming to be the Constitution of the United States is such in fact, and whether any given passage in it is genuine—really belongs there—and also to

determine the exact meaning of any particular section, or article, or clause, the Sacred Scripture invites to be applied to itself. It will shrink from no such inquiry and examination, and will abide by the result of the closest scrutiny.

But as the Constitution of the United States would not submit to be mutilated, or to have its meaning determined on no other ground than the mere whim or prejudice of each person, or on the ground of its consistency, or otherwise, with what the reason of each person may presume to decide is right or wrong, and for no better cause, so neither will the Scriptures. It demands that its claims to be the word of God shall be thoroughly investigated. But it will not consent that the reason of man, which it pronounces corrupt and perverted in its natural state, and not able to "receive the things of the Spirit of God, which are foolishness unto it, neither capable of knowing them," shall declare for its—the Scripture's—meaning, its own—reason's own—notions. It demands that when its claims to be the word of God are established by legitimate method, its contents shall be accepted as truth, however they may contradict our opinions.

There must be some certain and fixed laws whereby to determine the genuineness and real meaning of any word that lays claim to a particular origin, or authorship, else we are forever floundering amid a chaotic mass of always changing notions, and can not be sure, at any time, that we have the truth, nor that we shall be able ever to know it. Among the variety of the conflicting judgments which reason announces, which is true? Each lays claim to truth—claims, indeed, a certain inspiration, and infallibility, and each man must accept the decision of his reason as authoritative for his faith and practice. To him it is the voice of God—and one has as much right as another to hold his judgment for truth.

We repeat—for we are so often charged with holding to a blind, uninquiring superstitious faith, that it is necessary to make ourselves clearly understood—that we shun or deprecate no legitimate inquiry, no matter how rigid and

uncompromising, into the justice of the claim of the Bible to be the word of God. Nor do we forbid—on the contrary, we invite—an investigation, by all recognized laws of criticism and interpretation, to find the meaning of each of its several books and sentences and words. The many and able works of a great number of believers—works of various kinds—didactic, polemic, expository, critical, apologetic—stand as proofs of this. But how shall we proceed to find whether the Scriptures are the word of God? or whether a particular passage is of that word? and, if so, what it means? One man says, My reason tells me that inspiration, as that word is understood by orthodox Christians, is impossible and absurd. So he disposes of the matter. Another man says, My reason tells me an inspired revelation from God is possible and reasonable, and—if we are to have any correct knowledge of God, and of our relations to him—necessary. Now which of these are we to believe? One has as much right to his opinion as the other to his. But neither has a right over me to require me to receive the judgment of his reason. I say, what is the fact? Let us have that! Therefore, we appeal from what reason says to facts as they are presented in independence of reason, substantiated by sure evidence, such as we would require and count sufficient if the genuineness of a document, claiming to be the Constitution of the United States, was the matter in question.

Or, again, suppose it is admitted, in general terms, that the Bible is the word of God, given by inspiration. It is proposed to inquire in regard to some particular passage—“Is it genuine?” Let the passage be this—“Except a man be born again, he can not see the kingdom of God!” One man, says, doubting, “How can this be?” Another says, My reason tells me that it is mere unmeaning nonsense, it is simply absurd. Still another says, My reason approves it, as pointing out a necessary change of human nature from a state of sin, in which my experience tells me it lies. Here, again, the judgment of one, as merely a judgment of reason, is as weighty and as worthy of credit as that of another—

one doubting, another denying, and still another affirming, that the given passage is genuine, and neither one nor another good for anything as a settlement of the question. What then? Why, let us to the evidences! the proofs! which exist independently of reason, and let us use our reason upon them with a view to find what is the fact in regard to it. If they establish its genuineness, it is genuine. And, as to that result, it is of no consequence what reason has to say upon the merit, or supposed merit, of the passage itself, or of the doctrine it teaches.

Once more. Let the genuineness of the passage be granted, and suppose the inquiry is raised, What does it mean? One man says, It can not mean what it seems to mean, for that would contradict reason—in other words, would contradict my theory concerning the moral condition of the human family. Another declares, It does mean what it seems to mean, for reason points out the necessity of such a great, radical change of human nature. Here it is to be remarked, that there is a fallacy in the use of the word “reason,” in that the individual reason, or the reason of each person, is put for reason in general, or universal reason. The reply to the foregoing declarations is, We can not consent that the meaning of the passage shall be determined by your reason, or made to rest upon whatsoever theory you may have formed touching the moral state of mankind. We must rather judge your theory by its meaning, when the meaning shall have been discovered by the legitimate application of the just laws of language, criticism, and interpretation. If its meaning contradicts your theory, your theory must fall—not the real teaching of the passage in order that your theory may be saved. Let us inquire, What do the words naturally mean? What is their connection with that which goes before, and that which follows, or the preceding and following context? Are the words to be taken in their literal or in a figurative sense?—a matter not to be decided by a simple, arbitrary declaration that they are, or are not, but by well-known, settled rules. If they are figurative,

what is the nature of the figure, and its laws? What, if any, are the explanations made by the speaker, or author of the passage? Who is he? What are his claims to be believed? When, by pursuing such inquiries to their results, we have found the meaning and authenticity of the passage, then we have the truth. And by the truth, reason and theory must be tried and approved, or condemned—not the truth by them.

According to the theory of reason to which we are objecting, we can not establish the first principles of religion, viz: the being of God. For by what power or exercise of reason that can be made to bear upon the proposition, there is a God! can it be demonstrated to be true? It must be kept in mind that the very substance of the theory requires that we discard, as quite inadmissible, the conclusions that may be drawn from the proofs of his existence that appear in nature, or the universe. It requires that we be able to comprehend all that the proposition contains, or implies—that our reason be able to comprehend, to fully grasp, and know by a direct, intuitional force of understanding or insight, such things as self-existence, eternity, immensity, omnipresence, omnipotence, etc., and upon the ground of so doing, pronounce that they are, and also, by the same power or exercise of reason, that they are qualities or attributes of a self-conscious personal being. It must be able to know such things by itself, independently of all evidence—itsself, or its independent knowledge or intuition of them, its own and only sufficient evidence. Unless it can do this, the proposition must be rejected and condemned as an assertion of somewhat that is impossible, absurd and—confounding, as is constantly done by those we oppose, what is above or beyond the reach of reason with what is contrary to it—repugnant to reason. Yet it is merely idle to profess to be able to comprehend it. It utterly escapes our grasp, and must forever do so. We can make no proximate approach unto it. “It is higher than heaven, what can we do? The measure thereof is longer than the earth and

broadier than the seas!" "The world by wisdom knew not God." "Who hath known the mind of the Lord? or who hath been his counselor?" Reason must itself have divine attributes, in order to be able to comprehend Deity.

Begin, then, with the doctrine that the words of Scripture are to be tested by reason, to determine whether they are true according to some rule in our own mind—some standard that is independent of all outward authority, and that discards testimony, to which standard they must conform—and the inevitable logical result is Atheism.

But do we say there is no use to which our reason must be put in regard to the question, Is there a God? Do we teach there is here no place for it? that it must be quite put aside? By no means. It has its use, and that highly important, even essential. We must regard its use as imperative upon us. Neither in this case, on this question, nor on any other do we discard it. We do not cast contempt on it, nor seek to bring it into odium. We profess to honor it as highly as those do who adopt the theory of its supremacy, and we confidently believe we bestow upon it the higher honor, just as we find out and contend for its power and use and limits, as they are by the purpose and creative act of God. To assert for it more than this, is not to set it free, but to bring it under bondage. They who assert for it more than this, are they who dishonor, weaken and abuse it. We must use our reason in reference to the proposition, There is a God! Not upon the intrinsic merits of that proposition—that is, not by attempting to grasp and comprehend the idea of God, of his being and attributes, and rejecting it as untrue if the attempt should be unsuccessful—but upon the evidences that point to it. In other words, we may arrive at the conclusion there is a God! and hold it with a thorough, firm, and undoubting conviction, as if we were able to comprehend it immediately by our reason, by reasoning from the existence and phenomena of the actual universe, and the proofs it contains of power and wisdom, pointing us to an intelligent Cause. These may safely enough lead us to

adopt the proposition as true. But still the truth itself, as to its how or manner, as to its own essence, lies and must forever lie before us a great unsearchable and incomprehensible infinitude of height and depth and length and breadth, in the presence of which all that reason can do is to bow down itself and confess it can know nothing—humbly prostrate itself in simple adoration before Him, the amazing brightness and marvelous abounding of whose glory are past finding out.

On the ground of the theory of the supreme authority of reason, the declaration is made by many of those who consent—as on their own principles they can not, without disregarding, as we have just seen, the result to which logical consistency points them—to the Being of God, that a written revelation from him is impossible, and belief therein absurd. Here again a confusion is made between things contrary to reason, and things not subject to it. They can not understand how God can by his Spirit inspire the minds of men to speak or write what he wishes to make known in the very words he dictates—therefore he is not able to do so. At any rate, we are under no obligation to believe he has done so, or can do so, and to credit any word that purports to be from him by supernatural revelation, and to submit to its teaching as authoritative, until we can understand. This is as rational as to affirm that in this great universe there are and can be no operations in the worlds of matter and mind beyond what they can trace through all their hidden courses up to their secret springs—no processes in nature beyond what they can see through and through and fully comprehend in every part and at every stage taking place—no facts beyond what they can discover, and, placing themselves where they are coming into existence by means of Divine creating energies, tell how and why they are, and all about them—and no Divine energy in creating beyond what they can and do perfectly comprehend. Unless they can—if not preside at, at least—sit by and sit in judgment upon, as fully comprehending the manner and the reasons of all that is done, they will

not believe. In effect, they blasphemously claim for their reason, as the condition for believing in the existence of the worlds, what is attributed to Divine wisdom, that it "was set up from everlasting, from the beginning, or ever the earth was. When there were no depths, it was brought forth, when there were no fountains abounding with water. . . . When he prepared the heavens, it was there; when he set a compass upon the face of the depth; when he established the clouds above; when he strengthened the foundations of the deep; when he gave to the sea his decree that the waters should not pass his commandment; when he appointed the foundations of the earth, then it was by him as one brought up with him, and was daily his delight, rejoicing always before him—rejoicing in the habitable part of the earth." Such knowledge of whatsoever God does, whether in material or spiritual nature, is claimed as a necessary condition of faith—if consistency is maintained by him who holds that faith in a written revelation from God is to be withheld as repugnant to reason, unless and until reason can understand all about it. Surely it is no harder to believe in such a revelation, than that once mere emptiness, void, and night filled all that vast space through which innumerable bright worlds sweep in their immense courses, and which is full of glorious fountains of gushing light—that these all arose out of the nothing that was before them. How absurd this idea is—that we can have no verbal or written revelation from God, because we can not tell how, while here lies round about us a whole universe of facts of which our reason can not tell us how one came to be! It tells us they are here—tells us this through the testimony of our senses—but not one word about how they are. They say to us, Here we are! and demand that we accept them. If our reason presumes to say, I do not understand how you came to be, therefore you are not! they are, and obstinately stay, nevertheless, and show the contradicting reason to be but a fool, and its folly is punished by its being condemned to be shut up in darkness. Because, forsooth, he can not see the pro-

cess whereby the eternal, infinite, omniscient Spirit—Jehovah—inspires men, and communicates to them and to the world by them, things quite beyond what reason could have found out by itself, things which God alone could originally know, which yet it is of the very last importance should be made known to us, our salvation depending on our having knowledge of them—and because we can not understand how he does it, therefore he can not do it! Therefore we are condemned to ignorance of things, on knowledge of which our salvation depends, because we can not tell how it is possible for God to communicate them to us. The only ground the objection has on which to stand is—not that it is contrary to reason, for in the very nature of things this can not be shown, but—that it is beyond our reason.

We say, in the nature of the case it can not be shown to be contrary to reason. For if so, it must be because it is contrary to some fact already known to our reason. But to what fact is it—revelation—contrary? There is not one known to us. It is only more than anything else that we know. And if we go on the principle of admitting no more than we know already, how rapidly will we increase knowledge? The truth is, this theory, if rigidly carried out to its logical results, would render the acquisition of knowledge impossible. It would require not only the denial of God, but also of a visible universe. We could not admit the existence of any substance, material or spiritual. There is not one thing that can by reason be affirmed to be true, or declared to be not true, simply upon the ground of any judgment we can make upon its inherent merits. For no one thing can rightfully be declared to be true, or not true, until it is tried by some other and known thing—known otherwise than by a judgment of reason acting independently of all help—which either establishes or contradicts it. So the fact of a revelation can only be pronounced false upon the ground of some other fact being known that makes it or proves it to be so—some fact with which it would be inconsistent—and not at all upon the ground of mere absence of

knowledge, or inability to comprehend it, or the mere want of some other known fact, by which to sustain it. Nothing is inconsistent in itself. And the very fact that anything is above and more than our reason, and stands by itself independent of anything that is known, makes it quite impossible for us to show that it is contrary to reason.

Strictly speaking, nothing is contrary to reason. We are apt to be deceived by the phrase, and to be led to imagine that reason is itself, or at least contains within itself, originally, prior to experience or observation, all truth, or the types of all truths, so that we have but to bring any proposition to be judged by its agreement or not, with its independently existing type, or idea, in our reason. Now, reason is nothing of this sort. It neither is nor contains truths, nor their ideas or images. It is not a sort of supreme, independent, divine, institutional faculty, self-illuminated or inspired, and flashing light upon what subject soever is presented to it. Its use is to compare truths, or what purport to be such, among themselves. It may decide that a given thing is not true, on the ground of some other thing, the truth of which is known, contradicting it. When we use the words "contrary to reason," we ought to remember, therefore, that nothing more nor else is meant than that some certain proposition is contrary to some fact, the truth of which is known and established, and not to reason itself; though reason pronounces the judgement, having discovered the contradiction.

On the ground of the asserted supreme authority of reason, some reject, as contrary to reason, the doctrine of the Trinity of the Godhead. On the other hand, we say it is sheer idleness to seek to determine upon grounds of pure reason how God subsists. If there is any absurdity in the doctrine of three persons in the Godhead, that can be made to appear only by means of some known fact touching the Divine Being which it contradicts. Now, what known fact does it contradict? We ask for that fact. There is not one within the whole range of our knowledge. That God is one in essence or substance, is a different proposition altogether,

unaffected by any proposition in regard to plurality of persons in the Godhead. Unity of essence is one proposition; plurality of person is another. Unity of essence or substance is contradicted by, or inconsistent with plurality of essence or substance. And unity of person, or personal unity, is inconsistent with plurality of persons. That is, to say that God is one and several in the same sense, would be an absurdity. It would be a contradiction to say that God is one, and yet several as to substance; or that he is one and yet several as to persons; or to say that he is one God, and yet three Gods. But that one essence can not subsist under the form of several persons is what reason can not rightfully declare to be contradictory in itself, or inconsistent with any fact known to us. We can simply know nothing about it by reason alone. We must wait for light. This doctrine, or denial of the orthodox doctrine, claimed to be eminently rational, is really extremely irrational. There is no sound philosophy in it.

If we are told the doctrine of the plurality of persons in the Godhead is a contradiction, we demand, and have a right to demand, that some known fact be given, to which it stands a contradiction, concerning the mode of the being of God. If it is answered, His unity is that fact! We reply, If unity of substance is meant, it is not so, for the one has no such relation of sameness, or in any other respect, to the other as to render them incongruous. They are different things altogether, with no more opposition between them than there is between unity of essence and plurality of attributes; or than between unity of mind and plurality of thoughts; or than between unity of soul and plurality of affections. No more, so far as reason can determine, and no more, so far as any fact known to us causes to appear. Without pretending that there is any resemblance beyond that which may do for illustration, we might with as much propriety as is done in regard to the doctrine of the Trinity by those who deny it on the ground asserted, that it involves a contradiction, take our stand and say, the soul is a unit, simple, indivisible, therefore it can not admit a plurality of

thoughts or of affections. To all evidences of a plurality of thoughts or affections, we would reply, Evidences, facts, are nothing; for my reason tells me the proposition involves an absurdity. And reason is supreme arbiter, making nugatory all seeming evidences, proving all facts, so appearing, which point to a different conclusion, deceptive. If still pressed with the inquiry, How does the proposition of the unity of the soul contradict a plurality of thoughts or affections? our answer would be, The soul is one, therefore it can not be many! If reminded that it is freely admitted that the soul is one, is a unit, but that its thoughts and its affections are many, and that this is the thing affirmed, we would be very careful to not notice, to not see the explanation, and quite ignoring it would persist in declaring, It is absurd to suppose that the soul is one soul, and at the same time many souls. Now, this ridiculous quibbling would be just as rational, just as legitimate a use of reason as that which pretends upon purely rational grounds to find a contradiction between the plurality of persons in the Godhead, and the unity of the divine substance. The same thing can not be one and several in the same sense. But reason can never make it appear that a particular object can not be one in a given, understood sense, and many in an entirely different sense; that in regard to Deity one essence, involving unity in regard to such matters as eternity, self-existence, omnipresence, omniscience, indeed in regard to all Divine attributes, may not pass over, as it were, into several persons. We must know more than we now know before this can be shown to be contrary to reason.

Or, take the ordinary metaphysical division of the soul into understanding, will and affections. Who has ever objected to this division on the ground that one can not be three; nor three one? that the soul being one, this division involves an absurdity? Here the understanding is not believed to be a different substance from either the will or the affections, nor any one of the three different substances from the soul itself. Moreover, it is not considered an objection

to these distinctions that we can not tell how they are, that we can not explain the separate mode of each. They exist in harmony, each distinct and not the others, yet no one so independent of the others as to be capable of being without them. These three agree in one, and are one—one soul and not three souls. Nor are we aware that it would involve any difficulty to say of any one, It is the soul; or to ascribe to it the attributes of the soul. This would, if said, mean no more than that it is of the substance of the soul. It is the soul willing, or the soul knowing, or the soul loving or hating. If the distinctions named are ever objected to, it is upon quite other ground than that they involve the absurdity of making one three, or three one. Yet no one can tell us how each one of these three divisions exists in what we may call personality, and yet not in separation, or difference, or plurality of substance; how each has its own character, by which it may be known and contemplated by itself, and yet has no separate essence.

It would be difficult indeed to show that reason revolts at the doctrine of a plurality of persons in the Godhead, even when not enlightened by revelation. The pantheist—whether represented by him who thinks it honest and consistent to hold his pantheism along with the profession of the religion of Jesus, and with the claim to have attained unto the highest walks thereof, or by the worshiper of Brahm, in eastern lands, who claims that remote ages have handed down to him the doctrine he holds, too high for the vulgar mind—the pantheist, in a super-eminent measure, asserts the Divinity of reason. Yet according to him, God reveals himself in a countless number and endless succession of persons. His God is one—one substance—out of which the whole visible universe proceeds. And all of individual things, beings and persons, the universe contains, are but the phenomena of his God, unconsciously striving to become, or struggling into temporary, sensible objects. God attains his, probably, highest state of development, and most exalted consciousness, in humanity. All men are therefore persons holding

or subsisting in God. Here, then, we have philosophy—so called—itsself teaching plurality of persons, and persons innumerable, and in an endless succession of coming and departing generations in unity of substance. Surely, in view of such a doctrine claiming to be eminently rational—a doctrine that presents us with the spectacle of numberless persons and individuals belonging to a vast variety of orders coming and going, appearing and disappearing, emerging from the one universal Divine substance, and returning to be again swallowed up thereof, their personal consciousness lost in an unending succession—the boaster of the supremacy of reason may well pause before bringing against the evangelical doctrine of the Divine tri-unity the charge of absurdity, of being contrary to reason. Even the natural reason does not always revolt at it. As we have just seen, it sometimes teaches it, or teaches plurality of persons in unity of substance, in its most extravagant form. It sometimes goes so far as to deny that any of all the persons who, and of all the individuals that, are, exist, or can exist, in any other manner than as developments or phenomena of Deity. It asserts that all persons are in one Divine substance, holding and rooted in it and drawing their vital force from it, as all the trees of the forest are rooted in and derive vitality from one soil; or as all the waves and billows of the ocean are of the one great mass of waters, on the bosom of which they roll and heave; or as the colors of the rainbow are phenomena of the one ray of light, itself invisible. To the charge that the evangelical doctrine is contrary to reason, we may then reply, by placing reason against reason, or judgment of reason against judgment of reason—set philosophy against philosophy, and not be disturbed at the charge until they agree—until reason itself gives forth a certain and consistent sound or decree. There is good cause for thinking that nothing is absurd in the judgment of reason, or too hard to be accepted by it, which agrees with the inclination of the heart, and flatters its proud boast of independence, while anything, no matter how simple, is esteemed by it an absurdity, which rebukes

its arrogant pretension, and is distasteful to the carnal appetite.

We think it is evident by this time that there is utterly an abuse of reason, a forcing of it forth from its proper sphere, a parade of sophistry, and a pompous show of folly, when the attempt is made to apply it to a determination of the essence of truth itself in a way that assumes for it the power of immediate, independent, authoritative and infallible judgment. Those who adopt that theory in regard to it, are apt to assert for themselves a peculiarly large measure of learning and wisdom, and to put on the airs of superiority in those respects over common mortals, whom they affect to pity for their bondage to ignorance and narrow-mindedness and superstitious reverence for the good "old paths." With how much right they do so, it is not difficult to decide; nor who they are who are really the slaves. Genuine superiority is usually found not far away from humility, and is most self-unconscious.

The fact is, that notwithstanding the boast of the supreme excellence of reason, and notwithstanding its real excellence and grandeur when properly apprehended and used, it is one of the feeblest of things when tried within spheres that lie beyond its legitimate domain—within which spheres some would force it to dwell. Within them it is absolutely helpless, and all its strivings are vain and fruitless of substantial results. Instead of having found freedom, it is the slave of more prejudices; and instead of developing a robust strength, it remains a puny babe. It can not go. It has no means nor power of progress. When it throws away its proper helps—such as the facts of experience, observation, testimony, etc., which conduct to knowledge, and attempts to go by itself, unassisted, to form, to judge, to create, independently, it at once becomes an infant, and must always stay so. It may be pleased, amused, self-satisfied with its speculations, but its speculations are puerilities and nothings—which amount to nothing, prove nothing, and rest upon nothing. Its course is a headlong career through

empty space, full of air-images, and philosophical nothings painted. Reason can only go from strength to strength, and from result to result, by being aware of its own self-helplessness, and leaning upon its suitable aids. It was never made to go alone—to go out by itself upon the vast deep of immensity, and by itself call up real, substantial creations to people it. It can go only by means of foothold foundations already laid—by means of truths which defy being comprehended in their inmost nature, and which demand to be accepted upon sufficient evidence, and which, accepted, support and assist it over fathomless gulfs, where, otherwise, it must flounder and sink, and abide forever, vainly struggling as amid the unprogressive void.

Try reason forth yonder, where, beyond life's limit—beyond the little circumference which bounds the small space where our earthly existence is pulsating itself away—can reason tell us where away?—yonder, where death lies in profound silence! Can reason give a tongue and voice to death, so that it shall tell us what it is? and what bounds of space and duration are set to its dominion? or whether it is boundless? Can it declare to us that vast and awful mystery? Reason has stood on that border, and tried to penetrate into that unknown to which our destiny bears us onward with resistless force, and has tried to catch the sound of some voice speaking from the deep, but has been compelled to confess it can see, or hear, or know nothing—or in sheer ignorant presumption has boldly given forth for its judgment, "Death is an eternal sleep!"

Try it on the question of immortality—can it answer? Is time all with which we have to do? Is our destiny all fulfilled in time? Are our cares, our hopes, our labors, our loves, our hatreds, our gains, our developments, all finished when our time on earth is ended? Reason can inform us nothing—nothing surely. Reason declares that as man passes hence he "leaps into the dark," not knowing what will be his next experience, nor whether any. But suppose, as it can not, reason should be able to answer the question,

and answer on the side of immortality—an immortality in possession of which all men shall appear in full, personal consciousness—then can it tell us concerning immortality—what are its states? its conditions? its relations? How are those who shall be clothed with it affected by their conduct in their previous life? What employments does it afford? Is it a state of activity? or of mere quiet, passive contemplation? Is it light? or is it darkness? Is it hope? or is it despair? Is it heaven? or is it hell? Is it a place, or state, of new trials? fresh opportunities? a place, or state, where mistakes made now, and here, may be corrected? or is it a place, or state, allowing no such things, but where are being forever found out only the consequences of present views, and beliefs, and conduct? Reason can not answer. Why? Because reason has no experience there—because reason has no facts which have been brought thence. Deprive it of, or deny it, facts—imagine it dwelling by itself in an absolute void, and reason can not tell what is, and what is not, possible. Nothing, to its apprehension, would be impossible, and, perhaps, we might say, nothing would be possible—or, all things would be alike possible, or alike impossible. For, as we have repeatedly said, its province is simply to employ itself with things that are already, for the sake of finding out their reality and nature and relations. In the absence of all things, therefore, it has nothing at all to do—no judgments to form, no decisions to make.

To illustrate a little farther the point that out of its proper sphere, that is, out of the region of facts—the place of experience and observation—reason is utterly helpless and weak. How much of our reasoning is founded upon the ideas or facts of time and space! Take these away from under it, and what would support it, or keep it from falling straight, headlong, unimpeded, through no sustaining element, down through emptiness itself, without ever finding a resisting medium on which to spread out its wings to lift up itself? In other words, without them, the universe would be to it as one great void. But what are time and space?

They are creations, are created things, or facts, and depend for their being on the will of God. They depend for their being, as we know them, upon our succession of thought and change of place. They belong, therefore, to the dominion of experience—rank themselves along with the things we know by experience. Now, if reason is that independent power, or faculty, which some claim it to be, it must be able to go by itself, without the helps of time and space. But can it? It can not. Let any one try to reason independently of them, and the utter inability to do so will not be long revealing itself. No finite mind, or reason, can take up its position, or make its habitation, in eternity, or immensity—absolute, empty, boundlessness—and think or act solely in their light, under their conditions. To do that is the prerogative of God alone. “Thus saith the high and lofty One that inhabiteth eternity.” Of him alone is it true that “a thousand years are as one day, and one day as a thousand years.” To be able to inhabit eternity, is to be able to be above and without change. If reason can take its position in eternity, it can live above change. Yet of none but God alone is it true that he is “without variable-ness or shadow of turning;” “the same yesterday, to-day, and forever.”

This discussion will not be considered useless by those who have given attention to the signs of the present time, and who have noticed the extensive prevalence of the theory that all things are to be tested by reason—by its illegitimate use.

Reason boasters bring their taper light to explore the temple of God—which is all sublimely beautiful in the unquenchable light that breaks forth from the unspeakable glory which surrounds the great throne—in which Divine light all its parts appear standing forth amid the splendor of all-pervading brightness. They go about this temple—the grandeur, and immensity, and perfection of beauty of which proclaim the glory of God, the builder, while his praises are declared by the sun, and moon, and stars, which,

revolving within its vast dome, are its illuminating fires, and the songs of angelic choirs, lifted up to Jehovah, are its ravishing music—they go about it, holding their taper lights, ignoring the light of God, and proclaiming the supreme excellence of their own, to scan with mole eyes the porches and the altars, and the aisles, and the buildings, and then pronounce wisely and learnedly, as they imagine, upon the proportions, and the adjustments of the several parts, and the display of the presence or absence of architectural taste and skill. This pleases, and that displeases; this is right, and that is wrong; this is ornamental, that is a blunder and a blemish; this is properly located, but that is quite out of place. And so they give us a new version—an improved universe—not what really is, but what ought to be according to their superior judgment. They take on themselves to correct the faults of the Divine Architect, and give us instead their plan and theory of the spiritual temple, claiming for it a right to be preferred over that of which the Scriptures contain a description. Of this they speak with, perhaps, a certain condescending praise, as admirably well suited to former ages when there was little light, and to a people emerging from the ignorance of barbarism and superstition, but far behind the demands and necessities of this day of free, independent inquiry and progress. These pretenders—self-constituted leaders of boasted progress—grope their way back until they arrive among the arcana of creation, and hold the taper light of their reason to explore amid the mysteries of forming worlds, and then pronounce philosophically, as they think, upon the various processes, though in fact they mutter only things foolish and unintelligible, as did the ancient oracular pretenders and dupes from the dark caves in which they sat. They make their boasted explorations, and publish their vaunted valuable discoveries—"oppositions of science, falsely so called"—amid the secrets of the creation of the worlds, seeing with mole eyes by taper lights, where to faith beholding in the great light of the glory of revelation, all appears a brilliant pro-

cession of suns and stars going forth sublimely out of chaos and night and void, at the word of God—"Let them be!"

But now in this day of advanced progress we must not talk of faith. We must not see anything in God created light. Now we must see only in man made light. Divine revelations, flashing, and sparkling, and gushing from everlasting springs of infinite love and wisdom, until worlds, and times, and new creations sport and praise in the bright shinings and splendors thereof; these must depart. Man, as a reasonable being, must away with all this work and worth of God, as a fable, must not believe in them, must cast them out if he would be free and assert his proper dignity, and must himself try his hand at a creation over the desolate ruin he has made. New moral philosophies must arise, new systems of virtue and vice, new theories concerning holiness and sin. The moral philosophy of the Bible must be given up. The way of salvation it makes known must give place to some more rational plan, some plan suggested and approved by our reason. The Christ Jesus of Nazareth, of Galilee, who lived on earth eighteen hundred years ago, must yield preference as a Saviour to some other Christ, a Christ consisting of natural human virtue, declared to dwell in every man, waiting only to be sought out and made worthy to be a Saviour by the hand of self-culture, or a Christ of good works. An atonement for sin by a bloody sacrifice, by a literal shedding of blood, by the death of Christ vicariously substituted for that of the sinner, must give place to an atonement by repentance and reformation.

Always this theory of reason tends downward more and more. It is worthy to be remarked, and ought to stand for a warning not to listen to its first stealthy approaches, that reason has never led him who put it in the stead of faith, to embrace the evangelical teachings of the sacred Scriptures, never led any one to Christ, never led any one to the revealed way of forgiveness of sin and acceptance with God. It has always inclined away from Christ, next from the God of the Bible, and finally from any God. Are we not justified,

therefore, in view of what has been said, in saying that the use of reason, as contended for by those against whose theory concerning it we object, is an abuse of it—is unphilosophical and utterly Anti-Christian? And in asserting that it is a bondage? a tyranny? a thralldom to a lie? a slavery of the soul? and that freedom is not in it? Where is liberty, then? In the word of God! In that word how apprehended? By reason? or by faith? By faith! What! Is reason to be rejected then? No! But reason is to determine, upon legitimate grounds of evidence, that we have the word of God, and not upon the wisdom of the contents of that word, and their truth. Having found by a legitimate use of reason, that we have the word of God, we must then heartily accept and believe whatsoever is therein contained, our reason itself taking the place of subjection to that which is, according to its own rightly-formed judgment, from God, to be instructed, to have its pride cast down, its darkness enlightened, its error corrected, its foolishness changed to wisdom. Having used our reason to determine by the means he has himself directed us to employ, that the One claiming to be the great Teacher is indeed he, then reason itself must sit at his feet to hear his words and to believe them to be true; accepting them without cavil, without dispute, without contradiction, in mere childlike, undoubting, simplicity of faith.

By faith in the word of God we are made free. By our faith in the word of God reason is, and never until then, itself emancipated from bondage to a corrupt and enslaving will. The word of God goes forth upon the regions of death, and death lives. It goes forth and searches the hereafter, and out of that dark, dread, mysterious abyss brings life and immortality to light. It goes forth among the mysteries of the soul and its destinies, every-where; and wheresoever it goes, darkness, doubt, uncertainty, flee away, and light and life abound. It searches out everything concerning which the anxious soul makes question, and returns sure answer. That word is not bound. It is free to go whithersoever the

eternal and omnipresent spirit of God listeth, amid the deeps or the heights of spiritual being. This is freedom; and this freedom belongs to the soul emancipated by faith in the word. For the wide regions of that word belong to faith; those vast regions which, by the word, are explored and opened up. Faith, attaching itself to that word, goes forth with, conducted by it, not as uncertainly, but confidently. It sees in the light of God, and sees afar, with more keen than angel-glance penetrating the future through the thick folds of its garments of night and death. Compared with what lies open, fully revealed to faith beholding through the word of God of those great things to which the soul, groaning under the weight of immense, crushing burdens, and agonizing with intense desire after knowledge and relief, is related, how contemptibly little and worthless are the most boasted achievements of reason!

Truth, and truth alone, makes free. And in religious matters the word of God is the only truth, and it is all truth, and all of truth. Only by the word of God can we know God as God and our Saviour. Only there can we know ourself and our sin. Only there can we know that and how our sin may be forgiven, and that and how we may be saved. With the knowledge that we receive by faith from that word, comes the real emancipation of the soul—"the glorious liberty of the children of God." But reason can do nothing for us—nothing for him who, under the power of deep conviction of sin wrought in the soul by the Holy Spirit, goes to it with the momentous inquiry, and demanding a clear and certain solution, able to be satisfied with nothing else—"What must I do to be saved?" It has been tried—and men will continue to try it, notwithstanding the history of its failures—and upon sin and holiness, life and death, time and eternity, guilt and atonement, God and his dealings with and purposes concerning our race, it sits stupidly pondering, or ignorantly and foolishly chattering, and boasting great things, and giving us nothing.

If we had not already occupied so much space, it would

be interesting to notice a little more than has been done, the affectation of superior wisdom and independence on the part of those who sneer at the advocates of evangelical truth, as narrow-minded, bigoted, and anti-progressive. A comparison of the works of both classes would show that nothing is further from the truth than their boastful assertions. Faith indeed works to add to the power and vigor of the reasoning faculty, and enables it to reach a development it would else fail to secure. The works of faith stand all along the course of the history of the Church as grand and enduring monuments of such results. Those monuments stand and will stand forever, while the unsubstantial works of reason without or against faith are continually disappearing—passing away into the vast receptacle of forgotten things. There are no grander works of logical ability, of philosophical acumen, of sound criticisms, of bold independence and fearless far-forth searchings of thought than those of the earnest advocates for creeds and for absolute subjection of the whole mind and soul to the written word of God. They have always been foremost among defenders of human liberty—civil and religious—promoters of education, and of all true progress and genuine enterprise.

Reason fails, fatally fails him who relies upon it as teacher and guide at death. We do not say that the merely reasoning philosopher may not die as calmly as Socrates. But reason affords in death no really sustaining strength. It stretches forth its wings over emptiness, and struggles vainly, however anxiously, with the terrible uncertainties of the nigh future. It does not hope, nor desire, nor exult in any good, intelligent sense. It takes the leap which carries it forever from the experiences of this life "into the dark." But in the hour of death, he who has lived by faith in God, and in Jesus Christ his only begotten Son, finds he has a sure strength, one that does not fail. His soul stretches forth its wings upon the boundless, illuminated expanse of revealed truth and grace, and goes forth exultingly upon the broad regions of the Divine promises, fearing nothing, hoping

all things, secure of life, confident of immortal bliss. Reason offers no rest to the weary, but annihilation—no refuge for the storm-driven, no hiding-place for the troubled soul, but the grave as a place of eternal sleep. Alas for him who trusts it! it can not make that poor offer good. It can not bind the soul in the grave so as to detain it there. Faith carries the soul and lays it upon the bosom of God, in whose paternal smile it abides in peace and joy forever.

ART. II.—*The Covenants of Scripture.*

It has pleased God, in all his dealings with men, to operate through a system of agencies called covenants. Of these, the number is sufficiently large to utterly perplex the generality of readers, while those who devote more especial attention to such things, and whose business it is to understand and expound the word of God, frequently have but a confused perception of them, failing rightly to discriminate between the several ones, and also to reduce them all to a system that is compact and clear. Wherever the Scriptures seem to be confused and without system, we may rely upon it that we have failed to comprehend them, either through lack of attention, meekness and spiritual insight, or else we have applied to them wrong principles, and with a conceit bordering on presumption, in striving to adapt them thereto, wrest and do violence to those living oracles. He who would interpret God's word to men, must stand with the rod of God in his hand, do reverently, and sanctify him before the people. All parts of God's word have been handled deceitfully, all parts of it have been misunderstood, and what with the deceitfulness of our own hearts, and the malignity of the evil one, there has been so much misrepresentation and misunderstanding, that those who love the Lord have always gladly welcomed, and been edified with every repeated

attempt of any of his servants to make a statement of what he teaches us, and to eviscerate untruth. The Lord has always set himself forth as a covenant-keeping God. In this his honor is concerned. Untruth, instead of being content with deluding souls, must also cast indignity upon him, by showing him false to his own engagements, or denying that he has so bound himself, in the face of his own repeated asseverations to the contrary. Every untruth strikes at some covenant or other; as Pelagianism at the covenant of works, Arminianism at the covenant of redemption, Antipædobaptism at the Abrahamic, and Rationalism at the Gospel covenant. The influence of these errors does not end with the obliteration of the single covenant to which each one is immediately opposed, but by necessary consequence invalidates the others also.

The truth of God unto salvation is a perfect and well-compacted scheme, made up of parts, every one of which is absolutely essential to the whole. It is impossible either to modify or take away one of these parts, or introduce a foreign one, without vitiating the whole. As in chemistry, as change in the proportions of the same elements, much less the taking away of some or the introduction of others, makes an entirely different compound, so in the truth of God, the slightest error vitiates the whole, providing it be logically followed out to its legitimate result. And the only reason why the souls of all persons who hold to any error are not lost, is that they are bad reasoners, and their hearts are stronger than their heads. We do not hesitate in the face of all mankind to declare, that any departure, however slight from God's truth, or any perversion or dilution of it, or any introduction of anything foreign into it, will, if followed out, and the process be carried far enough, end at the last in the total rejection of everything that he has revealed to us; in the denial of his being; of our own existence, and of all things whatsoever. Of course, it is only with the fewest and most radical errors that the human mind is able unerringly to follow this process. But who will deny that

to the infinite intuition of God, or even to the reasonings of higher intelligences, this is not true of every error, however slight? We have sometimes thought that a very profitable book might be written, by taking up the five points of Calvinism, and showing that this is true concerning every one of them. There is certainly no better way to test the truth of any doctrine than to run it out in all its bearings, in all possible aspects, upon every shade and phase, of other truth that is certainly known. The human mind has a wonderful *penchant* for what does not immediately concern it, or what concerns it as little as possible; perhaps it might gratify its taste for speculations and refinings, so as to render its work not altogether useless, by indulging in the manner just indicated.

The fact that all error modifies or denies some one or more of the covenants, renders a distinct statement of them necessary. The fact that all God's dealings with men is through covenants, is a fact which must strike every attentive reader of the Scriptures. When this is examined into, it is discovered that every succeeding one is an advance upon what precedes; that each advance is so distinctly marked from both what precedes and follows, as to possess a kind of unity and be unique, or, in other words, to be a separate dispensation. These dispensations, we all know, are successive manifestations of the plan of redemption. Having observed all this, reason itself would lead us, even if the Scriptures were silent upon the subject, to infer that the whole plan is itself a covenant. There is always some reason revealed or unrevealed, existing either in our own condition or the nature of God, to account for all of his acts concerning us. If we inquire why he should save us by a system of covenants, obvious reasons appear. These are, unbelief in us, and faithfulness in God. Unbelief is the great sin of the unregenerate heart, just as faith is the great grace of the renewed heart; and faithfulness is the great characteristic of the true God, just as faithlessness and deception is of all false gods. That the Lord is a covenant-keeping God is a

truth most precious to the Christian heart, and a fact in which he especially glories. As unbelief and distrust of him are chief obstacles to be overcome in our salvation, the Lord adopts the means best adapted to have this result, and that is by solemn covenant. To all of these he has shown himself faithful, and he fearlessly challenges all nations and tribes of men, in every age, to produce a single instance of a soul that hath trusted him and been put to confusion. The great and mighty God hath most graciously condescended to obligate himself to man, and he appeals to our unbelief, and asks us to trust him far enough to test him. The soul that puts his trust in Christ leans upon the mediator of the eternal covenant. His death is not only sacrificial but covenantal, the slain lamb betwixt whose dis severed portions the parties to the covenant walk. His people perform this action when they are baptized into his death. The covenant secures everything to us; there is not a promise that we can plead, or a spiritual gift that we can ask, but lo! his sacred honor is pledged to grant it infinitely beyond our most consuming longings. Why is it that, after so many ages of faithfulness and high and noble dealing, we still distrust him? And is it not a matter of profound thanksgiving, that he has not long since cast us off, and refused to plead with a faithless, a perverse and a gainsaying generation? And should we not hasten to abase ourselves in the dust before him, and offer him the ready homage of our spirits, and the sacrifice of our lives?

The reasons already given are perhaps enough to satisfy us why God, in dealing with sinners, should always do it by covenant. If, however, we advance a step further, and seek to know why, in dealing with sinless man, he adopted the same plan, we find ourselves on the confines of a great mystery, and should tread reverently and cautiously, and seek not with unholy vision to penetrate the vail which the wand of Omnipotence hath not raised. The covenant of works is of this description. Unfallen man could not distrust his Maker, and he in turn need not resort to this to persuade

man of his faithfulness. But we must here pause, for whatever there might be in the very nature of things to account for it, and however forward a fruitful conjecture might be in assigning reasons, we must be content with two statements: *firstly, so far as we can see*, it would have been impossible to convey the benefit proposed in another way. It was necessary for Adam to be the *federal* as well as the natural head of the race, in order for them to be benefited by his obedience, or to inherit by a natural descent the estate, whatever it might be, into which he himself might be brought by his covenant relation with God, or to go back of this, that he should himself enter into that estate on a given condition; and *secondly*, the eminent wise God always does the best thing, in the best possible way, and though he may not reveal his reasons, yet they are good and sufficient; that they are not revealed argues that they would be inscrutable to us, or that to know them would not benefit us.

God entered into a covenant of life with sinless man, on condition of perfect obedience. We can not suppose that by this covenant a merciful and wise God would have increased the hazard of man's condition. By this covenant he was placed on a probation; but a probation is hazardous; he was, therefore, on a probation before. We can not conceive of a holy and merciful God entering into a new dispensation with an innocent and perfect being, that would not be to better his condition. If now man was on a probation, both before and after the covenant of works, the bettering of his condition must consist in the latter probation being a more merciful one than the former. It is more merciful in this, that it limits the probation as to time, places it within a specified period; and that instead of standing for himself only, he stands for himself and all his natural descendants. It may be replied that this would have been true if he had not fallen; but inasmuch as he fell, it was a calamity instead of a blessing that the race was represented in him. To this the reply is obvious, that if as far as the terms of the covenant itself are concerned the objection lies, God had it in mind

by another covenant, upon the failure of this one, to redeem unto himself a people. There are, in all probability, more redeemed by the covenant of grace than would have kept the first covenant, if they had all stood for themselves. For the truth of this, what we know concerning the angels, fallen and unfallen, affords a strong presumption. There is this advantage also, those who are redeemed attain an infinitely higher happiness than they would if they had kept the first covenant and stood by their own righteousness, to say nothing of the revelation of the Trinity, and many of God's most adorable attributes, of which we could then have known nothing. We have just said, that probably more are saved by the covenant of redemption than would have stood by the covenant of works; but it is an exceedingly charitable supposition to grant that any would have stood at all; for if the representative man of the race failed with a limited probation, under probably the first temptation, how is it possible for any considerable number, or any at all of his descendants, the vast majority of whom must be inferior to himself, to stand in an unlimited probation, and under innumerable temptations? This argument is very ably put in the writings of an eminent living theologian, whom every one at all conversant with the subject will immediately recognize.

If the covenant of works had attained its end, none other had been necessary; but inasmuch as it was broken, the end must be abandoned or sought by another covenant. This and infinitely more is accomplished through the covenant of redemption. This last embraces all that God has done, or will do, for man's salvation; it is the complete plan, from its inception in the eternity past, to its consummation in the eternity to come. It is called a covenant because it was entered into between the three persons of the Trinity, each taking upon himself his peculiar office-work. Inasmuch as it contemplates nothing less than the entire completion of the whole work, it of course embraces whatever subsidiary agencies may be employed to bring about that end. Inasmuch, therefore, as God made many covenants with men in

the successive stages of the plan, they are all of them but outgrowths of the covenant of redemption; nothing more or less than agencies employed to carry out its provisions. The covenant of works is the solitary exception to this rule. The only relation which it bears to the rest is, that the *breach* of it is the occasion of the existence of the covenant of redemption, and consequently of the other covenants. The object of the covenant of redemption is the salvation of sinners; there are no sinners capable of salvation except those who perish by a covenant. The covenant of works was, therefore, a merciful provision, even when broken; for if we perish at all it is infinitely better for us that we so perish that we may be delivered. We perish by a covenanted and natural head; we are restored by a covenanted and supernatural head. We descend from the one by a natural generation, and are born of the flesh. We descend from the other by a supernatural generation, and are born of the spirit. In the covenant of redemption our supernatural head stands for us, and in the counsels of eternity secures from the other persons of the Trinity, and engages himself to perform whatever is necessary for our salvation. In the actual outworking of the plan, minor ends are secured by minor covenants, all looking to the same final issue, though each immediately accomplishing something different. For instance, the objects of the Jewish and Christian œconomys were ultimately the same—the salvation of souls; yet immediately how different! The one restricted, cumbrous, and ceremonial; the other free, simple, and spiritual; the one the *old* covenant, the other the *new*; yet both of them executive provisions of the one eternal covenant of redemption; the latter a more recent, a fuller, and a more spiritual development of it. This covenant is known by two names in theology, which are taken respectively from the *character* of it, and the *end* of it. From the character of it, it is called the *covenant of grace*, because it itself, and all of its provisions toward man, are gracious; from the end of it, which is the redemption of man, it is called the *covenant of redemption*.

We have just seen that the whole plan of salvation, in its widest and most general scope, is a covenant; that the occasion of any salvation at all was a broken covenant; it remains now to be shown that this same plan, in its narrowest and most direct application, to wit, the salvation of the individual soul, is in like manner a covenant; and that in every phase of it, between these two extremes, wherein any part of it is conceived as a whole, or as separate and distinct from other parts, so as to be denominated a dispensation, that part or dispensation is in like manner a covenant. Between the covenant of the individual soul with God, and the whole conception of the plan arising in the exhaustless past, infolding the present in its embrace, and culminating amid the fruition of the world to come, these aspects of it appear: There are first two great divisions, from Adam to Abraham, or the Church without a visible organization separate from the world, constituting the patriarchal covenant; and the period from Abraham to the end, wherein the Church is organized and separate from the world, constituting the Abrahamic covenant. Both of these, and especially the latter, are supplemented by other and subsidiary and executive covenants, to be hereafter explained. Through the whole of these periods, amid changing covenants and expiring dispensations, remains steadfast and indispensable to every one of them, the covenant of the individual soul with God. This is the center of the circle, as the covenant of redemption is its circumference and frame; the changing dispensations and evanishing lesser covenants are the sections that appear and disappear in its mighty revolution; and Jesus Christ is the eternal mediator of them all. This covenant of the individual soul with God, we venture to designate specifically as the *Covenant of Faith*. Faith is the law of the life upon which every individual soul—so far as we have certain knowledge—enters and remains whilst in the flesh. The first act of faith is this covenant. In it, we trust the Lord; intrust ourselves to him, renounce this world, and engage to be his. In it, the Lord perils all his

honor, and unhesitatingly stakes it, forever to be unto us a God and Saviour. The terms are unconditional on both sides, there is no reservation whatever, there is absolutely no appeal from it, it can consequently be abrogated only by the consent of both parties; and though we ourselves may change, and break covenant with him, yet he will not on this account forsake us. We would fall away every moment of time if it were not for his grace sustaining us. If we do fall, it is because sufficient grace is not given; but the promise to all his children is that his grace shall be sufficient for them. He hath sworn that he will not deliver us into the hand of the spoiler, and that we shall never be moved. In the brief compass of nine words he has given us a threefold assurance—*Οὐ μὴ σε ἀνῷ οὐδ' οὐ μὴ σε εγκαταλίπω*—I will never leave thee nor forsake thee. A solemnity should be upon our spirits whenever we treat of the great doctrines of the cross, and particularly those in which the honor of the Most High is concerned; and we should be careful not to lightly handle, and above all to question, the truth of any doctrine in such a manner as to charge covenant-breaking upon the dreadful God. We should also search our own hearts, and be watchful to depart from all iniquity; for in the case of every sin against light and knowledge, we incur not only the guilt of the transgression itself, but add thereto the heinous and dishonorable crime of covenant-breaking.

It is not our purpose to do more concerning the patriarchal covenant than to indicate its general posture in relation to the other covenants; and whatever may now be said must be considered rather in the light of hints, to indicate the course of future investigation, than as well-established doctrine upon the subject; and instead of now treating it fully, this topic will form the subject for a future article, either by the writer of this, or by an abler and more experienced hand. What we have now to say is, that the dispensation from Adam to Abraham seems to us, as far as our present investigation has led us, to be a covenant. We are aware that it is common to divide this period and make two

of it—from Adam to Noah, and from Noah to Abraham. The differences between these two sections of the period do not seem strong enough to invalidate the unity of the whole, and may exist in perfect conformity with that idea. Reasoning from analogy, as has already been indicated, and will presently be seen, every dispensation except this is a covenant, it would seem strange that the initial one of them all should differ in so essential a characteristic from every one of its successors. The very idea of a covenant, however, seems to necessitate two contracting parties—one of them seems to be wanting here. We might, however, with strict propriety, inasmuch as the Scripture usage of the term covers both ideas, make this a testament; against this, the objection just mentioned would not lie. A *covenant*, as we understand it, is a compact, necessitating two or more parties; a *testament* is a *bequeathment*, necessitating but one. The Scriptures, however, call a testament a covenant, so that, with this understanding, the patriarchal dispensation is a covenant still. The Church, under this dispensation, was visible as far as its ordinances made it so; but it had not yet received an organized outward form separate and distinct from the world. This characteristic pervades the entire period, from Adam to Abraham, and is the reason why we have made it one dispensation instead of two. This idea enables us to grasp more definitely the conception of the Church in all time. It is divided into two great periods, without a visible organization, and with it. When it was without the organization, it was feeble and struggling, on the point continually of being extinguished amid the surrounding darkness. After the lapse of ages it was found embracing only eight persons, and confined to a single household. The wickedness of man was great upon the earth, why continue other ages of like effort with like result? It is not in the plans of Omnipotence to do so. The world must be destroyed. The flood came, other ages rolled away, the world has again apostatized from God, and the Church is again found within a single family; must the world again

be destroyed? God never repeats himself in providence. Instead of destroying the world, he will separate his people from it. This is done in Abraham. The Church attains its visible organization; at the first exceedingly impure in comparison with what follows; it is as the weak and beggarly elements of the world. Every succeeding minor dispensation makes it purer and purer, and wider and wider, until, at last, every one shall know the Lord, from the least unto the greatest, and the knowledge of him shall cover the earth as the waters do the great deep!

The Noahic Covenant differs from all others, in that it was not made with the Church of the living God, but with the whole race, from the time it was given to the end of the world; that it did not constitute a separate dispensation, but arising in the bosom of one dispensation, it reaches through all others till time shall end; and that the object of it is not directly the redemption of man or anything spiritual, but temporal blessings only. This might at the first seem to be an exception to the principle, that all covenants except that of works are simply executive of the covenant of redemption; but this would give us a very limited and imperfect view of the work of Christ. He not only makes an atonement for the sins of his people, but he does more. The objections principally made by Arminians against the Calvinistic system, rest chiefly on this misconception. And he who would defend the system against the attacks of errorists, while holding to any such distorted conception of it, will find himself hopelessly worsted and beaten from the field of argument. The passages of Scripture are numerous which teach that the Lord Jesus Christ died for every human being. He tasted death for every man. As in Adam all die, so in Christ are all made alive. He who attempts to explain away Scriptures as plain as that large class, of which the foregoing express the sentiment, brings himself into ridicule, and the system he defends into contempt. So far as redemption is concerned, our blessed Lord took on him only the seed of Abraham; but, in assuming that seed, he took upon

him the nature of that seed, to wit, humanity; by a necessary consequence, humanity is benefited just so far as he assumed it. In addition to his connection with the seed of Abraham, through a common nature, he possesses a union with them—not hypothetical and by a legal fiction—but *real*, of which faith is in them the expression, which union is, as far as he is concerned, a headship and brotherhood, which is to the Father a sonship, and to the Holy Ghost, sanctity. This union secures to the seed of Abraham redemption; while his connection with the whole race, being only that of a common nature, the benefits resulting to them do not amount to salvation, but include only the blessings of this life, and the resurrection from the dead.

The Lord Jesus, in his union with humanity, did not take upon himself a human person, but humanity; he took upon him all the elements of a human person, but not the person. These elements have no union with one another, primarily, but secondarily; that is, they are all of them united to his divinity, and in this manner are united to one another. Hence, when in his death his divinity was separated from his humanity, the elements of it fell asunder, the compound personality God-man was dissolved, and the Lord Jesus died. It was not his humanity that died, but *himself*, the compound person, the God-man. He who says that he did not die, takes away the hope of the righteous; bars the gate of heaven; opens wider the yawning mouth of the bottomless pit; dethrones the mediator; and exalts the god of this world to his matchless empire. Of all his titles, that one which the Saviour most frequently applies to himself, is the *Son of Man*; that is, not son of any particular man, or family, or lineage of men, but *man*, humanity. He has no kinsmen according to the flesh, as we have, for he had not a human person. The only kinship which he recognizes, in addition to this one, is the kinship of faith, or the spiritual seed of Abraham. Matt. xii: 44–50. While he yet talked to the people, behold, his mother and his brethren stood without, desiring to speak with him. Then one said unto

him, Behold, thy mother and thy brethren stand without, desiring to speak with thee. But he answered and said unto him that told him, Who is my mother? and who are my brethren? And he stretched forth his hand toward his disciples, and said, Behold, my mother and my brethren! For whosoever shall do the will of my Father which is in heaven, the same is my brother, and sister, and mother,

Inasmuch as the connection of our Saviour with the race of man which we have just explained, was incidental, and auxiliary to his higher connection with the seed of Abraham, or the elect, so, in the covenant of redemption, the resurrection of the whole race, and the ordinary blessings of this life upon all mankind, are incidental, and auxiliary to the higher blessing, the salvation of the elect. And as the covenant of redemption embraces the latter as its chief end, it in like manner embraces the former, on the principle, that to secure an end, we must secure all the means to that end. And inasmuch as we have said that all covenants subsequent to that of works, are but executive provisions of the covenant of redemption, so, the Noahic covenant, in that it secures to the race many natural and incidental blessings, is one of those executive provisions. We arrive, therefore, at the doctrine, that all mercies to the righteous and the wicked are covenanted mercies, and are the purchase of Christ's blood. This idea is set forth in the Jewish sacrifice of the *peace offering*. This was not to atone for sin, but was a thank offering expressive of the worshiper's gratitude for mercies received or implored; and yet the priest made an atonement with the blood. What could this mean, but that the mercies, for which he expressed his gratitude, were the purchase of the blood of the great sacrifice that was to come? It is upon this idea of the covenant of redemption that we make the Noahic covenant an executive provision of it.

There are three great periods in the Church's history, so far as relates to her visible organization—the Church mingled with the world; the Church separate from the world; the Church triumphant over the world. In the first, the

patriarchal was the only form of government for Church and State; in the second, under different forms, there is the distinction in government between the nation that is God's, a holy nation, a peculiar people, and the nations of this world. In the third, the nations of this earth shall entirely disappear, and the great fifth empire shall be established, the kingdom of the *Son of Man* shall be the only kingdom. The stone cut out of the mountain without hands, shall have smitten all other kingdoms, and broken them to dust, and driven them away as the chaff of the summer threshing-floor. The first is the period of the patriarchal covenant; the second, of the Abrahamic; and the third, of her millennial glory. There is great diversity in the unity of the second of these, but the essential features are the same throughout. As the whole three periods are a progress, the one upon the other, so is this period within itself; that is, it is divided into sub-periods, each of which is an advance upon the other; as from Abraham to the exodus, from the exodus to Christ, from Christ to the millennium. As the Abrahamic covenant covers the whole period from Abraham to the millennium, all the covenants which are found included in this period are simply executive provisions of it; just as it, with those preceding, are of the covenant of redemption. The seal of this covenant is circumcision, *now* as at the first. Baptism comes in the place of circumcision in several respects, but not in the sense that it is the seal of the Abrahamic covenant. Circumcision is the seal of that, while baptism is the seal of another covenant, as will be presently shown. And instead of this being fatal to the doctrine of infant baptism, we think we can show that it is the only tenable ground on which to advocate it. It would seem to an unsophisticated mind, that the reliability and perpetuity of a covenant would depend upon the inviolability of its seal. Neither can we understand why, if the covenant itself be not changed, there should be any propriety in changing the seal; nor can we understand how two parties to a solemn compact having set to a given seal, one of them should afterward

without consulting the other, change it; nor what validity there would be in it when thus changed. But we will treat of this again, in its appropriate place.

The Abrahamic covenant when first given was manifold; it consisted of divers articles or stipulations, and we apprehend that none can gainsay but that it is so still. To the one covenant, embracing all these stipulations as a unit, was the seal of circumcision placed. He who received the mark of circumcision in his flesh, did not by that act receive all the stipulations of the whole covenant, but only such as applied to his condition. The promise was to Abraham and his seed, and yet many who were not his seed received circumcision. When given to Ishmael, or to the sons of Keturah, or to the servants of the household, or to the incorporated stranger, it meant a different thing in each case, and then all of these again differed vastly from the case of Isaac. It is not the whole covenant that we have explicated as covering the immense period of time just mentioned, but that single article or stipulation of it which was applied to Isaac and Jacob. It is not the God of Abraham that is in covenant with us, but *the God of Abraham, of Isaac, and of Jacob!* This is the branch of the covenant that constitutes the visible church. Neither Ishmael, nor Midian, nor Eliezer were made members of the visible Church by their circumcision if they did not cast in their lot with Isaac. The Lord blessed Ishmael, but established his covenant with Isaac. The limitation did not stop here. Of Isaac's sons, the Lord loved Jacob and hated Esau, and he cast out Esau and established his covenant with Jacob. Now, by this it is not to be for a moment supposed that there was no covenant at all with Ishmael and Esau, but that *par excellence*, that portion of it which was of the most importance was established with Isaac. We have indeed the words of the Lord himself to the contrary, wherein he calls circumcision itself the covenant. Gen. xvii: 10: "This is my covenant, which ye shall keep between me and you, and thy seed after thee; every man child among you shall be circumcised." Whether or not

the other provisions of the covenant, and particularly those promises under it to Ishmael and Esau, are yet fulfilled or not, is a question which will be answered affirmatively or negatively according as the notions of people differ about the interpretation of prophecy. "Ishmael shall be a wild man, warred upon and warring; nevertheless he shall dwell in the presence of his brethren, a fruitful and great nation. The fatness of the earth and the dew of heaven shall be Esau's habitation; by his sword shall he live and serve his brother, but his brother's yoke shall he break from his neck when the time shall come that he shall have the dominion." Whether or not these wonderful promises have yet been fulfilled, can scarcely be doubtful to the mind of him who looks for a great and gracious fullness in every promise of God. To us it seems there is a glorious future for the dweller in the desert and the inhabitant of the rock. "Let the wilderness and the cities thereof lift up their voice, the villages that Kedar doth inhabit: let the inhabitants of the rock sing, let them shout from the top of the mountains." Isa. xlii: 11. The promise that is given them, half blessing, half curse—have they not endured the curse already, in the long ages of wandering, of servitude and of war? And shall not their blessing, when it comes, be as full as their curse has been? "Yea, upon the rocks that Edom doth inhabit shall be reared sanctuaries of the living God, and the desert shall find a voice of praise in the mouth of its wandering sons."

When the Lord took his people by the hand to bring them out of the land of Egypt, he made with them a covenant. The words of this covenant he spake to them from the holy mount. In the midst of thunderings and lightnings, the quaking of the mountain, the smoke and fire, and the voice of the trumpet exceeding loud, the God of Israel descended. The people beholding, feared greatly and stood afar off, trembling. The mighty preparation having ceased, and awful silence ensuing, the voice of God, terrible in majesty, spake in the hearing of all the people the words of this

covenant. With the dread of the Most High upon them, the people solemnly ratified it. Ex. xxiv: 3-11. This covenant was the first one under the Abrahamic. The simple specifications of the original covenant had sufficed hitherto. The household of Abraham widened into a family under Jacob, under Jacob's sons, a mighty clan; but they were not yet a great nation, they needed not a national covenant as yet. In Egypt they became a nation in numbers, but not in privileges. Such a covenant was not yet necessary to them. But when God led them forth, and gave them freedom, he must also give them the laws, customs, and fabric of a nation. They are still his people, in covenant with him, the descendants of Abraham, in the line of Isaac and Jacob. Whatever institutions he may give them must be in the spirit and line of the covenant he made with their fathers. These institutions he gives them in the form of a covenant, which does not supersede the one made with their fathers, but naturally grows out of it. It is a natural branch of the olive tree, and not another tree. This covenant embraced whatever was peculiar to the Levitical economy, or Mosaic dispensation, or Jewish Church. The Theocracy and State Church, all that was fuller than what preceded, and different from what followed, was embraced in it. It was the fulfillment of that promise of the original covenant, which said, I will make of thee a great nation. The fulfillment of that other promise, In thee shall all the families of the earth be blessed, was reserved for a subsequent covenant. This covenant they brake. When the *Son of Man* gave up the ghost, and the vail of the Temple was rent from the top to the bottom, then this covenant was annulled, and the God of Israel departed from his throne upon the mercy-seat, between the cherubim. It is a remarkable fact, which no one seems to have noticed, that in the writings of the captivity, while this covenant was in abeyance, the Lord is seldom, if ever, called God of Israel, but *God of Heaven*. The God of Israel was the local sovereign of the country, according to the provisions of the Sinaitic covenant. This

was the constitution of the Jewish State. When, therefore, they no longer existed as a State, God was no longer their sovereign, or the God of Israel. The breaking up and passing away of this covenant did not affect the Abrahamic. The branch was torn from the tree, but the tree remained. Gal. iii: 17. And this I say, that the covenant that was confirmed before of God in Christ, the law, which was four hundred and thirty years after, can not disannul, that it should make the promise of none effect.

The stream widens as it flows downward in the course of time. All nations (that is, the heathen) must now be brought into the covenant. The promise was from the beginning that they should be embraced in it, but a special enactment had never been made to bring them in. The affairs of the covenant have now become so immense that special legislation, in the form of minor covenants, must be entered into to carry out its original provisions. In the case of the Gentiles this is done in the Gospel, or new covenant, through Jesus Christ. In the case of the Jewish nation, their special act was repealed; therefore, although not really cast out of the original covenant, they are virtually so. It is held in abeyance, and they are now in it only by promise, as the Gentiles were formerly in it only by promise. Formerly a Gentile could belong to the Church of the living God only by ceasing to be a Gentile and becoming a Jew; now, a Jew can be a member of the Church of the living God, only by ceasing to be a Jew, and becoming a Gentile. A Gentile, though embraced in the covenant by promise, yet, having no minor covenant of his own to bring him in, must conform to the Sinaitic covenant. So, now, the Sinaitic covenant being repealed, the Jew, who is in it, by promise, in order to enjoy its blessings must avail himself of the Gospel covenant, and become a member of the *Gentile Church*. And this must remain so, until God shall graft them in again; that is, make a new covenant with them, which he has promised to do.

The sacrament of baptism is the seal of the *Gospel* or *New Covenant*, but its position in the Abrahamic is peculiar. The

Gospel covenant does not supersede the Abrahamic, but the Sinaitic. Hence baptism does not supersede circumcision as the seal of the Abrahamic covenant, but only as a *carnal ordinance*. In so far as circumcision emblemized the work of God upon the heart, it is superseded by baptism; and in this regard baptism is called Christ's circumcision (Col. ii: 11), and may be said to come in the place of circumcision. We come into the Abrahamic covenant, *not by circumcision, but by Christ*. We are united to him by a living faith, so far as it is outward, by baptism. The circumcision is eternal in him, and we are circumcised in him. When asked, therefore, for the seal of the covenant, we point to baptism; if we are questioned further, we point to Christ, saying that baptism is the seal of his covenant with us, and that by it we are one with him (that is outwardly and ceremonially), that he is Abraham's seed, having the circumcision in his flesh. The Apostle Paul says, If ye be Christ's, then are ye Abraham's seed, and heirs according to the promise. If we are faithful, then are we the children of faithful Abraham. But faith does not unite us to Abraham, but to Christ, and he unites us to Abraham. While circumcision will remain forever the seal of the Abrahamic covenant, it will never be again practised, even when the Jews shall be brought back, having become eternal in the flesh of the *Son of Man*. Just as sacrifices, though they will always be necessary for sin, will never again be offered, having been once offered forever, in the person of the Messiah.

It may be well here to remark, though out of its proper connection, that although sacrifices ceased synchronously with the Sinaitic covenant, they did not cease because it did. It did not create them; it found them, and embraced them. They ceased because the great sacrifice that they prefigured had come, and for no other reason. When the substance came the shadow was done away.

It may be well here also to anticipate an objection which may be urged; that the above course of reasoning makes Christ inferior to Abraham. The answer is, that the Abra-

hamic covenant is an external organization; spiritually, Christ does not bring us to Abram; that Abraham himself must be found in Christ, or he will not be saved. And, finally, it is no more degrading for us to be Abraham's children, by virtue of our union to Christ, than it is for Christ himself to be Abraham's child, which the Scriptures confessedly teach him to be; and if the Scriptures shame not to say, "If ye be Christ's, then are ye Abraham's seed," it is certainly not wrong in us to endeavor to enforce the truth of this very observation upon our fellow men.

There remains now but one covenant to be explained, the covenant with Israel and Judah. This is still future, and the prediction concerning it is found in Jer. xxxi: 31-34. Behold the days come, saith the Lord, that I will make a new covenant with the house of Israel, and with the house of Judah: Not according to the covenant that I made with their fathers, in the day that I took them by the hand to bring them out of the land of Egypt; which my covenant they break, although I was an husband unto them, saith the Lord: But this shall be the covenant that I will make with the house of Israel after those days, saith the Lord; I will put my law in their inward parts, and write it in their hearts; and will be their God, and they shall be my people. And they shall teach no more every man his neighbor, and every man his brother, saying, Know the Lord: for they shall all know me, from the least of them unto the greatest of them, saith the Lord: for I will forgive their iniquity, and I will remember their sin no more. We are perfectly aware that this has invariably been interpreted of the present Gospel dispensation and applied to the Gentiles. Our reasons for differing from this belief, rest upon the general basis of that system of interpretation, which refuses to spiritualize and explain away that large class of Scriptures which promise future blessings to God's ancient people. It is not our purpose to meddle with this general argument farther than is necessary to set forth our conception of this covenant. When the Sinaitic covenant was abolished, the Jews, being the natural

branches of the olive tree, were broken off. In their stead, the Gentiles which were of the wild olive tree, were grafted in; if God be able to graft in the branch of the wild olive tree, how much more will he graft in again the natural branches. Rom. xi: 24-27. For if thou wert cut out of the olive-tree, which is wild by nature, and wert grafted contrary to nature into a good olive tree; how much more shall these, which be the natural branches, be grafted into their own olive tree? For I would not, brethren, that ye should be ignorant of this mystery, lest ye should be wise in your own conceits, that blindness in part is happened to Israel, *until the fullness of the Gentiles be come in.* And so all Israel shall be saved; as it is written, There shall come out of Zion the Deliverer, and shall turn away ungodliness from Jacob: *For this is my covenant unto them,* when I shall take away their sins! Not only shall the Jews return again to the Church of the living God, but they shall return by covenant. Their sin shall be forgiven them. The blood of the crucified shall no longer rest upon their heads to make them an astonishment and a by-word; but it shall be applied to their hearts to cleanse them, and give them equal rights in the kingdom with those who are the children of Abraham by faith. The Lord shall put his law in their inward parts and write it on their hearts; that is, it shall be an outpouring of the spirit of the living God upon them. It shall be unto them what the present Gospel dispensation is to us. They shall be brought back, not by a fleshly generation, as they were under the Sinaitic covenant, but by a spiritual generation in Jesus Christ. As we stand by the Gospel covenant, so shall they stand by the covenant with Israel and Judah.

The two are the counterpart of each other: Instead of carnal ordinances, spirituality; Jesus Christ the mediator of both, and the connecting link between both and the Abrahamic covenant, the provisions of which they both carry out; both of them are under the one reign of the spirit, the one the beginning, and the other the completion of it. Hence both of them are sometimes taken largely for one and the

same covenant, and are called the *New covenant*. In the eighth chapter of Hebrews, the apostle gives an explication of them in this sense: They are both equally opposed to the Sinaitic covenant, in their spirit and structure, and both equally succeed it.

In the ancient Jewish harvest there were two feasts, Pentecost and Tabernacles—the feast of first fruits and of ingathering; the one at the beginning of the harvest, and the other at the end; the latter one was peculiarly a feast of joy. The annual feast of pentecost was notoriously typical of the great day of pentecost, when Peter preached, three thousand souls were converted, and the Christian Church established; just as the annual feast of the passover was typical of the great passover to come. There was first the slaying of the lamb, then the eating. The Lamb was slain on Calvary, his people have fed on him by faith ever since, expressive of which they have the supper of the Lord. The death of Jesus is the passover; the continual observance of the supper he instituted is the feast connected with it. The great passover day has been kept; there was the Lamb slain from the foundation of the world, the Sun of Righteousness set in blood, his creature sun could not behold the sight, nature hid her face in darkness, the earth tore her desecrated bosom and cast out her dead, the car of Jehovah dreadfully departed from between the cherubim, leaving the vail of the temple rent and open behind it, disclosing no longer a holy place. Ever since that day his people have feasted upon him by faith, in gladness and singleness of heart.

The great harvest of the world is now come, and we are in its midst. On that memorable day, when our Saviour discoursed with the woman of Samaria, he said unto his disciples, behold, I say unto you, Lift up your eyes, and look on the fields; for they are white already to harvest. And he that reapeth receiveth wages, and gathereth fruit unto life eternal; that both he that soweth and he that reapeth may rejoice together. And herein is that saying true, One soweth, and another reapeth; I sent ye to reap that whereon ye

bestowed no labor; Other men labored, and ye are entered into their labor. Patriarchs, prophets and martyrs, labored in all past time; they sowed, but they reaped not; the apostles of the Lord entered into their labors, and reaped that which they had sown; when they shall return laden with their sheaves, their rejoicing shall not be their own; when their feet shall stand upon the mountain slopes beyond the river, they shall strike hands in gladness with them of old time, and sower and reaper shall rejoice together. The very first effort of the apostles, after that they were endued with power from on high, exceeded in its results the lifetime labors of any who had gone before them. It was the first thrusting of the sickle into the harvest; it was the garnering of the first fruits from every nation under heaven; it was the great day of pentecost.

In the same sense the great day of tabernacles is yet to come. When the fullness of the Gentiles shall have come in, then shall the Jews return. Then shall the Spirit of God be poured out upon all flesh. If the first fruits were such a profusion, what must the ingathering be? It will be seen by reference to Jer. xxxi: 84, that this event immediately succeeds or occurs with the giving of this covenant. God's blessing upon the Jews, is therefore the completion and fullness of his blessing upon the Gentiles. The giving of the covenant with Judah and Israel, is the completion and fullness of the Gospel. As the feast of pentecost was held at the beginning of the harvest, so at its end, the feast of tabernacles, that great feast of joy shall be held by all the countless multitudes that shall constitute that wonderful ingathering.

When this shall have come to pass, then the Abrahamic covenant shall be fulfilled, and shall pass away; all the families of the earth shall have been blessed in Abraham. The separation of the Church from the world will cease, for the Church shall be triumphant over the world. The stone cut out of the mountain without hands shall have filled the whole earth.

ART. III.—*Imputation*.*

PART III.

IMPUTATION AND ORIGINAL SIN.

IN our *first* Essay the following facts were affirmed: 1. That the Reformed or Calvinistic Church has never attached any importance to the order in which the topics *guilt* and *corruption* are stated, in their relation to the doctrine of original sin, and of course never entertained the dogma that inherent corruption is consequent upon immediate imputation; and 2. That it never, in any such sense, admitted the distinction made by Dr. Hodge and Placæus in treating the subject; and 3. That the dogma of immediate imputation, as presented by Dr. Hodge, never was entertained by the Calvinistic Church, but is, on the contrary, a relic of the old exploded and rejected Supralapsarian scheme. In our *second* Essay, we have shown that this scheme is, in all its essential features, utterly irreconcilable with both the

* Published with some reference to the Tractates mentioned in the note at the beginning of Essay I, (see *Danville Review*, Sept., 1861, p. 390.) Through an oversight, we omitted to remark at an earlier stage of the discussion, that if we err in assuming the correctness of the universal impression that Dr. Hodge is the author of the three articles on Imputation, republished from the Princeton Review in vol. 1 of the Princeton Essays, and which he appears to us substantially to admit in the Princeton Review for April and October, 1860, (in his Remarks upon the views of Dr. Baird,) we shall correct the error on being apprized of it. Those essays have greatly enhanced the reputation of Dr. Hodge as a theological writer, and though universally ascribed to his pen, he has never publicly disowned them. A general and very indefinite statement on the subject, like that in his controversy with Dr. Park, can not be thus construed in view of the facts which appear so clearly to indicate the contrary; and there appears to be something very like disingenuousness in that whole statement. Dr. Park had abundant reason to ascribe to Dr. Hodge the four essays which he does ascribe to him; but if he were mistaken, why could not Dr. Hodge have plainly said so? and if he were not mistaken, why attempt, by inuendo, to convey the contrary impression? See pp. 626-628 of Dr. Hodge's "Essays and Reviews," containing his three essays in reply to Dr. Park; and compare the statements in those pages with those contained in the Bibliotheca Sacra for 1852, pp. 214-216.

spirit and the theology of Calvinism, and that consequently an intelligent and consistent reception of the Calvinistic system necessitates an utter repudiation of the fundamental principle of Supralapsarianism, not only in the abstract, but in its application likewise to the doctrines both of reprobation and imputation. But here we are met by the perpetually repeated asseveration of Dr. Hodge, that the doctrine of imputation, (that is, antecedent and immediate,) as explained and asserted by himself, is the doctrine of the Reformed Church, as announced in their acknowledged symbols of doctrine, and by the testimony of their leading divines. The issue raised by Dr. Hodge is, therefore, a very plain one, for the question involved therein is one of simple fact, and can be satisfactorily decided by adducing fairly and fully the testimony referred to. This we shall proceed to do, after a few preliminary remarks which are called for in the connection.

As to our own views of the subject, the rules of fair and honorable discussion require that they be stated, since neither Dr. Hodge, nor Dr. Thornwell, nor Dr. Baird, (with each of whom, it seems, the Reformed Church is so unfortunate as to disagree,) has shrunk from the free expression of the doctrine he entertains on the subject. The view we entertain has been elicited, though not fully, in the course of the discussion, and to prevent misapprehension it will be proper to express it more definitely; after which it will be in place to call attention to some of the specific statements of Dr. Hodge in relation to the whole subject, so that our readers, in approaching the testimony we are about to adduce, and in contemplating the long array of witnesses adduced by Dr. Hodge, may be able to do it with a clear perception of the actual and specific and not merely the general issues involved.

While, therefore, we deny utterly that any antecedent or immediate imputation of the *culpæ alienæ reus* can so constitute the guiltless or innocent creature involuntarily guilty as to render him morally corrupt, and so entitle him justly

to the desert of moral corruption, we affirm that there is a plain and radical difference between the doctrine which teaches that the guilt or sin of Adam was imputed to his posterity, and that which teaches that Adam's posterity were merely involved along with him in the calamities or consequences of the Fall.* The latter doctrine is wholly inconsistent with any just claim to Calvinistic soundness. And in order to place in their true light some of the unfounded imputations of Dr. Hodge against those who have ventured to dissent from his views, we further affirm that a person may be *justly punished* for sin of which he is personally not guilty, as in the case of our blessed Lord and Redeemer. In fact, the distinction observed in the typical sacrifices of the Old Testament between the *sin-offering* and the *guilt-offering*, (a fact very generally overlooked in the discussion of the subject,) clearly shadows forth the same idea. An offering was appointed for guilt, and another and different offering was appointed for sin.† The legal responsibility for sin may therefore rest where the moral corruption and guilt of the personal act do not rest; for otherwise such a distinction in these typical references to our Lord and Redeemer is inconceivable. And hence nothing can be more shallow than the common assumptions against the doctrine of imputation. Grotius, in relation to the satisfaction of Christ, truly says: "Non esse simpliciter injustum aut contra naturam pœnæ ut quis puniatur ab aliena peccata."‡ But these things are, on no account, to be associated with the aforesaid dogma, that an innocent or guiltless creature may be, by antecedent imputation, constituted morally corrupt, and so be made an heir of hell, as the punishment of another's sin, without any consent or concurrence of his own, and without any connection, by participation or otherwise, with that sin. And hence to adduce such considerations in support of that dogma is unfair and absurd.

* See this point illustrated by Weissmann, in his *Theological Institutions*, p. 425, and by Turretin, vol. 1, pp. 561, 562.

† This point is well illustrated in vol. II, pp. 212-216 of Dr. Müller's late work on Sin.

‡ De Satisfactione Christi, cap. 4, Opp. tom. IV, p. 312.

Adam of course *existed before God entered into covenant with him*. And, as this will not be denied, so it is equally certain, that he was the natural head of his posterity before he could possibly become their covenant head.* His natural headship, therefore, in the order of both nature and time, takes precedence of his covenant headship. Dr. Hodge must, as a matter of course, admit this; for he technically admits the twofold relation of Adam to his posterity. We say technically, because his doctrine logically ignores the natural headship in its almost universally conceded relation to the doctrine of original sin. These relationships, moreover, are not to be confounded with each other, for they are essentially distinct and different. The moral headship, however, implies the existence of the natural, necessarily; but not *vice versa*; for the natural headship might, by hypothesis, be supposed to exist without the federal; for it did exist before the federal existed. To ignore the natural headship of Adam, therefore, as antecedent imputation logically does, in explicating the doctrine of original sin (for it makes its transmission to be *neque per corpus, neque per animam, sed per imputationem*), is plainly as much an inversion of the true order of things, to say the very least, as it would be to ignore the federal headship in explicating that doctrine. In fact it is without any reason, as the circumstances of the case themselves evince. For had there been no covenant with Adam, he would yet have been the natural head of his posterity; and by virtue of this connection all who, by natural descent, should become partakers of his nature, must be partakers of that condition thereof into which he would have brought it, either by persistence in his integrity, or by transgressing the legal precept. Gen. ii: 17. The law is not to be confounded with the covenant, nor the covenant with the law. When God entered into covenant with Adam he was already a

* See this point stated with great precision and clearness in the first volume of Dr. Breckinridge's *Theology*, pp. 461-482; and handsomely defended by Dr. Thornwell, in his very able review of that work, in *Southern Presbyterian Review* for 1860, pp. 192-206.

subject of law. And the covenant containing the promise of still higher blessings than he already possessed, found him in this condition; and thus his moral or federal headship was, so to speak, superadded to his natural headship. By his transgression of the law he forfeited not only the continuance of his present blessings, which the law would have secured to him on obedience, but he violated his covenant likewise, and forfeited also all its promised blessings. The forfeiture of the covenanted mercies, therefore, was entirely consequent upon his transgression of the law under which he stood when he, as the natural head of his posterity, entered into the covenant relation. On what principle is it, therefore, that we should regard the simple forfeiture of these covenanted blessings as the basis on which to explicate the whole doctrine, which includes in the fullest manner all his natural and legal relations, or headship? and so, in effect, at least, to ignore these altogether. The covenant relation may, so to speak, arise out of the natural relation; but the natural can not, even by hypothesis, arise out of the covenant relation, and when Adam's existence began, then, of course, began the natural headship of his posterity. It is obvious, therefore, that if the distinction adopted as the basis of their theological explications, by both Placæus and Dr. Hodge, is to be made; and if the doctrine of original sin is to be explicated from the standpoint either of *mediate* or *immediate* imputation; instead of being explicated, as we insist it should be, on the ground of a full and equal recognition of both, it is incomparably more reasonable to explicate it from the natural and legal relationship of Adam to his posterity, than from that which is merely an adventitious arrangement; an arrangement which, whether made or not made, must, in the very nature of the case, leave the natural and legal relationship as it was, and wholly undisturbed. We hold, however, as already stated, that the distinction ought not to be made, as Dr. Hodge and Placæus make it, in treating the subject; that is, as representing Adam's personal sin alone as *causal* of the moral corruption of the race;

or this corruption as causal of the imputation of Adam's sin (neither of which expresses the doctrine of the apostle, or the views of the Reformed Church); but that the doctrine of original sin can be truly explicated only by recognizing the existence of both, and the influence of both in procuring the existing results to the race. In other words, the guilt was common; and therefore the imputation of the Adamic sin, and of our own subjective guilt, are to be viewed, not as cause and effect, as Dr. Hodge will have it, but that Adam's guilt, and our own guilt, are to be viewed as synchronically existing (as the principle of representation itself fully evinces, and as Paul most plainly declares); the imputation not being antecedent to, or causal of the guilt, but coetaneous therewith, and based upon the facts whose existence is clearly recognized and announced by God, Adam being both our natural and federal head, and we sinning in and falling with him. So that, to use the language of one of the most eminent of the Leyden divines, Walsæus, who was appointed by the Synod of Dort to draw up its canons, the guilt of the first sin, and our own inherent guilt, are connected, and beget a common guilt.*

We may illustrate this whole subject by adverting to the fact that Drs. Hodge and Placcæus, though agreeing to make the distinction aforesaid, are not only in antagonism to each other, but are both equally in antagonism to the Reformed Theology. The fact, moreover, is an interesting one, and has a direct bearing upon our general subject. The antecedent imputation against which Placcæus wrote, is defined by him to be "that imputation whereby the act of Adam in eating the forbidden fruit is truly and immediately charged upon his whole posterity, Christ alone being excepted; and on the ground that they are his posterity, this his act is, an-

* "Sed dicimus hæc duo esse connexa, et communem reatum gignere, qui peccatorem ad poenam ejusdem generis obligat: quia reatus primi peccati ad condemnationem non potest posteris imputari nisi mediante illâ peccati inhaerentis vitiositate." p. 151 of his Reply to the Censure of Corvinus (the Arminian) on Molinæus' *Anatomy of Arminianism*.

tedecently to inherent corruption, imputed for a twofold punishment properly so called, to wit, the privation of original righteousness, and eternal death." This is the dogma against which he wrote;* and, as remarked in our second Essay, his aim was to resist the approach of Supralapsarianism which was seeking to regain its position in the theology of the Church under the guise of a superior zeal for the doctrine of original sin. Walch, already referred to, as quoted by De Moor, expressly says, "Placcæus at first rejected the imputation of the Adamic sin; but after the Synod of Charenton, in 1645, condemned the sentiment, he, in 1655, *put forth a more distinct explication of his views*; and made a distinction between immediate and mediate imputation, *the former of which may depend from the will of God and*

* In referring to Placcæus, Dr. Hodge remarks, (Princeton Essays, vol. 1, p. 195,) that after the decision of the third Synod of Charenton against his views, he invented the distinction between immediate and mediate imputation. Now, the standing rule of the National Synods did not permit him to write again without leave; which having obtained some years afterwards, he, in 1655 published the work in which he makes this distinction, and expressly declares that the decision aforesaid of the Synod did not conflict with the views he entertained and inculcated. And our readers will please to observe, that at the very next national Synod, that of Loudon, in 1659-1660, (of which the celebrated John Daille was moderator,) which was likewise the next national Synod after that of Charenton in 1644-1645, the matter of the aforesaid decision in respect to Placcæus was reconsidered; whereupon the following act was passed: "On reading that article of the last national Synod concerning original sin, divers provinces *demanding with great importunity that the Assembly would be pleased to moderate it*; this decree was made: That for the future all Pastors and Proposans [Candidates] who should offer themselves to the holy ministry, *shall be only obliged to subscribe to the 10th and 11th articles of the Confession of Faith held by all the Reformed Churches of this kingdom*; and in the meanwhile all persons are forbidden to preach or print anything against the imputation mentioned by the said Synod in that article before named, nor shall anything more or less be changed in it." *To this article, as above stated, Placcæus expressly declares that he does not object.* Neither Turretin nor De Moor make any allusion to this last action: though without it, as every one can see, the representations which they make of Placcæus are partial and distorted, and of course unjust to the memory of a great and good man. The articles of the Confession (10th and 11th) referred to in this last action of the Synod, will be found in their place in our subsequent citations.

arbitrary law," etc. This last clause evinces that it was the direct aim of Placæus to oppose the encroachments of Supralapsarianism. Weissmann, however, in his History of the Church during the seventeenth century, explains precisely the *positive ground* which Placæus assumed, to-wit, that though he recognized both the moral and natural headship of Adam, HE PLACED THE NATURAL HEADSHIP BEFORE THE MORAL. *Ita ut non tam de re ipsa, quam de modo quæstio fuerit; hæcque tandem eo recidat, cum Adamus caput naturale et morale fuerit totius generis humani, quænam ex duobus his relationibus præcedat, atque alterius sit fundamentum? statuente Placæo, naturale præcedere morali, atque ideo imputari peccatum Adami posteris, quia in ipso quoad radicem et naturam fuerunt.*" Precisely here was the error of this truly great and learned divine; and precisely here, though in the opposite direction, is the error of Dr. Hodge; *for he*, in like manner, *places the moral relation before the natural.* The Reformed Theology, however, does not place either relation *before* the other; but regards both equally and synchronously in explicating the doctrine of original sin. The error of Placæus is that of the New England school; and if followed out must ignore the moral headship of Adam, and the imputation of his sin, and lead into Pelagianism; and the error of Dr. Hodge tends to a like ignoring of the natural headship of Adam, and of the great fact that we sinned in and fell with Adam in his first transgression; and to lead directly into Supralapsarianism. Hence it is not remarkable that the celebrated Arminian professor Le Clerc (†1736,) who succeeded Limborch, applauded the position assumed by Placæus; and Dr. Hodge may well ponder, in relation to his own position and its results, the excellent observations to which we have referred in our former essay.*

* Zwinglius also, in opposing the antecedent imputation dogma of the Papal divines, fell into the error similar to those attributed to Placæus, as may be seen by several citations from his writings in our First Essay, pp. 556, 557. And we may here remark, in passing, that the work of Rivetus (so often referred to by Dr. Hodge) on the Placæan controversy, and as Dr. Hodge's citations

Paul, in Rom. v: 12-21, as we have shown, makes a clear and definite distinction between the two great facts which he announces respecting the first sin; to wit, the fact that Adam sinned, and the fact that all sinned—the fact that by one man sin entered into the world, and death by sin, and the fact that because all sinned, death has passed upon all. The offense was *one*, in one sense, and in another sense it was many offenses. It was the sin of Adam, and yet every one of his naturally-begotten posterity sinned likewise.

The apostle merely announces these facts, and adopts them as the basis of his argument, without attempting to explain them on the philosophical principles of traduction, antecedent imputation, identity of personality, or anything else. The facts are, that Adam sinned, and that all sinned; and these facts are given as the reason why guilt was imputed to all, and why, as a consequence, the judgment and

from it abundantly evince,) was not written in defense of *antecedent* imputation, but solely to show that the doctrine of the imputation of Adam's sin to his posterity was universally held by the Reformed Church. And, moreover, the error of Dr. Hodge, in averring that the view of Edwards (in the "one place" to which he excepts,) is precisely that of Placæus, may now be seen by comparing the two. Placæus places the natural headship of Adam *before* the moral; but Edwards, while he justly remarks, that if either must be placed before the other, and that if either sin and imputation is to be viewed as *causal*, it would be more reasonable to regard sin as producing the imputation, rather than imputation as producing the sin; goes on to show, by adducing at great length the exposition of Stapfer, what is the position which he himself assumes, to-wit, *that it is injurious to separate one from the other in any such way*. Edwards, therefore, did not separate the two, but regarded them as synchronously existing. But Placæus and Dr. Hodge do separate them, and therefore, while Edwards stands firmly upon the very center of Reformed doctrine, both Placæus and Dr. Hodge, though in opposite directions, have departed therefrom. At first Placæus was supposed to have denied imputation altogether, as is evident from the decision of the third Synod of Charenton in his case. (See our First Essay, pp. 402, 403.) And hence the treatise of Rivetus was written, as above stated, to show that the Reformed Church had ever admitted that doctrine. But after his explanation appeared, the succeeding Synod modified the decision, as above shown; yet insisting upon the doctrine of imputation as taught in their own standards, in which no distinction is attempted between mediate and immediate imputation.

death came upon all. This same statement runs through the whole theology of the Reformed Church, and is ignored only by some of the Supralapsarians, who persist, like Dr. Hodge, (see Princeton Essays I, pp. 186-189,) in attempting, on the principles of their philosophy, to show that the sinful act of Adam, and our own sin and fall in Adam, are one and the same in the apostle's argument; and that the sin of Adam, irrespective of our own sin and fall, or subjective guilt, is antecedently imputed to us for condemnation. Their design in this procedure is obvious. They need the conclusion in order to be able to deduce the corollary that it is for the sin of Adam alone that pollution and death have come upon all his posterity. So that the doctrine of antecedent imputation was begotten by the Supralapsarian principle, after severing what God has joined together; and by ignoring just one-half of the statement of facts given by the apostle in Romans v.

The claim of Dr. Hodge, as asserted in the foregoing reference, that when the apostle says that *all sinned*, he means nothing more than that Adam sinned, and that his sin became the sin of his posterity by antecedent imputation, is without any real foundation. We will not contend with Dr. Hodge about a word; but a statement like this, based upon a clear ignoring of one of the great facts in the apostle's argument, demands something better to sustain it than mere assumption. We admit that he may plead the language of many divines, even of Walæus, Molinæus, or even of Placæus himself, when, in treating upon the subject in a popular style, the expressions are employed almost interchangeably. As illustrative of this popular mode of speaking, the sermon of President Davies, on Romans v: 12, may be referred to. But it is not to any such representation that a point like the one before us is to be referred, but to *strict theological usage*. And throughout Calvinistic theology, where the matter is carefully exhibited and expounded, it is always in this form; that the guilt of the first transgression was not Adam's alone, but common to him and his posterity,

all of whom participated in his guilt, and sinned and fell with him in his first transgression; and that hence all are treated as he was treated, as sinners, guilty and corrupt. His sin was their sin, in the clear and obvious sense that it was the expression of their own as well as of his guilt; and their sin, according to the representation of the apostle and of the Reformed Church, brought guilt and death upon themselves, as his sin brought guilt and death upon himself and upon them. That is, they participated therein, the guilt was common; he sinned, and all sinned; and hence judgment and death passed upon all, the one offense being common to all. And as his act was confessedly not their act, (as Dr. Hodge fully concedes,) so his sin is not to be confounded with their sin, and *vice versa*; any further than the guilt of the Participator is to be confounded with the guilt of the Principal. It is, of course, common alike to both; but it is, at the same time, individual and distinct; for community of guilt does not destroy individual responsibility. Adam sinned, and was treated as a sinner. This is plainly affirmed. With equal plainness it is likewise affirmed that all sinned, and that all are treated as sinners. The fact is asserted, but it is not explained. And as God has left it unexplained, we have no right to insist on any explanation of our own as the only true one, and then that all are errorists who are unwilling to receive it at our hands. Hence, when Dr. Hodge assures us that the antecedent imputation of Adam's sin will explain the matter, we, while we are perfectly willing he should think so, object that he should insist upon the alternative that we, too, must think so, or be branded as errorists or heretics.

The idea of our really sinning in Adam, or when he sinned and fell, Dr. Hodge denounces, and attempts to hold up to ridicule, (Princeton Essays, I, pp. 137-139, 172, etc.,) simply because he insists on viewing the statement of this fact through his own vague and indefinite ideas of personality, insisting, that if we then sinned otherwise than imputatively, it must have been personally, and this he affirms to be utterly

impossible. Whether he means by this that all sin must consist in action, we shall leave him to say. But we can not here go into a discussion of personality, (nor is it needed, for the question is, What are the facts on the subject as announced in the word of God,) though we should be happy to discuss that matter with him on any suitable occasion; yet it may be well worth while for both Dr. Hodge and Dr. Thornwell to reflect seriously upon their dogmatical utterances in relation to this subject. The speculations of men who reject the doctrine of the Trinity in the Godhead, on the ground that they can attach no definite idea to a trifold personality in a unity of essence, may fairly be laid along side of the speculations which aver that the inconceivability of our sinning when Adam sinned is a just reason for either rejecting or explaining away the inspired announcement which asseverates the fact. See also Rom. iii; 9, 23; Gal. iii: 22, etc.

Dr. Hodge, by his philosophical theory of antecedent imputation, makes the sin of Adam really the sin of all men, averring as he does that the posterity of Adam, as such, inasmuch as they did not exist and sin personally, did not sin at all; and that therefore they did not as such, when Adam sinned, contract any subjective guilt whatever. For the personal sin of Adam was all the sin that was then committed; and that personal sin, says Dr. Hodge, became ours by antecedent imputation; and of course then, in the only sense which it seems possible to attach to the terms employed by Dr. Hodge, the posterity of Adam sinned not only when he did, but sinned the very sin that he did. For he alone sinned, and his sins were antecedently imputed to them for condemnation. And this is, of course, true of all his naturally begotten posterity, infants, idiots, and all, according to the argument of Dr. Hodge. Of whom then can it be said, with the apostle, that they sinned not after the similitude of Adam's transgression, and that yet the penalty of the law reigned over them because they were nevertheless guilty of the violation of law? verse 13. The reign of death over them

evinces that they had sinned and violated the law ; and it is conceded that, in the sense in which Dr. Hodge employs the terms, they did not yet possess personality and moral agency ; and yet they sinned, though not after the similitude of Adam's transgression. Of whom then is this true, according to the theory of Dr. Hodge? It is not true of any one of all the posterity of Adam ; for they all sinned the sin that he did, (that is, in the only sense in which Dr. H. admits that they did sin,) and that sin brought the reign of death over all. The language, therefore, not only condemns utterly and directly the dogma of Dr. Hodge, but it is wholly inexplicable on the ground assumed by that dogma ; while, on the contrary, it is perfectly intelligible on the principles asserted by the apostle, and recognized in the theology of the Reformed Church. We know not how the race sinned when Adam sinned. We know, however, upon the testimony of God, the fact that they did then sin ; and that their sin was not after the similitude of his sin. *They* could not sin as a covenant head, though they participated in the guilt of violating the covenant : and more than these facts it is not necessary we should know on the subject.

It is, moreover, universally conceded that every rational individual of the human race, from the very beginning of the exercise of those powers which constitute moral agency, has a consciousness of subjective guilt, and of a positive alienation from holiness and from God. But it is perfectly apparent that the mere imputation of guilt could of itself bring no such consciousness. It did not bring it to Christ ; and if Philemon had charged upon Paul the debt contracted by Onesimus, it could not have brought to Paul the consciousness that he himself had personally contracted the debt which Onesimus had contracted to Philemon. And neither does the imputation of the righteousness of Christ bring to the penitent and believing soul a consciousness that he had personally wrought out that righteousness. How then can the aforesaid consciousness of subjective guilt, which arises with the first dawn of our conscious moral agency, be

explained on the ground of an antecedent imputation of another's sin? Such imputation could bring with it no such consciousness; and the solution is to be found only in the fact asserted by the apostle, that *all sinned*. But to return.

The Calvinistic Church, therefore, without attempting to explain in any way *how* the human race sinned in their first father, acknowledge the fact, on the Divine testimony, that we did sin and fall in him; and also the other fact, that by the one offense death came upon all. And it is certainly remarkable that Dr. Hodge, in all his discussions of the subject, seems never to have really apprehended the issue actually involved in the question. In the doctrine of the Reformed Church, we find both facts fully and clearly recognized, that the sin of Adam, and our own sin in Adam, and the consequent moral corruption of our whole nature, are imputed to us for condemnation and death; and that this imputation, both immediate and subjective, is the ground upon which judgment has passed upon all. And thus both mediate and subjective imputation, (though with some variety of statement,) are fully recognized as inseparable; as Turretin himself frankly admits: "*Nos vero cum orthodoxis utrumque affirmamus.*"*

The same strange misapprehension, as it appears to us, runs through nearly all of Dr. Hodge's representations of the views of others on this subject. Hence he finds Edwards to be unin-

* Opp. Tom. I, p. 558, Loco. 9, Quæst. 9, Sec. 14, 15. The whole sentence is as follows: "*Illi cum quibus hic agimus vel negant absolute imputationem, vel mediatam tantum admittunt: nos vero cum orthodoxis utrumque affirmamus, et dari imputationem, et eam esse immediatam et antecedentam.*" Dr. Hodge, in attempting to show that the doctrine of Edwards is precisely that which the third Synod of Charenton attributed to Placcæus, (Princeton Essays I, p. 150,) endeavors to justify the statement by the authority of Turretin; and, referring to the very passage from which we have just quoted, represents Turretin as saying: "The question is, whether his (Adam's) sin is imputed to his posterity with an imputation not mediate and consequent, but immediate and antecedent." And Dr. Hodge adds: "*It is of the LATTER he says, 'nos cum orthodoxis affirmamus.'*" Dr. Hodge has thus not only changed but *reversed* the statement of Turretin, by a direct assertion; and by the omission of a word, in order to sustain the assertion. Turretin says: "We, with the orthodox, affirm BOTH"

telligible and self-contradictory. Edwards makes the aforesaid distinction clearly, and reasons from it as all the eminent divines of the Reformed Church have ever done. Like them, he speaks of *the sin* of Adam, and of *our sin* in Adam, and of the effects or consequences of both; and avers that the imputation of both by "the just judgment of God," brought the whole race under condemnation and sin. But Dr. Hodge, referring to his statements, represents him as saying that "depravity results from withholding special divine influences, and according to this passage, the withholding these influences is a just judgment FOR ADAM'S SIN," though Edwards, in the very passage cited by Dr. Hodge, expressly states that "All (men) are looked upon as sinning *in and with* their common root." Thus while Edwards asserts both facts, to wit, that Adam sinned, and that all sinned, and without any attempt here at philosophical explanation, proceeds to reason from both, Dr. Hodge represents him as acknowledging but one, and thus finds him so inconsistent with himself and contradictory, that he *is unable to reconcile his statement*. Because, as Dr. Hodge adds, "The one teaches immediate and antecedent imputation, which is the old doctrine; the other mediate and consequent, which the old writers considered as a virtual denial of that doctrine." And on the ground of this strange misapprehension, he would impair confidence in Edwards' great work, which for more than a century the whole Calvinistic Church has regarded as a most triumphant vindication, of the doctrine of original sin.*

mediate and immediate imputation; Dr. Hodge, omitting the word *UTRUMQUE*, makes him say, and affirms that he does say, "We, with the orthodox, affirm immediate imputation." We have examined the earliest and the latest, as well as one or two intermediate editions of Turretin, and find the passage just as we have quoted it above. It would be doing great injustice to Dr. Hodge, however, to decide that either this, or any other of the repeated instances of a similar kind, to which we shall have occasion to refer in the course of this discussion, is not susceptible of an every way satisfactory solution, until he shall have had the opportunity of explanation, and has failed to furnish it.

* See Princeton Essays, I, pp. 151, 152.

Another illustration of what would be regarded in most cases as incapacity or unwillingness to understand the truth, may be found in the Princeton Essays, I, p. 149, where Dr. Hodge repeats the asseveration that the Leyden divines aver that "Imputation being denied inherent corruption, can not be just." We have in our Second Essay, p. 611, briefly adverted to this. But Dr. Hodge so employs this statement as to make it refer to the imputation of Adam's sin exclusive of our own; whereas they refer the imputation just as Paul and the whole Reformed Church ever have done (except the Supralapsarian) *to Adam's sin, and our own sin in and fall with him*, making it immediate so far as relates to Adam's own sin, and mediate so far as it relates to our own. Hence though they held that "imputation being denied, inherent corruption can not be just," they also held that *inherent corruption being denied, imputation can not be just*, which is in direct antagonism to Dr. Hodge's whole view of the subject.* And he thus makes those divines ignore one of the conditions of their own affirmation, and really say the very reverse of what they do say. For the imputation which they declare to be the just occasion and procuring cause of the present fallen condition of our race, it is the imputation of the sin of Adam and of our own sin in Adam; but with Dr. Hodge it is solely the antecedent imputation of Adam's own sin.

When the reformed divines speak of our being condemned for Adam's sin (not for his sin *alone*, as Dr. Hodge and the Supralapsarian school assert) the language is to be understood as in the apostle's argument, as asserting that we are condemned because the guilt was common, and that our own guilt as well as his guilt was imputed to us for condemnation. In the Princeton Essays, I, p. 186-189, already referred to, Dr. Hodge has laboriously endeavored to show, in common with Supralapsarians, that the sin of Adam, and our own sin in Adam, are regarded as one and the same thing in Re-

* Their own testimony will be adduced presently.

formed theology; but with what success will be apparent to our readers from the citations we shall present from their own testimony. The state of the case is just as we have presented it above. They admit both as facts, and explicate the doctrine of original sin from both, without any attempt (save in a very few instances) to philosophise thereupon. And, in fact, so clearly is this great truth announced in their theology, that even the Supralapsarians do not venture to depart from the common language respecting it; but endeavor as Dr. Hodge does, to reconcile it with their scheme, though on that scheme no definite idea can be attached to the language itself; since they make our guilt, that is, the guilt of Adam's posterity, not to be subjective, but the guilt of Adam's sin alone. In our First Essay, p. 414, an illustration of this is given in a passage cited from Beza, in which he traces our guilt to the fact that *we all sinned in our first parent*; and to the corruption which is the punishment of *this guilt*; and to the sins which *this root of corruption* brings forth. The same passage is likewise found word for word in Danæus, the colleague of Beza, who survived him nine years; and who was not a Supralapsarian, though strongly sympathising with his colleague, in his views of theology. But Dr. Hodge, instead of being satisfied to receive the facts as they are divinely stated, endeavors to philosophise thereon, and to show that the two facts after all are but one, and so endeavors to make out his case by proving a point philosophically, which they would not recognize, and in the elucidation of which they, in general, regarded philosophy as of no account.

It certainly is strange that Dr. Hodge does not see that even on this very point his philosophy fails him, and leads to a conclusion the very reverse of his own. His favorite and reiterated illustration is the principle involved in the doctrine of representation; but it is wholly inconceivable that he should seriously endeavor to reconcile with that principle a denial of the aforesaid truth, to wit: that the guilt of the race is a common guilt, in which all alike are

involved by participation. He can not understand how we could have sinned *when* Adam sinned; neither can we understand the matter, though we are satisfied of its truth on the testimony of God. But this does not seem sufficient for Dr. Hodge, and hence he maintains, that as the testimony, literally taken, involves an absurdity, some other meaning must be attached to the terms in which it is presented; and hence he appeals, as above stated, in illustration of his view of the principle of representation as existing and recognized among men (see, for example, his *Essays and Reviews*, p. 68, note); asserting that, as on this principle, so in the case of Adam, the act of the representative is so far the act of the represented, that they are justly treated as responsible for it. But it never seems to have occurred to Dr. Hodge, to consider this illustration in its true bearing upon the case; for why, otherwise, could he have failed to see that (for example, where guilt is concerned or supposed) the guilt of the representative is imputed to the represented, *not antecedently*, and as *causal of their own guilt*, but simply because the guilt is regarded as *common*; and a common guilt, of course, involves participation. This is the real ground of the imputation, and of course it presupposes the existence of subjective guilt.

But Dr. Hodge, in order to tack about and break the center of the line of argument, of whose advance he seemed to have some conception, claims that if subjective desert be insisted on as the ground of condemnation, or of the imputation of guilt to condemnation, then it must be equally insisted on as the ground of justification, or of the imputation of righteousness to justification; and so adopts the Supralapsarian sophism already mentioned, that if sin be the ground of reprobation, faith and good works must be the ground of election. Nor is this all; for in his controversy with Dr. Park, as shown above, he acknowledges that both he and Dr. Park recognize alike the same principle in this matter, to wit: that "our calamities hang suspended on the sovereign purpose of Heaven;" the only difference being, that Dr. Hodge says, "indirectly, through the intervening

links of imputation, guilt," etc. (which also depend solely upon the sovereign will of God, according to Dr. Hodge), and Dr. Park says that they depend on his will "directly" (see Dr. Hodge's *Essays and Reviews*, pp. 618, 619). Both professors, therefore, clearly agree in explicating the matter from the mere will and sovereignty of God; and both alike recognize the fundamental error of the Supralapsarian school. The replication of Dr. Hodge, therefore, to the foregoing argument, and his insisting upon the sophism referred to, can have no weight in the minds of those whose Calvinism is not of the Supralapsarian type. And while we are on this point we may add, that it would be gratifying to know how Dr. Hodge would essay, on his principles, to escape from an open advocacy of the doctrine which the Supralapsarian school have based upon this principle, to wit, that God created a large proportion of mankind expressly to be damned; for if his principles lead to this, he is bound in all candor to abandon them, or else frankly to avow himself a Supralapsarian; and if they do not, he certainly should explain how the conclusion may be avoided. The imputation of Adam's guilt to his posterity is affirmed by Dr. Hodge to be solely antecedent and immediate, or "from without," and he claims that the posterity of Adam are as destitute of subjective desert as a ground for this imputation, as they are destitute of such desert as a ground for the imputation of the righteousness of Christ to justification; for they no more deserve subjectively the condemnation they receive for the sin of Adam, than the elect deserve, subjectively, the justification they receive for the obedience of Christ. And Dr. Hodge claims, moreover, that to deny this, is to invalidate the whole doctrine of salvation through the free grace of God. If this be so, it follows, therefore, in respect to those who are saved or rescued from this condemnation, that as it was always God's purpose to save or rescue them from it, (as Dr. Hodge will admit,) so, also, it was his eternal purpose to leave those to perish therein, who do perish. And, consequently, as the imputation of both guilt and righteousness is without sub-

jective desert, in either case, and depends solely upon the will of God in both cases, it follows, according to these principles, that it was God's eternal purpose that the reprobate should perish, without any regard to their subjective desert, as it was his eternal purpose that the elect should be saved, without any regard to their subjective desert. Hence God, of his own mere will and pleasure, created the reprobate, with the eternal purpose of consigning them, of his own mere will and pleasure, to everlasting death. This is the fair and logical conclusion from these principles, and thus the doctrine of antecedent imputation involves, necessarily, the adoption of the whole Supralapsarian scheme.

It is important, too, to notice in this connection, that Dr. Hodge, who, as we have shown in Essay II, p. 610, insists that no view of imputation is true that does not apply to the elucidation of the three points, to wit: the imputation of Adam's sin to us; of our sin to Christ; and of his righteousness to us; affirms, also, that as imputation makes no one a sinner, none of the race of Adam are ever condemned to endure the curse of the law, merely on account of the imputation of his sin. And yet he maintains, in opposition to the Grotian and Socinian schools, that Christ did really endure the curse of the law on account of the imputation of our sin to him.* But Dr. Hodge should have seen that the two ideas can not be made to cohere; for if imputed sin, without subjective guilt, does not bring us under the proper penalty of the law, then on what principle can he aver, that Christ endured that penalty? And if it does bring us under that penalty, then, on what principle does he deny, that any one is condemned to suffer that penalty, on account of the imputation of Adam's sin? Dr. Hodge should frankly assume one or the other of these positions, for he can hardly maintain both. He must either concede, that Christ did not

* "The righteousness of Christ, therefore, *consisting in the obedience and death demanded by the law,*" etc. See Dr. Hodge's Review of Beman on the Atonement, in the *Repertory* for 1845, republished in *Princeton Essays*, I, pp. 308-351. A most admirable article.

endure the penalty of the law, and so fall in with the exploded governmental scheme of the atonement; or he must admit, that imputed sin, without subjective guilt, does, on his own principles, necessarily involve the penalty of the law; and if so, that infants perish, and, as above remarked, that the reprobate were created in order that they might be damned. Such are the logical results of his strange assertion, that because the exercise of grace and mercy are gratuitous, on the part of God, therefore condemnation, vengeance, and punishment are equally so, "or the whole foundation of the *Gospel* is undermined;" a sentiment which, if admitted, might impart a meaning to the utterance of the celebrated Dogberry: "O villain! thou wilt be *condemned into everlasting redemption* for this."

It is at all events, however, freely conceded by Dr. Hodge, and those who at the present time sympathize with him in his peculiar views, that no one of the posterity of Adam shall ever suffer the endless penalty of the law merely on account of the imputation of his sin. This, though denied by the earlier Supralapsarians, has long since, though subsequently to the Synod of Dort, been conceded by some who have entertained one or more of their distinctive principles. R. Vogelsangius, for example, as quoted largely by De Moor, (III, 274-276,) to disprove the *mediate* imputation scheme attributed to Placæus, exclaims, "Certe neminem sempiterna subire supplicia propter inobedientiam protoplasti, *nisi mediante cognata perversitate* verissima sententia est." Turretin, too, decidedly asserts the same; and when he comes to explain the view entertained by him, it is in perfect accordance with the doctrine as taught by Calvin, Stapfer, Edwards, and Breckinridge, as may be seen by the following passages: "*Pœna quam peccatum in nos accersit, vel est privativa vel positiva. Prior est carentia et privatio justitiæ originalis. Posterior est mors tum temporalis, tum æterna, et in genere mala omnia, quæ peccatoribus immittuntur. Elsi secunda necessario sequitur primam ex natura rei, nisi intercedat Dei misericordia, non debet tamen cum ea confundi. Quoad primam dicimus*

Adami peccatum nobis imputari immediate ad pœnam privativam, quia est causa privationis justiciæ originalis, et sic corruptionem antecedere debet, SALTEM ORDINE NATURÆ; sed quoad posteriorem potest dici IMPUTARI MEDIATE positivam, quia ISTI PœNÆ obnoxii non sumus, NISI POSTQUAM nati et CORRUPTI SUMUS." * So that moral corruption, which is, according to Drs. Hodge and Thornwell, the penalty of antecedently imputed sin, though it deserve the punishment of eternal death, as all moral corruption must, (and of course deserves it, according to the just judgment of God, for *desert* here can mean nothing else,) yet, according to their own authorities, it never will receive that punishment except *mediately*, and on account of personally subjective desert. So that moral guilt or desert, though justly inflicted, (as Dr. Hodge maintains,) as the penalty of imputed sin, may exist, and exist universally, and from which nothing but the mercy of God can rescue any; and yet no man can reasonably believe that it ever will receive its proper award unless it becomes associated with new moral desert or guilt! for this is the obvious meaning of the language. † And if, therefore, no one is ever thus condemned for merely imputed sin; and if we are obnoxious to the "positive penalty" only *mediately*, or after we have become corrupt, then the attempt to explicate the doctrine of original sin on the ground of immediate or antecedent impu-

* See Opp. Tom. I, p. 558, Loco 9, Quæst. 9, Sec. 14. In Section 15, as above remarked, he likewise adds, "Nos vero cum Orthodoxis utrumque affirmamus."

† In order to maintain this idea in consistency with the theory of immediate imputation, Dr. Hodge can have no alternative, logically, but to resort to the old Papal distinction of *reatum culpæ* and *reatum pœnæ*, originating in the Scheme of Ockham, and sought to be, by a monstrous perversion, associated (as employed by them) with the aforesaid typical institution in the Mosaic economy. Even Turretin condemns their distinction most decidedly in Loc. 9, Quæst. 3, Sect. 6. And Owen condemns it with equal decision, (Justification, chap. 8, p. 226.) Yet Turretin elsewhere, when pressed to expound his idea of sin and the fall, seems to justify it; and asserts the existence of a distinction between *anima pura, impura, et non pura*, which the Polish Socinians also asserted against the theology of Calvin. See in Turretin, Loc. 9, Quæst. 12, Sec. 9, this preposterous distinction.

tation, and to the exclusion of subjective desert, must be conceded to be wholly unauthorized. And the only true position is that of Calvin and the Reformed Church, as illustrated in our First Essay, pp. 396-403, 406, 407.

Turretin and De Moor, as we have seen, maintain that the positive penalty of the law can not come upon us until we are subjectively guilty; (and even Dr. Hodge *in this* professes to agree with them herein;) and thus far they agree with Stapfer, etc. But in treating of subjective guilt itself, they, while they claim that the statement of the apostle, that Adam sinned, is to be understood according to its literal import, practically ignore his other statement that *we all sinned*, by making it substantially a mere figure of speech, which is to be understood in a philosophical sense, and insist that subjective guilt can not be predicated of his descendants, until they have the same manifested existence which he had, and thus existing, perpetuate actual sin; which actual sin is asserted by them to be the fruits of the moral corruption penally inflicted upon us on account of the antecedent imputation of Adam's sin. And herein they differ, *toto cælo*, from the theology of the Calvinistic Church; for it holds that our guilt in Adam being common, God finds us subjectively guilty, and that our moral corruption is the punishment of this subjective guilt, and not the punishment of Adam's sin *antecedently* imputed to us. The difference is obvious. And in this sense, therefore, so fully recognized by the Scriptures and the Reformed Church, the doctrine is to be understood. God finds us subjectively guilty, because our guilt is common with that of Adam. *He sinned, and we sinned*, though *how* we then sinned is left unexplained. And God finding us subjectively guilty, treats us as such; and imputes not only our own sin to us, but the sin of Adam also, for he could do no less, as the guilt was common. This is the Calvinistic doctrine, and is of course the very reverse of the doctrine of Dr. Hodge, that God, of his mere will and pleasure, constitutes us subjectively corrupt merely on account of Adam's sin.

Should it be said, that if we sinned in Adam, or when he sinned, and if this our sin is imputed to us, there is no necessity for supposing that his sin is also imputed to us; since his own sin is not to be so confounded with our sin in him as to suppose them one and the same; the answer is plain: Adam being our natural and federal head, though his act is not our act, nor his sin our sin, yet our participation therein, or our sinning in and falling with him, renders us guilty of that sin, and hence it is justly imputed to us. Our sin was that of participation; (*how*, we know not, and need not know;) but participation begets common guilt, though we may not personally have committed the act in the guilt of which we participate. This is a principle well understood, and fully recognized in ethics and in all jurisprudence. The guilt of the participator is not only charged upon or imputed to him, but he is held responsible for the act by which that common guilt found expression or manifested itself. And so in the matter before us. Hence, though we are justly regarded by God as subjectively guilty with Adam, his sin in which we participated is justly imputed to us. And then further: the imputation of Adam's sin to himself was not *immediate*, but *mediate* and *subjective*; but as his posterity had not the same manifested existence as he, his sin was imputed to them antecedently to such existence, and of course immediately. And as in another sense, unknown and unexplained to us, they did sin when he sinned, or sinned in and fell with him, (the guilt being common,) the imputation of this sin to them was, as in the case of Adam, mediate and in consequence of subjective desert. The punishment of course can not take effect upon them in the sense that it did upon Adam, until they have the same personally manifested existence that Adam had; but that punishment, to be just, as the Leyden divines, and Turretin, and all Calvinists admit, must be in consequence of imputed guilt or sin. To explicate the doctrine of original sin, therefore, on the ground of the antecedent *imputation of Adam's sin alone*, is a grievous error, and has no countenance either in the

word of God, or, as our readers will see, in the theology of the Reformed Church.

The doctrine of antecedent imputation, as held by the Supralapsarians, and asserted by Drs. Hodge and Thornwell, is, therefore, a very different doctrine from the imputation held by the Calvinistic Church, and different, likewise, from that antecedent imputation, which was admitted by Heidegger and others of his day, and so on to our own times. For all, except the late Dr. Ashbel Green* and a few others, who assert the federal headship of Adam, and by consequence the imputation of his sin to his posterity, admit that his sin was antecedent to the formal personal existence of his posterity, and, of course to their privation of original righteousness, moral corruption, or anything else which may depend upon such existence. But this view finds the posterity of Adam, in some way, inexplicable by us, guilty with him, and the imputation as consequent upon that guilt: or, in other words, as resulting from both his natural and moral headship. While, on the contrary, Dr. Hodge's view seems logically to ignore the natural headship, and to make the imputation of Adam's own sin, and of that sin alone, the procuring cause of their guilt and corruption, in the way of penal infliction. It results from the imputation of Adam's sin alone, and not from a common and subjective guilt, a view which Dr. Hodge not only can rarely find outside of the Supralapsarian school, but which, as he can easily learn, the Reformed divines regard as detestable. Even Whittaker, with all his Supralapsarian proclivities, does not hesitate to pronounce it such.

The view entertained by us, and rejected by Dr. Hodge,

* This venerable patriarch of the Presbyterian Church entertained most fully the views of his illustrious preceptor, Witherspoon (see our Essay I, p. 426-7), in respect to the subjective guilt of all creatures who fall under the condemnation of God. Consequently he rejected utterly the doctrine of antecedent imputation; but supposed that when God created Adam, he created also the souls of all his posterity; a view which originated in the ancient Jewish Church. See on this subject the Summæ of Thomas Aquinas, Part I, Quæst. 23, Art. 5, in which he treats it in his peculiar style.

and which we have presented (in Essay I) from Calvin, Edwards, Stapfer and Breckinridge, recognizes the necessity for explicating the doctrine of original sin from both the natural and moral headship of Adam; and emphatically denies that it can be explicated from either alone. It denies that the native headship alone is the ground upon which God treats the posterity of Adam as sinners, or that the moral headship alone is the ground. But as the Reformed Church has ever so emphatically maintained, it demands that both be taken into the account. Dr. Hodge, as we have shown, discards this view; asserts that it was the view of Placæus, and attempts so to explicate the doctrine on the ground of the federal headship, as to make our moral corruption the penalty of Adam's sin. We have named this the Supralapsarian view, for even though all the Supralapsarians do not assert it as strongly as Dr. Hodge, yet as their scheme makes the will of God the procuring cause of sin, so this doctrine makes his will the procuring cause of moral corruption.*

And then further, in the Repertory for 1860, p. 341, Dr. Hodge asserts in exhibiting his views of antecedent imputation, "that as in the case of Christ, his righteousness as something neither done by us nor wrought in us, is the judicial ground of our justification, *with which inward holiness is*

* As a further illustration of the manner in which Dr. Hodge uses his authorities, we may here mention Dr. John Owen; who in referring to the imputation of righteousness, defines the doctrine thus: "To impute to us that which is not our own antecedently to that imputation, includes also in it two things. 1, A grant or donation of the thing itself to us to be ours, on some just ground or foundation. For a thing must be made ours, before we can justly be dealt with according to what is required on account of it. 2, A will of dealing with us, or an actual dealing with us according to that which is so made ours."—*Justification*, p. 188. This is strictly true as regards the imputation of the righteousness of Christ, to which Dr. Owen applies it; but it is a baseless assumption to say with Dr. Hodge, that it is also true as respects the unrighteousness of Adam. On the same page Dr. Owen objects to the definition of Vasquez, on the ground that it confounds *imputare* with *reputare*. Vasquez says, "To impute a thing to a person is to reckon it among those things which are his and belong to him." On which Owen remarks: "This is *reputare*; *imputare* includes an

connected as an invariable consequence; so in the case of Adam, his offense as something out of ourselves, a *peccatum alienum*, is the judicial ground of the condemnation of the race, of which condemnation, spiritual death, or inward corruption, is the expression and the consequence." This statement is necessary to Dr. Hodge's argument, and unless it can be sustained, his whole theory fails; and yet the whole statement is utterly repugnant to Calvinistic theology, and directly at variance with the expression of it as contained in our standards. Where, in all Protestant theology, except in the Supralapsarian school, can Dr. Hodge find the doctrine that inward holiness is connected with justification *as a consequence*? The penitent soul is justified by the righteousness of Christ imputed to it and received by faith, and hence it is said to be justified by faith. Is then the faith by which we are justified the exercise of a renewed, or of an unrenewed soul? Does saving faith result from the saving operation of the Holy Spirit, or does it not? No Calvinist can ever entertain a doubt upon this subject. How then can Dr. Hodge venture to assert in the very face of our standards, and of all Calvinistic theology, that "inward holiness is connected as an invariable consequence" with justification? when the faith which justifies is the fruit of the renewal of the Holy Ghost? To this subversion of one of the very fundamental principles of our theology he is led by attempting to carry out his Supralapsarian exposition of Rom. v., and he is thus brought to the alternative of either abandoning the doctrines of grace, or of giving up this exposition. And if it be not true (as it is not) that holiness is the *consequence* of justification, then it is confessedly, and on Dr. Hodge's own author-

act antecedent to this, accounting or esteeming a thing to belong to any person." And what, pray, is this act? The answer is given above, and is adopted by Dr. Hodge, not only in imputation of righteousness, but also of sin,—it is the act which makes the thing ours. This then is immediate imputation as avowed by Princeton: God makes the sin of Adam ours, and then deals with us according to that sin. See a similar misuse and misapplication of Owen, in *Princeton Essays I*, pp. 145, 146. How greatly he has been misrepresented here will appear in our citation of testimonies *infra*.

ity, not true, according to this analogy, that corruption is the *consequence* of an antecedent imputation of Adam's sin. But on the contrary, as no one is justified without being renewed, (the two being absolutely inseparable in relation to fallen man,) so sin is never imputed unless in connection with moral corruption, the two being inseparable in their relation to fallen creatures, as fully illustrated in our Second Essay. And then, in regard to the sin of Adam being "something out of ourselves a *peccatum alienum*," Dr. Hodge assuredly should know that the Reformed Church never entertained that idea in the sense in which he asserts it. They always maintained that it was "out of ourselves" in no sense that could possibly exclude the fact that "*we* sinned in and fell with Adam;" and that had it been a *peccatum alienum*, in any other sense, it could have been of no more account to us than the sin of any other remote ancestors. Hence, as the Reformed theology always taught—our natural union with Adam is the basis of the imputation of his sin to us, and not merely the federal. We sinned in and fell with him by virtue of this union; for without it God could no more have imputed his sin to us than he could have imputed to us the *peccatum alienum* of the angels themselves, which kept not their first estate. The same is true, as shown in our Essay II, in respect to the righteousness of Christ. It is imputed for justification to none but his "seed"—the seed given him in covenant, and of which he is the Head; and who become partakers of his nature by the power of the Holy Ghost, (Luke i: 35). True, justification *declares* them to be one in law with him, but they become one by being made partakers of this new nature. He represents them therefore, for by virtue of this union they and He are one, as Adam represents his seed, who by virtue of the natural union are one with him. Take away the oneness and you destroy the representation in both cases. Admit the oneness, and where is Dr. Hodge's *alienum peccatum*? *

* Dr. Archibald Alexander, in his tract on Justification, is in utter antagonism to Dr. Hodge in reference to inward holiness being the consequence of

By virtue of the covenant made with Adam, he and his posterity were accounted one, connected as they were by this natural union. And by virtue of the covenant made with Christ, he and the "seed" given to him were one; for there was such a union established between them as constituted them his *seed*. They having been given to him, became his; and hence he redeemed, effectually called, justified and sanctified them: and he will eternally save them, none being able to pluck them out of his hand. And hence, too, in answer to Question 32, of the *Catechism*, "What benefits do they that are effectually called partake of in this life?" the answer is, "They that are effectually called do, in this life, partake of justification, adoption, sanctification," etc. Now, effectual calling being the renewal of our nature by the Holy Ghost, and justification, adoption, and sanctification being "benefits" resulting therefrom, what does Dr. Hodge mean by asserting, in direct opposition to this truth, that "inward holiness is the inseparable consequence of justification?" It is precisely the principle which underlies that most pernicious dogma—"eternal justification."

And then further: Dr. Hodge, in several places, attempts to incorporate with his doctrine of immediate imputation, the doctrine of a natural union between Adam and his posterity; which, while it would justify antecedent imputation in the case of his posterity, would not justify it in the case of any creature not thus connected with him. See, for example, the *Princeton Review* for 1860, p. 339, where he says that the sin of Adam, as out of ourselves, is imputed to us

justification. "The truth is," says he, "that the imputation of righteousness, although it procures perfect justification, produces no change in the inherent character of the man; but, as stated before, it merely changes his relation to the law, and therefore the idea of our being made as righteous as Christ, is without reason alleged against this doctrine," p. 86. If this be so, and what Calvinist will doubt it, inward holiness is in no sense the consequence of justification, as Dr. Hodge asserts. And on what ground, therefore, can it be inferred, as he infers, that inward corruption is the consequence of Adam's guilt alone, and not of our subjective guilt, "by sinning and falling with him in his first transgression?"

on the ground of *the union, representative and natural*, between him and his posterity. See also Princeton Essays I, pp. 136, 138, 142. The importance of this natural union is fully asserted by all Calvinistic theologians in explicating the doctrine of original sin; but the attempt to connect it with this view of antecedent imputation is an astounding absurdity. For the natural union either connects the posterity of Adam with his guilt, (as the Calvinistic Church has ever held,) or it does not. If it does, then they are thus far *subjectively* guilty; and the imputation does not, as Dr. Hodge and the Supralapsarians affirm, depend on the mere will and pleasure of God. But if it does not connect them with his guilt, then to plead it as a reason for the antecedent imputation of his sin to them is sheer absurdity; for, in that case, a union which connects us with Adam, can furnish no reason for an imputation which depends solely upon the mere will of God; for it may be pleaded likewise, that a certain union existed between Adam and the angels, by virtue of the fact that they were all intelligent creatures of God; which, on the same principle, might be the basis of an antecedent imputation of the sin of the one to the other. The natural union between Adam and his posterity can in no proper sense, therefore, be pleaded as a ground for such an antecedent imputation of his sin to them, as is taught by Dr. Hodge, though in the Calvinistic theology it is recognized as furnishing the basis of the representation of the apostle, that "all sinned;" and so of connecting the imputation with the justice, instead of the mere will of God.

Before concluding, there is one point to which we must here specifically advert. Dr. Hodge, in his reply to the rejoinder of Dr. Baird, (see Princeton Rev. for Oct., 1860,) adverts to the fact that Dr. Archibald Alexander had read his Commentary on Romans, in manuscript, and approved of it. This is said in order to sustain, by Dr. Alexander's authority, the exposition given therein of Rom. v: 12-21, against which Dr. Baird takes exception. And yet Dr. Alexander regarded the *Theologia Polemica* of Stapfer as expressing his own

views, rather than the *Medulla* of *Marck*, with which he could not fully coincide on the points in which Marck differed from Stapfer. We regret that Dr. Hodge has adverted to this matter in the way he has, for otherwise the whole question before us could have been left to be adjudicated according to the testimony of the early Reformed Church. But we must now solicit attention to a few facts of a more practical character, and relating to more recent times. For it is certainly remarkable that Dr. Hodge should thus advert to the excellent Dr. Alexander to sustain the soundness of his exposition; when, as above remarked, Dr. Alexander expressed his full sympathy with Stapfer, whom Dr. Hodge repudiates; and not only this, but when Drs. Miller and Alexander, and the whole Calvinistic Church of modern times, have expressed their approbation of the very work of President Edwards, which Dr. Hodge repudiates as Placæan, and have ever regarded it, and justly, as the ablest defense ever written of the doctrine of original sin. Dr. Hodge's voice is almost the only voice which has been heard amongst all the most learned and eminent divines who have, either in this country or in Europe, spoken of Edwards, that has assailed his view as inconsistent with true Calvinism.

In illustration of this representation, we advert to the fact, that amongst all our eminent American theologians, from the time of Edwards, and even before, no one can be found, until about thirty years past, who sides with Dr. Hodge on those points respecting the doctrine before us, on which he disagrees with Edwards. Dickerson, Davies, (who endorsed his views most warmly,) Finley, Witherspoon, S. S. Smith, Dr. Ashbel Green, all reject the doctrine denied by Edwards, and asserted by Dr. Hodge, that imputation is only antecedent to and causative of moral corruption. And if we refer to our brethren of Scotland, we find them equally decided. The Lectures of Dr. Dick, published in this country, with the high commendation of Drs. Alexander and Miller, and which have been even regarded as a text-book in Princeton Seminary, evince the same sympathy, (as may

be seen from our quotation therefrom in Essay II, p. 599.) And though he differs from Edwards on a philosophical speculation, he does not hesitate to speak of him and his work in the following style of approval. Referring to the relation between the first and second Adam and their seed, he says: "I have endeavored to prove the fact, but I do not pretend fully to explain it. President Edwards, in his book on Original Sin, *which is an admirable work, and one of the ablest and most triumphant refutations of error which is to be found in our language*, in answering the objection, that to deal with Adam and his posterity as one, was to act contrary to truth," etc., etc. (See Lecture 45.)

In like manner the venerable Dr. GEORGE HILL, Professor of Divinity in St. Mary's College, St. Andrews, and whose Lectures have ever been regarded as truly Calvinistic in Scotland, and in this country, at least by our own Church and by the Dutch Reformed, after stating the doctrine of original sin, as given in the Confession of Faith, chapter 6, and in the 9th article of the Church of England, as expressing the true Calvinistic view, proceeds to take Edwards as his guide in explicating the doctrine. His words are: "This opinion (the one expressed in the symbols aforesaid) is supported in all the Calvinistic systems of divinity by nearly the same arguments. *But in stating the grounds of it, I shall take as my principal guide, Mr. Edwards*, formerly president of the college of New Jersey, in America, who has written able treatises upon the different branches of the Calvinistic system, and *whose defense of the doctrine of original sin contains the fullest and acutest answers that I have seen to the objections commonly urged against that doctrine.*" (Carter's edition, New York, 1856.) Here, then, this learned divine, whose soundness can not be impugned, and whose work has ever held a high rank as a text-book in our schools, adopts as his guide on the subject the very author whose doctrine Dr. Hodge has undertaken to assail, and which he denounces as precisely the doctrine of Placæus.

If we advert to cotemporary Calvinistic literature, and

such as has been and still is regarded as truly sound by our Churches, as well as by those of Europe, the result will be still the same. We do not purpose to anticipate here any portion of the testimonies which we shall proceed to cite presently; but these references are important in the present connection, as showing the present recognized type of Calvinistic soundness (but which Dr. Hodge had seen proper to denounce as unsound and erroneous), that our readers may have it in view while consulting the testimony of the reformed divines, from the very beginning of the Reformation.

Robert Haldane in his *Exposition of Romans*, in which he defends the orthodox faith against Prof. Stuart, Dr. Mac-knight, etc., says, on Rom. v: 16, "*Condemnation*. Here it is expressly asserted, that condemnation has come by the one sin of the one man. If, then, all are condemned by that sin, all must be guilty by it, for the righteous judge would not condemn the innocent. To say that any are punished or condemned for Adam's sin, who are not guilty of it, is to accuse the righteous God of injustice. Can God impute to any man anything that is not true? If Adam's sin is not ours as truly as it was Adam's sin, could God impute it to us? Does God deal with men as sinners, while they are not truly such? If God deals with men as sinners on account of Adam's sin, then it is self-evident that they are sinners on that account. The just God could not deal with men as sinners on any account which did not make them truly sinners. The assertion, however, that Adam's sin is as truly ours as it was his, does not imply that it is his and ours in the same way. It was his personally; it is ours because we were in him. Adam's sin, then, is as truly ours as it was his sin, though not in the same way." (Carter's Ed., p. 217.) Then on verse 12 he says, "*All have sinned*"; that is, all have really sinned, though not in their own persons. This does not mean, as some explain it, that infants become involved in the consequences of Adam's sin without his guilt. Adam stood as the head, the forefather and representative of all his posterity. They were all created in him, and in the guilt of his sin, as well as its conse-

quences, they became partakers." . . . "No man can well allege, that it is by a separate act of creative power that each of Adam's descendants come into this world. They were in the loins of Adam when he was created. Heb. vii:10."

Dr. Chalmers, likewise, presents the same view. In his twenty-fifth lecture on Romans, (chap. v: 12-21,) he says, "The question, how far a native and original depravity exists among mankind, is one thing. The question, how far mankind are justly liable to be reckoned with, or to be dealt with as responsible and worthy of punishment for having such a tendency is another. . . . In as far as the doctrine of original sin affirms a native disposition to sin, and a disposition so strong in all as that all are sinners, then is the doctrine at one with experience. But in as far as the doctrine affirms, that there is a blame or a demerit rightly attachable to man for having such a disposition, or that he is to be held a guilty and condemned creature on account of it—this is a question referable not to the experience of man, but to the moral sense of man." "And if there be a guilt attachable to evil desires, as well as to evil doings; and if the evil desire which prompted Adam to his first transgression, enter into the nature of all his posterity, then are his posterity *the objects of moral blame and moral aversion, not on account of the transgression which Adam committed, but on account of such a wrong principle in their hearts as would lead every one of them to the very same transgression in the very same circumstances. It is thus that Adam has transmitted a guilt the same with his own, as well as a depravity the same as his own, among all the individuals and families of our species; if not that each of them is liable to a separate reckoning on account of the offense committed in the garden of Eden, at least that each of them is liable to a separate reckoning on account of his own separate and personal depravity—a depravity which had its rise in the offense that was then and there committed, and a depravity which would lead in every one instance to the same offense, in the same circumstances of temptation.* According to this explanation,

every man still reapeth, not what another soweth, but what he soweth himself. Every man eateth the fruit of his own doings. Every man beareth the burden of his own tainted and accursed nature. *Every man suffereth for his own guilt, and not for Adam's guilt; and if he is said to suffer for Adam's guilt, the meaning is, that from Adam he inherits a corruption which lands him in a guilt equal to that of Adam.*" pp. 124, 128, Carter's Ed., 1850. In like manner he says, in Lec. iii, (Rom. xi: 22) "When He is severe, it is not because of his delight in the sufferings of his creatures, *but because of his justice, and holiness, and truth.* . . . And except it be to the injury of these high moral attributes, He ever rejoices in scattering the fruits of his beneficence over the wide extent of a grateful and rejoicing family. When he is vindictive, it is not because he desires a work of vengeance, but because the righteousness of his character, and the stability of a righteous government, demand it."

Such, then, are the views, among others, of the representative men of the Presbyterian Church of Scotland; men whose noble monuments of learning and piety have endeared their names to the Calvinistic Church in this land also; and thus are they in utter antagonism to the theory of Dr. Hodge.

To conclude, therefore, the question to be determined by the testimony we shall adduce, is, whether the views advanced by Dr. Hodge, or whether the opposite views are the recognized doctrine of the Calvinistic Church? Does the Reformed Church recognize the distinction adopted by him and Placcæus, and entertain the theory, that the imputation of sin is antecedent, and causal of moral corruption? Dr. Hodge maintains that it does, and that the Reformed Church taught, that the imputation of sin, like the imputation of righteousness, is antecedent or immediate; and that the guilt and corruption of the human race is consequent upon that imputation.* And the doctrine that God, in his treatment

* Dr. Hodge not only adopts the view of imputation which he attributes to Owen, as shown in a preceding note, but reiterates it in every form of expression, in *Princeton Essays* I, pp. 171-174, 176, 177 (note), 182, 183. And then

of the posterity of Adam, has respect to the double relation existing between them, and to the facts, that he sinned and that they sinned, as so fully taught by the apostle, and by Calvin, Edwards, Stapfer and Breckinridge, Dr. Hodge rejects, and denounces as *mediate* imputation, as is shown in our First Essay. Now, we claim that this doctrine, which Dr. Hodge thus repudiates, is the doctrine of the Calvinistic Church, and that, with the exception of some Supralapsarians, the testimony of that Church is uniform in support of it. And of the conclusiveness (or the contrary) of the testimony to which we appeal to sustain these averments, our readers must judge for themselves. We shall, moreover, fully adopt, and strictly follow out, the formula prescribed by Dr. Hodge in such matters, and which is thus set forth in Princeton Essays I, p. 176: "The only proper standard by which to decide what Calvinism is, is the Confessions of the Reformed Churches, and the current writings of standard Calvinistic writers." We shall likewise adopt the greater portion of the testimonies which he has cited from Rivetus, (and if our limits permitted would present them all,) for, as we shall have occasion to show fully, hereafter, he not only has failed to sustain his position by those testimonies, but has wholly mistaken the very design of Rivetus, in citing them. Rivetus cites them to prove one thing, and Dr. Hodge to prove quite another.*

In considering the subjoined testimony our readers will please to remember, that the marked and essential difference

in Princeton Review for 1860, pp. 338-368, and 764, indorses and reiterates the whole representation; and even asserts, that the Lutheran and Reformed Churches adopt his dogma of antecedent imputation. We are willing to concede this in respect to some of the Lutheran divines, to whose testimony we shall have occasion to refer presently. And as to the Reformed Church, our readers shall soon have the opportunity of deciding for themselves.

* Professor Park, instead of examining the matter for himself, as he professes to have done, has fallen into the same error with Dr. Hodge, and pronounces the citations of Rivetus "decisive" in support of Dr. Hodge's views. *Ut vacca vaccam, auctor autorem sequitur.* Will Dr. Hodge own him as an Expositor?

between the Supralapsarians and Calvinists (for we shall not separate their testimony) is, that the former explicate the doctrine of original sin from the standpoint of the will of God, and the latter from the standpoint of his justice. The Supralapsarians, as we have shown, to avoid the charge of having departed from the received doctrine of the Church, have endeavored, in their definitions of its doctrines, to conform, as nearly as possible, to the language of Augustine; and they have done so. It will likewise be seen, that the language of Calvinistic divines, in several instances, is such as a Supralapsarian might adopt; and *vice versa* also, as may be illustrated by a citation from Dr. Thornwell, in our First Essay, p. 408. But it is *in the interpretation of this language*, that the *toto cælo* difference between them is brought to view. The case is, for example, similar to that of the Arminians, who, in their statements of doctrine, often employ language which is employed on the same subject by Calvinists; or, as with the Arians, who not unfrequently employ terms in speaking of Christ, to which a Trinitarian would scarcely object. But, in both cases, the meaning which they attach to the language is the very reverse of that which has ever been attached to it by the Church of God. So, also, in the instance before us. When the Supralapsarian explains the language of the Church respecting the doctrine of original sin, he refers the imputation of Adam's sin to *the mere will and pleasure of God*, from a standpoint antecedent to subjective desert, and making the imputation causal of moral corruption; but when the Calvinist explains it, he refers the imputation to *the immutable justice of God*, and of man's guilt and desert, as we have so fully illustrated in our Second Essay. The former is the view insisted on by Dr. Hodge, the latter is the view which he rejects,* but which we affirm to be taught by the whole Reformed, or Calvinistic Church.

*The employment of the terms, "justice" and "guilt," in this connection, by Dr. Hodge, and his attempt (as also that of Zanchius, and other Supralapsarians,) to attach to those terms such a meaning as to reconcile them with this conception, we had intended to make the subject of special remark. But to

And in citing its testimony, we shall first adduce the Confessions, and then the leading divines of the Church, from the commencement of the Reformation until the present time. We begin with

1. *The Augsburg or Augustan Confession.*

This Confession is claimed without just reason by the Supralapsarians. As originally drawn up and laid before the Emperor Charles V, in July, 1530, the second article reads as follows :

"They teach also, that after the fall of Adam, all men naturally begotten, *are born with sin*, (*nascantur cum peccato*,) that is, without the fear of God, without trust in God, and with concupiscence ; and that this disease or original blot is truly sin, (*quodque hic morbus, seu vitium originis vere sit peccatum*,) condemning and bringing even now eternal death to those who are not renewed by baptism and the Holy Ghost.

"They condemn the Pelagians and others who deny that this original blot is sin ; and, that they may extenuate the glory of the merit and benefits of Christ, argue that man by his own powers of reason (*propriis viribus rationis*) is able to obtain justification before God."

As subsequently revised and amended, this article reads as follows :

"They teach also, that after the fall of Adam, all men propagated in a natural way have original sin when they are born. (*Omnes homines naturali modo propagati nascentes habent peccatum originis*.) By *original sin*, as it is called by the holy fathers, and by all pious men of learning and sound judgment in the Church, we mean that guilt whereby all that come into the world are, through Adam's fall, exposed to the wrath of God and eternal death, and that very corruption of human nature derived from Adam, which *corruption*

expose the glaring unfairness and absurdity of the procedure in the way it deserves, would require too long a digression ; and we have moreover supposed that the conception of the moral nature of God, necessarily involved therein, has been sufficiently exhibited in our Second Essay. Should the attempt be reiterated, however, we shall have a few words to offer more directly in relation to it.

of man's nature includes, not only the defect of original righteousness, integrity or obedience, but concupiscence likewise," etc.

How thoroughly Luther, (†1546,) and Melancthon, (†1560,) adopted at the very outset the fundamental principle of the Supralapsarian scheme, is shown in our Second Essay. And the doctrine of Imputation, as taught by Luther, may be learned from his very remarkable annotations on Gal. iii: 13, where, in perfect accordance with that doctrine as held by himself, he pronounces our blessed Lord "the greatest transgressor, murderer, adulterer, thief, rebel, and blasphemer that ever was or could be in the world," and asserts that whatever sins we have committed, or may hereafter commit, "are Christ's own sins as verily as if he himself had done them." And these views, moreover, his disciples continued to reiterate for more than a century and a half. Take a single instance from the zealous Jerome Kromayer, (†1670,) Primary Professor of Sacred Theology in Leipsic, who employs on the same subject the following language: "Christus, qui non noverat peccatum, per imputationem factus est peccatum, id est, *peccatorum atrocissimus*.* This terrible blasphemy is the legitimate outgrowth of the principle which bases imputation on the mere will of God, to the ignoring of his moral perfection. Nor is it surprising that such views should have led to the conclusions to which Luther's disciple, J. Agricola, (†1556,) carried them, even during his professorship at Wittemberg. The well known Dr. Crisp was his disciple, and only completed what Agricola begun. In his Sermons, vol. I, p. 430, he says, "Christ is as really the transgressor as the man that did commit it (the sin) was;" and he insists that "iniquity," in Is. liii: 5, 6, is not "spoken figuratively, that is, the punishment of it," but

* See his *Scrutinium Religionum*, p. 208, thesis 42, (Second Edition, Leipsic, 1673.) On the title page he is said to be "Vir de Ecclesia multisque officiis meritissimus, nunc beatissimus;" though a grievous calumniator of the Reformed Church. He should not be confounded with his uncle, J. Kromayer, (†1648.)

in the sense that our iniquity became, by imputation, literally the iniquity of Christ. *And yet Dr. Hodge has labored to show that the doctrine of the Lutheran Church on this subject does not materially differ from that of the Reformed! **

Luther and Melancthon were, in the main, the authors of the Augsburg symbol. And in further illustration of their earlier views on original sin and imputation, we may refer also to the following: Luther says, "God works the evil in us as well as the good." "He pleases you when he crowns the unworthy; he ought not to displease you when he *condemns the innocent.*" "It is no more unworthy of God to *damn the innocent*, than to forgive, as he does, the guilty." And "that if any one should complain that he has been created to be damned, he is on that account worthy of damnation," (a sentiment in which Zanchius seems to concur.) And so on through a large part of his *De Servo Arbitrio*, from which work our readers may find in our Second Essay, p. 562, another extract, in which Luther affirms that it is the highest attainment of faith to believe that God *of his own will* makes us necessarily damnable, and appears to be delighted with the torments of the miserable, and to be worthy rather of hatred than of love. In fact we know of no treatise in existence which advances more decidedly than this, the principles of the Supralapsarian school. And now, in further illustration of our statement that some of the distinguishing dogmas of that school find favor in Princeton, we invite attention to the following extract from an article on original sin, first published in the Repertory for 1880, and subsequently republished in Princeton Essays, vol. 1, on p. 115, of which is found the following high approval and laudation of this very treatise:

"The doctrine of total depravity, derived as an inheritance from our first father, is not inculcated more strongly by any writer than

* The doctrine of the Calvinistic Church is in direct contrast with the foregoing. Turretin expresses it thus: "*Christus propter imputatum ipsi nostrum peccatum, non potest dici peccator, quod importat corruptionem inhaerentem.*" So, too, Owen: "To be *culpæ alienæ reus* makes no man a sinner."

by Luther, in his work entitled *De Servo Arbitrio*, written against the celebrated Erasmus. It was our first purpose to have given an abridgment of this treatise of the great Reformer, but Luther's style and manner are so peculiar, that his writings do not bear to be abridged without much loss," etc.

Dr. Hodge has enjoyed the reputation of the authorship of this Essay. And then in the *Repertory* for 1860, p. 388, he speaks as follows :

"The Lutheran and Reformed Church, the two great historical divisions of the Protestant world, *happily are perfectly united on all points concerning our relation to Adam and Christ*. They agree as to the whole class of doctrines connected with the fall and redemption of man, the covenant with Adam, the nature of the union between him and his posterity, the effect of his sin on his descendants, **AND THEY CONSEQUENTLY ARE OF ONE MIND AS TO IMPUTATION**, [the capitals are ours,] depravity and inability, and, on the other hand, as to the nature of our union with Christ, justification and sanctification. *Not only in the symbols of these Churches, but in the writings of all their leading theologians of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, there is this thorough agreement on the subjects above mentioned.*"

Our readers, who compare these statements with the remarkable illustration of this "one mind on imputation," as evidenced by the fore-cited testimonies of Luther and Kromayer, as compared with Turretin and Owen, may regard these facts as sufficient. Yet we must, in the same connection, ask attention to the following brief extract from the first of Dr. Hodge's three Essays on Imputation, republished (from the *Repertory*) in the *Princeton Essays*, vol. 1, on p. 137, of which he says :

"We have never been so unhappy as to have our hearts torn by being told that we believe and teach that the blessed Saviour was morally a sinner; that our 'moral character' was transferred to him. *If this is imputation, IF THIS 'TRANSFER OF MORAL CHARACTER,' is included in it, we have not words to express our deep abhorrence of the doctrine. We would hold no communion with the man who taught it.* And if this is what our brethren [the New Haven divines] mean to charge us with, then is the golden cord of charity forever broken, for

what fellowship can there be between parties where one accuses the other of blasphemy?"

But, though the dogma of antecedent imputation is claimed to be taught in the foregoing article of the Augsburg Confession, it is not found there in the sense in which it is inculcated by Dr. Hodge, and it would be doubtful whether it is taught there in any sense, (that is, as being antecedent to instead of synchronical with corruption,) did not the well known Supralapsarian proclivities of its chief framers seem to render such a conclusion fairly deducible. But however this may be, we do find both Luther and his followers not at all disposed to regard this feature as at all essential, or to constitute it, as Dr. Hodge does, a breaking point of difference with his co-laborers in the cause of God; for at the colloquy held at Marburg, in October of the preceding year, (1529,) the following was agreed upon as expressing the views of the Churches represented by Luther, Zuinglius, and Bucer on original sin: "For the *fourth*, we believe that *original sin descends unto us from Adam by birth and inheritance*, and is such a sin that it damneth all men; and if that Christ had not come to relieve us with his death and life, then had we perished thereby everlastingly, and could never have come to the kingdom of God." These articles are subscribed by Luther, Melancthon,* Jonas, Osiander, Brent, Agricola, Ecolampadius, Zuinglius, Bucer and Hedio, to the first three of whom, along with Bugenhgen, the Augsburg Confession is attributed. Here, then, the doctrine of original sin is clearly explicated, not from the ground of antecedent

* The views entertained by Melancthon were, as we have remarked, subsequently modified. In his *Locis Theol.* he thus expresses them: "*Peccatum originis est carentia justiciæ originalis . . . secuta lapsum Adæ, propter quam corruptionem nati sunt rei, et filii iræ. . . . Si quis vult addere, natos etiam propter lapsum Adæ reos esse, non impedio. Revera autem perpetua Ecclesiæ sententia est, Prophetarum, Apostolorum et Scriptorum veterum: peccatum originale non tantum esse imputationem, sed in ipsa hominum natura caliginem et pravitatem.*" Precisely the sentiment which we insist upon. See also his *Apol. Confessionis*, Art. 1.

imputation, but from that of the natural and federal headship of Adam.

A similar illustration may be found likewise in either of the following symbols, which will be found in their proper places in the subjoined catalogue of testimonies: the Confession of Wittenberg, (1536,) the Articles of Smalcald, (1537,) and the Conference at Worms, (1541,) from all of which, not less than from the foregoing, although alleged to have been prepared mainly by those who were under the influence of the Supralapsarian scheme, two things are apparent: 1. That the Reformers, as we have shown in Essay I, attached very little importance to the logical precedence of either *guilt* or *depravity* in stating the doctrine of original sin, and of course on this essential point they differ *toto celo* from Dr. Hodge; and 2. That they explicated the doctrine, not from the single point of the federal headship or imputation, as Dr. Hodge insists should be done, but from both the federal and natural headship united, as Stapfer asserts that they do, that is, on the united basis of both imputed and inherent guilt. Our next witness is,

2. *The Former Confession of Basel.*

The exact time when this Confession was prepared is still a matter of uncertainty, though the evidence seems to preponderate in favor of assigning it to the year 1532, two years later than that of Augsburg. Its second article reads as follows: "We confess that MAN was made in the beginning, after the image of God, in righteousness and true holiness. But he fell into sin by his own will—(est autem sua sponte lapsus in peccatum)—*by which fall the whole human race, being corrupted, was made subject to damnation, (corruptum, damnationi obnoxium factum est.) Even thus was our nature vitiated, and arrived at so great a proneness to sin, that unless it is regenerated by the Holy Ghost, man of himself can neither do nor will anything good.*" Here, then, we are taught that man fell of his own accord; that the whole human race was corrupted by the fall; and that this corruption renders them guilty, and obnoxious to damnation.

3. *The Second Basel, or First Helvetic Confession.*

Great efforts were put forth in preparing this symbol, and great hopes were entertained as to the result. The work was committed chiefly to the two celebrated professors at Basel, Mycomius, (†1546,) Grynæus, (†1541,) along with Bullinger, (†1575,) Capito, (†1542,) Bucer, (†1551,) with whom were several others; and when completed, the Confession was, in 1536, presented by Bucer and Capito to the Assembly of divines at Wittenberg. In the following year, likewise, Bucer presented it at Smalcald, where, as Luther declares, it received the approval of the whole assemblage of the Protestant princes. It was originally written in German, and then translated into Latin. Its language respecting original sin is the following:

"MAN being the most perfect image of God upon earth after he was made holy by God, *having fallen into sin* by his own fault, drew with himself into the same ruin the human race, and rendered them obnoxious to the same calamity, (*sua culpa in vitium prolapsum, in eandem secum ruinam genus humanum totum traxit, accidem calamitati obnoxium reddidit.*) And this infection, (*lues,*) which they call *original*, has so pervaded the whole human race, that the child of wrath and enemy of God can be cured by no help, except by that which is divine through Christ."—Art. 2.

This Confession was, however, not entirely satisfactory, being regarded as too brief; and it was rewritten and enlarged in 1566, (only two years after Calvin's death,) by the pastors of Zurich; and was approved and subscribed not only by their confederates of Berne and Schaffhausen, and Sangallia, Rhetia, Myllhausia, and Bienna, of the Grison league, but by the Churches of Geneva, Savoy, Poland, Hungary and Scotland. As thus rewritten we now present it in its connection here, though out of the chronological arrangement.

4. *The Second, or Latter Helvetic Confession.*

"MAN was from the beginning created by God, after the image of God, in righteousness and true holiness, good and upright; but by the instigation of the serpent and his own fault, (*culpa,*) falling from goodness and rectitude, he *became subject to sin*, death, and various

calamities; and such as he became by the fall, (à lapsu,) such are all who are propagated from him, they being subject to sin, death, and various calamities. We understand that sin is that native corruption of man, derived or propagated to us all by those our parents, by which we, being sunk in depraved desires, and averse from good, but prone to all evil, filled with all wickedness, distrust, contempt and hatred of God, can of ourselves neither do nor even think that which is good. Nay, rather, as we increase in years, we bring forth corrupt fruit appropriate to the evil tree, in thoughts, words, and depraved actions committed against the law of God; by reason of which we, through our own desert, being exposed to the wrath of God, are subjected to just punishment, (iræ Dei obnoxii, pœnis subjiciemur justis,) and therefore we should all have been rejected by God, had not Christ our deliverer brought us back again."—Chap. 8.*

5. *The Confession of Wittemburg, 1536.*

"We believe and confess that MAN was originally created by God, just and wise, endowed with free will, and adorned with the Holy Spirit, and was happy; but that afterwards, for his disobedience, he was deprived of the Holy Spirit, and made the bond-slave of Satan, and subject to corporal and eternal damnation; and that this evil did not remain with Adam alone, but was propagated to all his posterity," etc.—Chap. 4.

6. *The Articles of Smalcald, 1537.*

These articles, to which we have already referred, were written by Luther himself; and the first article of Part III reads as follows: "Here it must be confessed by us, that Paul, in Rom. v, affirms that sin sprang from one man, Adam, and entered into the world, (ortum esse et introïsse,) by whose disobedience all men were made sinners, subject to death and the devil. This is named original, hereditary, principal and capital sin, (die Erbsünde oder Heuptsünde. See Hase, p. 817.)

7. *Conference at Worms, Jan. 1541.*

This colloquy was between Eccius, Mensing, Bucer, and

* Dr. Hodge, in his citation of testimonies, quotes the following two lines and a half as giving the sense of this important article: "Such as Adam became after the fall, such are all those descended from him; that is to say, they are equally obnoxious to sin, death, and all sorts of calamities;" thus leaving an opening for antecedent imputation. But fully quoted, it destroys his doctrine

Melancthon; and they thus express their agreement on the topic before us: "We unanimously admit that *all who are propagated from Adam*, in accordance with the ordinary law, (of nature,) *are born with original sin, and so under the displeasure of God*; (cum peccato originali, et ita in ira Dei nasci.) *But origiaal sin consists in a destitution of original righteousness with concupiscence.*"

8. *Confession of Saxony, 1551.*

This Confession was written by Melancthon, to be presented to the Council of Trent. He wrote it on behalf of the Churches of Saxony, though the Meissen Churches, and very many others subscribed it. Dr. Hodge presents the sense of the second article in a brief extract, as follows:

"Original sin exists; and on account of the fall of our first parents, and in consequence of the depravation which followed their fall, they that are born are liable to the wrath of God, and deserving eternal damnation, unless remission be obtained through the Mediator."

The same is repeated in article first of the Repetitio Anhaltina, (1579):

"Ita peccatum originis est reatus non tantum propter lapsum primorum parentum sed etiam propter hanc ipsam depravationem, quæ lapsum illum sequita est, et nobiscum nascitur: omnesque homines, naturali ordine progenitos, facit obnoxios iræ Dei, et dignos æterna damnatione nisi fiat remissio propter mediatorem."

9. *The French Confession.*

This Confession of the Faith of the Reformed Churches in France was adopted by the first National Synod, which was held at Paris, in May, 1559, (F. de Morell being the Moderator,) and was presented to Charles IX, at Poissy, in 1561, on behalf of all his Protestant subjects; and it continued to be their recognized symbol, always being read and re-adopted at every National Synod, until the revocation of the edict of Nantes. Winer supposes that it was prepared by Calvin; but this is mere conjecture, unsustained by any historical support. Its testimony is as follows:

"*Art. 9.* We believe that MAN being created pure and upright, and conformable (*Lat. conformem; Gal. conforme*) to the image of God,

by his own fault fell from the grace which he had received; and thereby so alienated himself from God, the fountain of all righteousness, and of all good, that his nature has become altogether corrupt, (*adeo ut ipsius natura sit prorsus corrupta; en sorte que sa nature est de tout corrompue;*) and being blinded in spirit, and depraved in heart, he has entirely lost all that integrity without any exception. For, although he has some discernment (*discretionem*) of good and evil, we nevertheless affirm, that whatever light he has becomes darkness immediately, when he argues of seeking God, so that he can in no way draw near to him by his own understanding and reason. Also, although he is endowed with will, by which he is moved to this or that, yet inasmuch as it is wholly a captive under sin, it has no liberty at all to desire good, unless what it may receive from grace, and by the gift of God.

"Art. 10. We believe that the entire offspring of Adam is *infected by this contagion*, (*est infectée de telle contagion,*) which we call *original sin*; that is, a stain, (*vitium, un vice héréditaire*, not "fault," as Dr. Hodge translates it,) extending by propagation, and not only by imitation, as *Pelagians* think, all of whose errors we detest. Neither do we think it necessary to inquire how this sin can be propagated from one to another. For it suffices, that the things which God bestowed upon Adam, were given, not to him alone, but to his whole posterity; and therefore, we being in his person despoiled of all those gifts, have fallen into all this misery and curse.

"Art. 11. We believe that *THIS STAIN* is truly sin (*verè peccatum; vrayment piché;*) because it makes all and every man, not excepting unborn infants themselves, guilty of eternal death before God. We affirm, also, that *this stain, even after baptism, is truly sin*, as respects the fault, although they who are the children of God shall not on that account be condemned; because God, out of his goodness and mercy, does not impute it to them. We affirm, moreover, that this perverseness always brings forth some of the fruits of malice and rebellion, so that they even who excel in holiness, although they resist, are yet defiled by many infirmities and offenses, so long as they remain in this world.

"Art. 12. We believe that from this universal corruption and condemnation, in which all men are sunk by nature, God elects certain," etc.

One might have reasonably supposed, that Dr. Hodge, since he has so much to say about *Placæus* and the French

Synod, would have been careful to present this testimony somewhat fully, at least, as it has such an important bearing on the subject. But he has presented a garbled and mis-translated extract, of *barely four lines and a half*, and there leaves the matter. See P. E. I, p. 197.

10. *The Ancient (or First) Scottish Confession.*

This Confession is attributed to John Knox, who prepared it by appointment of the Synod held at Edinburg, in 1560, and it was prepared during the session of that assembly. It was prepared first in the Scottish language, and afterward translated into Latin. The following is Art. III, as published in English, nearly a century ago, at Glasgow, Scotland, and in Hall's *Harmony of Confessions*, in 1842, and in the Latin *Collectio Confessionum*, (Leipsic, 1840,) by Niemeyer:

"By which transgression, commonly called original sin, was the image of God utterly defaced in man; and he and his posterity of nature, became enemies to God, (or, as the Latin gives it, 'ipseque et ejus posterit natura facti sunt inimici Dei,') slaves to Satan, and servants to sin. Eph. ii: 1-3. Insomuch that death everlasting hath had, and shall have, power and dominion over all, Rom. v: 14, 21, that have not been, are not, or shall not be regenerate from above; which regeneration is wrought by the power of the Holy Ghost. John iii: 5, working in the hearts of the elect of God an assured faith in the promise of God, revealed to us in his word; by which faith we apprehend Jesus Christ, with the graces and benefits promised in him. Rom. v: 1."

In the *Princeton Repertory*, for 1839, and in *Princeton Essays*, (1846,) in the catalogue of testimonies on original sin, the above article is professedly given. Three lines and a half are faithfully taken from the Confession, to which the following three lines are added, as part of the article, but which neither are, nor ever have been, any part of it. The quotation, as far as the phrase *servants of sin*, is accurate; and all after that is spurious. It is as follows: "*servants of sin*; and so we, **IN HIS PERSON**, were despoiled of all those gifts, and fell into all this misery and curse. *These things can not be said without imputation. Hæc sine imputatione dici non possunt.*" (The italics and capitals are Dr. Hodge's.) Here, then, we have not only the *English*, thus set off by italics and capitals,

but the *Latin original* is likewise paraded before the reader; and yet both are fictitious. Whence were they obtained? The importance of this question will be seen in the citation we shall presently make from the works of Rivetus.*

11. *The Confession of England, 1562.*

This Confession was inserted in his Apology, (in 1562,) by Bishop Jewell, on behalf of the English Churches. The 18th article reads as follows:

"We say, also, that every person is born in sin, and leadeth his life in sin; that nobody is able truly to say his heart is clean; Prov. xx: 9; that the most righteous person is but an unprofitable servant; Luke, xvii: 10; that the law of God is perfect, and requireth of us perfect and full obedience; that we are able by no means to fulfill the law in this worldly life; that there is no mortal creature which can be justified by his own deserts, in God's sight."

12. *Articles of the Church of England.*

These Articles were agreed upon by the Archbishop, Bishops, and Clergy of England and Ireland, (after having, it is said, received the approval of Calvin,) in the Convention held in London (an. 1562,) for avoiding diversities of opinion, and establishing unanimity of consent in matters of true religion. Their testimony (see Art. IX) is very important, and the reader will find it on p. 406 of our First Essay.

* Our readers will observe the remarkable unanimity with which these symbols all sustain the representation of Stapfer, respecting the true nature of imputation; to wit, "that it consists in nothing else than this, that his posterity are viewed as in the same place with their father, and are like him." "Inasmuch as to give Adam a posterity like himself, and to impute his sin to them, is one and the same thing." (See our First Essay, p. 400.) And, moreover, that there is no attempt to distinguish between Adam's federal and natural headship; and not a syllable mentioned which sustains Dr. Hodge's idea of antecedent imputation. The statement is, that all the race were in Adam, all sinned in and fell with him, and all consequently inherited the same moral corruption. Dr. Hodge must have greatly missed the word *imputation* here; and in citing the Confessions, he by some strange process, when he comes to the old Scottish, thinks he has found it; so he first gives the English *translation*, and then the *Latin original*, when neither had any existence in the Confession. We suppose that in rapid copying, his eye must have rested upon some commentary on the words, and that he mistook the one for the other—a mistake not without frequent precedents. But we respectfully suggest to Dr. Hodge, that even the word *imputatio*, in that connection, is not the same as *imputatio antecedens*.

13. *The Belgic Confession.*

This Confession appears to have been drawn up in 1559, (in the French language, originally,) and was first approved in 1561, and was finally ratified and adopted in Synod by all the Belgic Churches in 1579. The following is from Art. XV.

"We believe that by the disobedience of Adam, the sin which is called original, is diffused into the whole human race. But original sin is a corruption of the whole nature, and a *hereditary blot* (*vitium hereditarium*), *by which even infants, themselves, in their mother's womb, are polluted; and which, as some noisome root, produces every kind of sin in man; and is so foul and execrable before God, that it alone may suffice for the condemnation of the whole human race.* (*Est-que tam fœdum, atque execrabile coram Deo, ut ad universi generis humani condemnationem sufficiat.*)

This last clause, which is, moreover, the conclusion of the sentence, is wholly omitted by Dr. Hodge, and the sentence is given as complete without it. And why? Its testimony is overwhelming on the point that moral corruption is the ground of imputed guilt; while both the fact and the doctrine are denied by Dr. Hodge.

14. *The Heidelberg Catechism, or Catechism of the Reformed Churches, 1563.*

"*Quest. 7.* Whence, then, arose this depravity of human nature?

"*Ans.* From the fall and disobedience of our first parents, Adam and Eve. Hence, our nature is *so depraved that we are all conceived and born in sin.*" See also *Quest. 9.*

15. *Confession of the Bohemians, or Waldenses, 1578.*

After dwelling on the knowledge of man's own self, the Confession thus refers to his sin:

"Wherefore the spring and principal author of all evil is that cruel and detestable Devil, the tempter, liar, and manslayer; and next, the free-will of man, which, notwithstanding being converted to evil, through lust and naughty desires, and perverse concupiscence, chooseth that which is evil. Hereby sins, according to these degrees, and after this order, may be considered and judged of. The first, and weightiest, and most grievous sin of all was, without doubt, after that sin of Adam, which the apostle calleth disobedience, for the which

death reigneth over all, even over those, also, which have not sinned with like transgression as did Adam. A second kind is original sin, naturally engendered in us and hereditary, wherein we are all conceived and born into the world. 'Behold,' saith David, Ps. li, 'I was born in iniquity, and in sin hath my mother conceived me.' And Paul, Eph. ii, 'We are by nature the children of wrath.' *Let the force of this hereditary destruction be acknowledged and judged of by the guilt and fault, by our proneness and declination, by our evil nature, and by the punishment which is laid upon it.* The third kind of sins are those which are called actual," etc. "Here, withal, this is also taught, that by reason of *that corruption and depravation*, common to all mankind, and for the sin, transgressions, and injustice, [unrighteousness,] *which ensued thereof*, all men ought to acknowledge, according to the Holy Scripture, their own just condemnation, and the horrible and severe vengeance of God; and, consequently, the most deserved punishment of death, and eternal torments in hell," etc.

Let our readers compare this most clear statement of the order of the topics *depravity, guilt, and death*, with Dr. Hodge's attempt to represent it as teaching the doctrine of immediate or antecedent imputation. The passage, as he presents it, is a clear perversion. See Princeton Essays, I, 196.

16. *Synod of Dort, 1618.*

"MAN, from the beginning, was created in the image of God, adorned in his mind with the true and saving knowledge of his Creator, and of spiritual things, with righteousness in his will and heart, and purity in all his affections, and thus was altogether holy; but, by the instigation of the devil and his own free will, (*libera sua voluntate*,) revolting from God, he bereaved himself of these inestimable gifts; and, on the contrary, in their place, contracted in himself blindness, horrible darkness, and perversity of judgment in the mind; malice, rebellion, hardness in the will and heart; and, finally, impurity in all his affections. And such as man was after the fall, such children also he begat; namely, being corrupted, corrupt ones—*corruption having been derived from Adam to all his posterity*, (Christ only excepted,) not by imitation, as the Pelagians formerly would have it, but by the propagation of a vicious nature through the just judgment of God; therefore, all men are conceived in sin, and born the children of wrath, indisposed to all saving good, propense to evil, dead in sins, and the slaves of sin," etc.

This testimony Dr. Hodge has omitted to cite.

17. *The Westminster Confession, and Catechisms.*

This symbol was examined and approved by the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland, in 1647, and ratified and established by act of Parliament, in 1649. Having already cited its testimony in our First Essay, pp. 408, 405, from chap. vi, and from Shorter Catechism 2, 16-18, we need not repeat it here. It explicates the doctrine of original sin from both the natural and federal headship of Adam; and, like Calvin and the Reformed Church, bases the imputation of Adam's sin to his posterity upon both equally.

18. *The Savoy Confession.*

This symbol, being a declaration of the faith and order of the Congregational Churches in England, was adopted by the representatives of their Churches in their meeting at the Savoy, (London,) in 1658. In 1680, it was approved by a Synod of the representatives of the Churches of Massachusetts, convened in Boston; and subsequently by those of Connecticut, assembled at Saybrook, in 1708:

"1. God having made a covenant of works and life thereupon, with our first parents, and all their posterity in them, they being seduced by the subtlety and temptation of Satan, did wilfully transgress the law of their creation, and break the covenant in eating the forbidden fruit.

"2. *By this sin they, and we in them, fell from original righteousness and communion with God, and so became dead in sin, and wholly defiled in all the faculties and parts of soul and body.*

"3. *They being the root, and by God's appointment standing in the room and stead of all mankind, the guilt of this sin was imputed, and corrupted nature conveyed, to all their posterity, descending from them by ordinary generation.*

"4. *From this original corruption, whereby we are utterly indisposed, disabled, and made opposite to all good, and wholly inclined to all evil, do proceed all actual transgressions.*

"5. *This corruption of nature during this life doth remain in those who are regenerated," etc.*

We omit the Confessions of the London Baptists, (1646,) Mennonists, (1682,) Moravians, Welch Calvinists, &c., for they merely reiterate the language of the above cited.

Here, then, we have, as expressed by the great body of the

Confessions of the Reformed Church, its testimony on the vital doctrine of original sin. And we look in vain therein for any such dogma on that subject as Dr. Hodge insists upon as essential to the right understanding and true reception of that doctrine. They refer imputation to the fact that we all sinned in Adam, which fact they state without attempting to explain it. They teach that our moral corruption is not the direct penal infliction for the imputed sin of Adam alone, but that it results also from our own sin in Adam. So that the imputation they teach is, as Turretin himself avers, both mediate and immediate,—an imputation of our own sin in and through Adam, rather than the imputation of his own sin alone, as we have already abundantly illustrated. And thus the natural and federal headship of Adam are both equally regarded as essential to the right statement and explication of the doctrine. And thus, moreover, the statement of Stapfer (denounced by Dr. Hodge as Placæanism) stands forth fully vindicated—that it is the adversaries of the Reformed doctrine who assert that it teaches that God imputes the first sin of Adam without any regard to universal corruption, and esteems all Adam's posterity as guilty, and holds them as liable to condemnation, purely on account of that sinful act of their first parent; so that they, without any respect had to their own sin, and so as innocent in themselves, are destined to eternal punishment. And he adds, that those adversaries injuriously suppose those things to be separated in our doctrine which are by no means to be separated; for they consider imputation only as immediate, and abstractly from the mediate, when the Reformed divines suppose that neither ought to be considered separately from the other. Dr. Hodge assumes precisely the position of those adversaries, and maintains their very ground.

We shall now proceed to cite the separate testimonies of the eminent divines of the Reformed Church.

ERRATA IN PART II, DEC. 1861.

Several errata in the article on Imputation, in our last number, and which had been placed in the publisher's hands more than two months anterior to its

publication, were not corrected by him; the most important of which are the following:

On p. 560, line 11, for 1285, read 1265; and for 1807, read 1808.

On p. 578, Maccovius is incorrectly declared to have been a member of the Synod of Dort. We were led into the error by Dr. Hodge; and our readers will please regard the statement as withdrawn.

On p. 589, l. 9, for *man* read *men*.

ART. IV.—*The Secession Conspiracy in Kentucky, and its Overthrow: with the Relation of both to the General Revolt.*

A Memoir of Civil and Political Events, public and private, in Kentucky: To serve as a History of the Secession Conspiracy which had its Center in Kentucky: Commencing in 1859, and extending to the overthrow of the Conspiracy, and the breaking out of the Civil War in that State in 1861.

PART FIRST—Containing the History of the Conspiracy from the Triumph of the Democratic Party in August, 1859, till the Triumph of the Union Party in August, 1861.

I.—1. Kentucky: her Position and Character.—2. Triumph of the Democratic Party in 1859: Subsequent Division and Disorganization: Treason of the Part that adhered to Vice-President Breckinridge.—3. Popular Votes between Aug. 1859, and Aug. 1861: Loyalty of the People: Overthrow of the Vice-President and his Party.

1. The posture of the great border slave States, Maryland, Virginia, Kentucky and Missouri, has been every way peculiar in our great civil war. The posture of North Carolina, Tennessee and Arkansas, lying immediately behind them, and both tiers of States stretching entirely across the somewhat densely-peopled region of the nation, was more nearly analogous to that of the four States first named, than to that of any other portion of the Union. Tennessee had been a portion of North Carolina, and had been originally peopled from that State; and the upper and most populous parts of Arkansas had been settled chiefly by the same class of persons. Kentucky had been a part of Virginia, and had been

peopled chiefly from that State; while Missouri had been peopled chiefly from Kentucky. Centrally situated with respect to the whole Union, Kentucky is bounded on three sides by the three most powerful of the six remaining States named above, to wit, by Virginia, Tennessee, and Missouri; while her remaining boundary lays broadside to the three powerful States of Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois. It added greatly to the influence of Kentucky, that an immense proportion of the inhabitants of the three States last named were connected by the closest ties of blood, of mutual friendship and of trade and commerce with her own people; multitudes of their most eminent men, and vast numbers of their most prosperous citizens, being also Kentuckians by birth. Nor can it be denied that States acquire, in the course of ages, just as individuals acquire, in the course of years, a character at once precise and well understood; nor that, in the case of Kentucky, her long succession of great citizens who had adorned every branch of the public service—the general vigor, patriotism, and generosity of her people—and the habitual wisdom, integrity, and prosperity of her internal administration, had invested her with a public character as eminently honorable to her as it was intensely cherished by her. In effect, the course which Kentucky would take in the great crisis which had fallen upon the nation, was apparently important, out of all proportion to her numerical strength, by reason of the circumstances to which we have thus slightly alluded. The course she did take, and the effect of it upon the immediate fate of the civil war, is now matter of history. There is a lesson too valuable to be lost, far too important in all respects to be forgotten, which does not lie on the surface of public acts, but is indissolubly connected with the public and private history of them. It is this we would rescue from oblivion. For its contrast with all that has occurred elsewhere is as instructive as it is remarkable, whether the other border slave States, where the struggle has been so protracted, or the more southerly States where the conspiracy, the pre-concerted fraud, and the sudden violence were everywhere successful, are made the subjects of the comparison.

2. At the general election in Kentucky which immediately preceded the last canvass for the Presidency of the United States, the Democratic party, then undivided and in possession of the whole power of the National Government, perfected the political revolution which had been working for some years in Kentucky. It elected the Governor of the State, it carried both branches of the State Legislature, it sent to Congress a decided majority of our members. Another State was securely chained to the fortunes of that great political organization, which seemed to be in permanent possession of power in the nation, and to need only a moderate share of wisdom and prudence to put its dominion, its principles, and its policy beyond the reach of chance. Long in advance of any necessity, the Democratic Legislature elected John C. Breckinridge, then Vice-President of the United States, to be a Senator in Congress in the place of Mr. Crittenden, whose term would not expire before the 4th of March, 1861. Mr. Powell, a former Democratic Governor of the State, was already the other Senator from Kentucky. After the rupture of the Democratic party at Charleston and Baltimore, Major Breckinridge, already Vice-President and Senator elect, became the candidate of the Southern wing of the party for the Presidency. His acceptance of this nomination, it is now obvious, drew after it his subsequent identification with the secession party, to which we are satisfied he did not at that time belong. They who nominated him neither expected nor desired to elect him. What they designed was, by his means to carry the electoral votes of the border slave States, and in this manner draw closer to the South the Democratic party in those States. His acceptance of the nomination was a fatal political mistake that in the end sealed his destiny, and to us, who were bound to him by so many ties, it may be permitted to believe that his fall was not premeditated, and to say that it was a national calamity. The work of his overthrow began in Kentucky, which had cherished him with so much affection. The first manifest proof that his political ruin was impending, was given in the election of the Clerk of the Court of Appeals of the State, which

occurred during the heat of the Presidential canvass. By it the division of the Democratic party in the State was shown to be complete, and the Douglas portion of it intensely hostile to Major Breckinridge. At the Presidential election a few months afterward, he was beaten by an immense majority, having received little more than one-third of the votes cast. This result, though not fully understood at the time, proved that the backbone of the secession party in Kentucky was broken. And the results of the same election in all the slave States made it apparent, that so far was it from being possible to array all those States in a national movement against the Federal Government, that very few, if any of them, except South Carolina, could be induced to vote for secession, and that the mass of the people in the bulk of those States, though exasperated at the success of the Republican party, were loyal to the Union. The popular vote given in the slave States, on the Presidential election, demonstrated to the secession party that they were lost if the popular will was to be regarded. They immediately initiated a reign of universal anarchy and violence, and by fraud and terror, violating all laws and trampling constitutions under their feet, proclaimed State after State out of the Union, consummating their work in the organization of the provisional Confederate Government. The whole procedure was a naked and atrocious series of audacious usurpations. What it is of the utmost importance to observe, is, that the whole secession movement has nowhere any foundation but this; and this was resorted to because disunion was not attainable in any other way. We escaped in Kentucky simply because it was perfectly understood that it would be necessary to conquer us first.

3. It will be remembered that the public authorities of Virginia invited a convention of delegates, from the border slave States, to assemble in the Spring of 1861. The result of the vote of the people of Kentucky, on the 4th of May of that year, for members of that convention, showed that the great majority of them were opposed to secession. The same fact was established by a still more decisive vote, on the 20th of June of the same year, in the special election of members of

Congress. And counting the two general elections, mentioned on a previous page, (that for Appellate Clerk, and that for Presidential Electors,) and the two just mentioned, the general State election, on the first Monday of August, 1861, was the fifth occasion, within a year and three months, on which the people had proclaimed their devotion to the Union and the Constitution. The counter Revolution in favor of the Union, as compared with party devotion and disloyalty combined, had wrought so deeply, and had been so completely established by those five popular elections, that after August, 1861, what remained of the Democratic triumph, completed in August, 1859, was three or four members of the State Senate, about a dozen members of the House of Representatives, Mr. Magoffin the governor, and Mr. Powell the Senator in Congress. They stood like a few dead trees scattered over one of our great "clearings," the decaying remnants of a great and betrayed party, which held the State with an apparently irresistible grasp, when Major Breckinridge, its most popular leader, was seduced into accepting a nomination for the Presidency, by a disloyal faction. Now, it is perfectly apparent, from this brief recital of public and notorious facts, that the party which obtained all power in Kentucky, at the election of August, 1859, the party which, with almost indecent haste, prematurely elected Major Breckinridge to the Senate of the United States, was bound by the five popular elections, which took place between August, 1859, and August, 1861—if not indeed by each of them separately to respect the determination of the people of Kentucky not to secede from the Federal Union, and to acquiesce in their settled and reiterated will. Under the most ordinary political circumstances, they were bound to confine themselves to loyal, peaceable, and legal means, in seeking to change the public will. Under the circumstances which existed, the use of any other description of means was traitorous; for it was giving aid and comfort to armed rebels and traitors, who, they knew, were preparing to invade the State, and who did invade it, for the avowed purpose of conquering it into secession, which had been five times repudiated. But to conspire secretly with armed traitors,

to urge and to promote the success of their military invasion of the State; and then, when detected and baffled, to flee secretly to the invading traitors, and take military service with them, in the bosom of Kentucky, against Kentucky; all of which, many thousands of them, embracing most of their leaders, did: these are the most atrocious, as well as the most degrading forms of the highest crimes against society, which it is possible for human beings to commit. Let the horrible condemnation fall where it may, he is no patriot who would arrest it, and that community is unworthy of freedom which hesitates to inflict it.

II.—1. Governor Mageffin, Vice President Breckinridge, and the Legislature, at its Regular Session, in 1859.—2. Public Opinion: Parties: Universal Agitation: Beginning of the Revolt: Neutrality: The People and their leaders.—3. The Mass of the People in the Slave States were Loyal: Violence and Fraud resorted to by the Conspirators: Their attempt upon Kentucky: The Called Session of the Legislature, in 1860: The Adjourned Session of the Legislature in 1861.

1. The elections for members of the Senate and House of Representatives of the Kentucky Legislature, are biennial, and the regular sessions of the body of limited duration, and only biennial. In all free governments, the power to make the laws is the most obvious, as well as the most important function of the sovereignty which comes to be exercised by the representatives of the people. But in this country, some years ago, the radical reformers seem to have come clearly to the notion that representative government was a failure, in comparison with party caucuses; and, in numerous States, they succeeded in so changing existing institutions, that the people were required to vote about ten times as much as they did before, while the aggregate possibility of anything effectual, much less anything good being accomplished by the multiplied votings, was scarcely one-hundredth part of what it had been before. It was against the legislative power of society, its most vital power, that this dangerous fanaticism spent its chief fury. Before 1850 Kentucky had one of the noblest Constitutions ever possessed by a free people: since

that time, perhaps the poorest ever reduced to writing in this country. The Legislature, elected in 1859, instead of being in session a single time, in the lapse of two years, and not more than sixty days in all, as the Constitution of 1850 had provided, as the rule, held three separate sessions, amounting in the aggregate to a good deal more than the average of two annual sessions, as of old. It met, as of course, in the Autumn of 1859: it convened again, upon the call of Governor Magoffin, in 1860, (for what purpose we shall see,) and it held a third session in 1861, on its own adjournment at the called session. At its first, or regular session, it elected Major Breckinridge to the Senate of the United States, and he came from Washington city to Frankfort, as was fit, to render them his thanks, and to open his heart and his mind to them, upon the infinite perils which appeared to threaten the country; perils concerning which, his great position as Vice-President, would add force and solemnity to his words, on this imposing occasion. The speech he delivered to the Legislature, was widely published, and most anxiously read. It did not satisfy the public expectation—and it grievously disappointed the loyal friends of Major Breckinridge, of whom the number, at that time, was by no means inconsiderable. The speech clearly showed that he did not desire to be considered a secessionist—that on the contrary, he desired the preservation of the Union, while he doubted if that was possible; but it proved as clearly, that however much he might be a patriot, he was as much, or more, a partizan. It was, essentially, a mere argument from the point of view of a National Democrat, as the faction he led then called themselves; and its object was to show that in the union and triumph of the Democratic party, lay the only hope of saving the country—if, indeed, it was worth while to save it, on any other terms. It was a great occasion lost. Neither the first nor the second opportunity which Providence had offered to him, wherein a career of unspeakable renown to himself, and service to his country, was set clearly before him, and he proved that, although a very superior man, a destiny was set before him to which he was not equal. The letter of Dr.

Robert J. Breckinridge, to him, dated January 9, 1860, and widely published, immediately after the publication of the speech spoken of above, strove to recall the minds of men from all mere party views of the terrible crisis upon which the country was entering, and to make them comprehend that the triumph or the destruction of parties, was as nothing compared with the preservation of our national life and glory, while it sought to prove that this had always been, and would forever be, the sentiment of Kentucky, and that his kinsman had no course, whether as a Senator, or as a man, either of personal honor or public fame, but to espouse it and to adorn it.

2. A year wore away in the midst of indescribable agitations everywhere. Mr. Lincoln had been elected, but was not yet inaugurated. The Southern States had begun to secede. Kentucky was profoundly moved; and the state of opinion was, in its distinguishing characteristics, almost peculiar to herself. At that period there was not, probably, one person out of a thousand in the State, who did not feel persuaded, that the people of the South had received great injury and provocation from the North, and that there was abundant reason for them to apprehend great danger in the future. On the other hand, the number was comparatively small, not one in a hundred, perhaps, of the entire population, who were willing to secede from the Federal Union; nor was the proportion much larger of those who then believed the States had any power to secede; or, even if the power existed, any adequate justification for doing so. The vote of the State had been given to Mr. Bell; the Democratic party had been divided, the larger portion voting for Major Breckinridge, the smaller for Mr. Douglas. The first and third of these three parties, unitedly, made about two-thirds of the people, and of the voters of the State; and the progress of agitation, of discussion, and of events, did ultimately unite them in support of the Union; leaving the other portion of the Democratic party, being hardly one-third of the people, or of the voters, adherents of Major Breckinridge, and ultimately secessionists, embracing the Governor of the State, and most of the con-

spicuous Democrats of it. There were, however, numerous exceptions to these general statements, with reference to individuals, many of them conspicuous, who had acted with each of the three parties just named. And the general tendency was to a decided, but not very rapid fixing of men and parties, more and more distinctly in their respective convictions and aims. As a kind of interlude in the great game of revolution, while the community was intensely heated, and yet reluctant to take any irrevocable step, the idea of the *Neutrality* of the State was suggested, and seemed to afford the very relief and hesitation which the people desired. Among the innumerable follies which marked the course of the Revolt, and stamped upon its leaders the brand of incapacity; the two most fatal, perhaps, were the bombardment of Fort Sumter, in the harbor of Charleston, which rendered war inevitable, and the invasion and attempted conquest of Kentucky, which rendered the rebel success in the war impossible. The former event had just occurred. The nation was electrified. The new President, whose previous forbearance had been complete, issued his proclamation calling for 75,000 volunteers, and was answered by the immediate tender of treble, or quadruple the number. To Kentucky was assigned by the President, one or two regiments, as her quota of the volunteers: and her Governor, Mr. Magoffin, returned to him a curt and insolent refusal; and what, without the explanations we have been making, would seem now to be inconceivable, the Legislature approved his act, without serious opposition. As long as there was a hope that civil war could be avoided; and as long after it commenced, as there was a hope that it would be brief; there were plausible reasons to urge why it might be both possible and wise for Kentucky to occupy a position of neutrality; and there were motives, very opposite from each other, which induced the leaders of hostile parties to concur in the effort to maintain it. But it was inevitable that secessionists and loyal citizens must mean by neutrality, a condition while it lasted, and a result when it was reached, totally the opposite one from the other. It was a truce, responsive to a peculiar and most agitated condition

of the loyal mind of the State, eagerly employed by the leaders of the disloyal portion of the people in maturing their preparations, and suddenly disappearing as soon as the real and terrible issues at stake, came clearly before the general mind. The common people of Kentucky have been wiser, braver, and more loyal, than their leaders. Multitudes of those leaders have already disappeared before the majesty of the simple, and resolute purpose of the true people. Multitudes of them still maintain precarious positions, by mere tolerance, or the force of popular habit, who will presently disappear. Of all those who were conspicuous in the regular session of the Legislature, elected in August, 1859, and of those who were then their conspicuous friends, in the State at large, how small is the number left, who have any appreciable hold upon the public mind! And of that small number, how close is the connection between their fidelity then, and their present hold upon the confidence of their country! Who pleads for neutrality in Kentucky now? Who indorses Governor Magoffin's rebuke of the President, for offering to accept Kentucky volunteers? Who desires to send commissioners to Washington, to demand the removal of loyal Kentucky troops from a Kentucky camp, in the bosom of the State? And yet our public men should understand, that our vision is far more thoroughly purged to day, than it was two years ago, and that the remembrance of acts performed now, will not perish two years hence.

3. Nothing had occurred, during the regular session of the Legislature, to shake the confidence of the leading men of the party, which called itself the *Southern Rights party*, in their ability to lead that body effectually in the way of secession. On the contrary, much had been done during that session to strengthen the disloyal sentiment and party, and to awaken distrust and apprehension in all loyal minds. In November, 1860, the Presidential election occurred, and was followed immediately by the revolt of several Southern States, and by open preparations for revolution and war in all the Cotton States, while secret machinations to the same end agitated all the remaining slave States. The state of the popu-

lar vote throughout the slave States had clearly shown, that the aggregate majority of the whole was hostile to the party that ran Major Breckinridge for the Presidency; and that while this majority was very large in many of those States, there was not one of them in which hostile minorities did not exist; while those minorities were very powerful in many of them. It followed, that any idea of a national movement in the slave States, against the Federal Union and Constitution, was simply preposterous. It also followed, that any attempt to carry the slave States out of the Union, *by voting*, would fail outright, in the majority of those States, embracing all of the first class; and that the loyal minorities, in any that might vote to secede, would be every-where an embarrassment, destructive of success to every peaceful attempt at disunion. In short, first or last, treason meant violence and war. In all possible forms of government, revolutions that can not be accomplished by voting, can be accomplished only by the bayonet. From the very first movement, therefore, of this insurrection in America, it was perfectly clear to every man of common sense, who was engaged in it, that it was an attempt to carry through a revolution by violence and fraud, instead of an attempt to change existing institutions through the agency of opinion, made known by voting. And its whole course has been attended by an uninterrupted use of violence, public and private, and an unbroken stream of falsehood, in word and act, designed to conceal the intimate nature of the atrocious conspiracy. The favorite instrument resorted to, was what were called *sovereign conventions*; that is, a gathering of a certain number of traitors, constituted in permanence, and exercising unlimited despotic power. But the ordinary institutions of society were also seized on, and perverted to the use of treason; and among these, State Legislatures, in secret and in extraordinary sessions, were made effective engines of revolutionary fanaticism. At this stage of the spreading anarchy, Major Breckinridge appeared openly as the leader of the disloyal movement in Kentucky. The time was supposed to have come for the decisive blow to be struck in Kentucky. There was, therefore, widely

published throughout the State, a short letter from him, written at Washington city, laying down the programme for the guidance of Kentucky, amid the darkness which covered the land, about the end of the year 1860. He was careful not to say, in so many words, what ground Kentucky ought to take; but he was explicit in advising those methods to be resorted to, in reaching the ground she would occupy, which had led to secession every-where else. The Legislature was to be called together in extra session; a sovereign convention of the people was to be convened; the State was to put herself right upon the great questions which were convulsing her, and which had dissolved the Union; and the Federal Government was assumed to be at an end, and the Federal Constitution to be destroyed: that is, in plain English, the Revolution being an accomplished fact, and the valid existence of the Government common to the nation being ended; all that remained for Kentucky was to make a revolution for herself, follow the lead of the revolted States, and set up on her own account. What all this was to end in might be determined afterwards, Major Breckinridge not being committed in his letter. Kentucky might see fit to become an independent commonwealth; she might unite in some kind of a reconstruction of the general government; she might form a new and separate league, or federation, or government, with the other Border slave States, or with certain conterminous States, without regard to slavery; or she might unite with all the slave States in a new and limited Confederacy—this last, probably, being the result secretly intended. The letter was probably written after counsel and agreement among the leading men of the Southern Rights party in the State; and its suggestions were followed by the party, as far as they had power to do so. There was a time when it would have produced a great impression, and done much mischief; but the elections of May and November, 1860, had overthrown its author, and his party in Kentucky. With reference to it, and the objects recommended in it, however, Governor Magoffin convened the Legislature in extra session; and his party in that body did all the mischief they

could, and would gladly have done more. With reference, also, to the same perilous topics, but with views considerably modified since their election in August, 1859, the same Legislature held a third session, on its own adjournment, toward the close of their term of service, in the year 1861. Over them, during the existence of this Legislature, parties were distinctly and finally rallied; and the great political battle was fought and won; and the sword was drawn, and the civil victory cemented with human blood.

III.—1. The Legislature first hesitates, and then revolts against Vice-President Breckinridge and Governor Magoffin: James Guthrie, Esq., the nominee of the Legislature for the Presidency: Bearing of that Political Movement.—2. Guilt of the Disloyal Party after the Presidential Election of 1860, and Fate of its Kentucky Leaders: Their Attempts on Kentucky, and how defeated: The Loyal Party in that State—Its Principles, Conduct, and Final Triumph: Political Overthrow of the Traitors followed immediately by the Military Invasion of Kentucky.

1. Whatever may have been the state of opinion in the Legislature, of which so much has been said, when it was elected in August, 1859—whatever may have been the general tenor of its spirit and acts during its regular session, soon after that election—whatever may have been the hopes and designs of Governor Magoffin, and those who co-operated with him, when about a year afterward he convened the body in extra session: it is certain that the body itself paused, during that called session, in the career it had been running, and after a protracted internal struggle, openly revolted against the Vice-President and the Governor at its subsequent adjourned session. The two years of its existence were signalized by six popular votes in Kentucky, as remarkable as any ever cast in the State. The first of these was the vote which elected the body itself, and made the triumph of the Democratic party complete in that State, after a struggle of nearly forty years. The last of the six was the vote electing the next succeeding Legislature, in August, 1861, by which the counter-revolution in support of the Federal Union and Constitution was overwhelmingly established. The other four popular votes occurred in May and November, 1860, and

in May and June, 1861; the first of the four for the Clerk of the Supreme Court of the State, the second for Presidential Electors, the third for members of the Border State Convention recommended by Virginia, the fourth for members of Congress from Kentucky. Three of these four elections last named were hotly contested, and in each of the three the secession party was signally beaten; the remaining one—for members of the Border State Convention—that party allowed to go by default, having nominated candidates and then withdrawn them; but nothing was gained by the ruse, for the candidates of the Union party, though not opposed, received considerably over a hundred thousand votes, being more than two-thirds of all the votes in the State. All four of these popular votes occurred after the regular session of the Legislature of 1859 had adjourned, and the first of the four—in May, 1860—gave the first indisputable proof that the Democratic party in Kentucky was rent in twain upon the questions of Union and secession. The Democratic members of that Legislature were no less thoroughly divided among themselves, as the supporters of Major Breckinridge or Mr. Douglas for the Presidency, than the whole party was. And this general difficulty was exasperated by a personal one. For the friends of Mr. James Guthrie had succeeded in securing for him the Democratic nomination in Kentucky for the Presidency, and the vote of the State had been cast for him, in the Charleston Convention, up to the moment of its own disruption. Mr. Guthrie had been, before that, a conspicuous candidate in opposition to Major Breckinridge, for the seat to which the latter had so recently been elected to the Senate of the United States, and he had been for many years a distinguished leader of the party before his successful competitor for its headship, and all its highest honors, had arrived at man's estate. It is possible, also, that some appearance of patronage on the part of Major Breckinridge may have wounded Mr. Guthrie. And his public and continual avowal of indifference to all office, even the highest, coupled with his constant and openly proclaimed refusal to enter into any combinations or pledges with other candidates

for mutual promotion, may have aggravated the wound. It was well understood that the appointment of Mr. Guthrie, instead of the late Lynn Boyd, Esq., to the Secretaryship of the Treasury, by President Buchanan, in which Mr. Guthrie so greatly distinguished himself, was due to the decided interposition of Vice-President Breckinridge. There were obvious causes, numerous and powerful, operating during the two years for which this Legislature held office, and explaining the change which gradually passed upon the body. The party in power was broken to pieces, and the members of the Legislature took opposite sides. The candidate of that Legislature for the Presidency sunk out of view by that rupture, and two new candidates for that high office, one for each fragment of the ruined party, were presented to them as representatives of opinions absolutely irreconcilable, and involving the life of the nation. Moreover, they must have felt the power of the somewhat vague but intense Union feeling which pervaded the State, and which was made manifest in a succession of such immense votes. Possibly they sympathized with that feeling more deeply than was supposed at the time. Probably they recoiled from the calm but resolute opposition with which loyal men confronted all suggestion of every illegal and unconstitutional proceeding, and shrunk from precipitating the perils of the issue to which they distinctly knew that resistance would be carried. At any rate, the time had fully come "for Kentucky to put herself right," as Major Breckinridge's proclamation had defined the accepted secession method, and Governor Magoffin had called the Legislature to Frankfort expressly to take action concerning the interest, the honor, and the duty of Kentucky, in the frightful condition of affairs to which the country had been brought. No one could doubt what the Vice-President and the Governor desired the Legislature to do. The body, as we have before said, paused—was convulsed—and at last revolted against its leaders.

2. The judgment which ought to be formed of the conduct of the party which revolted in Kentucky, up to the Presidential election in November, 1860, may well be different

from the judgment which ought to be formed of its conduct after that period. All parties had been mistaken in some important particulars; Mr. Douglas proved to be a far more patriotic man than he was supposed to be; Mr. Bell proved to be utterly unworthy of the support of the party that nominated him; Major Breckinridge proved to be a mere instrument used for a special purpose by the leaders of a conspiracy, instead of the leader himself of the great State Rights party. And it must be added, that Mr. Lincoln has proved to be far less a partizan than those who elected him supposed he was, and far more a patriot than any of his opponents believed him to be. All that had publicly occurred up to the election of the President might well have passed away; and the fundamental principles not only of our entire political system, but also of all possible forms of free government, required that the person then elected President should be accepted as the choice of the American people, fairly made. After this, opposition to the will of the nation, constitutionally expressed, was factious; armed opposition was treason; secret and concerted opposition was a conspiracy; and anarchy is the natural result of all such opposition when it succeeds. In no portion of the United States was the secession party more fatally guilty, after November, 1860, than in Kentucky; and whoever will reflect on the fate of the conspicuous persons, natives or citizens of that State, Generals Johnson, Breckinridge, Preston, Buckner, Crittenden, Tilghman, Williams, Marshall, Governors Morehead, Powell, Magoffin—nay, even President Davis himself—who have partaken of this guilt, will perhaps more clearly appreciate the swift justice of God and the courageous loyalty of the people. For no violence or fraud which had prospered elsewhere, but was suggested to this Legislature as proper to be undertaken or approved by them; and nothing was suggested of either sort that would not have succeeded, if the loyal people of Kentucky had followed the example of the loyal people in every State that seceded. Secret sessions of the Legislature, which had been the common instruments of successful treason elsewhere, were vehemently urged at Frankfort; and nothing prevented them,

probably, but the recoil of a portion of the majority of those controlling the Legislature, from the extreme personal peril which the attempt involved. Sovereign conventions had been called and used elsewhere; and nothing prevented a resort to this instrument but the deliberate avowal of the Union men, that they would take up arms the moment a sovereign convention was called, under any other authority than that of the majority of the people of the State, lawfully expressed at the polls. Masses of armed secessionists were gathered at Frankfort by concert, in order to overawe the Legislature, as had been done in other States; gathered there at the appointed time by private arrangements, by printed appeals, by votes and resolutions of disloyal meetings, and by inflammatory harangues made by open traitors throughout the State. But when they met at the seat of Government, it was perceived that as many, as resolute, and as well armed Union men had taken care that no such overawing should take place. Whatever credit may be awarded to any portion of the secession party, in or out of the Legislature, for prudence or forbearance—and whatever praise may be due to those members of the party majority in the two Houses, who, by adhering to the Union cause, arrested the headlong career of the Governor and the Vice-President; the chief cause of whatever good was done, and of the much greater evil that was prevented, during these momentous sessions of the Legislature; is to be found in the sagacious and intrepid conduct of leading Union men, in and out of the Legislature, and in the wise and staunch loyalty of the people. In full view of the perils around them and before them, a certain number of persons, clearly seeing a definite course of duty, distinctly proclaimed it, and adhered to it with great forbearance, and yet with unalterable firmness: and, as in all similar cases, a wise, just, and manly course, clearly stated and firmly held, led the State through thick darkness, and along the brink of destruction, with her feet on the solid rock. It finally came to be seen, almost universally, by men deserving to be called loyal, that the salvation of the State depended on two things, and upon keeping the two as nigh together as

possible. *First*, That the Constitution of the State should be held sacred, and all revolutionary proceedings, in contempt of it, resisted to extremity, and if necessary by force. *Secondly*, That the will of the people, lawfully expressed at the polls, should be respected, and where it was possible, enforced; and in no case resisted by Union men with arms. At the back of these openly avowed rules of action—clear, simple, and just—was the calm, but sincere purpose, never concealed, to take up arms in vindication of them, at the first moment of necessity; but yet at the same time to acquiesce, as far as the safety of the State would allow, in the wishes and even in the caprices even of temporary and excited majorities of the people and the Legislature. There is little in the history of parties in Kentucky, during the years 1859, 1860, and 1861; little in the proceedings of the Legislature, which held office from August, 1859, to August, 1861; little in the varying shades of public opinion, during the two years preceding the election of August, 1861, the last that has been held in the State; that is not perfectly explicable when brought to the test of the statements just made. It was a great and protracted contest, wherein the leaders of the loyal party gained, day by day, in a period of revolution, against the party holding all power, civil and military; and finally, and without resorting to violence, achieved a complete triumph, solely by the skill, and courage, and temperance, with which they directed public opinion. Within thirty days after the election of August, 1861, at which the secession cause was politically annihilated in Kentucky, a large confederate army invaded the State. The bloodshed came late, but it came of course in a treason whose nature was violence and fraud. We will show that those thirty days were the most momentous of all, and the most fatal to the cause of treason.

IV.—1. The Conspirators called the *The Knights of the Golden Circle*: Their Infamous Character, and Atrocious Designs.—2. Surreptitious Organization of a Disloyal Force under General Buckner, called the *State Guard*: Object, and Fate of these Troops: Conduct of Governor Magoffin and his party: Military Force of the Disloyal Party in the State.—3. System and Means of Defense of the Loyal Party: Creation of the State Military Board—Effects of that

Expedient: Organization of the *Home Guard*—Nature and Extent of that Force: State Authorities evaded arming it—Private Persons induce the General Government to arm it: Decisive Importance of this Act—Violent Attempts of Secessionists to defeat it, and seize the arms: General Organization of *Union Clubs*—Their Nature and Use.—4. Final and Complete Political Overthrow of the Conspiracy: Elections of June and August, 1861: Reactionary Symptoms among Politicians: Past Conduct—Present Sentiment—Future Course of Kentucky.

1. There are several matters of sufficient importance to require a particular explanation in connection with the state of public affairs, when the Legislature of 1859–1861 adjourned finally, and all parties were organizing for elections near at hand, and whose results, it was seen, must be decisive. Among the chief of these was a secret political and military organization, called the *Knights of the Golden Circle*, which had been widely introduced into Kentucky, by means of a great number of *Castles*, as its lodges were called, organized among the secessionists of the State. We have no means of determining with certainty, what number of initiated members these castles unitedly contained; for, indeed, the practice of secrecy, and the use of numerous grades of membership, together with a complicated jargon made doubly unintelligible by hieroglyphics and pantomime, enabled a select central organization to monopolize at once all knowledge of its force, and all power to use it. It was one of those monsters, sprung from the fermenting dregs of revolutions, whose vile life is nourished only by filth and blood. The paternity of the order was ostentatiously claimed by a person called Beckley, who assumed the title of its General, in certain mysterious advertisements, and in occasional treasonable proclamation. The avowed objects of the order were various. Sometimes, it was to protect the Spanish States on the southern portion of this continent; sometimes, to protect the institution of slavery, in our own Southern States; in Ohio, its secret pretext was, the restoration of the Democratic party to power; while in Kentucky, its repeatedly avowed design was, to aid, by arms, in the separation of the State from the Federal Union, and the annexation of it to a Southern Confederacy. Its modes of proceeding, its hieroglyphics, and its

horrible oaths, were disclosed in Kentucky, and made public through the press; while in several other States, the same result was partially obtained in certain judicial investigations. In short, it was a standing conspiracy against the peace of society, and the safety of individuals, existing in the double form of a menace to all virtue, public and private, and of a refuge for desperadoes and ruffians. Its mere existence proved that society was fatally disordered; while its wide dissemination through the nation, and especially throughout the Southern States, of which its General openly boasted through the press, uncontradicted, was an infallible premonition either of dissolution, or the sword. There was a sort of standing advertisement by this General Beckley, that he had at his bidding an army of Kentucky Knights of the Golden Circle, armed, equipped, always increasing, always ready for battle, and never rated by him at less than 8,000; with which, when the word was given by those with whom he co-operated, he would immediately plant his flag on the capitol. It is manifest that such a force, on a sudden emergency, could not have been cut to pieces, as matters then stood, without costing Kentucky an infinite price, in the lives of her noblest citizens: and that it could not have been resisted at all, by a force hastily collected and imperfectly organized, unless that force was composed of dauntless men, accustomed to the use of arms. After all that has occurred since, it is not boasting to say, that, nevertheless, General Beckley and his Knights would have been cut to pieces, if he had ever got the word he was waiting for. The most surprising part to posterity, of the whole affair, will perhaps be, that not the slightest movement was made, either by the civil or military authorities of the party then in power, from the Governor of the State down, to call this traitor and his band to account, or to protect the loyal people of the State against them. Unless, indeed, the heroic indifference with which that loyal population contemplated both the proceedings of Beckley and his Knights, and the connivance of the Governor, should appear more surprising.

2. A more direct and effectual method than connivance at

the organized treason of the Knights of the Golden Circle, was resorted to by the party which then controlled the Legislature, in order to provide an adequate military force. There were about one hundred and fifty thousand men in the State, of the age of military service fixed by the existing laws: and there were probably fifty thousand more, under and over the military ages, who, upon a great emergency, would be capable of military service. All these might be set down as being two-thirds of them loyal, and one-third of them secessionists. The militia system of the State had been steadily and for a number of years, rendered more and more inefficient, by the passage of numerous laws, designed, apparently, to destroy it, until it had become so completely disorganized that not even a single regiment existed, except on paper, and not even on paper was there a single regiment with a full complement of officers. The people, as a mass, were skilled in the use of arms, from boyhood up; and there were private fire arms enough in the State, to have furnished every person capable of using it, with a tolerably good weapon. There were, also, a considerable number of United States small arms, and some fifty pieces of ordnance in the State, which had been appropriated to Kentucky, as her share of the arms distributed by the Federal Government, in former years, toward the arming of the national militia. Although, as has been shown, Governor Magoffin had tartly rebuffed the President, when he offered to accept a few regiments from Kentucky to aid in saving the Federal city from capture by the rebels; and although, the Legislature had approved his conduct; that was a very different matter from putting Governor Magoffin, himself, at the head of a powerful and well appointed military force—which might be raised and equipped under the pretext of causing the neutrality of Kentucky to be respected—and used in making the governor and his party masters of the State. The natural course to take, was to reorganize the entire militia of the State, promptly and thoroughly; to divide it into classes of thirty to fifty thousand men each; and to have the first class immediately prepared for service upon any emergency that might arise, while the

remaining classes were being more lieisurely and more perfectly organized, for successive service, as it might be necessary. The simplicity, the economy, and the efficacy of such a procedure, were the very reasons that prevented its adoption; for the party in power did not desire to give the State an impregnable position in the Union; but, on the contrary, such a position as would oblige her, at last, to leave the Union, or render her subjugation certain if she resisted their traitorous schemes. To this end, various projects were brought forward involving the expenditure of many millions of money, and the inauguration of vast preparations for defense: but every proposition involved a danger, greater than any a gallant people could incur, by being unprepared for a sudden attack, namely, the danger of having ample preparations so made, that a disloyal governor, and a disloyal majority in the Legislature, would have it in their power to abuse them all, to the ruin of a loyal people. It was a position of extreme embarrassment, for the loyal minority of the Legislature, even though they were sustained by a great majority of the people. The principles which should regulate their conduct, were perfectly simple; namely, that no encroachment should be attempted on the constitutional powers and prerogatives of the Governor, and no indignity should be offered to his great office; but on the other hand, that nothing which could be lawfully done, should be left undone, to prevent him from doing mischief. The practical application of these rules of conduct, during three sessions of the Legislature, covering considerable portions of two years, during the struggles of which, the minority continually increased in strength, and finally controlled the Legislature on many important questions; was a difficulty, requiring much higher qualifications than are ordinarily possessed by legislative bodies. Whatever mistakes were made, lay rather in an excess of forbearance to the Governor, than in an excess of zeal for the safety and honor of the State. The shape which the matter finally took, proved in the result, to be every way bad. A considerable sum of money was appropriated for military purposes, in such a way that the Governor was enabled to use it; and he did use a

large part of it in the secret purchase of arms, through an agent of his own, from the secessionists of New Orleans, for the use of the secessionists of Kentucky. In addition, an Act was passed, creating a volunteer force, called the *State Guard*, which was directed to be immediately raised, organized, armed, equipped, and drilled, chiefly at the expense of the State; and in direct violation of the Constitution, and of the whole structure of our own, and every other military system on earth; and in total disregard of all propriety, and even common sense, under the circumstances that existed; a staff officer of Governor Magoffin, himself a person not even belonging to the line of the army about to be raised, was created commander-in-chief, in the body of the law itself. This person proved to be Gen. S. B. Buckner, who was in command of the Confederate army at Fort Donelson, and was made a prisoner there, along with the rebel force under his command. It might as well be added that Col. Roger Hanson, who was captured at the same time, along with the bulk of his regiment, had been one of the Colonels of Gen. Buckner's State Guard; that Gen. Tilghman, who was captured a few days before, while in command of Fort Henry, was another of his Colonels; and that a large portion of the whole body has perished or been captured, in the service of the Confederate States. It consisted of about five thousand fine troops, and would have risen to five times that number if a little more time could have been gained, or the thoroughly disloyal character of the force had been somewhat more carefully concealed from the public. When the secession conspiracy in Kentucky prematurely broke down, this body of troops was transferred, almost entire, to the Confederate forces operating against that State. It is perfectly well known that the law creating this force, was passed almost in the very moment of the adjournment of the first session of the Legislature of 1859-61, by a mere trick of a handful of traitors—when not members enough of both houses were present at the midnight outrage, to have constituted a legal quorum of either of them. What shall be thought of the Governor of the State, who lent his whole personal and

official influence to procure in such a manner, the passage of a law designed to be used, and actually used, for purposes supremely wicked and disloyal—under the scandalous false pretext that it was necessary for the security of the commonwealth; and then, with complete knowledge of the outrageous manner in which the act was violently and disgracefully passed, gave efficacy to the audacious conspiracy, by affixing his official signature to the bill, and causing it to be filed as a good law, among the archives of the State! And what is to be thought of the overwhelming loyal majority, in both branches of the Legislature, elected in August, 1861, who allow two sessions of the body to pass, without calling the Governor to account, for a long series of official acts, of which these are but specimens! Will God approve, or can the country approve of the condemnation or punishment of the inferior instruments of treason, by inferior tribunals—when criminals the most elevated, the most bound to be faithful, and therefore the most guilty and dangerous of all, are thus allowed to go unquestioned by the great tribunal which is bound to call them to account? The sum of what we have been saying, in its military aspect, is this: there was a secret armed force of eight thousand traitors in Kentucky, and under Gen. Beckley, called Knights of the Golden Circle; there were five thousand well appointed State troops, called the State Guard, commanded by Gen. Buckner, an officer of the staff of the Governor; there was a body of secessionists, whose number we have no means of ascertaining with certainty, nor the precise nature or extent of their organization, amounting to twenty thousand men, or upwards, privately armed, in part with State arms, and in part with arms furnished to them from the rebel States—the whole body capable of immediate service, as neighborhood squads—and of being rapidly gathered in companies, and regiments. Immediately after the defeat of the Federal army at Manassas, in July, 1861, the most excitable and organized of this particular force, commenced leaving Kentucky to join the Confederate army; thus disclosing its previous condition. So that, at the period of darkness and peril now spoken of, there was a military force of

between thirty and forty thousand armed secessionists in Kentucky, in readiness to attempt there, what they and we knew, had been accomplished without difficulty, by similar, but far inferior means, in so many other States. Nor did they entertain the least doubt of their ability to accomplish it, whenever the proper time came; a confidence, as the event proved, wholly delusive, but to which is, perhaps, to be attributed in some degree, whatever delay occurred.

8. It may well be supposed that the loyal people of the State were not inattentive to these things; and that the leading men among them, whether in or out of the Legislature, were not ignorant of their real significance and design. The conviction daily extended and strengthened among the people, that the fate of the commonwealth would have to be decided by arms; and as this conviction became settled, their distrust of time-serving and irresolute, professional politicians grew apace; their demand for true and earnest leading became vehement, and partly by the help of insufficient enactments wrung from the Legislature, but chiefly by means of their own spontaneous vigor, a system and means of protection grew up, side by side, with the conspiracy against them. With the view of protecting the State, as far as possible, from Governor Magoffin, when it became obvious to the public what the surreptitious creation of his State Guard, commanded by his staff officer, General Buckner, meant; a military Board was created, at a subsequent session, and invested with as ample power as it was supposed the Constitution allowed. By a great struggle in the Legislature, General Buckner was prevented from being created, by law, a member of this Board; and the majority of persons put on it, by act of Assembly, were supposed to be loyal. After the Legislature itself had grown somewhat in loyalty, the Board was purged of the Governor, by act of Assembly, and its loyalty still farther strengthened. The practical effects of these indirect attempts to accomplish objects, which there were obvious direct methods of accomplishing, were not such as to vindicate the wisdom of their authors. The military patronage, and the military power of the State, fell very largely into the

hands of this Board, elected by the Legislature, and of the Adjutant-General of the State, appointed by the Governor—effects never contemplated by the constitution, theoretically absurd, and in their practical working full of inconvenience, and begetting endless opportunities and temptations of a character which laws ought to prevent instead of creating. The precedent was full of danger, and there was no need of setting it. It would have been far better to repeal the law creating the State guard; far better to have impeached the Governor; far better to have had him arrested—as many far less guilty and dangerous men were—under the authority of the General Government; far better to have left him to do his worst, relying on the power of the General Assembly to cut him short when it should be indispensable, and on the still higher power of organized public opinion, and armed public vengeance, to keep him in bounds, or deal with him when he transgressed them. At a still later period, an Act was passed authorising military companies to be raised, designed more particularly for local service, and called *Home Guards*. These troops were to be armed by the State. But whether through inattention or design, no provision was made authorizing their organization into larger bodies than a company, or the existence of any officer among them higher than a captain. About 20,000 unarmed men were immediately organized into companies, under this law; and it was seen that nearly the entire loyal male population, able to bear arms, could be enrolled in this force. At first, many persons of secession tendencies, more or less decided, encouraged the formation of these companies, and, to a certain extent, became members of them. They did this, however, chiefly as an expression of a political opinion, destructive of the very nature and object of the force itself; namely, that it was designed to protect the neutrality of the State, equally against the Federal and the Confederate Governments, instead of being designed especially to protect the people against sudden violence on the part of a military conspiracy organized within the State, and against sudden invasion by Confederate troops, who were hovering on its frontiers. This

sort of co-operation was, however, soon abandoned; for the companies of Home Guards, spontaneously, and to a considerable extent, supplied the fatal deficiency of the law under which they were organized, by voluntarily uniting into regiments; and, with a common consent, received men of known loyalty as regimental officers, designated by persons who had their confidence. To obtain arms was more difficult; because it was pretended by the State authorities, who should furnish them, that all the State arms had already been distributed; and in numerous instances, the difficulties created by the law itself, and made the means of defeating it, by disloyal civil officers, who were charged with certain preliminary duties connected with its execution, rendered a technically regular application for the arms impossible. In this emergency, successful application was made to the Federal Government, by certain loyal citizens, for arms to be used in their own defense by the loyal people of Kentucky. Chiefly through the instrumentality of Lieutenant Nelson, of the Navy, a native of Kentucky, and at present a General in the volunteer army of the United States; largely through the activity of a few private gentlemen, a large portion of the Home Guard, and a considerable number of private citizens in addition, were furnished with arms by the General Government. These arms were brought into Kentucky, during the spring and summer of 1861. As soon as the secessionists discovered that they were being brought in, attempts were every-where made by them to prevent it. The wildest clamor was raised; threats of violence were openly made; committees of vigilance claimed and exercised the right of inspecting depots and burden trains; bridges were set on fire, and in two instances, (one at Cynthiana and the other at Paris,) men who were guarding them were murdered; riots were attempted to be raised whenever it was known arms were being transported. The coming of these arms to Kentucky was the event which would decide the fate of the State before the summer of that year was passed. This the leading secessionists understood at the time, because, as the event proved, all the necessary arrangements were already made for the inva-

sion of the State after the August election, if in that election the secession party should be finally overthrown; and there was a vast difference between conquering a people, whether it was ready or not ready for the attack. Very few, perhaps none of the loyal men of the State, fully understood at that time the whole importance of what they were doing, for it was only after the *famous Scott dinner, on the 17th of August, 1861*, that the final and secret purpose of the conspirators was fully discovered. But the whole loyal population of the State already knew they must at last fight, or be enslaved, and they both desired and resolved to have better arms. The attempt to drive them from their purpose, first by menace and then by open violence, was met by that calm and intrepid front which finally saved the State, after more than two years of violence. Armed squads of loyal men, more or less numerous, sometimes two or three platoons, sometimes a full company, were always ready to receive and escort the arms that had been ordered. They needed to be the most desperate of mankind, or to be armed in the noblest of all causes, who ventured to obstruct the work these men set out to do. But, what was better even than the arms they so much needed, was the open avowal of the General Government, somewhat tardily made, that it recognized its obligation to stand by all, everywhere, who were faithful to the country; and in particular its assurance to the people of Kentucky that they should not be swallowed up by a traitorous conspiracy and invasion, without having a fair chance of defending ourselves. To crown the whole series of defensive arrangements, and impart vigor and unity to the entire system of protection, *Union Clubs* had been rapidly organized by a concerted movement throughout the State. By their aid about 50,000 loyal men were organized to a certain extent, and placed in a position of mutual concert. As a political force, these associations seemed to be indispensable against combinations which assailed Kentucky without ceasing, and under continually varying aspects, but ever with the same fatal design, and sustained under all circumstances by the whole influence of the revolted States. As the nucleus of a sudden military rising, in

the nature of a levy *en masse*, of the loyal population of the State, they offered the means of encountering the first shock of such an attack as had desolated Missouri; a general rising, namely, of the disloyal people of the State in concert with a powerful invasion by Confederate States.

4. We have now completed, up to a certain point and period, the general view we desired to give of the state of affairs in Kentucky, and the relations of those affairs, on the one hand to the general treason which broke out in civil war in the autumn of 1860, and their relations, on the other hand, to the national movements for the suppression of the traitorous revolt. The period and event at which we have arrived, are the general election in Kentucky, on the first Monday of August, 1861. On the 20th of the preceding June, six weeks earlier, there had been an election for the members of Congress from Kentucky. The total overthrow of the disloyal party in that State, proved, beyond mistake, by three immediately preceding general elections, was made complete, as it would have been accepted as final by patriotic men, by these last elections. By one of them, nine out of ten of the members returned to Congress, were loyal to the country; by the other, at least three-fourths of the members of each branch of the State Legislature were taken from the loyal party. In both cases the aggregate popular majority was very great; in both the tendency of opinion was in the same direction; loyal Representatives supplanting disloyal ones; decidedly loyal ones superseding such as had been weak or irresolute. And when those elections come to be repeated, in August, 1863, it will probably be found that Kentucky has very little sympathy with those untimely and ungracious scruples which seem to be the only contribution which a numerous class of public men are ever able to make, either to their own fame, or to the glory of their country. Having triumphed signally in a common cause, the good old State will hardly appreciate the value of chronic apprehensions, that they who saved her and all she had, may finally wrong or insult her, concerning some small part of the immense possession. She never expected unanimity at the North any more than at the South,

or in her own bosom ; nor did she ever have an idea of taking up arms either to suppress or to defend speculative opinions of any sort whatever. Least of all will she ever be induced to show even bad manners, or bad temper, much less bad principles, in groundless and painstaking distrust of heroic comrades, who have not only trusted and honored her, but have made her very name historic to eternal ages, by their great deeds wrought upon her soil, and in her defense. They who survive have taken her heart away with them ; the life-blood of those who fell in her cause has made her whole land sacred, and she will teach her children to honor every spot where the dust of even a nameless hero rests. No, no : let our public men be done with all unworthy cavils. The American people will never betray Kentucky. And though Kentucky has less than she once had, whereof she might boast, and has no heart now to boast of anything ; she may lift the veil from every loyal bosom in all her wide domain, and he who reads there the record of a quenchless love, and a loyalty so true that it counted all other things but dung, will read also lines of unutterable woe, endured unto the bitterness of death. She has done what she could : and oh ! at what cost ! God forbid, that after offering to sacrifice upon the altar of her duty, the third part of her children, who were dearer to her than her life, she should now be made infamous forever, by false pretexts, and base alarms and murmurings, and ignoble cavilings for nought !

ART. V.—*In Memoriam.*

A Tribute to the Rev. Stuart Robinson : With Notices of the Rev. J. M. Worrall, the Rev. T. A. Hoyt, the Rev. R. L. Breck, and some others.

“THE DANVILLE REVIEW.—Godly and loyal persons who fear the Lord and love their country, every-where, but especially in the West—and of all religious persuasions, but especially Presbyterians—

are requested to consider carefully the statements which follow, and afterward do what shall seem to them good.

"About a year ago a certain number of ministers, of whom I was one, founded the Danville Quarterly Review, four quarterly numbers of which, making a yearly volume, have been issued. It is to prevent the destruction of the work that this appeal is made—a destruction such as could happen only by means that would justify such an appeal as this.

"Before the first number of the work was issued, the Rev. Messrs. Stuart Robinson, Thos. A. Hoyt, and John H. Rice withdrew from our Association, of which they were members, because they understood the majority of its members desired me to advocate in its pages the loyal principles of my Discourse of the 4th of January, 1861—that is, because they were secessionists. At a much later period the Rev. R. L. Breck withdrew from the Association, because the majority of its members besought him not to publish in the Review the political article which he has since published in pamphlet form, and which—as was feared before we had full knowledge of its contents—it was impossible for any loyal man even to appear to endorse. Still later, and in succession, the Rev. Dr. R. W. Landis and the Rev. Prof. James Matthews went into the army of the United States as chaplains, and the Rev. Dr. J. T. Smith removed from the West to Baltimore. Finally, Richard H. Collins, Esq., the publisher of the Review and the owner of an extensive but unqualified property in it—who, if not a secessionist, is much misunderstood—having first notified the Association of his inability and his unwillingness to carry it on upon the terms of his contract with us, refuses to allow us the use of our own mail book, except upon terms which are wholly inadmissible. The Rev. J. M. Worrall approves of his conduct, as he did of Mr. Breck's. What remains is, that the Rev. Drs. E. P. Humphrey and S. Yerkes, together with Prof. J. Cooper and myself, aided by Dr. Landis and Prof. Matthews—as their duties in the army permit—must start the work anew, or it must be discontinued.

"In the present state of the country—and I may add, of the minds of men in the region to which the Review particularly appertains, touching a multitude of subjects of the greatest importance—it seems to me its destruction, especially by the means that have been resorted to, is both a calamity and a wrong, which loyal Christian people will not hesitate to defeat.

"The insuperable difficulty is the suppression of our mail book, for we had subscribers enough to sustain the publication, and enough

money was paid by them within the year to have covered all proper expenses. The object of this appeal is to secure the names of a certain number of subscribers immediately, whether of those who have already taken the work or of new patrons. And so great is my confidence in the loyalty of my countrymen, in their approval of the past course of this Review, and in their love of upright conduct, and so little am I either inclined or accustomed to be baffled in important matters deliberately undertaken, by such conduct as I have described, that I have become personally responsible for the expense of continuing the work, under the conviction that a sufficient number of patrons would be ready as soon as the next number can be issued, which I hope will be by the end of March.

"The subscription price is \$3.00 per annum; \$2.50 if paid strictly in advance; \$2.00, when a club of five numbers is paid for strictly in advance. Every one friendly to the enterprise is requested to obtain subscribers, and remit by mail their names and address, with money current where received, to the Rev. Prof. Jacob Cooper at this place. Exchanges, and works sent to be noticed, must be directed hereafter to Danville, Ky.

"Whoever will consider the state of public affairs in Kentucky a year ago, will hardly need any explanation of the mistakes which loyal men were liable to commit in organizing our Association and starting our Review. And perhaps, those who bear in mind the present state of affairs in this region, and the perils of all kinds through which the favorable change has been wrought, will hardly agree that any instrument, or any man, used in any degree by God in producing that change, shall be, just yet, ignominiously put out of the way, in the interest of the most flagitious conspiracy that ever assailed human society. If in these things I am mistaken, I desire at least that all who feel any interest in the matter should understand by what means this enterprise failed, and how thorough was my conviction that the failure ought to have been prevented.

"RO. J. BRECKINRIDGE.

"*Danville, Ky., Feb. 26, 1862.*"

"DR. BRECKINRIDGE AND THE DANVILLE REVIEW AGAIN.—In the Journal of Wednesday (5th), Dr. R. J. Breckinridge publishes a singular sensation advertisement of the wants of the Danville Review, from which it appears that, after a final quarrel with his publisher, preceded by three distinct quarrels, during the single year, with five out of the original eleven of Dr. B.'s associates, the Review is natu-

rally in a dying condition. The public will surely suspect that in such a series of quarrels, with parties so various in character, and all occupying a large place in the affection and confidence of Christian people, there may possibly have been some wrong even on the part of Dr. B. himself, notwithstanding his reputation for piety, profound wisdom, and philosophic evenness of temper.

"Now, granting the right of all literary enterprises to "drum" according to the adventurer's taste, no one will deny that it is of questionable taste, to say nothing more, for a venerable Professor of Theology, set to train and model the rising Ministry of the Church, to attempt the art by the rather unmanly and unchristian ruse of hounding on popular passion, already half frantic with excitement, against his brethren, merely because popular prejudices are just now in a condition to be easily roused, and credulous beyond degree in a direction to suit him.

"I know nothing of the causes of quarrel with the other gentlemen. For, so far from conspiring with them, it happens that I have not spoken or written to either of them, except Mr. Hoyt, that I can remember, during the existence of the Danville Review; certainly I have had no conference with them on that subject. But so far as relates to myself, the simple statement of facts and dates will show, that Dr. B.'s charges and insinuations, all and singular of them, are wholly untrue.

"An agreement was made—not 'a year ago,' but in October, 1860, before the trying times—to establish an organ for Danville Seminary, *provided four hundred subscribers could be obtained*. In the height of the financial distress which followed the Presidential election, Dr. B., who had charge of the experiment, wrote me—in December and again in January—that one hundred and twenty subscribers had been obtained; that Mr. Collins had agreed to risk publication with less than four hundred—say two hundred subscribers; that he desired to write an article on the political crisis, which, if I pleased, I could write on the other side in response to; and urged that the work go on immediately. To all of which I responded, in effect, as well as I remember, *First*, that the enterprise, if attempted in such a crisis, must fail, and thereby damage our reputation. (The event shows I judged rightly.) *Second*, that though Mr. Collins might agree to publish, we might not be willing to undergo the labor of writing for less than the covenanted four hundred subscribers. *Third*, that as to the political article, I thought it unwise, in *casting* our work, to discuss such a subject, except in its purely religious and ecclesiastical aspects. But at the

same time, not wishing to embarrass and discourage, by my objections, those who had faith in its success, I desired to withdraw my name as one of the responsible conductors, and, as an outside friend, do all I could for the enterprise. Accordingly, I withdrew two months before their first issue, before an article had been written, and before all the covenanted number of subscribers had been obtained; and I suppose they never were obtained. Since that period, not having been invited to assist as an outside friend, I have had no concern with or about the Danville Review, except to read and pay for it. Nor, except in private conversation with friends, have I spoken or written a word about it, good, bad, or indifferent.

"As to the unworthy cry of 'secessionist,' I know of no ground for Dr. B.'s charge, except that I do not concur in Dr. B.'s despotic and intolerant spirit, nor in his Jacobinical contempt for courts' and and judges' decisions, nor in his judgment of the ability and the importance of his articles, in which I have discovered few important ideas, that the Louisville Journal and other papers had not presented before, though with less of the '*vox et præterea nihil*' in the style of doing it.

"There is, indeed, an important difference between Dr. B.'s views and my own; but one with which 'secession' has nothing to do. I have for years held, taught, and practiced the doctrine, that Ministers of the Gospel, Professors of Theology, and teachers of religion generally, have no right to use a position given by the Church, to inculcate political dogmas, either Northern or Southern. Neither I, as pastor, nor he, as professor, may take advantage of the pulpit or theological chair as a politician. The secular press is open to us as to other citizens. If that is not to his taste, Dr. B., as a gentleman of wealth, has abundant means to publish his views in serial or occasional form, without claiming the solemnity and dignity of a Theological Quarterly, and a Theological Seminary, to invest them with a fictitious solemnity.

"So important do I consider this principle, and so much have I been pained at the disregard of it by the religious journals, that I have long meditated the publication of a weekly religious paper, which should exemplify the idea in the entire exclusion of secular matters, and be devoted wholly to religious intelligence, practical religion, and the advance of the doctrine, that the confounding of the two orders, spiritual and secular, is the great bane of religion and the Church. I have hesitated, lest, not being understood, the enterprise should disturb the quiet of the Church. Dr. Breckinridge having, by his singular pronouncement, removed the last obstacle, by showing a deter-

mination to disturb and agitate the Church, at all events, I now feel free to go forward. All I ask of our brethren is, to bear in mind I have not been the disturber, nor disposed to be. And if they will extend a kind confidence and support to the enterprize for six months, I shall then be content that they decide between my views and Dr. B.'s, after practical exemplification of them, and determine which are most for the glory and power of religion.

“STUART ROBINSON.”

The former of the two foregoing cards, was published in the *Louisville Journal* of March 5th. About the same time, covering a period of ten or fifteen days, it was published very extensively in many religious and secular newspapers of the highest character, and very large circulation, in most of the loyal States. I, the author of it, as well as my honored colleagues, have the greatest reason to be thankful to the conductors of the loyal press, for giving to it a publicity, so great and so rapid. And while all of us esteem their cordial and generous appreciation of our gratuitous labors on the Review, as among the very most flattering testimonials, which this generation could have bestowed on our endeavors; I, in particular, to whom it fell by the partial confidence of these colleagues, to prepare those articles which have given so much offense to traitors, and so much satisfaction to patriots, bow my gray hairs in meek thankfulness, beneath praise far greater than I merit—before I lift them up in open scorn and defiance, alike of the menaces and the calumnies of those, whose hate and vengeance are in near proportion to their own guilt.

By means of this cordial and universal approbation of the loyal press, in great part, our success has been instant and decided. The confidence I avowed in those who loved either God, or their country, and in which I acted, has proved to be perfectly well founded. When my card was issued, our work was put to press, without a single subscriber; and the largest number of copies our publisher had previously issued, according to our information, was ordered. On the tenth day after the first publication of my card, we found ourselves

obliged to increase the number by one-half. Less than a week afterward, we had to order a second enlargement, making the whole number double the original order. And already, at the date of this paper, a few days later, we are about to order another large increase of copies. The whole of this patronage has been absolutely spontaneous. And while it covers a very large area, it is attended with many striking local circumstances—some of them interesting, I would suppose, to the authors of the ferocious attacks, which immediately followed the publication of my card. Thus, I presume, it would interest the Rev. Stuart Robinson, and the Rev. Thomas A. Hoyt, to know, that since the publication of their unscrupulous abuse of me, we have received from the congregation of each of them, many more subscribers than the old Association previously had in the whole city of Louisville. And, perhaps, it may help the Rev. J. M. Worrall to discover which side he is on, to know that our prospects in Covington brighten under his condemnation. And, possibly, it may stimulate the Rev. R. L. Breck in his researches for the faintest possible line, between loyalty and treason, to be made aware that both in the city of his late charge, New Albany, Indiana, and in that of his present charge, Maysville, Ky., a large patronage for us has suddenly sprung up. Nor can it fail to interest all four of those ministers, to know, that in the county of my birth, and life-long citizenship, (Fayette,) more subscribers were added to our list, within two weeks after the publication of all our cards, than had previously been given to it, and all other American Quarterlies united, in that county. These are but samples of all.

The public has a right to know this decided success. Moreover, it is a point in my personal defense; for it is the endorsement of the community of the conduct of myself and my colleagues, upon the case as presented to them, merely upon "*Bill and Answer*," as they say in Courts of Equity; my short card, assailed and vilified, both it and myself, in four much longer cards, by the ministers before named. The force of this defense would be immeasurably strengthened by the publication of the names of the subscribers already sent

to us, and being daily sent: by the vehement expressions leveled against all such people as my assailants, in general, and against Mr. Robinson, with double emphasis; by the words of confidence, affection, and applause, addressed to me by persons whose approbation is fame. Now, however this aspect of the matter may strike those who have assailed me, I confess the way it looks to me is, that it is the solemn and recorded verdict of that great jury of upright, courageous, and patriotic men, which we call society. I am satisfied with the verdict. And I am going to show, that the more men know about all the facts of the case, the more obliged will they be to see that I have done my duty, and that in a way that good men ought to approve—my success in the fearless and effectual discharge of it being my real offense.

Mr. Robinson has allowed himself to say, that as far as relates to him, "Dr. B.'s charges and insinuations, all and singular of them, are wholly untrue:" and he precedes this assertion by this other one, that "the simple statement of facts and dates will show," the complete untruth, proclaimed in the words first quoted. Society, as appears, does not believe Mr. Robinson, and does believe me; wherein society is right; because, omitting our relative characters for veracity—it is positively certain in this case, that all I said was true, and his assertion that it was untrue is false, and that within his own knowledge so far as anything I said or insinuated, related to him; which I will make apparent, presently. Just now, what I wish to call attention to, is the relation of my colleagues—as before the relation of the loyal public, to the issues under discussion. It is more convenient, no doubt, to separate me to myself, and damage me separately, if possible. As for a matter of that sort, not apprehending any danger in the present case, I have no temptation to evade any amount of personal responsibility Mr. Robinson and the rest desire me to assume; besides the force of invincible habit, commencing before my recollection, of being rather provoked than frightened by insolence. But it is due to all concerned, that the whole state of the case should be known—whereby the accusation of falsehood, made against me, may be seen to have

just the bearing it actually has upon my colleagues; and where by the aggregate of their character for veracity added to mine, may show the relative value of these unmannerly accusations. The facts applying to this particular case, are decisive, and are as follows:

The members of the Review Association, remaining at Danville, at the period when my card was drawn up and issued, were Dr. Humphrey, Dr. Yerkes, Prof. Cooper, and myself. I had been confined to my house since the beginning of January, so that all the conferences relating to the difficulties connected with the Review, after that date, took place in my study. They were numerous, and very embarrassing; and resulted, apparently, in a general conviction among us, that our way was closed up. It is possible I would have acquiesced in this conclusion as a necessity, much as I chafed under it; but for well authenticated rumors, that "certain brethren about Louisville," under the lead of this turbulent Professor of extra holiness, were set upon plans and movements of various descriptions, against which, after the destruction of our Review, I knew of no adequate organ of defense. I therefore determined to furnish the first necessity for the continuance of the work—the money; and to make a personal appeal to the public, for the second necessity—the readers. Thereupon, I called my colleagues together—developed my ideas—made my pledge, and read my card to them. The plan was accepted and adopted; the card was carefully examined by all of us, with regard to *the exact truth of its statements*—and was published. Moreover, a limited number of manuscript copies was made, distributed among the four of us as equally as we could, and sent by those thus receiving them, to the different public journals, agreed on by us. I did not send the copy that went to Louisville. But the member of the Association who did send it, and who wrote a private letter to a personal friend there, an eminent citizen of the place, in order to secure its prompt publication, is known to every respectable person there, to be more incapable, if possible, of stating or giving currency to falsehood, than Mr. Robinson appears to be of frankly own-

ing the truth, when he risks something by so doing. I feel authorized to say, after repeated conferences, extending through the entire year 1861, with Dr. Landis, and Professor Matthews, now in the army, that they will endorse, as exactly true and fair, the statements of my card, in every particular, including specially those specially denounced as untrue by Mr. Robinson.

Here then, is the general state of the case, *a priori*, upon the face of the *Bill and Answer*, with the general facts, and the general character of the parties added. So considered, Mr. Robinsons' conduct is reckless, and his statements are immoral. To these considerations, further general considerations also crushing, might be added; such as follow: *First*: That the whole tenor of his life, conduct, writings, conversations, associations, and opinions, during a year past, are utterly inexplicable, except upon the supposition that he is a secessionist—which is the specific allegation I made, all the rest depending on that. *Secondly*: That in this very card, he shrinks from plainly denying that he is a secessionist, and resorts to unworthy subterfuges and evasions; interlarding various misstatements of fact, groundless personal accusations and insinuations, and great pretensions to high spiritual aspirations, instead of honestly owning, or openly denying the simple and pregnant matter in issue. Certainly I should never think of flying into a passion, if Mr. Robinson were to charge me directly with being a Union man. Nor would I find it necessary to use nearly a column of fine print, in evading a direct answer to the charge, or a naked confession of it. Now, I ask any man to look at Mr. Robinson's card, and then at mine, and ask himself, which has the stamp of truth?

I might, well enough, let the matter drop here. But Mr. R. has made what he calls "a simple statement of facts and dates," which show, as he asserts, all my "charges and insinuations," as he calls my explicit statements, to be untrue, as to him. This "simple statement" of his is a model of bad manners, improper language, coarse insinuations, and disregard of truth. It is with regard to the last quality, chiefly, that his "facts and dates" need to be treated here. I ought

to state that the card of Mr. R., which I use, is the one printed on a previous page, and originally in the Louisville Journal of the 7th of March. How many others he printed I can not say—nor how unlike this one. One other I have seen, printed in the Cincinnati Gazette of March 8th—not a copy of this—but a different card. I shall leave it, however, under the hand of the Editor of the Gazette, whose notice of it is as deadly as the fire of our friends was upon the friends of Mr. R., *at the same moment*, in the great battle we won at Pea Ridge, in Arkansas. The Gazette commences, “If this is the best defense Dr. Robinson has to make, it is worse for him than if he had remained silent.” And it closes its appreciative criticism, by uniting Mr. Worrall’s long article with Mr. R.’s pert one, saying of both writers, “*Their defense condemns them.*” That is what I am about to show of the one printed in Louisville, the previous day.

In the first paragraph of his card he intimates that our Review had died, and that I had caused its death by three distinct quarrels during the year, which he asserts I had with five of my colleagues, and a fourth and final one with my publisher. This assertion is the only intimation I ever had, that there had been any quarrel among us at all: and I have no idea he believes there was any such thing. If, in all the business of the Review, I was not the efficient friend of the publisher, (Mr. Collins,) up to the very moment of the final inability of himself and the Review Association to settle their affairs to their mutual satisfaction, he never had one in his life. No word of unkindness ever passed between Mr. Breck and myself, or Mr. Rice and myself, or Mr. Hoyt and myself, on any subject, whatever; nor such a word ever between Mr. Worrall and myself, concerning any matter connected with the Review. Mr. Robinson expressly precludes himself from embracing my published card, as one of these alleged quarrels. As to himself, I once had intimate relations with him; I was, far more than he deserved, his friend; he gave me abundant, ungrateful, and gross cause of quarrel; but I did not quarrel, even with him. His last provocation, even, I should have preferred to pass over; but pious, wise, and honorable friends,

whom I confide in, said I could not, I must not. And now, I limit myself, here, to the same comment I did before: such conduct is reckless, such statements are immoral.

His second paragraph is merely a series of insolent and calumnious insinuations, turgid in expression, and sprinkled with a few pious words, like salt on spoiled meat. The third one contains some immaterial statements, which may or may not be true; and, of course, some impertinence. The closing sentence of it I have before quoted, and remarked on.

The fourth paragraph is the longest of the whole, and, if any distinction can be made, the most erroneous. I am ready to blush at some of its littleness, and almost to marvel at its general baseness. Take one specimen, illustrative of both aspects. I had said, "*about a year ago*" we had formed our Association. Well: our *Articles of Agreement* had the first four names signed to them not earlier than the 5th of December, 1860; and afterward eight other names were added; the last being in February, 1861. On the 20th of December, 1860, the *Agreement* for the publication of the Review was signed by Mr. Collins, and the first number was issued about the end of March, 1861. On the 26th of February, 1862, in making a general statement to cover these facts, in my card, I wrote, "*about a year ago*," etc. Was not the statement true, and fair, even if there was any importance to me in the exact dates? But this person, with the view of making "facts and dates" extricate him, strikes out the word "*about*" from my statement, then quotes, with inverted commas, the mutilated sentence "*one year*," then denies its truth, and bases a defense on the alleged error he had created! He substitutes the first of several meetings for conference, for the organization of the Association, which I had reported from the record of the body; then he antedates a couple of months, saying, "*an agreement was made in October, 1860*;" and runs off with a rigmarole about the "*trying times*" which came round *after* that "*fact and date*," surreptitiously fixed up to suit the matter he had in hand; namely, to fix up a false pretext for his withdrawing from the Association. It is unfortunate for Mr. R.'s "facts and dates," that I am in possession of his letter

written at the time, as well as of the written memorandum of all these proceedings, made at the time, and read to and approved by the Association long ago. He ought to have kept, at least in sight of shore, when he undertook to manufacture "facts and dates" for the destruction of a man, who, he ought to have known, was somewhat careful in the preservation of that description of materials.

It is altogether idle for Mr. R. to draw on his versatile memory for "facts and dates," and trust to his passions and his imagination to work them into a "simple statement," by means of which it may be possible to make upright men doubt whether his conduct was not most unworthy at the beginning, wicked at the end, and disloyal throughout. He reduced to writing, at the time, the reasons of his withdrawal from the Association, and sent them to me, and they are now before me. The date, of course, is fixed by the letter, January 24, 1861, and I suppose he has my reply dated the day following, which I invite him to publish, along with my previous letter of January 22d, addressed jointly to Mr. Hoyt, Mr. Rice, and himself. Mr. Robinson's letter of January 24th, from which I am about to quote, was in reply to that joint letter; Mr. Hoyt's reply to it is dated January 26th: Mr. Rice's, January 25th. Under date of the 26th of January, Dr. Hill, the editor of the Presbyterian Herald, informed me that Messrs. Robinson, Rice, and Hoyt, had all erased their names from the list of editors of the Review, and had given me their reasons by letter. The letters are noted above. It may throw light on the motives and conduct of all concerned, to add, that Dr. Hill's immediate object in writing was to ascertain whether he should proceed to insert the advertisement of the Review, after the withdrawal of so large and so important a portion of those who had bound themselves in a written covenant to establish and conduct it, and bound themselves in another written covenant with Mr. Collins as the publisher of it. Dr. Hill seemed to have doubts of the wisdom of our going any further, and in a friendly manner suggested what appeared to be the grounds of those doubts. He tells me that brethren further South are

greatly exercised about my Discourse delivered on the 4th of January—and already very widely circulated, and that the immediate effect of their displeasure would probably be loss of patronage by the Theological Seminary at Danville. He gives his opinion that Tennessee would certainly go with the South, and that if Tennessee and Virginia should secede, the secessionists would carry Kentucky, and that already they were gaining every day and rapidly in many parts of the State. Now, we have here, upon unquestionable authority, the fact of withdrawal, the date of withdrawal, the fact that the reasons of withdrawal had been given to me in letters dated that day and the two previous days, together with the posture and bearing of the revolt in the South at that time, and with regard to Kentucky, and together with the publicity and effects of my 4th of January Discourse, as all these matters appeared to a third party occupying a position which made him familiar with the state of mind both of the Louisville ministers and of the Danville ministers. I do not see that it is possible to doubt that Mr. R.'s opinions and mine were as opposite as our conduct, or that the conduct of both of us was the fruit of our opinions, or that secession was the subject-matter of division, which he thought incompatible with joint action in conducting a Review avowedly designed to be particularly free, while I thought otherwise at that time. If it is not as yet clearly proved that he intended and desired this withdrawal from the Review Association to destroy the work on the spot, he now boasts that he then knew the enterprise must fail. And it is impossible not to see that the drift of expectation ran that way. The totally erroneous statement of the facts of the case, concerning the condition of the Review at that time, which Mr. R. makes in his card, by way of false pretext for his withdrawal, incontestibly proves that he believed it would not be difficult to kill it at that moment. Faithless and ignoble toward country, colleagues, friends, and engagements, he is also faithless and ignoble toward his own former convictions.

In this fourth paragraph of his card, Mr. R. has stated *three reasons*, which, he now says, were those which induced

him to withdraw from the Association which established the Review: and in the fifth paragraph he says, he knows of no ground for my charge of secession, except his freedom from my "despotic and intolerant spirit,"—from my "jacobinical contempt of courts' and judges' decisions,"—and from my "judgment of the ability and importance" of my articles, of which he expresses his judgment that they contain few important ideas that he has not discovered better and previously expressed in the newspapers, and that their style is wordy and empty. Possibly he may find *this* article somewhat less liable to that criticism: nay, he may discern grounds for charging him, different from those he guesses. In his letter of January 24, 1861, he also gives three reasons for withdrawing. By comparing what follows with the fourth and fifth paragraphs of his card, the reader will see how the real "facts and dates" bear upon the "simple statement." The first reason assigned in the letter is, that he had never felt hopeful of success, and that the great events which had distracted the country had increased the difficulties so much as to make it inexpedient to go on, and risk the damage of failure. The second reason assigned is, that the required number of subscribers had not then been obtained. The third and chief reason, occupying nearly a page and a half, while both the others do not quite occupy a page—and which he has summed up in about four utterly false printed lines—I give in full:

"3. In reference to your proposed article on the state of the country, allow me to say that no man in Kentucky will rejoice more than I, if you will either in the Review or out of it, expose that miserable compound of Jesuitry and Black Republicanism from the Princeton Review. At the same time, I should be unwilling to have the answer made on the basis of your Discourse of the 4th of January, in a Review bearing my name on the cover as one of the responsible parties, and especially the first number of the Review, which must settle the general impressions of the public with regard to its position and spirit. It seems to me that a foot-note avowing the authorship would not counteract the impression. Nor, on the other hand, would it be expedient, in the very first number, to have another article presenting

a different side of the subject, especially in view of our third article, "No direct controversy," etc., I am not aware of holding any views on the present state of the country in special sympathy with South Carolina. Except that in the event of no Union on the Crittenden Compromise, I think Kentucky, as the next best thing, or rather as the least of evils, should go to a Southern Confederacy. I have studiously avoided becoming a partizan on the subject, or as a minister of the Gospel obtruding my views on the subject. But I can not accept your views, in so far as they look hostile to the South, or complacently upon a confederacy with Ohio."

"For these and similar reasons," he adds, that he desires to have his name stricken from the list, and, as shown by Dr. Hill's letter dated two days afterward, had then stricken his name from the advertisement, at the office of the Presbyterian Herald. This state of mind in Mr. R., decided as it appears, was of sudden growth. I have a letter of his dated nine days before the one just quoted—namely, January 15, 1861—in which he announces absence from home, sickness, and the pressure of business since his return, as accounting for some delay in attending to certain business of the Review. He then excuses himself, by reason of the pressure of his affairs, "from writing for the Review within the next sixty days." He then explains the difficulty of getting subscribers in his congregation at that time. And then he closes the letter with these words: "I trust, however, to better prospects ahead." What had happened between the 15th and 24th of January to dash all these prospects, and put such an opposite mind in Mr. R.? The answer is clear. My Discourse of January 4, 1861, had been read by him in the mean time, and my letter of January 22, 1861, laying before him the wishes of the Review Association that I would write the article which appeared in March, 1861, had been received by him. He was a secessionist, and the facts and inference, stated very briefly in my card, are strictly fair and true. And the disgraceful statements of Mr. Robinson's card in March, 1862, as compared with his statements in writing in January, 1861, are perfectly explicable when the state of the secession party in Kentucky at the two dates is recollected and

compared with each other. At the one date, Mr. R. and his comrades were in high hopes; at the other, they are in strong apprehensions. At both periods, it was no way to their disadvantage to silence the Danville Review. But how different are the pretexts alleged by the same oracle on the two occasions! "*Third*: That as to the political article, I thought it unwise in casting the work, to discuss such a subject, except in its purely religious and ecclesiastical aspects." This is Mr. R.'s summary on the 7th of March, 1862, of reason third and chief, as given on the 24th of January, 1861, and printed at large on a previous page! Is there on earth a rational creature capable of believing the summary to be either true or fair? Is there a gentleman or a Christian under the sun, capable of believing the original statement and the representation he makes of it near enough alike, to justify any portion of the prevarications and insolence of his published card? Is it not perfectly certain that his conduct and principles, as exhibited by his published card, are disgraceful, even as compared with his previous bad conduct and principles, which that card professes to explain and vindicate?

The last two paragraphs of the card, are devoted, *first*, to an attack upon me, on the charge that I have used the pulpit, and the chair of a Professor of Theology, "to inculcate political dogmas;" and *secondly*, to a glorification of the character, conduct, principles, and aims of the author of the card, who alleges that he has, "for years held, taught, and practiced the doctrine" that is sound and pure, though amid wide defections of others, and at great pain, and with many meditations of his own; and who now sets forth his desire and purpose to publish a weekly religious newspaper, in order to enforce that wholesome doctrine of his, whatever it may turn out to be, which the years of his holding, teaching, and living, have not advanced to his satisfaction. The connection of both these topics, and the many subdivisions of them, with the professed objects of the attack on me, is disclosed by himself, as it lay in his own mind. He says, he had been apprehensive lest his "enterprise should disturb the quiet of the Church;" which was rather an odd apprehension

in so godly a minister, in pursuit of an object not only purely godly, but by the most godly of all ways. One would think, if there was any godliness at all mixed with that "quiet of the Church," which he feared to disturb, that quiet would be confirmed by his pure doctrine: whereas, if there was no godliness in the quiet, the disturbance of it by his pure doctrine, was the very thing needed. Not so Mr. R.: but, as he says, "Dr. Breckinridge, having by his singular pronouncement, removed the last obstacle, by showing a determination to disturb and agitate the Church at all events, I now feel free to go forward." Here, again, the pretext is rather odd—even admitting the assertion it rests on, were as true as it is false. For if bad men will "disturb and agitate the Church at all events," that may be a very sufficient reason why *they* should be dealt with; a truth, which Mr. R. will be wise to digest inwardly. But it is a singular reason for robbing the poor Church of what little quiet might remain to her, and hardly justifies even the most eminent practitioner upon her patience, in entering systematically upon the administration of a "doctrine," whose agitating qualities have so long restrained the patentee. However silly the reasoning may be, the motive for traducing me as a help to the establishment of a newspaper, is made plain enough. Mr. Robinson having failed to strangle the Review in its birth—and being doubtful of the fatal effects of his card upon it, puts on his Sunday coat, puts a thin varnish of piety over his turbulent spirit, and his schismatical and disloyal schemes, and announces an organ. Very good. We shall see—as the old grammarians used to define concerning the principal part of speech—what this new organ of holding, teaching, and practicing—is to be—to do—and to suffer.

As to my abusing either the pulpit, or the Professor's chair "to inculcate political dogmas," I reply, that no minister or Professor ever lived, who was less amenable to such an accusation, than myself: and for the past fifteen years of my ministry, and during the whole period of my Professorship, Mr. Robinson has had ample opportunity to know, that his statement is a shameless calumny. During about thirty years that I have exercised the Gospel ministry, over a wide

area, and to an innumerable multitude of people, in the aggregate; every one who knows me, knows that I have preached the Gospel of God, to the best of my ability—and *nothing else*. And during nine yearly sessions, now nearly finished, wherein I have taught theology as a science—all men may judge of the grossness of the slander, that I have abused my office—by looking into the volumes published and widely circulated—wherein the substance and method of two parts out of three of Theology, as taught by me, are disclosed to mankind. He may pretend that his charge has not that meaning—and that what he intended was, that although I was a preacher and a teacher, I was, with habitual and shameful engagedness, a politician also. His words do not admit of such a sense—but if they did, they would be utterly false. On ordinary occasions, I have habitually avoided the excitement of party politics since I became a minister of Jesus Christ, and have abstained even from voting for years together. On the several great occasions which have vehemently pressed my country, in my day—I have openly and vigorously, as a free citizen, ranged myself on her side; and it fills me, all the more, with satisfaction, to believe that I have done her service, and won her confidence—that thereby, I extricated from shame and dishonor, a name not unknown in her history, which others, who shared it with me, rendered odious by treason. It may be admitted that the line which lies between the duties of a patriot and the duties of a Christian, is not always perfectly distinct—and, further, that in the case of ministers of the Gospel, and Professors of Theology, there ought to be a particularly careful endeavor, both to observe the distinction, and to perform both classes of duties. My country has already decided, repeatedly, and with emphasis, and I leave to posterity to ratify or annul the decision—that all my endeavors to serve her, have been directed to noble ends, by just, upright, and effective ways. And however miscreants may hoot and scoff, the case is obliged to go to posterity—for no traitor will ever truly recount how this vast and audacious conspiracy was foiled, without making mention of me: and no loyal man will ever

truly explain how the public sentiment, by which the glorious country was saved, was roused and directed, without alluding to my efforts. And the lesson will live—not for my sake, but for the sake of the immense truth it conveys, to all generations. The power, namely, of a simple citizen, under circumstances the most adverse, and with no means of influence but his character, his voice, and his pen—to become an element worthy to be noted, in a revolt, such as no government upon earth, had ever before withstood. And, now, what judgment should society render concerning a turbulent and unscrupulous ecclesiastical demagogue, whose best possible defense is, that he did nothing, when his bleeding country needed that he should do everything? What judgment concerning a coarse and ostentatious pretender to a higher spiritual enlightenment, who demands, by way of cover to his past iniquities, opportunity to expound this doctrine, which, as he boasts, he has so held for years, that it has formed the basis of his teaching, and the substance of his practice; whereby he may prove, that I have dishonored the Christian ministry, and betrayed the Gospel of God, by whatever service I have rendered to my country, when she was staggering under his “doctrine”—the treason of his comrades—and the powers of darkness, combined?

But even in this avowed endeavor to develop and enforce a higher spiritual life, he is characteristically unable to pursue a simple and sincere course. The pretense that my card determined his mind, while he was yet hesitating whether to establish a paper, has no foundation in truth. I have seen the written statement of one who was obliged to know, not only that Mr. R., (united, perhaps, with others,) was desirous of purchasing the Presbyterian Herald, but that he declared he would have an organ before the 1st of March: all this, and much more like it, not only before my card was published, but before it was even thought of by me. And the statement, whether by him, or of him, was not a casual, or a thoughtless one; but was made by him in an endeavor to purchase the paper, and was repeated as an inducement to the “Danville Brethren” to provide a purchaser for it.

Moreover, his pretense of extreme sensitiveness about the "quiet" of the Church, may be better estimated when it is known that Dr. Hill had in his editorial desk, at one time, fifteen manuscript attacks on me, which he suppressed; though I have reason to believe that Mr. R. was not the writer of any of those particular attacks—they were all written by persons sharing his views. Moreover, my advice was asked, and my answer given—and I doubt not repeated to Mr. R.—as to what should be done with him, when his Oracle was fairly at work, in the privately avowed object of attacking both the Princeton and the Danville influence. Moreover, I was again consulted concerning the way to proceed in order to defeat a project, believed to exist, and to be likely to succeed, of inducing the Louisville Presbytery, at its approaching spring meeting, to refuse to send Commissioners to the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church, this year: and I gave advice of the most decided kind, which I said ought to be made known to Mr. R. And it is in accordance with my way of doing things, to repeat here, that I advised that the orthodox and loyal members of the Louisville Presbytery, if overpowered by a schismatical and disloyal majority, in the way apprehended, should constitute as the Presbytery, irrespective of numbers, send Commissioners to the Assembly, and make report of the others—no matter how many—to Synod, that the traitorous schism might be frankly met at its first organized movement. And concerning the threatened Oracle, with its threatened course, at that time, I openly declared I would go to Louisville, and if I could get some place where I could be heard, I would bring the whole subject at once before the Presbyterian public, by a public attack upon the disloyal and schismatic conduct of Mr. R. Now, I can not say that these things had any effect, or were even made known to Mr. R.; but this much is certain—that the *public* tenor of his purposes, about his new organ, and quiet in the Church, and obedience to the settlement at the last Synod, is exactly the reverse of the *private* tenor of them all, as made known to me before I had any idea of publishing my card. Moreover, if Mr. R., with all his alleged scruples concerning the nature of his office,

and the power of his "doctrine," did not habitually write political, nay, editorial articles, for the Louisville Courier, until the paper was suppressed, and the owners and editors escaped arrest by flight, the public is far more misled than is common in such cases. Perhaps it was with an eye to this very state of unlucky facts, that he put into his card the following sentence, which is as pregnant, as it seems inconsistent with all the rest he says on the subject: "*The secular press is open to us as to other citizens.*" Mr. Haldeman, and perhaps some others, may not at present consider it quite as wholesome doctrine as Mr. R. does, that while it is desperately wicked for a minister to be loyal openly, and take the risk of it, to be disloyal anonymously, at the peril of other people, is the very doctrine to be "held, taught, and practiced," by ministers and Professors of Theology, more especially through the secular press.

I have already said, that the great change in the condition and prospects of the secession conspiracy in Kentucky, between the latter part of January, 1861, and the early part of March, 1862, may account for the immense difference in *reason No. 3*, for withdrawing from our Review Association, as given by Mr. R. at the two dates. The condition of the Presbyterian Church in Kentucky, as guessed at, at the former date, and as developed and ascertained at the latter date, may account for the difference in Mr. R.'s purposes, and plans, during the winter and spring of 1862, as they are understood by those who had intercourse with him in private, and as he finally develops them in a printed prospectus for a newspaper. So far as that newspaper, in its origin or object, is connected with denunciations of me, private or public, and is projected as an engine of personal injury and defamation of me, I have only to say, that if those who set out on such an enterprize imagine that either their godliness, their gain, or their influence, will be promoted thereby, I can have no personal objection to their trying the experiment. So far as the design may be to promote a disloyal schism in Kentucky; or to undermine the institutions, the doctrine, the order, the policy, or the deliverances of the Presbyterian Church in the United

States; or to advocate immature crotchets of Mr. R.; or be the vehicle of his shallow and ever varying, and ever failing projects; I, of course, do not fall into the class that can take any interest, except in the early occurrence of that fate which, alas! attends, sooner or later, men and oracles alike. The gentlemen who have associated themselves with Mr. R. in this undertaking, under circumstances so peculiar, of course must be aware, that the orthodox and loyal Presbyterians of Kentucky, are both able and resolved to have a weekly religious newspaper, in sympathy with their views; and that, by no possibility, can Mr. R. be accepted as one of its conductors, much less as its projector and chief guide. Those people will not trust the statements of Mr. R. in his prospectus; for, considering his character and past conduct, not even the addition of certain respectable names to his, makes it credible that those statements convey all the truth, or that they can be practically realized. The scheme must be viewed as an absurdity and a sham, and a delusion, if it refuses to pass as a covert preparation for schism. As for Mr. R.'s being a fit person to develop a high type of practical religion, that is simply ludicrous. The total want of all spiritual unction, was the marked defect of his ministry, even in those earlier and better days of it when his heart was so far in it, that his vigorous mental powers, and his impressive manner, made his exhibitions attractive, chiefly to those who had little piety, or none. As to his capacity to settle the boundaries of great questions of any sort, and last of all in theology, either scientific or casuistical, he has neither the acquaintance with the learning on those subjects, nor the digested possession of such information as he has picked up, nor the habits of patient thought, nor the mental refinement of a high and varied culture, which fit him for such a work, either with credit to himself, or advantage to the public. Did Mr. R. ever command permanent success, in anything? Can he do it in this matter, where every circumstance attending the attempt is a mark of condemnation—and the very qualities indispensable to the undertaking *as professed*, are absent or deficient? We shall see: perhaps in half a year; perhaps sooner than that, if

success continues to attend the Federal arms—and the conspirators in Kentucky desire peace.

For the present, I will let the matter rest here. So far as Mr. Robinson is concerned, whether I shall feel obliged to deal with him any further, will depend on the opinion I shall have of the bearing of his conduct, whether past or future, upon public interests which it is my duty to regard. His personal conduct toward me, can be no longer of any importance whatever, except as it explains his character and designs, and gives a particular, and not the most agreeable, shape, to discussions having a certain importance.

There are also other cards—and some advertisements; concerning which I reserve the question, as to what notice—beyond the few words I will add—I should take of them; or whether any at all. For obvious reasons, it was proper, if I did anything—to deal with Mr. Robinson first, and by himself. So far as any of the rest may have made statements in relation to me or my published card, similar to any made by Mr. R., and now answered by me; it is not necessary for me to consider them over again, here. What more, if anything, my duty may require me to say—will be said in due time.

The Rev. J. M. Worrall, at present of Covington, Ky., has published a column and a third, directed, so far as I am concerned, to an attempt to weaken the impression of one sentence, consisting of nine words—besides his own name and title—and asserting one fact, not denied by him—namely, his approval of the conduct of Mr. Collins toward the Review Association; and of that of Mr. Breck, which led to his withdrawing from it. It was impossible for me to avoid stating that fact in my card; because that fact, if there had been nothing else to complain of, rendered it impossible for Mr. Worrall's former associates to allow him, even if he desired it, to co-operate with them in their attempt to start the work afresh. Whether Mr. Worrall is fairly entitled to the character of a secessionist—about which the public press near him, and the general public seem to have no doubt—is perfectly immaterial to anything I said about him. Let him be what he might, his conduct could do nothing but injure us: while

all injury to us, was directly to the interest of the detestable secession conspiracy. All I have now to say about the substance of his defense is, that a large part of it confirms a great deal of what I have said concerning Mr. Robinson: that all of it that relates to the matter of Mr. Collins and Mr. Breck, is an entire perversion of the facts; and the aggregate impression of the card conclusive to the unfitness of Mr. Worrall for the Association which aimed to restore the Review.

The Rev. Thos. A. Hoyt, has published a card. He is a native of the South—removed from South Carolina to Kentucky, several years ago—and has since been the pastor of the fine congregation in Louisville, of which my only surviving brother, Dr. Wm. L. Breckinridge, was pastor during above twenty years. I regretted, sincerely, to be obliged to make public mention of his name, as the unquestionable facts demanded. I now regret still more to be obliged to say, that his card proves him to be utterly unworthy of my sympathy, for his awkward position as a South Carolina secessionist, in the pastorate of a loyal Kentucky Church. His card is a gross and malicious personal attack, based on, apparently intentional perversions of my meaning, and full of mean and unmanly misrepresentations of my motives. Except his charges, to which I allude at the close of this paper, it needs only, for the present, to say in general, that terribly as *Southern Chivalry* has run down of late, I would not have believed that a Presbyterian minister, whom I considered a gentleman, would—under any provocation—much less with almost none that was just—have put his name to a publication so completely disgraceful.

The Rev. Robert L. Breck has also published a long card, of which it is possible I may be obliged, hereafter, to take some notice. He is a native of Kentucky: his venerable father is a man I have loved from my early boyhood: his maternal ancestors and kindred, and my people, have been hereditary friends always: and he will not say, that, except in one sentence in my published card, which he distorts, he ever received from me, anything but proofs of respect and affection. These are things which I can not wholly forget.

If, in such circumstances, he can be satisfied with the course he has adopted, and the things he has allowed himself to say, and to insinuate, concerning me; I feel strong enough, alike in the rectitude of my conduct, the purity of my intentions, and the power of a character established through a life of more than sixty years; not only to give full space for his attack to work me all the harm it can—but to testify in his behalf, that neither the men with whom he is co-operating, nor the business in which he is engaged, are worthy of his race, or his former self.

Richard H. Collins, Esq., the former publisher of the Review, appears to have procured certain statements to be made in a number of widely circulated newspapers; bearing mainly upon his alleged losses by that work—and certain proposed means, involving an implied agency in the circulation of the present work, for retrieving them. Mr. Collins is a member, and I believe an office-bearer, in the church of which Mr. Worrall is the pastor; and thus the false exposition of Mr. Collins's affairs made in Mr. Worrall's card, supplemented by Mr. Collins's published statements—make a case demanding, for the present, this slight notice. The public will therefore understand, that it is not I, but the old Review Association, that had any business difficulties with Mr. Collins; that all the members of that Association, except Mr. Worrall and Mr. Breck, have concurred in whatever acts Mr. Collins has found cause to object to; that all the members of it, now engaged in resuscitating the work, repudiate the published statements both of Mr. Worrall and Mr. Collins; and that Mr. Collins is not authorised to do any act whatever, concerning the present work, or its circulation. I would be glad to promote the pecuniary interest of Mr. Collins, in any proper way; and I desire, of course, the circulation of my own writings. But, I reiterate the statements of my card—and am ready to vindicate their exact truth and fairness—in every particular, whether of business, of politics, or of morals.

It is merely to complete the list of names mentioned in my card, that I now allude to the Rev. Dr. John H. Rice, late of Louisville, Ky. I have not heard that he has made any publication;

nor do I know that he has seen my card. My understanding is that he left Louisville, and removed into one of the seceded States, about the time that Virginia, of which State he is, I believe, a native, took up arms against the nation. So far as he is concerned, it is obvious, I could mean no more than I asserted; namely, that whatever else might concur in inducing him to withdraw from our Review Association, that act—in which he virtually united with Mr. Robinson and Mr. Hoyt—was an expression of his political sympathies: he was a secessionist. Perhaps mankind will accept his fidelity to his convictions, as being a more reputable course than the one adopted by Mr. Hoyt, even according to his own explanation of his; and certainly any course that has the smallest element of truth or manhood, is wronged by being compared with that of Mr. Robinson.

The tribunal of public opinion is the one to which all matters of the sort involved in these discussions, must come at last. But in all cases of much extent or importance, there are points which are susceptible of decision by other tribunals: and these collateral decisions of other tribunals, sometimes important of themselves, become elements of the final judgment of society. Among my various and heavy responsibilities in the present case, one is to a tribunal singularly illustrious. I hold my office of Professor in the Theological Seminary at Danville, during the pleasure of the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church in the United States of America. I was elected to it, by that august Court of the Church of the living God, nine years ago, come May next. I am publicly accused with abusing that high office, in what I have done to maintain the integrity of the nation, the sovereignty and loyalty of my native State, and the decrees of the General Assembly of my Church, and of the particular Synod and Presbytery to which I am amenable. That is, in my endeavors to uphold every civil and every ecclesiastical authority to which I am accountable, I am publicly and insultingly upbraided by Mr. Robinson and Mr. Hoyt, Presbyterian ministers in regular standing, with having abused and degraded the pulpit and the professor's chair. To this Mr. Hoyt has

added the direct charge—and Mr. Robinson seems to imply it, that the substance, the manner, and the form of what I have done in the premises, amounts to such use of the sacred funds of the School of Theology in which I occupy a chair, as to be a wicked perversion of them, for wicked ends—destructive of the peace of the Churches that contributed those funds, for a noble and perpetual charity : funds, that is, which, with great and completely gratuitous labors, through many years, I have, in connection with a few friends, been one of the chief instruments in so founding, collecting, and enlarging—that they now exceed, by many thousands of dollars, the aggregate of all that was ever bestowed on the institution. These are charges which I can not allow to pass by, without a more serious notice, than any that can be taken of them through the public press. No matter what gloss may be put on them, they are charges, the bare colorable suspicion of whose propriety, ought to deprive me of my office of teacher of the teacher's of God's people ; and in the absence of even any colorable suspicion of their justice or propriety—he who basely and cruelly utters them, ought to be held to be a ruffian and a barbarian.

Upon this issue I shall put myself at the bar of the great tribunal of my whole Church, which of its own motion called me to my office, and whose good pleasure is the tenure by which I hold it. And I shall ask that illustrious Court, convened in the name, and by the authority of the Lord of lords, to do unto me, and unto my accusers, as they will answer to God in the great day. And that no obstacle I can remove, may stand in the way either of a full ability or a clear necessity, to meet the issue and decide it ; I shall place the resignation of my office, with a brief memorial to the effect of this statement, in the hands of the Moderator of the Assembly, as soon as may be proper after it shall be constituted, at its immediately approaching sessions. Let my accusers take heed to this notice. And let God's people discern, by this case, the spirit that now worketh in the children of disobedience.

R. J. B.

DANVILLE, KY., March 22, 1862.

ART. VI.—*Jurisprudence, Sacred and Civil.*—*The published Criticisms on some of the Principles heretofore discussed in the Danville Quarterly Review.*

In the September number of this Review for last year, appeared an article on the action of the General Assembly on the famous Spring resolutions; the probable consequences in general of that action; and the use made of it to divide the Church. The article attracted the attention of the weekly religious press, and extracts from it, accompanied by editorial comments more or less extended, were made by all the Old School papers which the United States' mail brought to our hand, with one exception. In several instances these extracts were quite copious. The interests and principles involved, are of such magnitude and importance as to justify, in our judgment, a notice of some of these editorial comments, and a re-statement of the views maintained in that article. The same would have been submitted to the public in the December No., had it not been for difficulties connected with the publication of the Review, and of which its readers have been advised.

The exception referred to above, is the Presbyterian Herald. That paper, in a brief announcement of the contents of the Review for September, took occasion simply to express its judgment, characterizing the review of the action of the Assembly as wanting in ability, false in its conclusions, and as "giving up the whole point in dispute." As the remarks of the Herald were intended, of course, to do good, it will not be disagreeable to their author to have them repeated on these pages.

"The one (article) on the General Assembly, we think, will disappoint the expectations of the readers of the *Review* generally. It was expected that an able and searching review of the action of the Assembly would emanate from Danville, going to the bottom of the questions at issue and showing that the Spring resolutions were based upon wrong views of the province of the Church. This the *Reviewer* has not done. He gives up the whole point in dispute, admits that the Assembly not only had the right to act in the premises, but was bound

to do so. He contends that they did not come to a correct decision, it is true, but asserts that they should have acted in a way quite as objectionable to the mass of those who opposed their action as the action which they did take. The true point of complaint against their action was not in the nature of it, but that they acted at all on such a subject."

Alas! we are doomed to disappointment. A child of sin must needs be a child of sorrow. The Herald was looking for "an able and searching review of the action of the Assembly," but looked in vain. It is amusing to observe what the Herald would have considered "able and searching"—"going to the bottom of the questions at issue." Had the article attempted to show "that the Spring resolutions were based upon wrong views of the province of the Church," i. e., according to the standard adopted by the Herald—all would have been well; but because, forsooth, it places the unconstitutionality of the Assembly's action upon a different ground from that taken by Dr. Hodge and the other protestors at Philadelphia, it is shallow, and "gives up the whole point in dispute." Profound logic! "*able and searching*," "*going to the bottom*." Assume the unquestionable truth of a proposition, make that the infallible standard of judgment, and then decry every counter-proposition as weak and giving up the point! There may, indeed, be no great depth in our September article. It may present a sorry contrast by the side of the masterly disquisitions and the brilliant illustrations of great truths, which, from time to time, grace the columns of our cotemporary; still, we think it was not fairly dealt by. A contemptuous sneer and a begging of the question may impose upon the prejudiced and unthinking, but will hardly pass either for decent manners or sound reasoning with sensible persons.

But really if the said article is the weakling the Herald pretends, why did it not expose its weaknesses? Why did it not point out its follies and fallacies? Surely the subject is an important one, and the discussion of it timely. The position taken in the Danville Review, upon which the unconstitutionality of the resolution of the Assembly is predicated, has been presented, so far as we are informed, in no other

periodical; and however weak in itself, the Review might naturally be supposed to impart currency, if not credit, to it. The Presbyterian Herald, therefore, might well have condescended to notice what some few at least have the temerity to dignify with the name of argument. An ounce of proof is worth a whole cart-load of authoritative *dicta*. All the more was the Herald bound, as a reputable Kentucky journal, to point out the insufficiency of our constitutional objection to the action of the Assembly, inasmuch as just about the time the September number of the Danville Review was published, the Presbytery of West Lexington, implicitly discarding the doctrine, asserted by the protesters and endorsed by the Herald, did, by a unanimous vote, declare the Assembly to be in error as to the fundamental principles upon which the objectionable parts of their deliverance rested, *upon the very ground maintained by "the Reviewer."* In proof of this assertion, and for the information and satisfaction of the reader, the second of the series of resolutions passed by the Presbytery is transcribed.

"2. But more than this; it is our deliberate judgment that the General Assembly was in error, as to the fundamental principles upon which the objectionable parts of the deliverance alluded to above rested for their support. It is undoubtedly certain, that the Assembly had no authority, either from Christ or from the Constitution of the Church, to require, or even advise, the tens of thousands of Presbyterians who are citizens of the States which had seceded from the United States, and are at war with them, to revolt against the actual governments under which they live; nor should it, under the pretext of a general fast, have required them to perform acts, which the Assembly could not fail to know, would subject them to criminal prosecutions, and in the present condition of things, probably destroy the Presbyterian Church throughout considerable portions of at least ten States. This aspect of the matter seems to us perfectly conclusive, even upon the admission that the subject matter of the minute of the Assembly was clearly within the jurisdiction of the court, and even upon the further admission that it was wise and proper for the Assembly to take action upon it at that time. The objection we make is that the particular view taken, and the general order given, and the fundamental principles on which all rested, were

erroneous and destructive. The Assembly ought, by no means, to have taken any action that necessarily involved the idea that it required any members of the Church, as a Christian duty, to revolt against any *actual* government under which they lived."

This is the solemn official action of a large Kentucky Presbytery. The man who drew that resolution is not unknown to fame—a foeman unworthy of no man's steel. Even the Herald might have deigned to enter the lists with *him*. He is "able and searching." Yet even he, "able and searching" though he be, and noted for "going to the bottom," and his able coadjutors of the West Lexington Presbytery, arrive at the same conclusion with "the Reviewer" touching the fundamental principle on which the deliverance of the Assembly ought to be impugned. The Churches of West Lexington Presbytery must have been disappointed too, as well as the readers of this Review, for nothing better "emanated" from that quarter than "from Danville." Aye, and the readers of the Presbyterian Herald have been disappointed, and that for many months past. Nay, more; their indignation has been aroused, and their voice will not be stifled much longer. They believe that allegiance to the civil and ecclesiastical authorities is a religious duty, and that silence is moral treason when a wicked effort is made to subvert them. They believe it is the duty of all men, and especially the conductors of religious journals, to give an open and cordial support to the powers of Church and State. The loyal Presbyterians of Kentucky do not intend to tolerate anything short of this. They do not intend to become partakers of other men's sins by a sinful acquiescence in what they conscientiously believe to be wrong. They *will* have a paper that utters a clear and constant testimony in behalf of the old Church and the old State. They are not to be scared by the stale outcry of wishing to unite Church and State; nor to be duped by the pious pretext of keeping politics and religion distinct. They have not yet to learn to distinguish between the schemes and measures of parties, and the religious obligation of fidelity to the Government itself. They do not desire or permit their religious newspaper to join in the hue-and-cry of bank or no

bank, tariff or no tariff, Pacific railroad or no Pacific railroad; but they do demand one that shall teach boldly the duty—a great duty imposed of God—of upholding the National Government, whose existence is imperiled, and which they believe ought to be preserved. They demand a paper that will manfully oppose all efforts, whether open or covert, to divide the Church, or to alienate them and their children from it. Loyalty to the nation and loyalty to the Church is a part of their religion, and a *positively* loyal paper they will have. They would like the Presbyterian Herald to be that paper.

But not only did the West Lexington Presbytery ratify the doctrine of the Danville Review as to the true ground of opposition to the deliverance of the Assembly, the Synod of Kentucky did the same. The number of the Herald containing the unfair and indecorous notice already quoted, came to hand during the sessions of the last meeting of the Synod. That very day, and by a vote closely approximating unanimity, the Synod passed the following resolution:

“ This Synod deeply regrets that part of the action of the last General Assembly touching the order for a day of general prayer, which was liable to be construed and was construed into a requisition on all the members, and office-bearers of the Church, living in the numerous States which had seceded from the United States, and were in a state of war with them, as bound by Christian duty and by the authority of the Church, to disregard the hostile governments which had been established over them, and in defiance of the actual authority of these governments, pray for their overthrow. In the judgment of a large minority of the Assembly, and of multitudes in the Church, the subject-matter of the action of the Assembly in the premises, being purely political, was incompetent to a spiritual court. Undoubtedly it was incompetent to the Assembly, as a spiritual court, to require, or to advise acts of disobedience to actual governments, by those under the power of those governments—in the manner, and under the circumstances which existed; and still further, it was neither wise nor discreet for the Assembly of the whole Church to disregard, in its action, the difficulties and dangers, which rendered it impossible for large portions of the Church to obey its order, without being liable to the highest penalties. The action of the Assembly, being exhausted by the occurrence of the

day of prayer recommended—and no ulterior proceedings under the order of the Assembly being contemplated—this Synod contents itself with this expression of its grave disapprobation of this action of the General Assembly, which the Synod judges to be repugnant to the word of God, as that word is expounded in our Confession of Faith.”

So the Synod of Kentucky is in the same category with the West Lexington Presbytery and the Danville Review. It does *not* adopt the theory of the protesters. It alludes to it indeed as “the judgment of a large minority of the Assembly, and of multitudes in the Church,” but expresses its own judgment in these words: “Undoubtedly, it was incompetent to the Assembly, as a spiritual court, to require, or to advise acts of disobedience to actual governments, by those under the power of those governments.” Alas for the Synod of Kentucky! It once had some reputation for ability, but its glory has departed! Its deliverances may no longer be characterized as “*able and searching*,” but as deficient in *profundity*—not “*going to the bottom*.” Ought not the Presbyterian Herald to expose *its* shallowness? Surely, no work is more becoming a high-toned journal than the discussion of a principle that is alleged “to go to the bottom of the great questions at issue”—alleged not only by an anonymous writer in a Review, but also by high ecclesiastical courts. The Herald says, “The true point of complaint against their (the Assembly’s) action was not in the nature of it, but that they acted at all on such a subject.” The Presbytery of West Lexington and the Synod of Kentucky say, the true point of complaint is in the *nature* of their action.

The unfairness of the Herald’s notice is evinced in the following remark: “He gives up the whole point in dispute, admits that the Assembly not only had the right to act in the premises, but was bound to do so.” Now, the legitimate inference from this is, that the writer in the Review held that the Assembly had the right and was bound to decide *in these* the question of allegiance as between the Federal Government and that of the Confederate States. On the contrary, he denied the right of the Assembly, under the circumstances, to make a deliverance on that question. What he did affirm

the Assembly had a right to do in the premises, and was imperatively required to do, was to issue a Pastoral Letter to the Churches and people, expounding the law of God as the rule of duty by which all men ought to govern their conduct in the terrible crisis. We quote the *ipsissima verba*; Dan. Quar. Rev., p. 515, 1861:

"Appreciating the actual posture of affairs in the country, and resolutely resisting pressure from the world without, the Assembly ought to have issued a pastoral letter to the Churches, rivaling in dignity, piety, and wisdom, that of their illustrious predecessors of the old Synod. A day of prayer should have been appointed—to the end that, among other things, all might receive from on high the wisdom profitable to direct in a crisis so full of hazard: the law of God should have been faithfully expounded in its application to the case in hand, without fear, favor, or partiality; the distinction between the relation of the Church to the civil power, and that of her members, *as citizens*, should have been clearly presented; the people of God should have been warned of the duty of submission to the higher powers, 'not only for wrath, but also for conscience sake;' the limits of the right of revolution should have been carefully pointed out, and the people besought to keep a good conscience therein; and great circumspection, moderation, forbearance, and brotherly love, should have been enjoined upon all."

This was our position then, and is still, and of this the Herald asserts that it would have proved "quite as objectionable to the mass of those who opposed their (the Assembly's) action as the action which they did take." It might have been so; but we trow not—not in Kentucky certainly. Would any man who did not cherish rebellion in his heart, with a determination to carry it out at all hazards—the law of God to the contrary notwithstanding—have objected to a pastoral letter of that stamp? Or does it transcend the authority of the General Assembly to teach mankind their duties as laid down in the word of God, and exhort them to the performance thereof? Or must the truth be withheld at the very moment it is most needed and most pertinent, because, forsooth, it might not be palatable in some quarters? We have not so learned Presbyterianism. If the General Assembly

may not commend the Colonization Society, has it come to this, that it may not teach the truth of God and execute his will? This is *high-church* Presbyterianism with a vengeance; so etherial that it disdains to intermeddle with sublunary relations at all.

Recurring to the want of fairness exhibited in the Herald's notice of our previous article, we add what might, perhaps, be considered worse than unfair, were all the facts known by the public.

In the Presbyterian Herald for December 5, 1861, appeared an editorial of nearly two columns and a half, with this heading, "*Rev. Dr. Bullock in the Papers.*" After some remarks on the obligation to observe days of fasting and thanksgiving appointed by the *civil power*—the spirit of which, by the way, needs to be modified a good deal so as to accord with Chap. XIV of the Directory for Worship, the writer adds:

"The truth is, the civil appointment of Thanksgiving and Fasts, in its origin in our country, is an off-shoot of the New England Erastianism, which sought to remedy the evils of "Church and State," by the institution of "State and Church." And perhaps no other one cause has done more to bring us into our present troubles than the institution of two days in the year—a Feast and a Fast day, on which the clergy may have a clear field, with no Sabbath-day restraints, to "put through" the politicians and the Government. The thing is an exotic in the more Southern States, and indeed in the Presbyterian Church. Our people, however, have accepted the Thanksgiving-day as an agreeable arrangement, some for the sake of the social enjoyment—others, of the *bluer* stripe, as a good substitute for the Episcopal and Roman Catholic Christmas—others for other reasons. But none of the true Presbyterian sort have ever accepted it on the ground of an appointment of civil government, and *as by authority*, which it would be "impious audacity" and "treason" to fail in the observance of. We hope, therefore, that due allowance will be made for Dr. Bullock's want of Yankee raising."

We regretted to read this. The pious people of Kentucky accepted with gratitude to God the annual appointment of a day of thanksgiving by their Governor, as a step in the right direction. They did not stop to inquire into its origin, or to

ask, "Can any good thing come out of Nazareth?" They went up to the house of God at the summons of their chief magistrate, with gladness of heart, to render thanks to their Preserver and Bountiful Benefactor. Moreover, Presbyterians knew it to be in harmony with the teaching of their standards. They had been taught that "if at any time the civil power should think it proper to appoint a fast or thanksgiving, it is the duty of the ministers and people of our communion, as we live under a Christian government, to pay all due respect to the same." It was a pity and a wrong, therefore, to attempt to discredit the day by attributing its origin to New England Erastianism. If the thing is right in itself, in accordance with the word of God, let us hold fast to it, no matter in what part of the land it was first observed. Least of all should anything be done to lessen a general and devout observance of the day, by an appeal to the unworthy prejudices of men, intensified now as never before. There are facts, however, connected with the original appointment of Thanksgiving-day in Kentucky, which ought to be known, and which may go far toward disarming the prejudices that might be engendered or quickened by this unwise editorial. Its immediate paternity among us is of unsullied purity; not a taint of New England Erastianism about it; not a smell of the *Yankee*, either dead or alive. If "the thing is an exotic," it was introduced through the influence of one who hails from a more distant land than New England; one who hates Erastianism with a perfect hatred; one whose proclivities and likings are known to be intensely Southern, and intensely Presbyterian; and who, if he ever entertained any partialities for despised Yankeedom, must have undergone a complete metamorphosis. In a word, we are indebted for Thanksgiving in Kentucky to one of the ablest and most distinguished of the present ministers of our Synod; a man who is supposed to consider well the ground he takes, and to be able to maintain it with irresistible *logic*. We are informed by a venerable ex-governor, that his predecessor, the late Governor Letcher, issued the first proclamation for a day of Thanksgiving. We are informed by another venerable man, that he has

frequently heard the distinguished minister referred to, claim that it was he who induced Gov. Letcher, (then a member of his congregation in Frankfort,) to issue that first proclamation, and that he himself drafted it for the Governor: and further, that the distinguished minister aforesaid congratulated himself on having inserted in the proclamation a reference to the Mediator. Such are the facts.

We have always rejoiced to find in these gubernatorial proclamations a recognition of the Divine Mediator; for we know of no other way of acceptable approach to the Great God, even when we desire only to offer thanks for his preserving care and providential benefits. The Lord Jesus Christ, the anointed Saviour, is King of kings and Lord of lords, and Governor among the nations. He is head over all things to the Church. By him "kings reign and princes decree justice." It is meet, therefore, in issuing such proclamations, to direct attention to the Mediator. Yet at least one able Christian author would seem to be of a different opinion. For if it be true, that "the rule for the guidance of the civil power in its exercise, is the light of nature and reason, the law which the Author of nature reveals through reason to man;" and if this calling upon the people by the Governor, to render thanks to God, be a legitimate exercise of the civil power, as the language of our standards plainly implies, then we do not see the propriety of referring to the Mediator. "The light of nature and reason" reveals no Mediator. (See Robinson's Church of God, p. 85.)

It may appear to some that a brief notice, though uncourteous and unfair, does not require these extended remarks—particularly at this late day. But those who will carefully consider what has now been written, as well as what will be found in the sequel; and who have kept themselves informed of the course of events among us, for the last seven months; and who are aware of the reasons for believing movements to be on foot, whose object is to detach the Synod of Kentucky from the General Assembly, or at least to prepare the public mind for that deplorable result—such persons will take a different view of the matter. The issues growing out of the

action of the last Assembly are *living* issues still; nay, more vital and imminent in Kentucky than ever. It is to call attention to *these*, to arouse our loyal Presbyterian brethren, that we take the trouble to write this article. As to the defects of the previous article, we have no overweening sensitiveness about them. All we ask is fair play. But, let it be remembered, there are always two sides to a question. In this case, the weakness may have been in our September article—that is one side; or, the weakness may have been in the intellect of the Presbyterian Herald to appreciate its force—that is the other.

The positions taken and maintained at that time, are these:

1. It is *safe, scriptural, constitutional, and in accordance with the practice of the fathers*, for the General Assembly to decide the question of allegiance, when that question comes fairly before it in the orderly discharge of its ecclesiastical duties, and the decision of it is necessary in order to discharge those duties faithfully and fully.

2. The error of the Assembly of 1861 consisted in this, that the resolution adopted was tantamount to advising the Presbyterians of the seceded States to overthrow the governments actually established over them; or, in the language of the Synod of Kentucky, "It was incompetent to the Assembly, as a spiritual court, to require or to advise acts of disobedience to actual governments, by those under the power of those governments."

3. It was constitutional, and the condition of affairs in the country required, that the Assembly should issue a Pastoral Letter of the character described above.

4. The action of the Assembly, unwise and erroneous as it may have been, furnished no sufficient justification for schismatically dividing the Church—the Constitution providing a remedy in the right of protest, adequately meeting the exigencies of the case. Such also is the deliverance of the Synod of Kentucky: "The action of the Assembly being exhausted by the occurrence of the day of prayer recommended—and no ulterior proceedings under the order of the Assembly being contemplated—this Synod contents itself with this expression of its grave disapprobation of this action of the General Assembly."

5. The schismatical and violent disruption of the Church was a foregone conclusion. The action of the Assembly was only a pretext.

We have seen as yet no reason to alter these views, though we may at no distant day. Positive notice is given to the world that a great light is to break *forthwith* upon our dark horizon. We hope to have grace to hail its rising with joy, and to profit by its genial rays. It may be the harbinger of the millennium. On the contrary, it may prove but an *ignis fatuus*; a baleful star that leads its followers to ruin; an inflammable *gas*, ignited in the murky strata of the lower atmosphere, and soon dying out over the spot where it was generated. We shall watch for it, and keep a watch on it. Not every one who prophesieth, saying, "Thus saith the Lord," is a prophet of the Lord. If the effect of the coming light be to make its followers disturbers of the peace of the Church, seeking to break up existing ecclesiastical relations and institutions, they may perhaps be regarded, so far forth, rather as "Illuminati" than truly illuminated.

It is time, however, to direct attention to the criticisms of two other religious weeklies.

The editor of the *Presbyter* had the kindness to send us a copy of his paper, criticising at some length the article in the Danville Review. His estimate of it was different from that of the Presbyterian Herald, and his strictures candid and courteous. It is not our purpose to enter into a discussion with the *Presbyter*; we desire simply to submit a remark or two on two of its statements. (1.) "The views of this article will displease both sections of the Church." Quite likely; and for that very reason, likely to be about right. In times of high excitement, with the rock on the one hand and the whirlpool on the other, "*in medio tutissimus ibis*." (2.) "The writer in the Review we regard as a pro-slavery man. His opinions are certainly not in harmony with the action of our Church." Our respected brother is mistaken. The writer is not a pro-slavery man, as he understands that term; and he sincerely believes his opinions *are* in harmony with the action of our Church. But *pro-slavery* may mean one thing in one

latitude, and quite a different thing in another. Hence the difference of opinion between the Presbyter and ourselves. Holding fast the opinions of Washington and the early fathers of our Church, on this politico-religious question, we abhor alike the doctrine of Dr. Palmer's sermon, as we interpret it, and the insane vituperation of William Lloyd Garrison and Wendell Phillips. A real and lasting peace will not be restored to our bleeding country till these antipodal opinions are crushed out by a wholesome and overpowering public sentiment. While on the one side, slavery is regarded as the "sum of human villanies," which ought to be instantly abolished; and on the other, as a beneficent institution, to be cherished, perpetuated, and extended, and made the very corner-stone of the social fabric, it is in vain to look for a cessation to angry conflict. A spirit of moderation and forbearance, and a harmonious co-operation all round, are indispensable to a successful handling of a gigantic difficulty. There can be at best but an imperfect union hereafter, unless a kindly spirit and some degree of homogeneity of sentiment on the vexed question can be brought about. The safe and honorable way for us Presbyterians at any rate, is to abide by the judicious views and practice of our Church hitherto.

But really we were not a little amused, perhaps gratified, at being called *pro-slavery*. It was a healing oil. The brethren in Danville are denounced as "Abolitionists" by Secessionists all over Kentucky. This is a chief article of their stock in trade. The institutions here are said to be "*abolitionized*," and thus it is sought "to hound on popular prejudice" against them. Now if our brethren across the river, departing from the mild and respectful manner of speech observed by the Presbyter, would *denounce* us right soundly as *pro-slavery* men, they might enable us possibly to stand up against the charge of abolitionism. Of this, however, more hereafter.

The remarks in the *New York Observer* of Oct. 10th, 1861, were read with amazement. Far be it from us to charge the writer with intentional misrepresentation; but that an acute and practiced polemic, and withal an honest one, should so misconceive and misconstrue the views of another, is passing

strange; and all the more so when he says, "we have read the article attentively," and gives an extract from page 514 of the Review, which is as far from supporting his statements and inferences as anything well can be. In attempting to correct them it is hard to tell where to begin or where to end. The whole critique is a tissue of misconception. We respectfully ask the writer to review it in the light of what follows.

The Danville Review did *not* affirm the right of the General Assembly to decide in the abstract the question of allegiance, i. e., of contested allegiance, "and to direct the citizen to *the* government which it is his bounden duty to obey." On the contrary, it expressly disclaimed that right. It did *not* contend that "inasmuch as the Confederate Government was in operation, and no other government had existence in the seceded States, it was the right of the Assembly to decide that citizens living there owe their allegiance to it." It did *not* hold "the shocking morality that the Church ought to inculcate the duty of its members to submit to wicked rebellion, without an effort to preserve the benign institutions which they have enjoyed, and which God gave them to preserve and transmit to their children." It did *not* maintain the childish paralogism, either directly or inferentially, "of denying the right of secession, and of admitting the right of the Assembly to decide the question of allegiance, and *then* deny its right to teach the duty of upholding the best government in the world." And it is absolutely astounding how any man of a clear head and an honest heart, who had read the article in the Review *attentively*, could allege that these propositions are advocated there.

On the other hand, the Danville Review *did* affirm the right of the Assembly to determine the question of allegiance, "when that question comes fairly before it in the orderly discharge of its ecclesiastical duties, and the decision of it is necessary in order to discharge those duties faithfully and fully," and then only not *in.thesi*; or, as stated in the passage the Observer extracts, "when such a question comes fairly before it in determining the moral conduct of any within its pale." It *did* affirm the right and the duty of the Church to

teach the principles laid down in the word of God, and our standards, touching obedience to civil government, and the limits of the right of revolution. As to these principles and limitations, our views accord with those of the Observer. But just here is the point. The Church may teach these principles as general rules of duty, just as she teaches the law of God respecting theft or homicide. She may and does teach the general duty of obedience to superiors, as a religious duty, and the guilt of rebellion against them; and may judge before her tribunals those of her members who fail in that duty or incur that guilt. But it is no part of her teaching office to decide in the abstract conflicting claims of allegiance, or to declare a particular rebellion justifiable or unjustifiable. "Synods and councils are to handle or conclude nothing but that which is ecclesiastical." That decision rests, in the first instance, with each individual citizen, under all his responsibilities to his God, his country, and the Church, if a member of it. But then the Church must execute the revealed will of God within her own pale. There is a judicial as well as a teaching function attaching to her. Her members are as liable to be tried at her bar for a violation of the fifth commandment, as the sixth, or seventh. Rebellion against constituted authority is a case ecclesiastic, as well as civil, as soon as it becomes concrete in the person of a member of the Church. The Bible has nothing to say about railroads, or the most judicious methods of treating the ills that flesh is heir to, but it has much to say about the duty of obedience to civil power; and our standards assert that God, on Sinai, out of the midst of devouring fire, gave as one of his eternal laws of rectitude a commandment, which, by good and necessary inference, settles that question irreversibly and forever. "A Christian congregation," it is said, "would be shocked, if their pastor should preach a sermon on the importance of the Pacific Railroad." (Our Country and the Church: by N. L. Rice, D. D.) Very true; but in the name of all that is august and sacred in the principles of immutable morality, are illustrations drawn from railroads and the scientific treatment of disease, whether by

steam or calomel, to settle the question of the Church's authority to decide a case made and brought before her bar; as to the right and wrong of which God has spoken in a voice of thunder? It is sheer folly to talk here of "intermeddling with civil affairs which concern the Commonwealth." In the manifold relations which man bears to God, to the Church, to his country, and to his fellows, some fall exclusively within the purview of the State; others exclusively within the purview of the Church; and others are of such a nature that he becomes amenable to the laws of both State and Church, when he is at the same time a citizen and a member of the household of faith. These divinely ordained powers have concurrent jurisdiction over him; the one, as his offense is related to what is civil and temporal,—the other, as it is related to what is ecclesiastic and spiritual. Each must execute its laws upon delinquents: and while the Church claims only the right to exclude from the privileges of her spiritual household for breaches of the Divine law—not pretending to determine any thing as to the immunities and obligations of men as citizens,—she does not interfere with civil affairs. Nay, more; when the same offense falls within the purview of both Church and State; the former, being a court of conscience, may be obliged to go farther than the latter actually does, or is obliged to go. The law of homicide in the State may inflict no penalty for manslaughter in the duello; the Church should excommunicate the offender. So in the matter of obedience to the civil power. The State may be satisfied if no overt act of treason is committed; the law of the Church reaches further: and were that law, as expounded in the Confession of Faith and Larger Catechism, faithfully executed to-day, some eminent men would be dealt with, who now sadly need the correcting hand of discipline. The practical difficulties in the way of dealing with treason in spiritual courts, are the same in kind as attach to all questions of duty where the obligation is not absolute. To murder is always wrong; there are no conditions which can justify it. But the case is different when we come to consider the relation of parent and child, or that of the State and its citizens.

Here rights and obligations are conditional, and, at times exceedingly intricate. A child is not always bound to obey its parent; a citizen is not always bound to abide in true allegiance to the existing government. The court must use great caution and weigh well the conditions and limitations of duty in both instances; but surely no considerate man will maintain that because great, it may be, well-nigh insuperable difficulties, are in the way of reaching a just decision, therefore such cases are shut out of court altogether.

Again: the Danville Review *did* affirm that the Assembly had no right to advise its members in the seceded States to revolt against the actual governments established over them. It took issue exactly here with the Assembly. But are the perceptive faculties of the Observer so blunted as to confound this negative proposition with the assertion of the Assembly's right to decide that citizens of the seceded States, under existing circumstances, owe true allegiance to the Confederate Government? Does the converse positive proposition necessarily follow because the negative is true? A proposition and its converse may both be true, or may not; and it may happen that both are false. We utterly deny that it can be fairly inferred from any statement in our former article, that citizens of the seceded States owe allegiance to the Confederate Government, or that the Assembly had a right so to decide, or to decide that question at all in the premises. We said the Assembly had no right to *advise revolt* against actual governments, however wicked, or however wickedly established. If the seceded States should succeed in their attempted revolution, and be recognized as one of the powers of the earth, then allegiance might become due to their government. There are countless things the members of the Church *as citizens* have a right to do, and yet the Assembly no right to advise the doing of them. Among these is the right, in certain contingencies, to rebel against a bad government; but it is no business of the Church to advise them to do it. It is a strange logical process indeed whereby this is twisted into teaching "that the Church ought to inculcate the duty of its members to submit to wicked rebellion." The Observer closes its remarks with

this noble sentiment: "If we are to perish, let us perish with the language of truth and Christian patriotism on our lips." But when the day to perish comes, we apprehend the venerable editor will perish as a citizen of the United States, and not as a member of the Church of Jesus Christ. The teaching function of the Church ends as to the matter in hand, with publishing the law of God respecting the duty of obedience to "the powers that be," as a great general truth, coupled with the admission of the right of revolution for sufficient cause. These are *divine* truths—truths settled by God himself. Obedience is due to the government under which a man lives. This is to him "the powers that be." But there may arise sufficient reasons for an attempt to overthrow it. Of this, all Christian citizens, *as such*, must judge for themselves, in the exercise of their Christian liberty. The Church has no authority to come in at this point to decide the question of allegiance. If it had, we could vote for even more emphatic resolutions than Dr. Spring's. As a citizen, a Christian citizen, we yield neither to that venerable name, nor to the editor of the New York Observer, nor to any other man, in ardent attachment to the Government of the United States, or in a profound sense of obligation to bear true allegiance to it. We hope to see its authority re-established over its rightful and imperial domain, stretching from the great lakes to the Gulf, and from the Atlantic to the Pacific. We believe the Southern revolt, both in Church and State, to be without justification; that it is a wicked rebellion, inaugurated and carried over the heads of the great body of the Southern people by fraud and violence; and hope the day is nigh at hand when they will be able to subvert the revolutionary governments and return to the benign government of their fathers and ours. As a citizen we belong to that great Union party which Henry Clay predicted, and of which he declared his purpose to be a member should he be alive. But in the name of common sense, which is the best logic and metaphysics we know of, is there any contrariety between holding these opinions as a citizen of the State, and acting on them too, and at the same time holding that the *Church* has

no right to advise rebellion against actual governments? Many things are competent to me as a *citizen*, which are wholly incompetent to me as a constituent member of a spiritual court. Or is there any contrariety between teaching that the General Assembly, acting in the name of the Great Teacher, has the right to declare simply the fundamental principles of God's word touching obedience and rebellion, and yet no right to say to the Presbyterians of the seceded States, you ought to uphold and defend the Government of the United States? Or again, is there any between teaching that the Church has a right to judge at her bar one charged with a violation of the fifth commandment, and yet no right to decide *in thesi* the question of allegiance as between the Federal and Confederate Governments? Do any or all of the propositions maintained by us conduce to the conclusion that "when a lawful, mild and wholesome government has been for a time displaced, and one as bad as 'Nero's,' and which may prove 'permanent or not,' has been set up, that it is the duty of all men to submit to that revolution?" Is there anything in them that militates against the right of citizens to rise up instantly in rebellion against such a usurpation, when there is a reasonable prospect of success? God forbid. Let him show it who can. On a more careful scrutiny, perhaps the Observer will find its *own logic*, not *ours*, at fault.

A sentence in our September article may have been misunderstood. A word of explanation is offered here. In noting some suitable topics for a Pastoral Letter, the following one is named among others: "The law of God should have been faithfully expounded in its application to the case in hand, without fear, favor, or partiality." In writing this sentence, special reference was had to the people of the States which had not yet revolted. The rebellion, it will be remembered, was still progressing. The object to be aimed at was to call attention to the precise issue. Shall we join in a revolt against the government of the United States? Has that government failed so far in securing the prosperity of the nation, ample protection of person and property, and the largest de-

gree of personal liberty consistent with the good of the whole, as to justify its overthrow? In a word, has it so failed to answer the ends of civil government as to justify a revolution? The purpose was to bring the matter home to each individual soul as a question of religious duty; to enforce upon every one the awful responsibility resting upon *him*. Can *I*, with the law of God before my eyes, keep a good conscience and join in this rebellion? Can I answer for a part in it at the bar of God? This is what was intended by the application of the law of God to the case in hand,—bringing it to bear directly on the conscience as the rule of duty in choosing between loyalty and rebellion. This is what we have preached from the pulpit, but erred in that we did not preach it early enough; this is what ought to have been preached to every congregation in the land months and months ago. It would have been, and would be still, practical preaching well-timed. Had the standard of the Lord been lifted up in season by the ministers and office-bearers of the Churches, the incoming flood of iniquity might have been stayed. The rebellion might not have extended beyond the Cotton States. The populations of the other slave States had not been inoculated with the virus of secession, unless the tide-water region of Virginia be a partial exception. Here and there may have been a politician of the extreme Calhoun school; here and there a preacher of that complexion who had come up from a more Southern latitude, or one who by the distinguishing grace of God and the force of democratic institutions, had emerged from the lower stratum of society, and then assumed the lordly airs and principles which he foolishly supposed characterized high Southern blood; but these were mere exceptions—*rare aves*. The great body of the people were sound on the question of nationality. They had no doubt about allegiance being due primarily to the Federal Government. They had at hand no such quack plasters as the right of secession, or the prior claim of the State government to the allegiance of the citizen, wherewith to ease their consciences. What they needed was instruction, *religious* instruction, from the pulpit, the Christian press, the assemblies of

the Church. This it was the duty of the General Assembly of 1861 to give them.

Aside from the establishment of just principles on the relations of Church and State, we feel a profound and most pressing interest in all the matters discussed in the former part of this article, because of their bearing on the position and peace of the Synod of Kentucky. That the purpose to carry the Synod, or a part of it, into the Southern Assembly has been entertained, we have not the shadow of a doubt. That plans have been devised and measures initiated, looking to that end, we have as little doubt—no more than that plots have been laid and prosecuted, to carry the State into the Southern Confederacy. If the latter purpose has been abandoned at all, it is because it has been found impracticable, and because the persistent prosecution of it would involve its abettors in ruin; and so of the former. It is true the editor of the Presbyterian Herald asserted a short time since, that after *diligent search* he had found but two Presbyterians, and these private members of the Church, “who were willing to admit” that they desired the ministers and churches of Kentucky to join the Southern Assembly. But has that excellent man yet to learn that men may desire many things they are not “willing to admit;” entertain purposes they do not consider it politic to avow at once; and labor earnestly but quietly for their accomplishment till the opportune moment arrives for a public avowal and a *coup de grace*. The suspicion of no wrong doing on the part of our brethren, is a beautiful and edifying exhibition of simplicity of Christian character. Experience, however, warns us to be on our guard. Even good men may do unseemly and wicked things. Eternal vigilance is the price of political liberty, and peace is best maintained by being always prepared for war. The saints of God are exhorted to “follow after the things which make for peace;” and one of the best ways to do it, is to sound a timely warning against opening the flood-gates of strife.

Some of our reasons for believing the purpose has been entertained, and for aught known to us may be still enter-

tained, to revolutionize our Church in Kentucky, are the following :

1. It is a well-known fact that a number of our ministers sympathized so profoundly with the rebellion of the South, that they abandoned, for that reason and no other, the flocks over which they most solemnly averred they believed the Holy Ghost had made them overseers, and removed to seceded States. One of these brethren wrote back to the congregation he had forsaken in violation of his covenant "to discharge all the duties of a pastor" to them, that he would return provided Kentucky would retrieve her character by joining the rebellion. It is equally well known that other ministers, who have remained with their charges, sympathize with the belligerent movement against the Government of the United States—some avowedly, others more quietly. It is also well known that influential elders and private members of the Church have openly advocated secession. Now, can any one believe these gentlemen are not in favor of separating from the old Assembly and uniting with the one advertised to meet in Memphis this spring? Is it any mark of a suspicious nature to think they have harbored the purpose to do so? or that they have devised plans looking to that end? and that they have abandoned them, if indeed they are abandoned, because they are found impracticable? All the more are we driven to these conclusions, when we consider how important a part the ministers and churches of the South have played in urging forward and sustaining the secession scheme, and what a mighty impulse ecclesiastical secession would give to political in Kentucky. Still it is true there are brethren among us who make no strong professions of loyalty to the Union, yet repudiate utterly the idea of schism. We know of such and honor them—men of stern integrity, and loyalty to the Church.

2. The printing and circulating of a pamphlet bearing the following title: "*Address from the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church in the Confederate States of America, to all the Churches throughout the Earth; as reported by Rev. J. H. Thornwell, D. D., from a committee appointed to prepare it, and*"

unanimously adopted by the Assembly." From the cover we learn it was printed at Louisville "by private members of the Presbyterian Church;" but—and it is somewhat singular and begetteth suspicion—the name of the printer is not given. All we have to say about the merits of this surreptitiously printed Address is this: if it is the best the great logician can do in behalf of the great schism, who told the General Assembly of 1860 that his library contained all the valuable works on logic of ancient, mediæval, and modern times, his cause must be a bad one. But what was the intent in publishing it in Kentucky at the time and under the circumstances it was done? Most obviously, to prepare the minds of Presbyterians here also to separate from the Church of their fathers—to follow suit in the precipitate and outrageous schism already consummated elsewhere. This was the intent; and along with it, to forward the secession of the State. The proof of it is found in the prefatory note: "The publication" (in the Presbyterian Herald) "of the extract relating to the slavery question, apart from the statement of the chief grounds of separation which precedes it, may tend to confirm the prevalent error that it is the difference touching slavery that has caused the rending of the Church, instead of the fatal heresy of the late General Assembly, in the unscriptural assumption of power in ecclesiastical courts over civic and political questions. It is therefore perhaps the more important that the whole argument be laid before our Church members." Now if the argument is good for one latitude, it is equally so for another. If "the fatal heresy of the late General Assembly" was a sufficient reason for *their* renunciation of its authority, it is for *ours* also; for, be it noted, the Address is said to breathe the spirit of "manly Christian logic." This is perfectly manifest. But the fact is, the prefatory note misrepresents the Address. In relation to what the note calls "the fatal heresy," the Address says, "We frankly admit that the mere unconstitutionality of the proceedings of the last Assembly is not, in itself, considered a sufficient ground of separation." That is to say, the action of the Assembly was made a *pretext* for rending the Church—the very point insisted

on at the close of our previous article. And again, the prominence of the slavery question as a reason for separation, is ignored in the note, whereas the Address maintains "there is one difference which so radically and fundamentally distinguishes the North and the South, that it is becoming every day more and more apparent, that the religious, as well as the secular interests of both, will be more effectually promoted by a complete and lasting separation;" and about one-half of it is taken up in defining and supporting the modern position of Southern Christians on that question. This occurs in immediate connexion with the only strong argument for a division of the Church, in the vaunted performance. Granted the severance of the Union into two distinct and permanent nationalities, and we make no objection to two Assemblies.

We argue the same insidious and wicked intent from the fact that the Address is introduced to the public with another deceptive statement. "It was hoped that the Presbyterian Herald might find room for the entire Address in its columns, instead of a mere extract from the latter part of it." The fair construction of this sentence is that the press of matter on the columns of the Herald did not admit of the publication of the entire Address. This is the impression necessarily made on a plain and honest mind, whether sought to be made or not. Was it so? "*Credat Judæus Apella, non ego.*" A far more probable supposition, and one not without foundation, is that the editor of the Herald was not willing to assume the responsibility of publishing the whole of the precious document, when its obvious and designed effect here, if any, could only be to alienate the affections of his readers from the old Church. Hence another channel of communication with the public, whereby to regale their spiritual and intellectual appetite with a fragrant morsel "breathing so much of the spirit of Christian kindness, and of manly Christian logic." Oh, precious *logic*! LOGIC!!

Two reasons are assigned by "private members of the Presbyterian Church," for publishing the Address." (1.) "As an act of courtesy towards separated brethren." (2.) "As in itself

a true exposition of the results of the present tendency to the secularizing of the ecclesiastical courts." The invalidity of the second reason is an additional argument for our view of the real intent of the publication. The tendency alleged is *not* the present one in our highest court, unless a single rash act, in a season of unprecedented excitement and pressure, constitutes a *tendency*. Was not the Colonization Society ruled out at Indianapolis? Was not the slavery question most significantly ignored at Rochester? If there ever was such a tendency, it had been abundantly corrected; and it is well known that Dr. Thornwell himself has had no little influence in moulding the sentiment and shaping the legislation of the Church for several years past. Speaking of it in this Address, he says, "That venerable Church had always been distinguished for its conservative influence." Again, referring to slavery: "The Presbyterian Church in the United States has been enabled, by Divine grace, to pursue for the most part an eminently conservative, because a thoroughly Scriptural policy in relation to this delicate question." If the General Assembly is a fair index of the tendencies of the Church, it is not true that the "present tendency is to the secularizing of the ecclesiastical courts." To the first reason assigned for publishing the Address, the words of Laocoon—our fellow schoolmasters will indulge us in another Latin quotation—may be aptly applied:

"Aut aliquis latet error: equo ne credite, Teucri:
Quicquid id est, *timeo Danaos et dona ferentas.*"

3. Very serious apprehensions have been felt, and may be still, by loyal members of the Presbytery of Louisville, respecting an effort which they feared would be made at their next meeting to prevent the appointment of commissioners to the General Assembly of the current year. This, it has been supposed, was to be the entering wedge in the way of ecclesiastical action. Should it succeed, the way could soon be prepared for more positive measures. The numerical ministerial strength in other Presbyteries, on the side of the grand old Church, has prevented serious alarm there. Yet

in one of them, as we are informed, an aged minister, who is greatly belied if he is not a blatant secessionist, remarked some time since, that care should be taken to have elders of the *right stripe* elected to the Spring meeting of his Presbytery. That minister may not be "willing to admit" that he desires the Synod of Kentucky to renounce the jurisdiction of the General Assembly, but who can doubt it? Who doubts that he would strive to get his Presbytery to take that step were there a reasonable prospect of success? In Missouri, too, it appears the same purpose is entertained, and the first step in the programme the same. So writes a minister in that State to a friend in Kentucky. He inquires very anxiously, too, what the Presbyteries in Kentucky will do. This confirms the supposition of a like purpose and plan here.

4. The assaults upon the institutions and people of Danville. Centre College is the child of the Synod of Kentucky, and the Theological Seminary was founded by the General Assembly and is under its control. These institutions have heretofore commanded the confidence and patronage of the Presbyterian people of Kentucky. They have been the objects of their fostering care and earnest prayers. Why should they be assailed now? What evil have they done? All the Professors now connected with them have been in office for years. They hold the same opinions now they have held heretofore. They have been quietly occupied the past year in their appropriate duties as formerly. With one exception, they have taken no public part in the political discussions of the day; and he only with the pen, as the most honored ministers all over the land have done. Neither the President of the College, nor the Professors in the Seminary have taken military commands in the army in defense of the Federal Government, as like official persons have done elsewhere in rebellion against it. What have they done to forfeit the confidence of their brethren? It is true, they are all decided Union men. Is this a rock of offense? It is true one of the Professors in the Seminary drafted the minutes passed at the last meeting of Synod, another proposed an amendment to

it, which was accepted, and all voted for it. Is this a rock of offense? It is true they are resolutely opposed to separation from the General Assembly, and determined to resist it at all hazards, and to the last extremity. In a word, they are loyal to the nation and loyal to the Church. So are the overwhelming majority of the Presbyterian inhabitants of the town and its vicinity. Why, under these circumstances should Danville be denounced as that "*Abolition Hole?*" Why should the Professors in these Institutions be stigmatized by some as abolitionists? Why should others whine out their pious sorrow, saying, "We are sorry indeed, but the Seminary is gone—Danville is dead?" And this too by men, some of whom have been fed and clothed by the hand of charity, most generously and cordially extended to them by the good citizens of Danville, and educated on foundations belonging to the institutions here! Unspeakable baseness! To bite the hand that fed them, and sting the bosom that nursed them and warmed them into life! Oh shame "thou art fled to brutish beasts, and men have lost their reason!" Can mortal man conceive of any reason for these denunciations, and this vile conduct, other than the loyal sentiments entertained here toward both Church and State? Can any man wish to crush these institutions of the Church, who is not either a secessionist at heart, or an advocate of schism, or both? When Wicklif was supposed by his enemies to be dying, he was raised a little on his couch, and said to his persecutors, "*I shall not die, but live and declare the evil deeds of the friars.*" Thank God, Danville is not quite dead yet. By His help she hopes to live yet many days, always holding "full high advanced" a banner in defense of truth and godly living. She will be found standing hard by the ancient land-marks, immovably fixed on the old foundations, her face set as a flint against sectional fanaticisms and new-fangled notions in both theology and morals. If we perish, we perish; but will not die with a lie in our right hand, nor recreant to the Church that gave us being, and the benignant Government under whose shade we have rested as under the shadow of a great rock in a weary land. We are willing to

sacrifice every earthly interest on the Altar of God and our Country.

These are all the reasons we have either time or space at command to give for believing a purpose was formed, and initiatory measures instituted, to revolutionize the Synod of Kentucky; and they are sufficient. If that purpose has been abandoned or adjourned, it is because found impracticable at present. The pear is not yet ripe. If any Christian man denies that *he* ever entertained such a purpose, we credit his words. We should be glad to believe ourselves mistaken altogether, but can not. The force of the evidence given herein, is necessarily and greatly weakened by the suppression of names and facts which prudence and justice for the present require to be withheld. The time may come, (we hope not,) when the interests of truth and righteousness may demand an exposure of the whole.

It only remains to add, that the larger part of this article was written from the beginning to the middle of March, before the Presbyterian Herald was sold.

Dr. 11/2

DANVILLE REVIEW.

No. II.

JUNE, 1862.

ART. I.—STUDIES ON THE BIBLE, No. I. *The Sins of the Patriarchs.**

The term patriarch occurs four times in the New Testament. It invariably denotes the founder of a family or a race. It is applied once to Abraham, the progenitor of the chosen seed; Heb. vii : 4; twice to the sons of Jacob, from whom the twelve tribes took their origin and their designations; Acts vii : 8, 9; and once to David, the first in the royal line of Judah; Acts ii : 29. The corresponding term in the Hebrew text of the Old Testament is *Roshe Aboth*, describing the chief fathers of the tribes of Israel. Ex. vi : 14; Numb. xxxii : 28, etc. In popular language, however, they are styled patriarchs who stood in the line of men, beginning perhaps with Noah and ending with the sons of Jacob. The expression holy patriarchs is restricted to such of their number as are expressly declared to have been the servants of God, especially Noah, Abraham, Lot, Isaac and Jacob. The phrase, the sins of the holy patriarchs, stands for those flagrant immoralities into which they were betrayed, and brings us face to face with one of the well-known problems of sacred history.

The problem, when analyzed, resolves itself into three principal

* AUTHORITIES AND SOURCES OF INFORMATION. Hengstenberg's Pentateuch, vol. II, p. 482, seq.; Havernick's Pentateuch, p. 187; Princeton Review, 1855, p. 24, seq.; Poli Synopsis Criticorum; Calvin's Commentary on Genesis; Kurtz's Old Covenant, vol. I, p. 212; Smith's Dictionary of the Bible; North British Review, Feb. 1860, Art. 4, "Silence of Scripture."

elements. The first exhibits the heinous character of these sins. Noah was a just man, and he walked with God, and was a preacher of righteousness; yet after God had saved him from the flood, and had made with him a new covenant, he planted a vineyard, and drank the wine and was drunken. Righteous Lot, after being delivered from the overthrow of the cities of the plain, was seduced two days successively into drunkenness and incest, crimes of Sodom itself. Abraham, the father of the faithful, and the friend of God, was guilty of premeditated falsehood, first to Pharaoh, and then to Abimelech. Isaac, the heir to all the promises made to Abraham, followed his example of prevarication. Jacob, too, with Rebekah, his mother, practiced a preconceived fraud on his blind and helpless old father, upholding the fraud by a series of audacious falsehoods. Such were their delinquencies, man by man. The second condition of the problem is found in the form given to the sacred record. The facts are plainly stated, but without any express animadversion. The historian describes in few words the misconduct of Noah and Lot, and says no more. He enters into the particulars of the derelictions of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob, but he does not expressly condemn their conduct as derogatory to them or to their religion, or as offensive to God. Moreover—and this is the third element—it appears that these offenders were the objects of God's special favor and grace. God held frequent communion with Noah, saved him and his family from the waters of the deluge, and then entered into solemn covenant with him as the second father of the human race; Noah became intoxicated, even lying naked in his tent. Yet after this, God endowed him with the gift of prophecy. God chose Abraham to be the founder of the Church, the recipient and channel of boundless blessings. Yet, after he had beheld the Son of God in two distinct theophanies, he lied to Pharaoh. God granted to him other theophanies, and entered into a gracious covenant with him, and made sure to him the promise of a son; Abraham was again guilty of falsehood to Abimelech. Yet even after that, God gave Isaac to him, and revealed himself more fully to the patriarch as his God in the land of Moriah, and added to all his promises the word of his oath, saying, "Blessing I will bless thee, and in thy seed shall all the nations of the earth be blessed." Isaac's act of false-

hood was followed by the theophany at Beersheba, and the Lord said, "I am the God of Abraham thy father: fear not, for I am with thee, and will bless thee, and multiply thy seed for my servant Abraham's sake." Gen. xxvi: 24. The deception which Jacob practiced on his father was followed by the magnificent theophany at Bethel, the vision of the ascending and descending angels, and the awful appearance of Jehovah investing Jacob with all the blessings granted to Abraham, and adding this special promise, "Behold, I am with thee, and will keep thee in all places whither thou goest, and will bring thee again into this land: for I will not leave thee, until I have done that which I have spoken to thee of." Gen. xxviii. 15.

The sceptical critics have not failed to make diligent use of these circumstances for the purpose of establishing conclusions unfavorable to revealed religion. The English Deists of the last century, and the German Rationalists of later times, have put on for the exigencies of this discussion a hatred for sin and a zeal for the honor of God which would be somewhat more respectable if somewhat less malignant, and if not so slightly worn as to be scarcely a disguise. The indignant virtue of these critics appears to have been tempted beyond what they were able to bear or to express, if we may judge by the free use they have made of the opprobrious terms so copiously furnished by the English and the German tongues.

"The Jacob of the Hebrews," says De Wette, "was distinguished by them as a cunning deceiver. The Greeks had their crafty Ulysses, but what a noble, exalted personage compared with Jacob!" "Behold," is the cry of the author of the Wolfenbützel Fragments, "a succession of men, belonging to a race, who by lying, deceit, dishonest traffic, oppression and exaction, with robbery and murder, and restless marauding, sought to amass riches." Noah, according to these stern moralists, was as corrupt as the people who were drowned by the flood; Lot deserved the fate of Sodom as richly as his neighbors; and Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob were no better than Pharaoh, Abimelech, and Esau. "Who," exclaims Less, "would not rather be Esau than Jacob?" The general conclusion sought to be established by these allegations, is, that the religion revealed to the patriarchs, estimated by its effects, has no stronger claim to a divine origin than heathenism itself. By

another step in the same direction, the inspiration of the sacred writer is impugned on the ground that he relates the facts simply, without comment by way of censure. Van Bohlen, for example, maintains, that the failure of the author to blame the patriarchs, plainly indicates that he approved of their delinquencies, and regarded them as worthy of imitation. Tuch also suggests, that "the cunning and calculating character of Jacob, which might appear objectionable to a stricter moralist, is represented as wholly blameless." Finally, an inference, unfavorable both to the inspiration of the book and the character of the God of the Old Testament, is drawn from the fact that He is represented as holding special communion, and entering into solemn covenants, with these men. Are we at liberty to suppose, such is the argument, that God chose sinners like these to be his particular favorites, the sole heirs of his special and abounding promises; that he granted to them glorious theophanies, and bound himself by promise, by covenant, and by oath, to bless them, and curse their enemies, and in their seed to bless all nations? Could not the Almighty find on earth, or at least raise up, more upright men to receive his holy revelations, and his saving mercies? In this spirit, the Wolfenbittel writer says: "I take it to be a manifest contradiction, that God could have communion with such impure souls, and that he could choose such an impure, wicked race, in preference to others, for his peculiar people." Hartmann adds: "With the idea of God as a holy being, the distinction conferred on Jacob ill accords, whom the Scripture history itself charges with so many immoral actions. A man whom Jehovah, as consecrated to himself, would esteem worthy of his most secret revelations, ought to stand forth in the highest moral purity." The problem before us is supposed, therefore, to furnish invincible weapons of attack upon three vital points in revealed religion; that is to say, upon its divine origin, the inspiration of its Scriptures, and the rectitude of its God.

It is to be regretted that the problem has not been always well solved by the apologists. Hengstenberg utters a judicious remark, to the effect that the Jewish writers, and, to a certain extent, the early Christian fathers, having no clear conception of the idea of justification by faith, resorted to shallow and insufficient excuses for the sins of the patriarchs. "They

knew no God who justifies sinners, but one only who rewards saints. Now, in order to transform the recipient of divine revelation into saints, according to their notion, they proceeded not unfrequently to absurdities." Noah, for example, say the Jewish doctors, was unacquainted with the strength of wine; Epiphanius adds, that he was old and unable to bear its strength; Lilienthal, a modern writer, with the best intentions no doubt, subjoins: "One year produces stronger wine than another. Is it not possible that just when the earth had been manured by the rich soil of the deluge, and by so many dead bodies (*sic*), such generous wine might be produced, that a quantity which Noah would, at another time, have taken with impunity, now intoxicated him?" Lot is excused from his double immorality, on the ground that he was led astray by his daughters; the fact, however, of his repeating the same sins on the second day not having been duly considered. The apology for Abraham and Isaac, in attempting to pass off their wives for their sisters, is that, according to the usage of the Hebrew language, Sarah and Rebekah were, in a certain sense, their sisters; the suggestion overlooking the circumstance, that the patriarchs intended to create the impression that these women were not their wives. The Rabbi Jarchi persuaded himself that Jacob was not guilty of falsehood to his father, but resorted to an allowable ambiguity; "I am he who brings meat—Esau is thy first-born son." The more learned of the Christian fathers, while they rejected most of these quibbles, did not put the matter on impregnable grounds. Origen, Chrysostom, and Jerome excuse Jacob on the assumption that his fraud did not proceed from an intent to do evil, but to secure the greatest good. Even Augustine, the most profound theologian of his own and many following generations, expresses the opinion that Jacob's personation of Esau was justified by his purchase of the birthright. And in defense of Abraham, he adopts the Rabbinical sophism mentioned above, founded on the equivocal meaning of the Hebrew word for sister. He says: "*Indicavit sororem, non negavit uxorem; tacuit aliquid veri non dicit aliquid falsi.*" Finally, Pool's Synopsis embalms the names of two obscure writers, who suggest that "Jacob's statement, 'I am Esau, thy first-born,' was true in a figurative and representative sense; for he was, in

fact, the first-born, not indeed by birth, but by virtue of the divine decree, and by right of purchase: just as John was called Elias in a figure. Matt.xi: 14."

In the later theology, the treatment of the case has been far more satisfactory. John Calvin, who is unrivaled in the logical as distinguished from the verbal interpretation of the Scriptures, was perhaps the first to put some important parts of the subject in their proper light. Other parts have been elucidated by those who have come after him. Of the generation now passing, Hengstenberg, in his Dissertation on the Genuineness of the Pentateuch, and the late Dr. Joseph Addison Alexander, (*death loves a shining mark, a signal blow*), in the Princeton Review, have done much toward settling the principles which should govern the inquiry. But these principles have not been, as yet, universally adopted. The subject is often treated, both by the press and the pulpit, after methods which are liable to serious exceptions. A late writer, for example, in Smith's Dictionary of the Bible, follows Waterland, whose explanations are wholly insufficient. A re-statement of the case, therefore, may be acceptable to readers of the Scriptures who have not investigated the topic.

The whole ground will be covered by satisfactory replies to three inquiries. The first relates to the purpose of the sacred writer in recording these immoralities; the second to the circumstance that he records them without direct censure; and the third to the alleged connivance at these sins, indicated in the immeasurable blessings conferred on the patriarchs. Or, more briefly, why were these immoralities mentioned; why mentioned without animadversion; why were tokens of the divine favor associated with them?

To the first inquiry, why these incidents are recorded, one reply may well be, because they are both true and pertinent to the purpose of the historian. It was within his power to omit them altogether. In that event, they could not have come to the knowledge of the after ages; for Moses wrote five hundred years before the dawn of authentic profane history, and a thousand years before the birth of Herodotus, the father of that science. But Moses, true to his vocation as an inspired historian, states the facts as they actually occurred; he sets down the plain, unvarnished truth, without malice or extenuation,

without censure or apology. It has been well said, that this very account of the sins of God's people, shows that the Bible is the most honest book in the world. It sets forth the history of the early ages in its absolute truth; it is temperate in statement, exact, impartial, fearless of rigorous or even depreciatory criticism. The sacred writer, however, does not relate all the events of the patriarchal age; for an exhaustive statement was, in the nature of the case, impossible: why were these particular incidents selected out of the mass of materials before him? For the reason, such is the obvious reply, that these facts were the necessary elements of his narrative. The mention of Noah's sin explains the impiety of Ham, and the reverential grief of Shem and Japheth; that again explains the prophecy of Noah respecting the three great stocks of the race descending from the three brothers; and this prophecy contains the second Messianic promise, which is one of the central, luminous points in the history. The historical relations of the Moabites and Ammonites to the Israelites were so intimate, and in many ways so controlling, that their incestuous origin and their consanguinity to each other and to Israel, were required to be distinctly traced to the immoralities of Lot. As instances of the fulfillment of God's engagement with Abraham to bless those that blessed him, and to curse them that cursed him, the sacred writer describes the interviews of the patriarch with Pharaoh and Abimelech, in the course of which his equivocations occurred. Finally, in order to a true account of the lapse of the birthright from Esau to Jacob, the author was obliged to set forth the profaneness of Esau and the fraud of Jacob. It is clear, therefore, that Moses did not turn to the right in order to escape these facts, nor to the left in order to drag them into his narrative. Every incident introduced bears a definite relation to the plan of his history; nothing essential is suppressed, nothing irrelevant is admitted.

As a further reply, it may be well said that the record of the sins of the patriarchs was intended to answer important moral and religious purposes. It must be borne in mind, that the Pentateuch was written, primarily, for the Hebrews, first of the time of Moses and then of the after generations. They were in all ages a proud, arrogant people, vain of their own piety, and most boastful of the virtues of their ancestors,

especially of the three great patriarchs. No corrective to these evil passions more effectual could be supplied than the humiliating statements of Moses, convicting Noah of drunkenness, Lot of drunkenness and incest, Abraham and Isaac of falsehood, Jacob of fraud and falsehood; and then relating also, if we may look for a moment into the lives of the "twelve patriarchs," the incest of Reuben in his father's bed, the incest of Judah in his son's bed, the treacherous cruelty of Simeon and Levi in the slaughter of the Shechemites, and the sale of Joseph as a slave, by a conspiracy of his brothers. Even Stephen, eighteen hundred years afterward, recalled this disgraceful bargain and sale in the stinging words, "Jacob begat the twelve patriarchs; and the patriarchs, moved with envy, sold Joseph into Egypt." But this narrative served another and higher purpose in the clearness with which it taught to the Jews, and to all men every-where as well, the doctrine of justification by faith alone. The delusion of justification by works has been the wide-spread and inveterate heresy of the human race. The Jews established themselves in that heresy by resting, not on the saving faith, but on the saving merits of their ancestors. Paul met the argument by maintaining that even Abraham their father was justified, not by works but by faith, and that the sign of circumcision which he received from God, and which they regarded as a sign in their flesh of thorough righteousness, was a seal of the justification which was in him by faith, and not by works. Now, the record that exhibits the transgressions of Abraham and of the other patriarchs, shows that they were all concluded under sin, that they had not whereof to glory before God, and that their salvation was of faith alone. And, finally, this record shows that the patriarchs were constituted the chosen seed by the sovereign act of God. They were taken out of all the world to found the Church of God, to receive revelations, and to behold theophanies and mighty wonders: to them pertained the adoption, and the glory, and the covenants, and the giving of the law, and the service of God, and the promises; and to crown all of them, as concerning the flesh, Christ came, who is God over all, blessed forever! Why did God bestow upon the patriarchs and upon their seed supreme imperishable blessings? The Jew would say, they were holy men, and as such

deserved them all. But Moses teaches another lesson altogether; showing in the immoralities of every one of the line, from Noah to Moses, including both and including all, that the ground of their selection, and of the silent rejection of the whole human race besides, was not in the patriarchs but in God, in him who chose and not in them who were chosen; so that in all this stupendous series of events the purpose of God according to election might stand, not of works but of him that calleth. It was the sovereign act of God that laid Nahor in the grave in Chaldea, and called Abraham, his brother, to go into the land of Canaan; that appointed Isaac to be the heir of the promises, and sent Ishmael to wander a wild man in the wilderness; that adopted Jacob and banished Esau into perpetual exile in Mount Seir. Those God chose, these he rejected, and both the choice and the rejection were acts of his own unsearchable wisdom.

The second element in the problem is the circumstance that these delinquencies are not expressly censured by the sacred author. But, in the first place, it may well be asked, is not the simple record of them a sufficient rebuke? When a good man is betrayed into flagrant misconduct, and that misconduct is made known to the world, and the evidence of it is also perpetuated on the records of the church or the country, he suffers a censure of terrible severity. "*Remember not the sins of my youth, nor my transgressions,*" exclaimed David. The shame of the patriarchs, like their faith, is perpetuated in the memory of mankind by the testimony of the most truthful and public record on earth. It is held by millions to be the word of God, and therefore absolutely true, true in the general and true in the minutest particular. It can not pass into oblivion; not one jot nor tittle thereof can perish; it is the unwasted legacy of all generations; it is to be multiplied by myriads of copies in a thousand different languages; distributed among all the tribes under the whole heaven; it is to be privately read and studied by multitudes upon multitudes in every age; taught to the young; read daily in families; publicly read on the Lord's day in religious assemblies throughout the earth; perpetually discussed from the pulpit in sermons and expositions; perpetually discussed from the press in commentaries and criticisms, and assaults, and apologies, and

eager controversies; the text guarded with the keenest jealousy against both erasure and interpolation; such is the publicity given the misdeeds of the patriarchs. And more than this, these Scriptures reveal the divine abhorrence toward every breach of morality; they educate the conscience of mankind to partake in that abhorrence; and they are accompanied by the Holy Spirit, whose work it is to establish in the soul of man an everlasting hatred for sin. What need was there of laying any further rebuke upon the patriarchs? ~~What~~ reprimand could have been more terrific than ~~this~~ calm, impassive narrative?

It is to be observed, in the second place, that the purpose of the writer did not lead him to utter any further rebuke. If Moses had set before himself the task of composing complete biographies of the men of old times, including, in detail, the incidents of their lives, and an impartial estimate of their characters; or if he had proposed to write a treatise on ethics, with illustrations drawn from real life, we should reasonably expect to find appropriate comments on all these transactions, by way of palliation where admissible, and of hearty disapprobation where deserved. But Moses wrote with widely different purposes. His immediate design was to exhibit the History of Redemption; to trace the evolution of the plan of salvation; to show how the First Gospel, the promise—to wit, that the seed of the woman shall bruise the serpent's head—was progressively unfolded through the ages. His final purpose was to exalt Jehovah of Hosts, to show forth his power and glory, and to declare his mighty acts. Now, since the Book of Genesis is strictly a history, a history composed on a preconceived plan, since it adheres most closely to its own primal idea—the Glory of God in the Redemption of Man—there was no place left in it for a dissertation on the sins of the patriarchs. The facts are related because they were essential elements in the history: comments on them, being superfluous, are wholly omitted. Hengstenberg states that Henderwerk, a commentator on Isaiah, in expounding the passage, "The ass knoweth his master's crib," treats his readers to a prolix discussion on the natural history of the ass, and on the difference between the Oriental and Occidental breeds; just as if the prophecy of Isaiah were a herd-book on asses. That is only

a ludicrous counterpart of the mistake made by those who suppose the Pentateuch was intended to be a biographical dictionary.

These conclusions are reinforced by three other considerations, drawn from the structure of the book. The first is its silence as to the sins of notoriously wicked persons. The fratricide of Cain, the indecency of Ham, the shamelessness of Lot's daughters, the lust of Pharaoh, the mocking of Ishmael, the profaneness of Esau, and the bad faith of Laban, are simply stated without animadversion. Nor, secondly, do the virtues of the patriarchs call forth expressions of admiration from the writer. Noah alone of all the living walked with God; Lot was the only just man in the cities of the plain; the generosity, hospitality, and piety of Abraham, and his many acts of obedience, crowned in the sacrifice of Isaac, were every way most memorable; and the wrestling of Jacob with the Jehovah-angel, is the highest example in the Old Testament of persistence and power in prayer; yet the sacred writer treats with the like reserve these acts of faith and piety, and the acts of infirmity and sin, which were unhappily associated with them. To this should be added, lastly, the fact that the patriarchs are unceremoniously dropped out of the narrative when they have finished their allotted parts in the progress of affairs. Adam, for example, was only a hundred and thirty-one years old at the birth of Seth; he then suddenly disappears from the record, and, although he lived eight hundred years longer, he is not once mentioned again, except that he died. Noah lived, after the flood, three hundred and fifty years, yet not an incident in this part of his career is related. Shem, his son, received the promise of the Saviour; he lived until Abraham was a hundred and fifty, and Isaac fifty years old, and may have seen all the great events of that era, yet, after he received Noah's blessing, he too is quietly laid aside. Abraham, in the last sixty or seventy years of his life, shares the common lot, and passes out of sight; so does Isaac for the fifty years of his old age; so also does Jacob; so do they all. Each performed his part in the evolution of God's self-revelation and mercy, and then stepped aside forever. They resemble the subordinate characters in a great epic poem, who appear, at the proper time, upon the stage of action, and then

retire behind the curtain, and are seen no more, while the epic itself moves on majestically to its winding up. These three peculiarities of the Pentateuch all point in one direction. The first does not indicate that the author was indifferent to crime, nor the second that he was insensible to virtue, nor the third that he was ignorant of the career of the patriarchs for whole decades and centuries; but these all, in exact congruity with his silence as to the demerit of the sins of the patriarchs, show that he was true to his grand design, which was not to honor Abraham, Isaac and Jacob, but to exalt the Most High God.

In the third place, the narrative is so drawn up as to show, incidentally, the direct connection between these transgressions and their retribution. It is made clear that Noah was punished by the contempt of Ham, and then the curse which fell upon his guilty son; Lot must have keenly felt the shame of his daughters; Abraham stood abashed at the deserved rebuke which he received from the king of Egypt and the Philistine chief; both Sarah and Abraham were afflicted in Ishmael for their wrong in the affair with Hagar; Isaac, who deceived Abimelech, was himself deceived by his wife and youngest son; Rebekah was punished for contriving Jacob's fraud, by his final separation from her, so that she died without seeing him again; Jacob was ignominiously chased into exile; was cheated and robbed by Laban; the wife whom he wrongfully treated became the mother of the royal tribe of Judah; the wife whom he preferred died early; and her son, whom he loved more than all his children, was kidnapped and sold into slavery by his brothers. The old man, overwhelmed by a swarm of woes, every one of which can be traced to his infirmities or delinquencies, cried out, at the close of a life of one hundred and thirty years, "Few and evil have been the days of my years." Having wantonly deceived his father, he was himself cruelly deceived by his own children. His punishment was complete. Even heathen writers were silent in the presence of their Nemesis; and why should it be thought strange that the inspired historian, having recorded the infliction of divine judgments on sin, should forbear to express any judgment of his own?

The third and last condition of the problem raises the inquiry, whether, in the blessings bestowed on the patriarchs,

the Divine Being did not virtually connive at their sins? The blessings themselves were of two kinds. Some of them were purely personal, and such as are common to all believers. These were justification by faith, the renewal of their natures by the Holy Spirit, and the good hope of life eternal. In this respect, their case is precisely that of other sinners saved by divine mercy, and their personal salvation was in no sense a connivance at their sins; unless, indeed, such a sense lurks in that true and faithful saying, that Jesus Christ came into the world to save sinners. It may be alleged, however, that the patriarchs were guilty of these transgressions after their supposed regeneration; and further, that such conduct excludes the possibility of true piety. But these assertions bring up the general question, how far is it possible for one to depart from the line of rectitude, and yet be a child of God. This question, however, may properly be ruled out of the discussion, for the reasons that it is not determined in Scripture; it has no exclusive relevancy to the patriarchs, but it relates to David, Peter, and many other pious men as well; and, finally, it does not enter into the real difficulties of the subject. These are supposed to discover themselves in certain peculiar blessings, which were bestowed on Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob. God entered into special covenants with them; he appeared to them in imposing theophanies; he constituted his Church in their respective families; he gave to them and to their posterity the land of Canaan; and made promise that in them and in their seed all nations should be blessed. Now, were they worthy of such honor? Did not their transgressions disqualify them for positions so exalted? Is it to be supposed that God, the most holy, would so far wink at sin as to choose such men to be the recipients of his sacred covenants and revelations, and the founders of his Church? To these objections several answers may be proposed.

In the first place, it is to be observed that those men were not only the recipients, but the channels of blessings. If they had been called for the sake of themselves only, if these mercies had terminated on them, and been exhausted in their persons, the problem would have been, perhaps, insoluble. But it was quite otherwise. The promise was made to the patriarchs, not only for themselves, but for their seed after

them. Indeed, there is an important sense in which they were far more the vehicles than the immediate beneficiaries of the promise. To Abraham the word of God was, "To thee and to thy seed will I give this land"—the land, to wit, of Canaan. But he obtained no actual possession in it besides a place for the burial of his dead. Isaac, his son, also, instead of the inheritance itself, received only a renewal of the promise, and died a pilgrim and stranger in the land. After Isaac, Jacob, and after Jacob, the twelve patriarchs, and after them their sons, instead of coming into possession, died exiles or slaves in Egypt. Not until the days of Moses, five hundred years after the date of the original grant, did the chosen seed enter the chosen land. Abraham and the five or six generations following him, were heirs only for the purpose of transmitting the estate; the title passing through them without actually vesting in them; channels they were, conveying to posterity the goodly land, not proprietors themselves of the imperial gift. The same is to be said of the consummate blessing indicated in the clause of the covenant, "In thy seed shall all the nations of the earth be blessed." According to Paul, the SEED here promised is Christ; and the blessing flowing from him unto all nations is Salvation. Gal. iii: 8-16. Both the Saviour and the Salvation are made sure, not *to* the line of Abraham, but *through* that line to all true believers, both Jews and Gentiles. The people of God who are now alive, and those who are to come after, are the direct beneficiaries of every spiritual advantage, the legitimate heirs to every saving mercy conveyed to Abraham, and then confirmed in his son and his son's son. These men were not sole proprietors, but joint heirs with all other true believers; trustees in a high sense, holding every word of truth, and every hope of eternal life, in sacred keeping, to be enjoyed by them, and then transmitted, with accumulating riches, to their natural descendants, and not to them only but to the out-lying millions also of the human race. Now, the employment of sinful man as the medium of communicating divine truth and eternal salvation to his fellow men, is an established method in the divine administration. Aaron and his sons were sinners. All the holy men of old, who spake as they were moved by the Holy Ghost, were without exception sinners; the most

devout of them crying out, when he saw the Lord, "Woe is me, for I am a man of unclean lips." The evangelists and apostles were sinners. The ministry of the gospel is intrusted to sinners—"a treasure in earthen vessels, that the excellency of the power may be of God and not of us." Will any rational man, the "rationalists" always excepted, maintain that the gift of the priesthood to Aaron, of prophecy to Isaiah, of inspiration to Matthew, of the apostleship to Paul, of the sacred office to the ministers of the word—that these divine gifts, all and singular, carry with them a divine connivance at the sins of these men respectively? Indeed, has not God made the basest of mankind the channels of his overflowing goodness? Did not Baalam receive and utter the word of an inspired prophecy? Did not Judas heal the sick and cast out devils? Are these endowments, which were unquestionably from God, to be construed into an open connivance at the vileness of the strolling magician and the hypocrisy of the traitor?

In the second place, it was the purpose of God to secure his own glory, and not the exaltation of the patriarchs, in all these transactions. It is to be borne in mind, that the final cause of all things, is the glory of God; and the highest manifestation of this glory; so far as man is able to judge, is in the work of redemption. In carrying forward this work, he makes use of instruments; in the beginning, the patriarchs, then Moses, Joshua, and the judges, afterward the kings and prophets, still later, the apostles and evangelists, and now, his servants in the Church. It is, no doubt, true that God put a high honor on these men when he employed them in the various ministries of his kingdom. But the distinction which they obtained was merely incidental to the work set before them; and it was gained by the necessities of their several positions, while all the real, inherent glory of what was done belongs only to God. Thus Cyrus, a heathen, was selected by the Almighty, as the instrument of rescuing his people from their captivity in Babylon. The idolatrous prince did not know the Lord, yet God styled him his shepherd, his anointed, and promised to break in pieces the gates of brass, and to cut in sunder the bars of iron, before his advancing legions: and unto what end? Unto the renown of Cyrus and the glory of

the Persian throne? By no means; but to the end that God's elect might be delivered from their enemies, and that all men, "from the rising of the sun, and from the west," might know that there is none besides God. Isaiah xlv: 28; xlv: 1-6. It is impossible to read the Pentateuch aright, except in the light of this controlling principle. And he who is guided by it will never be so far misled as to suppose that all the theophanies and promises of the patriarchal era were intended for the exaltation of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob, who were but sinners like ourselves.

In the third place, the patriarchs were holy men, and, as such, were better fitted to be the representatives of the covenant than any of their contemporaries. Thus far in this discussion, no account has been taken of their faith and piety, as qualities which must enter into the right solution of the problem. They must, therefore, now be brought forward. It will hardly be denied that Abraham was, every way, a holier man than any of his contemporaries, so far as we have knowledge of him, and of them. Isaac was far better adapted to the divine purposes than Ishmael, and Jacob than Esau or Laban. They were all, notwithstanding their infirmities, the best men of their respective generations. The character of Abraham, especially, is so adorned with all the graces of humanity in its highest type; such was his generosity, hospitality, courage, gentleness, and simplicity, that he has always been considered the model of these manly virtues. Indeed, some sceptical writers have inferred from these excellencies that his biography is, for the most part, a charming oriental fiction, and nothing more. But all these are less remarkable than his faith and obedience. The Apostle Paul indicates several of the occasions which called forth these gracious affections, closing the series with the most extraordinary manifestation of faith which has ever been witnessed on earth—the sacrifice of Isaac. Now, whatever may be said of his sins, it ought to be added that he was, of all men who lived in his day, fitted by Divine grace to be the organ of divine revelations, the human party to the divine covenants, and the special vehicle of true religion. Nor is the character of Jacob without its redeeming qualities. As Calvin well remarks, both he and Rebekah exhibited faith in the promise and purpose of God, even in the

act of purchasing the birthright from Esau, and obtaining the blessing from Isaac. And, afterward, his uniform obedience to God, his wrestling in prayer, his faith exhibited in his prophecies concerning his twelve sons, in his blessings on the sons of Joseph, and in the commandment he gave respecting his burial in Hebron, all show that the grace of God was in him, though mingled with human weakness. Any fair comparison which may be instituted between the gentle and humane temper of Jacob, and the rude, sensual, and profane disposition of Esau, will vindicate the choice of Jacob over Esau. The case may be stated thus: Before either of them were born, or had done good or evil, God chose Jacob rather than Esau. He bestowed his grace upon the younger, fitting him, notwithstanding his infirmities, for the divine purpose. Jacob sinned grievously, yet withal, he was better than Esau; and God, who will not allow his plans to be defeated by even the imperfection of his instruments, confirmed his covenant in Jacob, and then chastised him for his sins and granted him repentance unto life eternal; while Esau renounced his interest in the offered salvation, married heathen wives, and went away into the mountains of Edom to found a race of hunters and barbarians.

The method according to which this particular problem receives its true solution, has perhaps been sufficiently explained. But the same method may be used for the purpose of resolving other questions which emerge from the historical Scriptures. Some of these ought to be briefly considered before the subject is finally dropped.

In the first place, the principles which have guided the foregoing inquiry are applicable to other men, both good and bad, mentioned in the Bible. These may, for the purposes of this remark, be distributed into three classes. One class includes eminently pious men, who were, nevertheless, overtaken by flagrant sin: such as Moses, Aaron, Eli, David, Jeremiah perhaps, and the Apostle Peter. Their case is closely analogous to that of the patriarchs, both as to their offenses and the record made of them, together with its proper explanation. The sacred writers describe, with perfect simplicity, the faults and virtues of all these men, when the governing thought of the history requires that to be done; rarely interposing any judgment of their own upon the facts. But the history is so

constructed as to humble the pride of the Jews in their most distinguished prophets, priests, and kings, and to show that these all were saved by grace through faith alone. The record, by exposing the inherent weakness and sinfulness of these great men, shows also that the choice which God made of them to be the instruments of his blessed purposes rested as to the ground of it, not on their merits, but on his own sovereign will; that this choice looked, as to its immediate end unto the salvation of the races, and as to its final cause unto the glory of Jehovah, and not to the worldly aggrandizement of the chosen vessels. And, finally, as if to guard against any conclusion to the divine connivance at their delinquencies, from the blessings conferred upon them, the direct connection between their sins and the retributive judgments which followed them, is clearly indicated. The thronging calamities which overwhelmed David's old age, afford a striking instance of this retribution. The precise nature of his crime, in the matter of Uriah, confronted him in the nature of his afflictions. His child died; Amnon, his son, outraged Tamar, his daughter; another son, Absalom, assassinated the wretched criminal; Absalom himself contrived a conspiracy against his royal father; seduced Ahitoeophel from his fealty to the king; chased the poor fallen monarch out of Jerusalem; polluted his marriage-bed, and was himself ignominiously slain, and then dragged to a dishonored grave. With what pitiless fury did lust, treachery, and murder avenge lust, treachery, and murder!

Other men, though devoid of true piety, were exalted to important positions in the patriarchy and theocracy. These fall into the second class, and are to be found among the twelve Patriarchs, the judges, and the kings of Judah. The relation of Jacob's sons to the covenant, was materially different from that of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob. In the beginning of the dispensation, the chosen seed was the individual man, and his personal faith was an indispensable incident to his position. But when, as in Jacob's household, the chosen seed began to expand into a nation, a distinction instantly arose among them, between those who externally represented the covenant, and those of their number who were also the true children of God; between the Israel according to the flesh, and Israel

according to the spirit. Joseph represented the spiritual seed in the family; but if Reuben, Simeon, and Levi were thoroughly bad men, their relation to God was simply that of unbelieving Jews in all ages. God showed extraordinary favor to them, notwithstanding their sins, so that the tares and the wheat might grow together unto the harvest, and that meanwhile they might be vessels of revelation and salvation unto others. The judges were not persons ecclesiastical, but extraordinary executive officers, providentially raised up to drive off from Canaan the marauding barbarians. They were regents, or dictators, and for the most part military chiefs, bearing relations to the theocracy similar to those held by military and naval commanders to modern States. God bestowed upon them supernatural courage and physical strength for the sake of his people, and his own Holy Name; and their immoralities are dealt with in the record according to the principles already defined. There were, also, in the house of David, wicked kings—Rehoboam, Abijam, Ahaz, and Manasseh. They wore the crown of Judah; were the viceroys of Jehovah, and stood in the genealogy of Christ, the eternal king in Zion. But of them, and of their renown, and their crimes, this only need be said, that they were little more than connecting links between David and David's Lord; their renown was purely accidental to their birth into the royal family; their throne was divinely upheld for David's sake; and their crimes did not go unpunished.

The remaining class includes Baalam and Judas Iscariot. God was pleased to bestow upon them the gift of prophecy, or of miraculous power; he used them as the organs by which he pronounced blessings upon Israel, or vehicles by which he communicated healing to the sick. It were folly as well as blasphemy, to allege that God exhibited anything but abhorrence for their wickedness, even while he gave them gifts; for when they had served his purposes he left them to perish in their infamy.

In the second place, the principles which have been relied on in this inquiry, define the peculiar position occupied by the biographical portions of the Scriptures. Nearly a hundred genealogical registers are interspersed through the sacred text. Indeed these are so complete, that probably every Jew of the

time of Christ, was able, through their contents, to trace back his lineage to Abraham. Besides these tables, large spaces in the record are occupied by the lives of individuals, as Abraham, Joseph, Moses, Samuel, Saul, David, Elijah, Daniel, Peter and Paul. In many places the narrative is very copious, entering into minute details of personal incident and adventure. The journeys of these persons are described, their conversations are recited, their perils and escapes from danger are noted, anecdotes respecting them are related, and their virtues and faults are exhibited. Although the sacred writer does not attempt a positive estimate of their characters, yet so skillfully are the materials selected and arranged, that no personages in history, or even in drama or fiction, stand out in broader relief, no sun-picture is truer to nature than the personal delineations of the Old and New Testaments. So well marked is this feature, that the rapid impression of most readers is, perhaps, that the historical Scriptures are chiefly made up of a series of biographies. But on a closer inspection it is observed, that these narratives, considered as biographies, are singularly incomplete. There is, for example, in the most of them, a remarkable absence of dates. It is impossible to determine either the month, or the day of the month, on which our Lord was born. There is a minute specification of his birth-year in Luke, iii: 1-3; yet so great confusion has fallen into the reckoning of time, that the best chronologists are agreed in the opinion that the common era begins from four to seven years too late; that is to say, the current year is, in fact, A. D. 1866-69. The silence of the New Testament is complete in respect of the time when the evangelists and apostles, and the mother of our Lord, were born and died. It is an insufficient explanation of this neglect of dates, to allege that the Jewish, like most oriental historians, were habitually inattentive to chronology, while they were precise in genealogy; for while that fact may be as stated, the New Testament observes the same silence as to other particulars essential to a biography. In the first three Gospels we find but one incident of the infancy of Christ—his flight into Egypt; and but one of his youth—the visit to the temple. And the fourth Gospel, as a late writer remarks, “comprehends his birth, infancy, and youth, the first thirty years, in a single sentence,

‘The word became flesh and dwelt among us.’” Of his innumerable miracles, and many parables, only about thirty-three of each are reported. We are left in ignorance “of many other things which Jesus did” before his crucifixion, and of most of what occurred personal to himself during the mysterious period between his resurrection and ascension. We catch but two or three transient glimpses of the virgin mother between the Nativity and the Pentecost; and thenceforth she is seen no more. Our Lord sent out seventy disciples to preach the Gospel and work miracles, yet the name of not a single one of these is mentioned. Eleven of the original apostles received the last command of the risen Saviour; why are the labors of Peter, alone, out of the eleven, recorded in the book which bears the comprehensive title of the Acts of the Apostles? Their names are contained in the opening chapter; in what regions did they severally preach the Gospel, and what churches did they found? Why are the names of eight out of the twelve mentioned no more in the book and in the subsequent Scriptures? Where and how did these chosen and holy men close their lives? Herod slew James, the brother of John, with the sword; what became of John? Our Lord predicted the martyrdom of Peter; was this word fulfilled in Rome or in Babylon, or in neither city? Did he meet death at the stake, at the edge of the sword, at the mouth of the lion, or on the cross? Which of his fellow disciples died by violence, and which by disease? When and where did Paul make his final and ready offering? If, as has been above suggested, the first thought of the reader might be that the historical Scriptures are little more than a series of biographies, his second thought might be that these narratives are not biographies after all, but random recollections or memorabilia only. But on a mature inquiry he will discover two circumstances which, taken together, explain the whole case. The first shows that the Scriptures were determined to biographical forms by one of the fundamental principles of the kingdom of God; the principle, to wit, of personal election to eternal life. The subjects of the kingdom are, without exception, first chosen man by man; then as many as are chosen, and no more, are efficaciously redeemed by the blood of Christ, and finally they are

regenerated one by one. From this germinal idea springs the method of the divine vocation unto service in the kingdom. The Church was originally established in the family of a single patriarch, who was personally called of God to enter into the church-covenant with himself; it was perpetuated in the family of another man, and after that in the family of a third, both of whom were selected by God for this very purpose; until at last it expanded into a nation. In the fullness of time the promised SEED emerged from the bosom of that nation, who was one Divine-human person. Meanwhile, Moses, Aaron, Joshua, the fourteen lawful judges, David, and the prophets of the Old Testament Church, received each a divine vocation to his high office. So at the reorganization of the Church the apostles were called individually by the Master to the work set before them, and unto this day all the ministers of doctrine, discipline and distribution—to wit, pastors, ruling elders, and deacons—do lawfully come into office only as they are called of God, man by man, thereunto. Now, the extended genealogies and copious biographical memoirs contained in Scripture, are the natural expressions of the primal formative law of the kingdom—the election of men, one after another, unto salvation. If this election had been by races or peoples, then the materials of the record would have been historical as distinguished from biographical; history being the biography of a race or people in the aggregate. But as the election is individual, the record conforming thereto is constructed out of incidents in the career of individuals. The other circumstance has been set forth in this paper. The law of the kingdom, as to its development in time, is historical and progressive. It is the evolution of the Messianic promise which was made to our first parents, “The seed of the woman shall bruise the serpent’s head,” and of the Messianic promise which was made to Abraham, “In thy seed shall all nations be blessed.” The sacred writers take the plan of their history from the plan of the development of redemption. As the development was historical, slowly unfolding through the ages, so the narrative is historical, tracing the process from age to age. These authors adhere with unforgetful steadfastness to this idea. It regulates the selection and arrangement of the materials, prescribing what shall be introduced and what omitted. Here it

fills large spaces with minute details, and there it leaves wide blanks in the narrative. It follows the clew from land to land; to Egypt, to Canaan, to Babylon, and back to Palestine; from century to century also, through the run of four thousand years. It admits what is pertinent to its grand design, though in itself otherwise uninteresting as the genealogies; it excludes rigorously what is not relevant to that end, though otherwise most captivating as the early life of Jesus.

Here there are found two laws in force; both laws of the kingdom; the first showing how its subjects are obtained, by the method, namely, of personal election; and the second exhibiting the mode of its development, the mode, namely, of historical progress. These two laws working together on the sacred record, prescribe one of them the materials which are, in a large measure, biographical; and the other, the form into which these materials shall be cast, which is the historical. The result is a coherent consecutive narrative, wrought out of personal memoirs. It may be styled a biographico-history; the first term pointing to the primal law of personal election from eternity; the last pointing to the primal law of the evolution of the kingdom in time. By virtue of these controlling principles, the Pentateuch lifts up into the light twenty-five years of Abraham's life, and leaves in obscurity the seventy-five years which went before, and the seventy-five which followed after the historical period of his career. They admit to record the calling and training of the apostles, and exclude their birth-dates, their early lives, and, excepting Peter, their apostolic labors, and, excepting James, the manner of their death. The first part of the Acts of the Apostles, relates minutely the planting of the Christian Church among the Jews by the labors of Peter, and then Peter himself is relegated into obscurity. One chapter describes the mission of Philip among the Samaritans, and then Philip disappears. Eighteen chapters are occupied with the planting of the Church among the Gentiles in the great cities of the empire, by the ministry of Paul, and so soon as he has gotten as far as Rome in his work, the history is finished, and the curtain falls upon the great Apostle. His conversion is related three times, but not a line is added respecting his death. The laws of the composition of the book are perpetually enforced, excluding this, admitting that.

Its very reserve is not less instructive than its utterances, or, to quote a fine remark of Boyle : "There is such fullness in that book, that oftentimes it says much by saying nothing ; and not only its expressions, but its silences are teaching, like a dial in which the shadow, as well as the light, informs us." The final product of inspiration is a series of historical Scriptures, which combine the charm of personal incident with the majestic movement of history ; a narrative full of graphic power, adorned with surpassing and surprising beauties, laden with unsearchable riches, and instinct with life and salvation.

In the work of redemption, an everlasting kingdom is established, an irresistible power is evolved, and a supreme glory floods the firmament. But the kingdom, and the power, and the glory, are all of God. Patriarch, prophet, apostle, martyr, all these are nothing. God, the uncreated, unchanging, unending one, is All and in All. Herodotus composed a history, so he himself declares, in order that the deeds done by man might not be forgotten, and that the great and wonderful exploits of the Greeks and the barbarians might not pass into oblivion. His plan was faithfully executed, and the product of his industry is an agreeable and gossiping narrative. But so humbling was the impression left on the mind of Daniel by the perusal of the historical Scriptures, that he exclaimed : "O Lord, to us belongeth confusion of face, to our kings, to our princes, and to our fathers, because we have sinned against thee. To the Lord our God belong mercies and forgiveness." Such is the radical and thorough difference between the sacred school of ancient history and the profane.

ART. II.—*The Secession Conspiracy in Kentucky, and its Overthrow: with the Relations of both to the General Revolt.*

A Memoir of Civil and Political Events, public and private, in Kentucky: To serve as a History of the Secession Conspiracy which had its Center in Kentucky: Commencing in 1859, and extending to the Overthrow of the Conspiracy, and the breaking out of the Civil War in that State in 1861.

PART SECOND.—Preparations, secret and public, of the Conspirators for the seizure and subjugation of Kentucky, after their final Political Overthrow, in August, 1861; up to the Conference of Loyal Citizens at Camp Dick Robinson, which provided for the sudden and unexpected Defeat of the Conspiracy.

- I.—1. President Buchanan—President Lincoln—Vice President Breckinridge:
Extra Session of the Senate of the United States: Called Session of Congress.
2, Concerted Movement of the Conspirators in Maryland, Kentucky, and Missouri: Governor Harris, of Tennessee—Governor Magoffin, of Kentucky:
Traitorous Negotiations—Invasion of Kentucky.

1. On the 4th of March, 1861, the presidential term of Mr. Buchanan expired, and that of Mr. Lincoln commenced. History furnishes little, more worthy the contempt of every true and firm spirit, and the disgust and scorn of every sincere and loyal heart, than the conduct of President Buchanan, toward the close of his administration. No one ever reached the supreme executive power, among a free people, and by the due course of their political institutions, who had need of the highest principles, the noblest endowments, and the grandest character, in a higher degree than President Lincoln. His nomination was a surprise to all parties; his election was a great shock to the nation. It remains for him, if he is capable of doing so, to make for himself one of the greatest names in the annals of mankind. At the moment of this great periodical change of the National Government, Vice President Breckinridge ceased to be the presiding officer in the Senate, and became a member of the body. A little while before, he had been Vice President, Senator elect, and candidate for the Presidency, all at once: a state of case all the more remarkable, and indicating a course all the more illustrious, that he had then hardly attained the prime of life. The events of the

preceding half year had, no doubt, shaken his position, and clouded his future: but he still occupied an immense elevation, and was just entering upon a long term of one of the highest offices on earth. When he took his seat as a Senator from Kentucky, at the usual extra session of that body, immediately after the inauguration of the new President, a great career was once more open before him. The public well knew that he was in no way answerable for the conduct of President Buchanan, or for the policy of his administration. For Mr. Buchanan, with the mean jealousy of an ignoble nature, hated the superiority of the Vice President, and was ostentatious in slighting him; while, on his part, the Vice President, with a reserve and manliness that were natural to him, accepted and was even profited by a position so unusual. Moreover, the Vice President, up to the period of his own nomination for the Presidency, had been for some years the warm supporter of Mr. Douglas for that office. And the tenor of his conduct and declarations, both public and private, during the presidential canvass just passed, was more that of Western than Southern Democracy: and whether as a great statesman, or as an ambitious politician, or as a disinterested patriot, it appeared impossible that he should not see, that the fate of the nation was necessarily in the hands of the great central section, to which he belonged, and not in the hands either of the extreme northern or southern section of it. If any thing was needed to add conclusive force to such considerations, that would be found in the unquestionable former patriotism of the Vice President, and in the great and notorious fact, that he had it in his power, by a prompt and decided lead of his party in Kentucky in opposition to Secession, to have made that State well-nigh unanimous for the Union. It was a national calamity that he was not equal to his destiny: alas! how few are. His course during the short extra session of the Senate, was completely reserved. When that session was over, he returned to Kentucky in the spring of 1861, and found every thing there in a state of intense agitation—the decisive election of August, 1861, occupying all parties. Before that election came on, the President had called for 75,000 volunteers, after the bombardment of Fort Sumter, and had also called Congress together to make provision for the safety of the nation

and the preservation of the Union; and the disastrous battle of Bull Run had been fought. During that memorable session of Congress, Senator Breckinridge took such a course, as seemed to show that his previous reserve had not been produced by any uncertainty in his own mind, as to the part he intended to act: which is, to a certain extent, confirmed by the course he had previously marked out for his party in Kentucky, as has been explained in the First Part of this memoir. His opposition in the Senate became open, unqualified, constant, to every kind of action on the part of the nation, that looked to the armed preservation of its existence, or to the suppression by force of the immense military organization of traitors, avowedly seeking its conquest and destruction. The conquest of his own State by arms, was one of the points in this atrocious scheme, to the defense of which the Kentucky Senator lent himself, at Washington, in his vehement opposition to the Federal Administration; and in the support of which, on his return to that State in August, 1861, the conspirator became a refugee, and the refugee a general in the army of traitors, and the general an invader of the land to whose defense he owed every drop of his blood. His expulsion, as a traitor to the nation, from the Senate of the United States, a few months later, was the just and natural result. He had not even the poor excuse that he was loyal to Kentucky. He was traitor to her also: and that with a treason aggravated almost beyond historic example, and destitute of every pretext ever plead by traitor before.

2. On his way from this called session of Congress, Major Breckinridge spent about a week in Baltimore, early in August, 1861. The opportunity was thus afforded—or made—to concert more perfectly with the Secessionists of Maryland, their share of the plan for rousing the people and organizing the movement in the Border Slave States, not only in concert with each other, but in concert with the general plan to make the rebellion triumph. It is now well known that the whole conspiracy was conducted by the body of Southern Senators at Washington, and that State after State was hurried into Secession, according to the schedule furnished by them. The attempt to initiate this movement in Maryland with great *eclat*, by a seditious speech from Major Breckinridge himself, to a night

crowd of the disloyal citizens in the streets of Baltimore—broke down. The affair was then made to wear the appearance of a spontaneous gathering of the people to do him honor, and an unpremeditated speech on his part, broken up by the police of the city. It was, most probably, an overt act of a conspiracy, in the same direction as one of earlier date under the auspices of Marshal Kane, which, under equally false pretenses, proved to be an attack upon a regiment of Federal troops, by the organized mob of the city. The military force of the General Government brought Marshal Kane's first act of the conspiracy to an end, after much trouble and delay, and a somewhat clear demonstration that the safety of the nation did not allow a revolt in Maryland to be treated as an open question. The dread of the same military force cut short this second act of the conspiracy, which was to have been set afloat by seditious meetings and speeches, and consummated, at the right time, by the invasion of Maryland and the capture of Baltimore, by the Confederate army under General Beauregard; an event anticipated at that period, with joyful and undoubting faith by the disloyal population of that city. The fact is important, and was in the personal knowledge of thousands, and is still, no doubt, vividly in their recollection, that during the months of August and September, 1861, this profound belief, and this earnest desire, that the Confederate army would speedily conquer their country, which was cherished by traitors, in Maryland; pervaded with equal intensity the disloyal population of Kentucky and Missouri, at the same period. So wide were the ramifications of the conspiracy, and so corrupting was its influence. It will be remembered too, with what zeal and energy a cloud of Secession witnesses took the stump—especially in Kentucky—immediately before the general election in 1861, and thenceforward until and during the meeting of the Legislature, strove to arouse the people to ungovernable hostility toward the General Government. Coincidentally, almost to a day, with the meeting of that Legislature in Kentucky, a body of rebel troops estimated at 40,000 actually invaded and occupied the western portion of the State; while another body of them estimated at 10,000, had already occupied the Cumberland Gap at the south-western corner of it. When these rebel

troops from Tennessee took possession—without notice or declaration of war—of Western Kentucky, Commissioners from Tennessee, sent by Governor Harris; were at the capital of Kentucky, professedly to negotiate with Governor Magoffin for a better understanding between the two States—and especially for the dispersion of a small force of loyal Kentuckians and exiles from Tennessee who had begun to collect at Camp Dick Robinson, in Central Kentucky. These Tennessee exiles had fled from the horrors which surrounded them at home; and the rebel government of that State, had, besides its domestic atrocities, menaced Kentucky for months together with large bodies of troops, along the whole frontier between the two States, with the apparent connivance of Governor Magoffin and his comrades. It is now known that the real objects of Governor Harris in sending that mission to Frankfort, was to bribe a sufficient number of the members of the Kentucky Legislature, to neutralize for two years, the recent vote of the people; and to concert a perfect understanding with the Kentucky conspirators. One of the Tennessee party was intrusted with a very large sum (a million of dollars, according to our information), with which to commence the work. Those Commissioners, it will be recollected, left Frankfort suddenly and secretly; the unexpected invasion of Kentucky, in the midst of negotiations, and the fury excited by that outrage, rendering their mission useless, if not dangerous. They had urgent private reasons besides; and had, as is now known, notice thereof. For there were loyal and resolute Kentuckians, who had been made aware of the real objects of the Tennessee mission; and those Commissioners were fortunate enough to learn, through some of the countless spies and informers who infested the country, that their designs were penetrated. They barely escaped arrest, by the hesitation of those in authority, and by the promptitude and speed of their own movements.*

* The party from Tennessee consisted of John Marshall, Esq., of Franklin, Andrew Ewing, Esq., of Nashville, Edward S. Cheatham, Esq., of Robertson County, and Dr. Bolling, of Nashville, Commissioners: accompanied by Robertson Topp, Esq., and Dr. Jephtha Foulkes, of Memphis. We believe the whole of them had been Union men, up to the secession of Tennessee: and that all of

It is worth very serious reflection, how immeasurably different the fate of Maryland, Kentucky, and Missouri might have been—and through them the present condition of the nation, if this vast conspiracy had been better managed. Nor is it less striking to reflect how that which appears to the mass of men, as it is being enacted, a desperate escape—is seen by men of sense and courage, to be the inevitable result of causes capable of being understood and directed. Nor is it less worthy to be remembered, that, so far as the public yet knows, or may ever know, the means whereby a conspiracy having so many elements of power, was foiled and ultimately crushed, in all three of those States; took their origin in a manner altogether spontaneous and private, and to a great degree obscure, from the bosom of society. The executive power of two of those States, and the legislative power of all three of them—was in the hands of conspirators against the national life, who had at their back the whole power of the Confederate Government. Yet a way was found to defeat the conspiracy.

II.—1. Private meeting of Secession leaders in Scott County, August 17, 1861: Crusade on the Stump—its Import.—2. Plans for the Subjugation of Kentucky considered in the Scott meeting.—3. The Plan adopted, through the influence of Governor Magoffin: Concerted outcry against Camp Dick Robinson: Perilous Double Dealing.—5. Embassy from Governor Magoffin to Governor Harris and President Davis: Its Fruits.—6. Military Resources of the Conspirators, for the Subjugation of Kentucky.—7. Embassy from Governor Magoffin to President Lincoln: State of Fact and Opinion concerning this Mission.—8. Failure of the Mission: Great Peril of Kentucky: Calm and Firm Posture of the People.

1. On Sunday, the 17th day of August, 1861, a considerable number of the leading Secessionists of Central Kentucky, embracing the principal persons of that interest in the State, met in the County of Scott, at the house of a wealthy gentleman, residing in a very accessible, but not very public place. It may remove some mystery concerning the sources of our knowledge

them were persons of great influence in that State. It is a very melancholy illustration of the fatal mistake so largely committed by Union men, in their connivance at treason, when it seemed to be in the ascendant. It would have been no more difficult, we believe, to have overthrown the traitors of Tennessee, than those of Kentucky—and would have been of no less—perhaps of greater importance.

of matters it was not intended we should know, to say that this decisive meeting took place in the immediate neighborhood of the homestead of the writer of these lines, at which he arrived on the second day after it: and we had as well say at once, that we do not feel called on to make public, in this manner, either names or acts connected with this meeting, except so far as may be required by the duty we have before us: while we ought to add, that the very early knowledge thus possessed, threw a flood of light on the previous acts of the conspiracy, and on the course necessary to be adopted to render its success impossible in Kentucky. Major Breckinridge had returned to Kentucky a day or two before, having been delayed on his journey from Baltimore by the destructive floods which prevailed at that period. Whether the urgency of the occasion obliged the distinguished persons who composed the meeting, to overcome their reluctance to use the Sabbath day for such a purpose; or whether the impressions of their pious educations and lives gave way to the necessity of escaping public observation, there is, perhaps, no great need of inquiring. Of course, Major Breckinridge was at the meeting; since its very design was to discuss and settle the policy of *the party*, and to determine its general course and its immediate action, under the great foregone facts which had already given a color to its destiny: namely, *first*, its complete overthrow, two weeks before, at the general election; and *secondly*, its adhesion to the general conspiracy which had determined on the conquest of the Border Slave States, by arms, when all hope of obtaining them by other means was lost. It is singularly characteristic, that as soon as this party had fully determined that there should be no more peace in any of those Border States, except on conditions which were utterly preposterous, it assumed, throughout those States—and to a certain extent throughout the loyal States—the name of *The Peace Party*! One would think that a State Rights party would be dumb under such proofs of the sentiments of the State, as this party had. One would think a Democratic party would promptly acquiesce in the public will, so clearly and repeatedly declared. One would know very little of “the great heart” of treason and rebellion who would have such idle thoughts. We *now* know that before the election at which this party had just

been finally overthrown, it had been arranged that if they lost that election, Kentucky should be invaded: we know that the Confederate Congress had resolved that the State should be conquered, if it became necessary: we know that the military jurisdiction of the Confederate Government had been extended over the State, and that large sums of money had been appropriated to the arming of Rebels in it. But all these things were carefully concealed at that time. There was, of course, no debate, no conclusion, therefore, in this meeting, about any peaceful or patriotic submission to an overwhelming public sentiment, constitutionally and repeatedly expressed. There was, of course, neither debate nor conclusion, looking toward acceptance of the overtures for conciliation with them, made and remade over and over—and met always with disdain from them. What immediately followed this meeting, as its popular result, was a crusade upon the stump: innumerable seditious harangues by many of those at the meeting, and by many others who accepted its conclusions, and by some, it is probable, who were kept in the dark as to the real objects of the movement. The drift of all was, that the people had been deceived in the recent election, and would be betrayed by their Union representatives: that liberty, public and private, was at an end, and the State hopelessly lost, unless the broken and defeated Secession party, instead of the triumphant Union party, were allowed to explain what the people required: and that all this was so clear, so certain, so just, and so indispensable to *peace*, that it was impossible for gallant and patriotic men to contain themselves, if any part of it was refused to them. In one word, not the elected and sworn representatives of the people—convened in the Capital—but the Scott meeting, over their Sunday dinner, neither elected nor sworn, must decide the fate of the Commonwealth: or else there should be anarchy—that much was avowed; and what was kept secret—there should be invasion and civil war. They tried it. And they found out within about thirty days, that there was a Kentucky independent of them, and of their allies.

2. The plan of the conspiracy in Kentucky, however, as well as elsewhere, had far more in view than a mere attempt at popular commotion. Armed insurrection was thought of; invasion

also, by the Confederate forces ; public and private war, violent proceedings of all sorts. Extreme measures, therefore, were to be discussed at the Scott meeting : and extreme courses considering the general nature and objects of the wide conspiracy, and the actual posture of affairs—were likely enough to be adopted. Of course, therefore, Governor Magoffin was too important a member of the party to be absent from a final consultation on matters of that sort. In the consideration and discussion of the whole case by the meeting, three plans of action for the party were propounded ; every one of them, however, based on the distinct ideas, taken for granted—that the nation was broken up, and the Government at an end—that the Confederate Government was in full and lawful existence—that Kentucky rightfully belonged to the Confederate States, and that her obstinate refusal to take her proper place among those States, imposed upon the Confederate Government the necessity of forcing her to do so, and upon the Secession party in the State, the duty of taking part in her conquest. These three plans were, in substance, as follows :

First. That the army of General Polk on the Mississippi, and the army of General Zollicoffer on the Cumberland Mountain, and the armed Kentucky refugees in camps along the Tennessee frontier of Kentucky, should immediately and simultaneously invade the State, and begin the war ; while that sudden and general invasion, by some 60,000 troops, should be attended by a simultaneous rising of the Secessionists in the State, and the commencement, by their armed bands, of neighborhood war, wherever resistance might be offered to them. A diabolical plan ; good, in a military point of view, if attempted about a month earlier ; when actually attempted some weeks afterward, a failure ; because, being discovered, it was provided for.

Secondly. That, before proceeding to the extremities of the first plan, Governor Magoffin should issue his proclamation, calling upon all true Secessionists to rise, organize, and rendezvous in arms, at a time and place, fixed in the proclamation ; that the Secession members of the Legislature should be required to convene, and constitute at the same place and time, as the Senate and House of Representatives of the State ; and

thus by the joint action of the Governor, the skeleton Legislature, and the armed Secessionists, backed by the rebel armies and the refugee Kentuckians before spoken of, put the State regularly in the Confederacy before conquering her—instead of conquering her first. This was the plan adopted in Missouri. It was also tried some months later in Kentucky, in a small way, when a Provisional Government was set up at Russellville, under the protection of General Breckinridge, and his brigade of rebel troops. A silly and weak mixture of some of the ideas and forms of law, and the shadow of civil authority, with rampant treason and armed anarchy, which no really great man would even think of resorting to in a desperate emergency.

Thirdly. That all the matters proposed in both the foregoing plans, should be held in suspense, a little longer, while the arming, organizing, and educating of the secession party, should be secretly and rapidly carried to a higher state of completeness; that, in the mean time, the Governor should send Commissioners, in the name of the Commonwealth of Kentucky, to the President of the United States, demanding the dispersion or removal from the State, of the troops then collecting at Camp Dick Robinson, under General Nelson, or the disavowal of General Nelson and his acts by the President; and other Commissioners, both to Governor Harris of Tennessee, and to President Davis at Richmond, Virginia, in order to give precise information of the position, necessities, and plans of the party in Kentucky—to gain precise knowledge of the amount and character of the aid they could rely on—and to concert the most cordial and complete mutual understanding. If this plan could have been successfully executed, it would have rendered temporary success possible for the second plan, and complete success possible for the first plan. It was liable, however, to the great objection of being nearly incapable of execution, without being penetrated.

3. It is probable that in the statement of all these plans, we have made the Scott meeting our debtor, by making their various propositions somewhat more distinct and rational, and somewhat less atrocious than they really were. The third of the three plans stated above, was the one adopted by the meeting: the one, namely, which involved a little further delay—a

more complete preparation—the dispersion of the few loyal troops then gathering in the State—a more complete understanding of what was to be feared from the General Government, and what was to be hoped from the Confederate Government. Our information in various ways is precise, that the adoption of this plan, in preference to either of the others, for the time being, was due, in great part to the influence of Governor Magoffin. The party could not risk the loss of the hearty co-operation of the Governor of the State. And he manifested an untimely, and probably an unexpected reluctance, to take any step, or perform any act, *as Governor*, which necessarily involved a direct violation of the constitution and laws of the State, and drew after it immediate bloodshed. This executive scruple had to be respected. But it also had consequences that were not so flattering. One that was afterward notorious, was his own supersession as Governor by the Russellville Convention, which appointed Mr. G. W. Johnson in his place, so long as he should continue under restraint at Frankfort—as they somewhat sharply put it. Another was an immediate breach with his Secretary of State, Thomas B. Monroe, Jun.; who is said to have edified both the meeting and the Governor, in terms more plain than polite, in declaring his refusal to serve him any longer—and who shortly afterward went South—and was killed in the battle of Shiloh. It is a striking illustration of the sort of thing human nature is, that with all the Governor's official scruples, he had not scruples enough, to keep him away from such a meeting, having such objects; nor enough to prevent him from abusing his high office by carrying out the disloyal behests of a meeting of conspirators; nor enough to prevent him from sending commissioners to a government of traitors, to concert with them the conquest of his own State; nor enough to prevent him from sending commissioners to the General Government, to which his own State owed and acknowledged allegiance, with the secret and concerted object of betraying both; nor enough to make him understand, that after performing such acts as these, he could not hold the office of Chief Magistrate an hour longer, with honor to himself, or safety to the State. Mr. Magoffin happened to be the Governor of Kentucky. Being so, he happened not to perceive the enormity of the outrage he

committed, in conspiring with this Scott meeting, and afterward using his office to promote its disloyal schemes. But he happened to know that the extreme measures urged by the more violent of the men he met, did not necessarily insure the success of their treason, but did involve his own destruction. Upon these accidents, in themselves not very common, and in their nature altogether personal, the most important public affairs took the shape and complexion they did.

4. We have stated that a crusade upon the stump followed the Scott meeting, as a part of its machinery; and have pointed out the general sum and drift of the seditious harangues, responsive to the great and general design of the conspiracy. And now here in the special plan agreed on, we see a special object to be gained that admitted of a public outcry—nay, required it; while other objects to be gained required extreme secrecy. So an outcry for the immediate breaking up of Camp Dick Robinson, resounded throughout Kentucky: Secessionists leading the cry—neutral people chiming in lustily—professional politicians giving as uncertain a sound as possible—and timid Union men stunned by the din. The Governor, perfectly aware of the nature, the origin, and the object of the whole commotion; and not aware that any one but the initiated, suspected, much less knew the exact significance of the whole affair; in the fervor of his indignant loyalty to Kentucky, promptly sent his commissioners—ostentatiously to Washington. But the secret mission, as well as the public one, being in the programme, the outcry against the General Government about Camp Dick Robinson, and the small body of Kentucky troops there, was always accompanied by excuses for the Confederate Government, the Governor of Tennessee, and the great bodies of the rebel troops, that had long been a standing menace to Kentucky, along hundreds of miles of her frontier. So the Governor—not so ostentatiously, however, sent his commissioners, with equal promptitude, to Nashville and Richmond also. It was a curious sight to look upon—by those who understood both parts of this audacious and perilous double dealing; especially those, who were ready and resolved to risk every thing under the sun, to defeat both parts of the desperate and diabolical attempt—while yet they saw no means of deliverance, but in the intrepid loyalty of the

people, and the unfailing faithfulness of God! Both sets of Commissioners were sent by the Governor: and those sent to Washington, were on their way thither within the week following the Scott meeting. And it may be added, to the shame of many who have little desire to hear of it now, that numerous and urgent appeals went to the Cabinet at Washington, from those who should have known and done better; pressing upon the Government acquiescence in the demands of Governor Magoffin's Commissioners. It is also true that they who did both know and do better, took care that the President should understand exactly what he was asked to do—before he did it.

5. George W. Johnson, Esq., a member of the Scott meeting, and subsequently Provisional Governor of the Russellville Provisional State—and who fell at Shiloh; was the Commissioner sent by Governor Magoffin to Governor Harris of Tennessee—and President Davis at Richmond. There may have been one or more other persons united with Mr. Johnson, in this mission; on this point our memory, or our information, is at fault. This embassy being every way suspicious—especially the portion of it to the Confederate Government, the success of it, as well as the safety of Governor Magoffin in many possible contingencies, demanded that no notoriety should be given to it; nor is the loyal public, in Kentucky, even yet aware that the Richmond part of it was authorized. It was a ticklish thing for the Governor to make a dead secret of: and it was a ticklish thing to explain it, to the loyal Legislature, then just elected. Take it as we may, the way of the transgressor is hard. What really passed between Commissioner Johnson on the one side, and Governor Harris and President Davis on the other; is, even yet, less known to the public, than to Governor Magoffin. How great was the success of Mr. Johnson in the mission, and what its real design was, is sufficiently explained by the events which followed. The large Confederate army which invaded Western Kentucky on the 4th of September, 1861—went on to occupy the whole of that part of the State, and to fortify numerous intrenched camps, at the chief strategic points; while the officer in command and the Governor of Tennessee, made public explanations to the Governor of Kentucky—which he communicated officially, and without complaint or suggestion of redress, to the

Legislature. He did not explain any of his *private* reasons, for knowing that these letters were a part of the system of duplicity and violence, by means of which all the parties to the conspiracy, whether in Kentucky, in Tennessee, or at Richmond, were preparing for the conquest of Kentucky. Meantime another large body of Confederate troops, under General Zollicoffer, invaded the State at the opposite extremity from that which had been invaded by the army under General Polk. And this General also, commenced a diligent and extensive occupation of that part of the State—and subsequently constructed strong intrenched camps; not forgetting to write public letters to Governor Magoffin—nor he to communicate them—along with a very condescending letter from President Davis—to the Legislature. Still later, the whole force of refugee Kentuckians, strengthened by many other troops, and led by the refugee General S. B. Buckner, Governor Magoffin's famous staff officer and Commandant of his State Guard; suddenly invaded Kentucky, at a point between the army of Polk and that of Zollicoffer—and failing in an attempt to capture Louisville—fortified Bowling Green, and devastated whatever the armies under the Bishop and the Jew had spared, in Southern Kentucky. As fruits of an embassy of peace and conciliation—as it was pretended Mr. Johnson's was—Mr. Magoffin and the Scott meeting must have been greatly exercised by these consequences of that Commissioner's mission to Governor Harris and President Davis. The last grand consequence was a civil one—and may not have been thoroughly arranged beforehand to Governor Magoffin's satisfaction. We allude to the formation of the Provisional Government at Russellville, and the supplanting of Mr. Magoffin, as Governor *during duress*, by Mr. Johnson, his own Commissioner; which we have before explained. It was rather sharp practice to turn Governor Magoffin's own plan against himself, in such a way as to force him to avow himself, or take his office from him and give it to the chief agent in the execution of the most effective part of his plan. How this part of the matter—otherwise so successfully carried through—struck the Governor, may be conjectured from his published letter on the subject, dated December 13, 1861, and directed to the Louisville Journal, instead of the Legislature of Kentucky.

6. But we have overrun somewhat the cotemporary posture of affairs, upon which parties were required to act in August and September, 1861, in following to its conclusion the embassy to Nashville and Richmond, as part of the plan of the Scott meeting. The posture of the conspiracy, as it bore upon the mission of Mr. Johnson, and upon Kentucky, was extremely imposing. Forty thousand armed Secessionists, organized to a certain extent, and having an understanding among themselves, more or less perfect, were dispersed over the State—and were numerically the majority in a number of counties, and in a still larger number of towns, villages, and neighborhoods. What was equivalent to an efficient junto, composed of a large number of distinguished and influential citizens, with Senator Breckinridge at its head, and Governor Magoffin one of its members, gave tone to the principles, and directed the movements of this body. Two divisions of Confederate troops, unitedly amounting to fifty thousand men, seized upon strong positions within the State, at opposite extremities of it, one bordering on Virginia, the other on Missouri, and both on Tennessee; and occupied and ravaged large adjacent regions. Camps of refugee Kentuckians were formed along the Tennessee frontier adjoining Kentucky, and increasing from day to day were already supposed to number eight or ten thousand men. A State Guard recently organized, equipped, and drilled, numbered about five thousand good troops—being the only force the State had—the mass of whom were Secessionists, and the whole body commanded by a staff officer of Governor Magoffin (General S. B. Buckner), who had illegally been put in charge of them, under an act of Assembly, surreptitiously passed. A secret band of armed conspirators—the Knights of the Golden Circle—numbering eight thousand, were gathered in lodges throughout the State. And to complete an array, which even a brave man might be excused for some solicitude as he surveyed it, the State of Tennessee stood pledged to support her forces already in Kentucky, with her whole military strength, and the Confederate Government to exert all its power to sustain every movement, directed to the conquest and annexation of Kentucky to the Confederate States. The combination was universally believed, by the disloyal party in Kentucky, to be irresistible. In the

aggregate, it was immensely powerful. And, relatively, its prodigious force was increased by divisions of opinion among leading public men of the Union party—by the horror with which loyal men generally contemplated the occurrence of war among themselves—and by the total and helpless disorganization of the military power of the State, applicable to any loyal use. This brief recapitulation will probably satisfy thoughtful men, that the hundred thousand loyal freemen of Kentucky might have failed of victory without dishonor. Such a conspiracy ought, according to all chance and calculation, to have, at least, temporarily succeeded. It did not succeed at all. Precisely how, and why, it broke down, will be shown hereafter. Before doing so, we must give some account of the other embassy created by Governor Magoffin, under the plan of operations agreed on at the Scott meeting.

7. In further execution of the Scott County plan for subjugating Kentucky, Governor Magoffin promptly created a second embassy, and sent Commissioners to Washington City to demand of the President of the United States, that he should either disavow General Nelson and the force being organized under his command, or that he should order the camp at Dick Robinson to be broken up, and the troops to be removed from the State. The Commissioners appointed by the Governor, were F. K. Hunt, Esq. and W. A. Dudley, Esq., both of them residing then and now at Lexington, and both of them distinguished members of the bar, and influential citizens. They went immediately to the Federal city. The loyal public understood no more about this mission, than that it was designed to secure the neutral position of Kentucky, by preventing the military interference of the General Government; just as they knew no more about the other mission already described, than that its professed object was the very same—only that the Governor and military force of Tennessee were the objects of its care. It is probable that not one loyal man in every hundred, the State over, knew that either mission was thought of, until the whole matter was finished. The plan of which the missions were a chief element, was, in a manner, extemporized, at a secret meeting of conspirators on the 17th of August. On the 4th of September, eighteen days afterward, Bishop Polk's army seized on Western

Kentucky. On the 29th of August, twelve days after the secret order for the missions, and six days before Bishop Polk's invasion, the plan of a counter revolution, as it may be called, which we shall explain particularly, was agreed on, and immediately executed, which made the mission to Washington a nullity, disconcerted the double dealing of the Governor, turned Camp Dick Robinson to an exceedingly effective use, and put a totally new aspect upon the question of the subjugation of Kentucky. It is undoubtedly true, however, that a great clamor had been made by a certain class of Union men, against any organization of Federal troops in Kentucky, and against the special attempt at Camp Dick Robinson, in particular. The Governor, therefore, had abundant reason to know, that his embassy to Washington—very imperfectly understood—would meet with loud and cordial approbation in the bosom of the Union party, and from a large proportion of its nominal leaders; and he had neither the means of information, nor that sort of sagacity, whereby he might understand, that his real objects were penetrated, and that there was widely diffused through Kentucky, a deep and stern loyalty, of another sort from that which he habitually observed. We have no doubt that Mr. Hunt and Mr. Dudley had reason to be convinced, that the avowed object of their mission was warmly approved by the large and influential class of Union men, of whom we have just spoken; and we have reason to believe that the Federal Administration, as we have intimated before, were habitually and urgently pressed with advice, from Kentucky, in that general spirit and direction. We consider it personally due to both the commissioners to Washington, but especially to Mr. Dudley, to make these statements. He had been known as a Union man; and now occupies a high and responsible situation connected with the military service of Kentucky. He was not, of course, at the Scott meeting; and knew nothing about the mission he undertook, but the honest, outside look of the matter, as it might appear to one who had some trust in the fair dealing of the Secession leaders, and a strong conviction that the neutrality of Kentucky ought to be maintained. It gives us pain to have somewhat more to say, concerning the other Commissioner. Mr. Hunt was known—of late years—as a temperate but decided member of that

party, which under various names has done so much mischief, and which we call Secessionists. He was a member of the Scott meeting. There—and everywhere—our information and belief are, that the violent and extreme measures of his party, were not approved by him. Still, however, he was obliged to know the temper and objects of his comrades, in the meeting and elsewhere; and he was, necessarily, aware of the real and full import of the mission he undertook, of its intimate connection with the ulterior designs of his party—and of its bearing upon the fate they had prepared for Kentucky. Since the failure of his mission he has remained in Lexington, in the practice of his profession.

8. If the Commissioners to Washington made any official report, of what they did and attempted, it has not fallen into our hands. If they made any private explanations on these subjects, we have not been fortunate enough to come to the knowledge of them. The official reply of Mr. Lincoln to Mr. Magoffin has been published. Of course, the President refused to do what was required of him. Nor would it seem to be within the compass of human credulity, that any one who had tolerable information concerning the state and tendency of public affairs, or the least insight into the secret designs of the Secession party, could have had the faintest idea that the President would comply with the demand made on him. During the first week in August, there had been a general election in Kentucky, at which the Secessionists had received an unprecedented overthrow. During the first week in September, the new Legislature would convene, and would adopt a line of policy answerable to the wishes of the people. In the interval of these four weeks, a couple of very respectable gentlemen wait on the President, and in the name of the Secession Governor of Kentucky, demand of him the performance of an act which would be eminently weak in him, if he had had no previous connection with the Camp Dick Robinson affair—and eminently faithless in him, on any other supposition. It can well be imagined how Mr. Lincoln,—supposing him to have a grain of sense,—would interpret such a proceeding, in such circumstances. If Mr. Hunt, before he made the demand, had explained to the President the origin of the mission in the Scott meeting—the nature of that meeting—the relation of

Governor Magoffin to it—and the general plan of which the mission was a part; the President would very naturally have concluded that Mr. Hunt was insane, or that he believed Mr. Lincoln to be insane. The stake Kentucky had in this proceeding, will be better understood, when it is remembered that the handful of raw troops suddenly and recently drawn together, and which the President was thus required to disavow or disperse, constituted—except the scattered companies of home guards—the sole military force in the State, immediately available in the terrible emergency, and against the immense combination, we have before described. Colonel Rousseau, of Louisville, a member of the Senate of Kentucky, and one of the first who set about raising a military force in the State, avowedly under the auspices of the Federal Government, had so far respected the clamor of Secessionists, and the nervous caution of many leading Union men, as to locate his encampment in Indiana; while the First and Second Kentucky Regiments, organized about the same time in Ohio, and composed only in part of Kentuckians, were making the campaign in Western Virginia. Kentucky, divided, inadequately armed, without sufficient organization, rejecting the sympathy, and refusing the aid of all who were willing and able to assist her; was hastening to a position in which her only alternative would be, disgraceful submission, or frightful neighborhood butchery. It well becomes the people of Kentucky, to remember those who diligently contrived for them such a destiny, and then carefully led them toward it. To those few loyal men who knew precisely what was passing, and what was coming, it was a spectacle at once touching and august, to behold the calm and intrepid confidence of the people in themselves—under perils they did not fully understand, but knew to be immense, awaiting some way of assured deliverance which they would find, or make. Deliverance did come. The explosion of the conspiracy was delayed; the State was suddenly placed in a posture of defense; the vast preparations of the conspirators were foiled; everything disappeared, but armies ranged for combat; and the attempt to subjugate Kentucky assumed the least dangerous of all aspects to her brave people—the aspect of fair battle. At the moment of supreme peril, the conspirators suddenly encountered a degree of skill

and courage superior to their own: and out of a condition apparently hopeless, there sprung, as by a single effort, a combination of irresistible strength.

III.—1. Peculiar aspect of society: Its influence in the perplexed state of opinion and affairs: Gathering of troops by Rousseau and Nelson: Decisive influence of those troops in the end.—2. The Federal Government furnishes arms: The Secessionists attempt to prevent the arming: Camp Dick Robinson armed instead of being dispersed: Perilous and critical adventure at Cynthiana, and at Lexington.—3. Conference of loyal citizens on the Crisis, at Camp Dick Robinson, on the 29th of August, 1861: Owen County War Meeting of Secessionists, on the 5th of September: The great apparent strength of the Secessionists, and the completeness of their preparations: Critical condition of the State.

1. There was a body of loyal men scattered throughout Kentucky, not very numerous, perhaps, and generally neither in public life nor desirous of entering it, who in part knew more, and in part perhaps divined more, of the secret proceedings and purposes of the Secession leaders than the public in general knew, or even suspected. This will not appear surprising to those who know that the existence of such a class of persons has always been a peculiarity of the condition of society in that State; and that while indifferent or averse to public employments, they have, as a class, always possessed the confidence of the people. Such persons perfectly understood that the whole Secession conspiracy, after the Presidential election in the autumn of 1861, was an affair of fraud and violence; and their conviction was unalterable, and their information in many respects complete, that fraud and violence were relied on by the leading traitors, in controlling the destiny of Kentucky. Nor did they ever doubt that the plan of neutrality for that State, was, as a finality, impracticable; since the civil war, concerning which the neutrality was propounded, might as readily break out on the question of the true meaning of the neutrality, as on the direct question of loyalty to the nation, or that of adhesion to the revolt. And that was exactly the way in which the neutrality broke down, and the civil war broke out. The attempt of Colonel Rousseau on the northern border of the State, and that of General Nelson in the central region of it, to organize a loyal military force, after the election in August, 1861, were denounced as violations of the neutrality

of Kentucky by the conspirators, who accepted that neutrality merely as a means of preparing for conquest. Colonel Rousseau thought it advisable to pitch his camp in Indiana, near to Louisville, the chief city of Kentucky. General Nelson refused either to disband or remove his troops, and this afforded the pretext for the embassies created by Governor Magoffin, of which some account has been given. Both Colonel Rousseau and General Nelson acted under the authority of the General Government; and the opposite lines of conduct adopted by them, and both approved, probably, by that Government, are apt illustrations of the obscure and perplexed state of public affairs and public policy, at that dangerous period. It would be most instructive to have access to the written statements made at this period by multitudes of eminent Kentuckians, on one hand to the Federal, and on the other to the Confederate Government. As we look back, nothing is more palpable than the desperate treachery of the conspirators—straining every nerve in secret preparation for the subjugation of the State, and publicly bewailing and denouncing, as a violation of neutrality and a breach of peace and good faith, every movement that looked toward the safety of the State. The desperate blindness of many leading Union men, at that period, is hardly less conspicuous, in their refusal to understand or even credit the existence of perils, which were in the very act of bursting upon the State. Who can now doubt that the existence of Rousseau's small force, a little while after the embassy to Washington failed, was the decisive element in preventing Louisville from falling into the hands of Buckner's column, and thereby of saving the larger part of Kentucky from becoming the theatre of war? Who can now doubt that the existence of Nelson's encampment in Central Kentucky, furnished the necessary base for the operations by means of which the conspiracy was foiled, its leaders dispersed, the seizure of the State defeated, the enemy thrown back to the frontiers, and quickly expelled?

2. We will illustrate the truth and significance of the general statements we have just made, by recounting as briefly as possible, the main circumstances attending the principal attempt to arm the loyal troops at Camp Dick Robinson, while the counter attempt to disperse them was pending.

General Nelson had been some time in the West, and generally at Cincinnati; and he had been the main channel of communication between the loyal men of Central Kentucky, seeking arms, and the authorities at Washington, through whom alone they could be obtained; while the city of Cincinnati, and the railroad from it into the interior of Kentucky, through Covington, Cynthiana, Paris, Lexington, and Nicholasville, afforded the proper means for their storage, transportation, and delivery. At the period of the decisive incidents now to be stated, General Nelson was in command of about six regiments, none of them full, and none of them armed, at Camp Dick Robinson, about fifteen miles south of Nicholasville, the terminus of the railroad from Cincinnati. To arm these troops, or to disperse them, was the immediate question upon which the immediate fate of Kentucky depended. Arrangements had been made to transport arms—probably from eight to ten thousand stand—by the railroad; but the train of cars had been stopped at Cynthiana, and searched by a committee of Secessionists, in part sent from Lexington; and the principal owner of the road, a Mr. Bowler of Cincinnati, who was present, was notified by that committee that his road would be destroyed if it was used for any such purpose; and he gave a public pledge, that it should not be so used. The guns were not found, by the Secession committee that searched the train; the search having been anticipated and guarded against; but were carried back to Cincinnati—transported to Louisville, then by the railroad from that place to Lexington, and over to the camp as will be stated immediately. That is, when within some sixty miles of their destination they narrowly escaped capture; and had to be transported by a circuitous route of about three hundred miles—and to be managed with singular skill, and protected by a military force too strong to be resisted, in order to reach the troops. We had as well add, that about that time General Thomas Crittenden, then Brigadier of the State Guard of which Buckner was the commander—visited Cynthiana, as was understood, with authority from Governor Magoffin, and the purpose to take military possession of this railroad. But upon a consultation of certain persons, both Union men and Secessionists, Mr. Bowler the chief owner of it, as we have said, was allowed, on his earnest remonstrances.

to remain in possession of it—upon his pledge to have it guarded. Not long afterward, a man was killed while guarding the bridge near Cynthiana, and two were killed (one on each side) at the bridge in Paris. And it closes this part of the case to state, that on the 23d of September, 1861, the Thirty-fifth Regiment of Ohio Volunteers, under Colonel Vandevier, suddenly pitched their camp at Cynthiana, and took possession of the hundred miles of railroad extending from Cincinnati to Lexington; as part of the general plan of defence, to be explained hereafter. The searching committee of Secessionists did not get the arms: but they made palpable a series of dangers too great to be endured; and they were effectually provided against. Previous to this last event, however, during the latter part of August and within the week following the Scott meeting, arrangements were perfected at Louisville and Lexington, for the arms to pass over the railroad between those cities, and reach Lexington at a certain hour. There were Secessionists everywhere—and spies and informers were so diligent to know everything, that success in any movement depended full as much on promptitude, dexterity, and courage in execution, as on wisdom and secrecy in devising. The Secessionists both at Louisville and Lexington, became aware of the arrangements made for moving the arms—and made ample counter arrangements to capture them: *first*, by tearing up the track near Louisville; *secondly*, by having an adequate force at different depots along the road to stop them; *thirdly*, by having a military force at Lexington sufficient to seize them, if by any chance they should reach that point. Mr. Chipley, since of the Secession army, was reputed to have charge of the first point: Kean Richards, Esq., who is supposed to be in the same army, had charge of the squad for Payne's Depot, near Lexington; and Captain John Morgan—since very famous as a cavalry officer, in the same army—had charge of the force at Lexington. It was a good plan—and in skillful hands; and its success might have had a terrible, if not fatal effect, on the immediate destiny of all Central Kentucky. But it failed: as we might say, by a series of accidents; or, as was really the case, by extreme vigilance, and extreme promptitude in understanding and using small but significant circumstances. There were two

telegraphic instruments in Lexington, connected with the wires to Louisville; one at the Depot, one at the main office,—capable of being used together, or separately. The communication with the main one was found to have been intentionally cut off. Investigation followed, and immediately revealed the cause, and the object, and the remedy. The result was, that things were put right—and the arms were suddenly and quietly started from Louisville, several hours in advance of previous arrangements: and so their safe passage was secured, at every point of danger. What remained was to protect them after they arrived. This was thought to be adequately provided for by arrangements for the assembling of the Home Guard of the city, in arms at the Depot, on an agreed signal from their commander, the late distinguished Dr. E. L. Dudley, who has since died in the Army while serving as Colonel of a regiment of Kentucky Volunteers. But this was somewhat changed, in the following manner: A gentleman accidentally overheard a conversation between some Secessionists, the purport of which was, that no arms should leave the city for Union men. Very soon this fact was made known to Colonel Dudley—who, prudent as he was brave, thought it his duty to display such a force, as would overawe opposition. He therefore immediately dispatched messengers to Camp Dick Robinson, nearly thirty miles distant, and the next day Colonel Bramlette, of the Third Kentucky Regiment, arrived at the Lexington Depot, at the head of several hundred cavalry, nearly simultaneously with the arrival of the train of cars, with the arms. By this time the city was greatly excited, and the streets full of people. Major Breckinridge, fully aware of the bearing of the affair, whose crisis was now reached, upon the whole plan of the conspiracy of the 17th of August, is said to have declared publicly that he would drive Bramlette's force from the city, if fifty resolute men would follow him. Whereupon, a force of between one and two hundred armed Secessionists, was immediately collected by sound of bugle, at the armory of Captain John Morgan's rifle company. And this gathering was immediately followed by the assembling, by sound of bell, at the Depot, of between three and four hundred armed Home Guards. The united force of Bramlette and Dudley, rendered armed opposition

fruitless, on the part of the inferior force of Secessionists; and Major Breckinridge then spoke to the assembled Secessionists, exhorting them to abstain from any act of violence, and thereby show, what should be considered an act of unexampled forbearance. The arms were carried safely to Camp Dick Robinson, and put immediately in the hands of loyal troops; among the rest, the Kentucky regiments of Bramlette, Fry, Woolford and Garrard, and the Tennessee regiments of Carter and Byrd. In the latter part of October following, many of them did good service in the victory at Wild Cat, over Zollicoffer's army; and still more of them in the rout of the still larger force of Crittenden and Zollicoffer, at Logan's Field and Mill Springs, on the 19th of January, 1862. It was the possession of these arms by the small force under Nelson, during the first week of September, 1861, that made possible the movement which broke the conspiracy in Kentucky to pieces.

3. On the 29th of August, 1861, a few days after the safe arrival of the arms at Camp Dick Robinson, a certain number of gentlemen met at that place, on the invitation of General Nelson, to confer with him on the critical condition of public affairs. In the ordering of Divine Providence, the consultations then had and the conclusions arrived at, produced, by their vigorous execution, such results as completely defeated the conspiracy for the seizure of Kentucky, and overthrew its immense plot, at the moment its success was most imminent. The Scott County meeting preceded, by twelve days, the meeting at Camp Dick Robinson. The former meeting rendered the immediate arming of the loyal troops at the Camp, an indispensable necessity: and we have shown how it was accomplished. There followed the Scott meeting a great assemblage of Secessionists, essentially military in its nature, and intended to include as many of Buckner's State Guard as could be got together; which was held in the county of Owen on the 5th of September—the nineteenth day after the Scott meeting—the seventh day after the loyal meeting at Dick Robinson—and the third day after the meeting of the Legislature which, by act of the previous Legislature, convened several months earlier than usual. The Union party stood on its defense, pressed on all sides, events rushing to their conclusion, the time in which a counter-revolution was possible, if it

was possible at all, beginning to be counted by hours. One of the chief pretexts avowed for the Owen meeting, was to make an ovation to Mr. Vallandigham, the well known Democratic member of Congress from Ohio: to which were added other pretexts, equally designed to conceal its real objects. Whatever they may have been, it is difficult now to state them with certainty; for before that meeting took place, short as the time was, steps had been taken by the Union men, and some of them publicly and even officially stated, which rendered the commencement of hostilities by the Owen County meeting, too perilous to be ventured on. These steps were taken, however, with the perfect conviction, that the meeting was strictly military, that it was a direct menace to the loyal Legislature which was to be assembled at Frankfort, hardly a day's march off, the third day previous—that there was sufficient reason to believe there would be an attempt to occupy the capital, and seize the Legislature—and that whatever steps were taken to avert such proceedings and protect the Government and the capital, must be taken with the clear perception that a collision of arms was imminent, and a bloody civil war was the only apparent alternative to the subjugation of the State—*unless* such a demonstration could be made, suddenly and contrary to all appearances, as would make the loyal party complete master of the situation. So perfect were the arrangements of the conspirators, that the Confederate army under Polk, supposed to be forty thousand strong, seized on the western portion of Kentucky, on the day (September 4, 1861) preceding the one on which the military demonstration in Owen County, was made upon the capital of the State: and within a few days after the failure of the demonstration—ranging from ten days to thirty—most of the conspicuous leaders of this movement in Central Kentucky—John C. Breckinridge, Buckner, Williams, Marshall, Hanson, Monroe, and many more—were in arms with the Confederates. We do not know, with certainty, who was to have led the main column on the capital—who was to have sacked particular cities—who was to have occupied particular strategic points—who was to arrest obnoxious Union men, to seize arms, and levy contributions, occupy the country, and strike terror in all directions. Indeed we cannot venture to conjecture how

resolute might have been the patriotic ardor of the outraged Governor, under a blow so unexpected; nor how heroically he might have resisted all attempts to force or seduce him, "to put himself in the hands of his friends." There was much, however, that was notorious. Owen County was one of the most populous, and least divided of the Secession counties. It contained two regiments of Secessionists, carefully drilled by Humphrey Marshall. It was surrounded on all sides by a wide scope of country, in which a large disloyal force already existed in a certain state of organization; and lines of secret communication and travel, were already established from it into the Confederate lines. In short, it was Major Breckinridge's stronghold—had always given him votes enough to secure his success, until the late fatal Presidential election, and had received singular proofs of his gratitude. Every one knew that the most strenuous exertions were being made to draw together the largest possible body of armed Secessionists on the occasion, and to provide every means of immediate war, from ordnance down to kegs of rifle balls. The disloyal portion of the people seemed fully convinced that the State would immediately pass into their power. Few loyal people saw any adequate means of resisting a powerful organized rising, accompanied by an invasion in force; and none had any confidence that the Secession party, having such an opportunity, at such a crisis, would forbear to use it to the utmost. Whatever personal knowledge any one possessed of the individual leaders of the revolt, whom we have named, or others of equal influence, could only increase the certainty that desperate mischief was intended. And whoever had private information concerning the secret aims of these men, and their plottings against the peace of society and the integrity of the nation, were well aware that a great force of armed rebels, at the time and place appointed for the Owen meeting, could be held in check, and their designs defeated, only by some wise and daring combination and movement, the materials for which, at the moment, scarcely appeared to exist. Under such circumstances was the conference held at General Nelson's headquarters, upon his invitation.

ART. III.—*Imputation and Original Sin.*

PART III.—(Continued.)

THE TESTIMONY OF THE DIVINES OF THE REFORMED CHURCH.

WE shall present this testimony in chronological order, as nearly as we have been able to ascertain it. But no one, who has never made the attempt, can form any adequate conception of the difficulties to be encountered in such an effort, from the materials which are accessible in this country. The theology itself is enunciated with clearness, but the confusion and contradiction in dates is really appalling. The similarity of names is likewise a source of considerable perplexity. For example, there were two who bore the name of *Musculus*, both eminent writers on theology; two *Piscators*, both eminently learned, who were cotemporaries, and both professors of theology, and wrote upon the same themes; two of the name of *Campagius Vitringa*, (father and son,) associate professors of theology in the same university, both very eminent as theological writers, and they died within a few months of each other; two of the name of *Peter du Moulin*, (*Molinæus*), father and son; two of the name of *Sohunius*, both very highly esteemed as theologians; and, in one word, two of each of the following names, and all of them eminent: to wit, *Junius*, *Forbes*, *Rivet*, *Spanheim*, *Polyander*, *Triglandius*, and three of the name of *Grynæus*, and three of the name of *Turretin*, and also of *Pareus* and *Vossius*, and all of them justly eminent. One writer of great authority, speaking of J. J. Grynæus, represents him to have died at two several times, and at an interval of nearly two years; and so on very frequently. D'Aubigne, in his History of the Reformation, has perpetrated some such blunders, which evince great heedlessness, (as, for instance, where he makes F. Duns Scotus, the subtle doctor, crack a joke with Charles the Bald, confounding him with J. Scotus Erigena.) Some very amusing instances may be accredited also to the late Professor Stuart, and to Dr. Hodge, and others in our own land. We have done our best to avoid following the example, though we perceive, from one or two recent publications, that we have the high honor

accorded us (which we beg leave most respectfully to decline, however,) of having discovered a *Targum on Daniel*. The only person who has ever seen such a thing is, we believe, Elias Levita, (vide *præfat. suam ad Methurgamim*,) and no one ought to deprive him of the honor of such a discovery. Our first citation is from

I. ZUINGLIUS. Born 1484, died 1531.

The theology of Zuingle exhibits less precision of statement, and less evidence of having been thoroughly digested into systematic form, than that of any of the early Reformers. In our Second Essay, pp. 556, 557, we have, from his own writings, shown that he inculcated on original sin the very errors which were afterward attributed to Placæus. In his discourse *De Providentia*, cap. 5 and 6, he appears to have gone to the full length of Zanchius himself, or of the late Dr. Samuel Hopkins, in respect to the Divine agency in the production of sin; as for example, "Unum igitur atque facimus," etc.:

"One and the same evil deed, for example, adultery or murder, is not a crime so far as it is the work of God as author, mover, instigator; yet it is both crime and wickedness, so far as it is the work of man. . . . HE therefore moves the robber to kill both the innocent and him that is unprepared for death."

His *Fidei Ratio*, however, affords evidence of having been drawn up with great care. It was prepared and sent to Charles V., at Augsburg, in 1530, and in it he appears to have modified his earlier views respecting *original sin*. In sect. 4, he says:

"Hence, I thus think concerning original sin. Anything which is done contrary to law is truly sin: for where there is no law there is no violation of duty, and where there is no violation of duty there is no sin properly understood, that is, so far as sin, wickedness, crime, offense, or guilt is concerned. I admit, therefore, that our father sinned a sin; that it was truly sin, that is, a wicked and criminal act, and contrary to law. But they who have descended from him did not sin in this way, for none of us ever partook of the forbidden fruit in Paradise. . . . Why does death devastate us, since we have not sinned in the way Adam did? *Because he died on account of sin: and being dead, that is, adjudged to death, begot us.* We therefore die likewise, but the blame is his, but our condition is one of disease, or if you please, of sin, though the word here is not properly used."

This is, in brief, his view; we subjoin the original more fully:

"Hic de Originali peccato sic sentio: Peccatum vero dicitur, cum contra legem itum est: etc. Velimus igitur nolimus, admittere cogimur, peccatum originale ut est in filiis Adæ non proprie peccatum esse, quomodo jam expositum est, non enim est facimus contra legem. Morbus igitur est proprie et conditio, morbus quia," etc. "En nobis mortem etiamsi non peccaverimus quomodo Adam. *Quamobrem? Quia ille peccavit.* Nos autem cum non hoc modo peccaverimus, cur mors populatur? Quia ille mortuus est propter peccatum, et mortuus, hoc est, morti adjudicatus, nos generavit. Morimur ergo et nos, sed illius culpa, nostra vero conditione et morbo, aut si *maius peccato*, verum improprie capto. . . . Nati scelus non habent, sed pœnam ac mulctam sceleris, puta conditionem, servitutem, et ergastulum. Ista si scelus libet adpellare, *ideo quia pro scelere infliguntur, non veto.* Istud originale peccatum, per conditionem et contagionem agnasci omnibus qui ex adfectu maris et fœminæ gignuntur, agnosco: et nos esse natura filius iræ scio," etc.

II. PETER MARTYR. *Professor at Zurich, 1500-1561.*

We preface the testimony of this great divine with a few remarks. It is cited by Turretin (Loco ix, 2, 9, sect. 43) and by Dr. Hodge, (P. Essays, I., 183.) Turretin observes, that although Martyr, in his work against Pighius, says nothing on imputation, he yet announces it with sufficient clearness elsewhere, where he teaches that our original corruption is *the punishment of Adam's sin*. And in support of this statement, he quotes from his Commentary on Romans as follows: "Assuredly, there is no one who can doubt that original sin is inflicted on us *in revenge and punishment of the first fall.*" Dr. Hodge cites the same remark to prove the same thing, and adds to it the testimony of Beza.

I advert to this matter here, because it illustrates the mode in which all the advocates of antecedent imputation misunderstand and misapply the language of the Reformed divines. They ignore the explanation which those divines give of their own language: and then attaching to that language an altogether different meaning, deduce their inferences accordingly. For instance, Martyr in the foregoing clause, says that original sin is inflicted upon us as a punishment of the first fall. (Nobis infligi in ultionem et pœnam primi lapsus.) For he and all the Reformed divines, without attempting to explain the fact,

maintain that *we sinned and fell in Adam*, and that it was as truly *our sin and our fall*, as it was the sin and fall of Adam. And hence they use not only the word *pœna* in this connection, but the word *ultio*, as if to prevent the possibility of their meaning being misunderstood. The *revenge* and *punishment* of the fall, therefore, is the revenge and punishment of *our own fall*, and not merely a punishment inflicted in revenge upon us for the fall of another, as Dr. Hodge makes them say. They made no attempt to philosophise on the subject; but, confessing their inability to explain how we sinned in Adam, asserted the fact *as a fact* on the testimony of God. The imputation of guilt, therefore, was with them the imputation of our own subjective guilt as well as of Adam's guilt; and the penalty—the *ultio* and *pœna*—the *infliction of moral corruption*, (if we may again borrow the strange expression,) was the penalty of our own sin and fall, and not only of the sin and fall of another. Thus they reasoned with the Apostle in Rom. v. But Dr. Hodge utterly denies the existence of any subjective ground for this imputation, this *pœna* and *ultio*; and ignores the whole explanation, though constantly made by the Reformed; and asserts that the sin and fall referred to was simply the sin and fall of another; and that the punishment we suffer is simply the *ultio* and *pœna* of another's sin. And this is just the difference. And this mode of reasoning on the subject, and this treatment of the testimony of the Reformed divines, runs through all the lucubrations of Dr. Hodge touching this matter: who, instead of giving due weight to their own explanation of their views, suffers himself to be misled by their merely popular expressions, in which they attribute the *act, sin, fall*, to Adam personally. In illustration of the accuracy of this representation, we subjoin Martyr's own statement on the subject, together with his explanation:

"It, [the first sin and fall,] was equally the same as if we all had been [personally] present, and had sinned at the same time with him."

"Original sin is a depravation of the whole nature of man, *derived from our first parents to their posterity by generation*;"

and not by antecedent imputation, as Dr. Hodge avers.

"The efficient cause is the sinning will of Adam. *When, therefore, the the Apostle seems to assert that the sin for which we are condemned is not*

another's but our own, he means that the sin of Adam was not so the sin of another, but that it was ours also." (Comm. in Rom. v.)

Thus, therefore, is the subjective ground of imputation fully recognized; and by consequence the doctrine of *antecedent* imputation disallowed.

III. WOLFGANG MUSCULUS.

This eminent man was born at Lorraine, in September, 1497. The writings of Luther led him, in 1527, to embrace Protestantism; and his labors greatly promoted the Reformation. In 1531 he became pastor of the Church in Strasburg, where he remained eighteen years. He then went to Switzerland; and finally accepted the Chair of Theology in Berne, where he died, August 29, 1563. He was thoroughly conversant with the Greek, Hebrew, and Arabic languages; and his *Loci Communes* were in high esteem. Even Father Simon, who rarely praises anybody but himself, justly extols his commentaries on the Sacred Books; and says that he observes *une methode exacte* therein. He has been, not without reason, claimed as favoring Supralapsarianism.

In his Comment. in Rom. v: 12, he says:

"Some explain the word *ἥμαρτον* (they sinned) to mean, that we are condemned, or virtually constituted sinners, on account of sin; which is, indeed true; but there is no reason why you should not thereby understand the actual sin of Adam, in whom all that existed in his loins have sinned. For since we receive from Christ not only this benefit, that we should be virtually justified by his obedience; but also this, that by the very actual obedience of Christ, we obey the Father, as we are Christ's; so we are not only virtually made sinners in Adam, but are condemned for this very sin of Adam. Whence the Apostle declares that by the offense of one, or the one offense, judgment came upon all men to condemnation."

This is one of the earliest and strongest averments of what Dr. Hodge would wish to regard as the doctrine of *antecedent* imputation; and yet Musculus does not say, as Dr. Hodge does, that we are condemned *for the sin of Adam alone*. His modesty in hesitating to decide whether *δι' ἑνὸς παραπτώματος* means *the offense of one*, or *the one offense*, is remarkable, considering the views he was inclined to favor. But Calvin,

Stapfer, and Breckinridge, as well as President Edwards, all maintain, as above shown, that Adam's sin is imputed to his posterity; but that they are not condemned for his sin alone. And Musculus, so far from making the imputation of Adam's sin alone causal of the depravity and corruption of his posterity, makes his posterity "to have sinned *in the loins of Adam*;" and so recognizes their subjective guilt, which Dr. Hodge denies. This testimony, therefore, recognizing the fact that we sinned in the loins of Adam; and that we are condemned for the very sin of Adam; evinces that Musculus explicated the doctrine of original sin from the stand-point of both inherent and imputed guilt; and that he did not, as Dr. Hodge and Placcus do, separate them, and make the one causal of the other.

IV. CALVIN. 1509-1564.

The views of this prince of theologians have been, in part, presented in our First Essay, in citations from lib. ii, cap. 1, of his Institutes, and from his Exposition of Romans, ii: 17. A more full citation may, perhaps, be necessary, however, in order to place beyond doubt his views on the subject before us.

In referring to the general principle which underlies this whole discussion, Calvin remarks that God, in electing and reprobating *from the fallen and corrupt mass*, does it after the counsel of his own will. Inst., lib. iii, c. 23; adds in sec. 8:

"For if predestination is no other than a dispensation of Divine justice—mysterious indeed, but liable to no blame—*since it is certain that they were not unworthy of being predestinated to that fate*, it is equally certain, that the destruction they incur by predestination is consistent with the strictest justice. *Besides their perdition depends on the Divine predestination in such a manner, that the cause and matter of it are found in themselves.*" "In the next place we maintain, that they act preposterously, who, in seeking for the origin of their condemnation, *direct their views to the secret recesses of the Divine counsel, and overlook the corruption of nature, which is its real source.*" (Sec. 9.) And in sec. 11: "*We confess the guilt to be common*, but we say that some are relieved by Divine mercy."

See also the important admission of Turretin, respecting Calvin's views on this subject, in *Loco iv: quæst. 9, sec. 30*, which exposes the utter folly of the claim of Twisse, that he

was favorable to the Supralapsarian scheme; and the equally erroneous claim of Dr. Thornwell; who, while he maintains that his views on this whole subject are in harmony with those of Calvin, does not hesitate to say, in direct antagonism to him, *that it makes no difference whether the guilt is supposed to precede the imputation and condemnation, or whether it flows from and is produced by the imputation.* The former of these sentiments is that of Calvin and the Reformed Church; while the latter is that of the Supralapsarians. And it is rather odd, that a truly learned and intelligent divine should now claim that it makes no difference whether God is regarded from the Infralapsarian stand-point, or from that of the Supralapsarian school. This certainly would have been news to the Synod of Dort.

And then, speaking in reference to original sin, Calvin remarks (Inst., lib. iv: cap. 15, sec. 10):

"We have already proved* that *original sin is the pravity and corruption of our nature which FIRST MAKES US GUILTY OF THE WRATH OF GOD* (quæ primum reos facit nos iræ Dei,) and then also brings forth in us those works which the Scriptures call the *works of the flesh*. (Gal. v: 19.) The two following things are therefore to be distinctly observed: *first, that our nature being so depraved and vitiated, we are on account of this very corruption deservedly condemned and convicted before God; to whom nothing is acceptable, but righteousness, and innocence, and purity.* And therefore even infants themselves, bring their own condemnation with them into the world, who, even though they have not yet brought forth the fruits of their iniquity, have nevertheless the seed of it within themselves. Yea, their whole nature is, in a certain sense, a seed of sin; and therefore can not be otherwise than odious and abominable to God."

Again:

"We have heard that the impurity of the parents is so transmitted to the children, that all, without a single exception, are polluted as soon as they exist. *But we shall not find the origin of this pollution, unless we ascend to the first parent of us all, as to the fountain which sends forth*

*The passage here referred to by Calvin, is lib. ii, cap. 1, in which he says, "Videtur ergo peccatum originale hereditaria naturæ nostræ pravitas et corruptio, in omnes animæ partes diffusa: quæ primum facit reos iræ Dei, tum etiam opera in nobis profert, quæ Scriptura vocat opera carnis. Atque id est propriè quod à Paulo sæpius peccatum nominatur." Sec. 8, ut supra. See a translation of this in our Essay I, p. 407.

all the streams. Thus it is certain that Adam was not only the progenitor, *but as it were the root of mankind*, and therefore that all the race were deservedly (*merito*) vitiated in his corruption. The Apostle explains this by a comparison between him and Christ: 'As,' says he, 'by one man sin entered into the world, and death by sin, and so death passed upon all men, for that (*quando*) all have sinned,' so, by the grace of Christ, righteousness and life have been restored to us. What cavil will the Pelagians raise here?" "There is no obscurity in the declaration that many are made righteous by the obedience of Christ, as they had been made sinners by the obedience of Adam. And therefore, between these two persons, there is this relation, that *the one ruined us by involving us in his destruction*, the other by his grace has restored us to salvation." "He who pronounces that we were all dead in Adam, now at the same time openly testifies also that we were implicated in the guilt of sin, (*peccati labe esse implicitis*, not '*of his sin.*') For neither could condemnation reach to those who were touched with no blame of iniquity." (*Neque enim ad eos perveniret damnatio, qui nullæ iniquitatis culpa attingerentur.*) "No other explanation, therefore, can be given of our being said to be dead in Adam, than that his transgression not only procured misery and ruin for himself, but precipitated our nature also into a like destruction. AND THAT NOT BY HIS INDIVIDUAL GUILT, WHICH PERTAINS NOT TO US, (*neque id suo unius vitio, quod nihil ad nos pertineat,*) *but because he infected all his descendants with the corruption into which he had fallen.* Otherwise there would be no truth in the statement of Paul, that all are by nature the children of wrath, if they had not been already under the curse before they were born. Now, it is easily inferred that our nature is there characterized, not as it was created by God, but as it was vitiated in Adam; because it would be unreasonable to make God the author of death. Adam therefore so corrupted himself that from him the contagion has passed to his whole offspring."—*Lib. II: cap. 1, sect. 6.*

"These two things, therefore, should be distinctly observed: first, that our nature being so totally vitiated and depraved, we, on account of this very corruption, are regarded as deservedly (*merito*) condemned and convicted in the sight of God, to whom nothing is acceptable but righteousness, innocence, and purity. Nor is this an obligation [to punishment] arising out of another's offense; (*neque ista est alieni delicti obligatio:*) *for when it is said that we by the sin of Adam are made obnoxious to the judgment of God, it is not to be so understood as if we, being innocent ourselves and undeserving, suffer the blame of his offense, but because we, through his transgression, are all entangled in the curse, he is said to have fettered us:* (*sed quia per ejus transgressionem*

maledictione induti sumus omnes, dicitur ille nos obstrinxisse.) Yet not the punishment alone proceeds from him to us, but the pollution to which the punishment is justly due, being instilled from himself, resides in us."—*Sect. 8.*

This language needs no expositor: and it is impossible to express in stronger terms an utter antagonism to the Antecedent Imputation scheme of Dr. Hodge.

We conclude with the following from Calvin's note on Rom. v: 17:

"It is worthy of remark that there are two differences between Christ and Adam, concerning which the Apostle was silent, not because he thought they might be neglected, but because it did not belong to his present argument to enumerate them. The first is, *that by the sin of Adam we are not condemned by imputation alone, as though the punishment of another's sin is exacted of us; but we bear his punishment because we also are guilty of his fault; for because our nature is vitiated in him, it is with God bound by the guilt of iniquity.*"

Dr. Hodge quotes this passage *just as we have done*, and adds the following as a continuous part of the quotation: "Here then we have the two things, *not only the imputation of the first sin; but also our own fault since our nature is corrupted:*" and refers it all to Calvin on Rom. v: 17. *But there is no such passage to be found in that connection.** And it is hardly fair to manufacture authorities, however great may be our need of them.

V. ANDREAS G. HYPERIUS.

This eminent Theologian and Reformer was born at Ypres, in 1511, and after studying at Louvain, and other Universities, with success, he traveled into England, Germany, and Italy; and on his return to Flanders was made Professor in the University of Nimeguen, where he died, greatly lamented, February 1, 1564. He was thoroughly learned, and possessed of great capacity. And his theological and exegetical works were highly prized by the Reformed. His treatises on the study of theology, and on the composition and delivery of

* I use Tholuck's edition of Calvin on the New Testament. Berlin, 1831.

sermons; and on the necessity of reading and meditating on the Holy Scriptures; were so much esteemed that, as Du Pin (an impartial witness) declares, they were copied and published by a Spanish Augustinian (Laurence de Villa,) as his own, and under his own name. "There are few things," says Du Pin, "which one can find fault with in them; and they are at this time very useful to instruct divines in studying divinity, and in the art of preaching it. And one can not too much commend Hyperius for the pains he has taken in composing these useful works." In his commentary on Rom. v: 12-21, he speaks as follows respecting original sin:

"The Apostle confirms the assertion that sin and death have prevailed in those also who had not sinned after the similitude of Adam's transgression. For the same reason he likewise frequently and strongly urges the universal particle, saying that *all* have sinned; that evil was propagated to *all*. But some one inquires, what is the formal cause or mode whereby the sin of Adam passes to all his posterity, so that even infants, who have committed no actual sins, are condemned? *I reply that the evil and contagion is derived to all the posterity of Adam by propagation itself alone, (ipsa sola propagatione.)** For what Adam became, after his transgression, so all became who were afterward begotten of him. . . . After that he, by transgressing the law of God, had lost all honor and uprightness, and had become surrounded by and involved in all spiritual and corporeal miseries, he necessarily transmitted this contagion to all who should descend from him. . . . Rightly, therefore, and wisely the Apostle inculcates these words: that by one man sin gained entrance to all men, and death passed upon all *ἐκ τῆς ἡμάρτιας, (ex quo, vel quoniam, vel quatenus) by whom, or because, or so far as all have sinned.* And again: Death reigned over those also who have not sinned after the similitude of Adam's transgression. And a little after *he most appositely explains it*: By the offense of one, evil was *propagated* (this word is not in the Greek,) *to all men for condemnation*, which formula of speaking concerning propagation the fathers freely used, and thereby refuted the obscure cavils of Pelagians and other heretics."

* Our readers will have very frequent occasion to call to mind the Supralapsarian formula of Dr. Hodge, respecting the transmission of sin: (*Neque per corpus, neque per animam, sed per culpam; id est, imputationem;*) in the way of antithesis.

VI. PETER VIRET. 1511–1571.

This eminent luminary of the French Church, was a native of Berne. He studied at Paris, where he became intimate with Farell, with whom he went to Switzerland, and was for many years pastor of the Reformed Church in Lausanne. In 1541 Calvin invited him to Geneva; and he afterward settled at Lyons. He, and Calvin and Farell, were the founders of the Reformed religion in France; but in eloquence he was far their superior. In 1563 he was Moderator of the National Synod of Lyons. A single sentence from his Dial. I, will express his views, on the subject before us, with sufficient clearness:

“God permitted the fall and corruption of the whole human race, and of the whole nature of man, *in the man first formed.*”

VII. HENRY BULLINGER. *Pastor and Professor at Zurich,* 1504–1575.

“Sin is called original, or the sin of our birth, because it comes from our first origin; *or is derived from our first-parent upon all, by propagation or traduction.* It derived its origin from the first formed man, and hence it is termed, the hereditary depravity and corruption of our nature. Moreover, this evil *flowed from our first parents* to all their posterity.” “After men became obnoxious to punishment, so far were we from having any power by which we could deliver ourselves, that by reason of our native and inherent depravity, we rather increase the shame.”

VIII. NEUSTADIAN DECLARATION. 1575.

This declaration was prepared by Ursinus, Zancheus, and other professors of the Palatinate, by order of the Palatine Elector, John Casimir.

“We acknowledge original sin *to be not only guilt, but the hereditary depravity of human nature*, which is repugnant to the law of God, and deserving eternal punishment.”

IX. ZECHARIAH URSINUS. 1534–1583.

Ursinus was one of the greatest of the Reformed divines. While very young he went to Wittenburg to study, where Melancthon became very strongly attached to him. In 1557 he accompanied Melancthon to the Conference at Worms;

after which he went to Geneva and conferred with Calvin; and finally to Paris, where he continued awhile, in order to perfect his knowledge of the Hebrew, under the celebrated Mercier. He then, in 1558, rejoined Melancthon at Wittemburg; but being unable to adopt the Lutheran views of the sacrament, proceeded to Zurich. In 1561 he was invited to the Chair of Theology in Heidelberg; and in 1562, by request of the elector (Frederick III), composed the Heidelberg Catechism; and subsequently he adopted it as the basis for his theological lectures. On several points of doctrine (though not on all), which give character to the Supralapsarian scheme, his views were similar to those of his venerated colleague, Zanchius.

In his *Explication of the Catechism*,* he says:

"Original sin is the guilt of the whole human race, on account of the fall of our first parents, and the privation of the knowledge of God. . . . Two things are included in it: 1. *The guilt of eternal damnation on account of the sin of our first parents.* 2. The depravation of our whole nature since the fall."

Then, speaking of those who "allege that the concupiscence in which we are born is not of the nature of sin," he says:

"*Against such it must be held, 1. That the whole human race is guilty of the eternal wrath of God, on account of the disobedience of our first parents, unless they are delivered from this guilt by the grace of the Mediator; 2. Besides this guilt there is in us a defect, and inclinations contrary to the law of God, as soon as we are born. These defects and evil inclinations are sins deserving the eternal wrath of God.*"

As Ursinus has been claimed by the Supralapsarians, and as an advocate of antecedent imputation, we shall here cite his views on the subject of the transmission of original sin. Dr. Hodge says, that the Reformed Church constantly declares that the transmission is *neque per corpus, neque per animam, sed per culpam*. Ursinus (Quæst. 7, pp. 40, 41,) gives the following explanation of the matter:

* A translation of this admirable Compendium of Theology, has been attempted in this country; but neither the translator nor Dr. Nevins, (who wrote an introduction to the work,) had sufficient knowledge of the matter to select the proper edition of the original for such a purpose. Their edition is not the one which Pareus requested might be used for republication; nor does it contain his latest revisions; revisions to which he attached great importance.

"The Pelagians object, that if original sin is transmitted from parent to child, it must pass either by the body or the soul. But it can not by the body, seeing that that is mere dull matter: nor by the soul, for that is not propagated *per traducem*, since it is a spiritual substance; nor is it created vicious by God, for God is not the author of sin. Therefore it can in no sense be transmitted by nature. *But I reply*, 1. That the minor is denied. Because, though the soul, created by God, is not vicious, it yet may contract corruption from the inert body in which it is placed, etc.) 2. The consequence is denied, because there is not a sufficient enumeration in the minor. For it passes neither by the body, nor by the soul, but by the unclean generation of the whole man, on account of the guilt of our first parents; on account of which God, by a just judgment, while he creates the souls, deprives them at the same time of the original rectitude and gifts which he had bestowed upon our first parents, with this law, that they should either lose them for, or transmit them to, their posterity, if they themselves should either lose or retain them." "Transit (peccatum originis) enim neque per corpus, neque per animam, sed per totius hominis generationem immundam PROPTER CULPAM [not per culpam, as Dr. Hodge has made him say,] primorum parentum, propter quam Deus justo iudicio, animas dum creat, simul privati originali rectitudine et donis, quæ parentibus hac lege contulerat, ut et posteris ea conferrent vel perderent, si ipsi ea retinerent vel amitterent."

Dr. Hodge, in the Princeton Review for 1860, p. 362, thus quotes the Supralapsarian dogma aforesaid:

"The constant answer to the objection to the doctrine of creation derived from the transmission of sin, made by Reformed theologians, is, that original sin is propagated NEQUE PER CORPUS, NEQUE PER ANIMAM, SED PER CULPAM: "*"

and on p. 367 he repeats the same affirmation: and on the same page adduces Ursinus as saying:

"Transit peccatum originis neque per corpus, neque per animam, sed per culpam parentum, propter quam Deus animas," etc.,

* Even Turretin himself is so far from sustaining this representation that he says directly: "Licet modus propagationis peccati sit obscurus, et explicatu difficilis; non ideo ipsa propagatio, quam Scriptura tam clare asserit, et experientia confirmat, neganda est. Quid autem de modo propagationis sit sentiendum peculiari Questione exotietur."—Loc. 9, quest. 10, sec. 28. De Moor also says: "In genere tuto affirmare licet, quod *Corruptio propagetur per Generationem Naturalem*," etc. And he devotes a whole section to the consideration of the subject. See Comment. Perpet. cap. 15, sec. 88. tom. iii, pp. 287-291.

accrediting the quotation to De Moor, cap. 15, sec. 32. The quotation is a part of what we have above given from Ursinus, and is obviously made to justify the assertions aforesaid respecting the adoption of this dogma by the church. Now we have cited the passage from the edition of the Explication, (p. 40,) containing the latest revisions of Pareus, (who was the favorite pupil of Ursinus, and received it from his own lips,) completed only one month before his death, *and in which he emphatically declares that that edition is the only exemplar from which the work should be thereafter printed.* And if our readers will compare the two passages, it will be seen that there never was a grosser falsification of any passage than of this as here presented. Ursinus, instead of saying, "neque per corpus, neque per animam, sed *per culpam* parentum," etc., says: "neque per corpus, neque per animam, sed *per totius hominis generationem propter culpam*," etc. The edition used by De Moor (to whom Dr. Hodge, instead of consulting the original work, accredits the quotation,) *was published by Pareus*; for he refers to the *Catechetical Miscellanies* as part of the volume. We have moreover carefully examined the edition of the Explication, issued at Geneva in 1584, (one year after the death of Ursinus,) and there is nothing of the kind therein. On the contrary, he therein speaks as follows: "Nam et infantes sunt peccato obnoxii: quia moriuntur. Non autem ex imitatione habent peccatum: ergo *ex propagatione*," p. 68; "Peccatum illud *Originale* appellatur, quod à prima venit origine, nempe à primo parente in omnes derivatum propagine vel traduce," p. 102.

X. M. CHEMNITZ (or Kemnitius.) 1522–1586.

This illustrious theologian was *nominally* a Lutheran. (He must not be confounded with his grand-nephew, C. Chemnitz, 1615–1666, who though very learned and celebrated, was a bigoted Lutheran.) His *Loci Communes* were highly valued by all the churches of the Reformation. His *Examen Concilii Tridentis*, gave the Papal theologues a vast deal of trouble: and his *Harmonia Evangelica*, is one of the ablest and richest commentaries on the Gospels which the age of the Reformation has bequeathed to the church of God.

In his *De Peccato Originis*, part I, p. 236, he thus remarks:

"Let it be sufficient that we are able to know that what our first parents were after the fall, in body and soul, such were all who were procreated afterward. But as to how the soul contracts that evil, we may be safely ignorant: (*Quomodo autem malum illud contrahat anima, salvâ fide potest ignorari.*) Because the Holy Spirit has not attempted to make this known by sure and perspicuous testimonies." *

XI. D. G. SOHNNIUS. Professor at Heidelberg, 1551-1589.

The Seminary at Herborn, in Central Germany, was founded in 1584, and the celebrated J. Piscator was its first professor of theology; in which office he continued during forty-one years. The Professorship had been, however, previously offered to Sohnnius, but he declined it, in order to accept the overture from Heidelberg, to fill the vacancy occasioned by the death of Ursinus; and he was inaugurated in July of the same year. In P. Essays I, 216, he is called "the colleague of Ursinus," who died, however, in 1583. Sohnnius was a man of deep piety; and though he died young, was very eminent for his learning and profound acquaintance with theological science. On the subject before us he speaks as follows:

"Original sin, as well in Adam as in his posterity, includes three deadly evils, *the demerit, the guilt* or liableness to punishment, and *the depravity* or corruption of nature. All these concur in the parent and in his posterity in relation to the first sin, with this difference only, that Adam sinning was the principal agent committing the fault, deserving the guilt, and casting off the image of God, and rendering himself depraved. Of all these do his posterity partake by imputation and by generation from a corrupted parent. Then it is vainly disputed by the sophists, whether the *demerit*, the *guilt*, or the *depravity*, is contracted by the fall, for all these do actually exist; so that taking the words in a

* Augustine has a beautiful passage of like import, wherein he likens the sinner to one who has fallen into a well where the water is deep, and he just on the eve of perishing; upon which a man who finds him in this condition begins to ask him, "*Quomodo huc cecidisti?*" At ille, obsecro, inquit, cogita; *quemodo hinc me libera, non quomodo huc ceciderim, queras.*" And he adds: "Let us rather endeavor to save men from sin and wrath, than to occupy our time and energies with inquiries which can do them no good."

wide sense, you may say that the fall and disobedience of our first parents, and in them of the whole human race, was that by which all of them in like manner lost the image of God, depraved their nature, became the enemies of God, and contracted the guilt of temporal and eternal death; unless deliverance and reconciliation should take place by the Son of God, the Mediator."

"Again, 'all are dead by the offense of one man'—therefore his offense was the offense of all, *but theirs by participation and imputation*, otherwise they could not be said to be dead by the offense of one, but by many offenses."

"Although it is truly said that the first sin was committed by Adam, yet not as a single person, but as the father of the whole human race. It is not correct, however, to say that original sin existed in Adam, or that Adam had original sin, for then the cause and effect, actual and original sin, would be manifestly confounded. The first sin of Adam, therefore, as we said before, must be viewed in a double aspect. In one respect it was the sin of Adam, and was not original sin, but actual, *originating*, that is, giving origin to the original sin of his posterity; in another respect it was the sin of his posterity, who were in his loins; *so that in mass THEY COMMITTED the same sin, AND HENCE IT WAS IMPUTED TO THEM ALL.* Thus this one fall pertains to original sin."

And again; after referring to various expressions from Rom. v: 12-18, which Pighius had adduced, he adds:

"In all these texts, says Pighius, the Apostle attributes condemnation to the sin of Adam, and nothing else. To which it may be replied, that when the Apostle declares that *sin had entered into the world*, he does not mean, merely, that Adam had become a sinner, but that it had come upon all his descendants, that is, upon all men in the world; *for he does not say in this place that guilt had entered, but that sin had entered into the world.* And this is not left to be inferred, but is expressly asserted in the same verse: '*in whom ALL have sinned*;' or, '*for that ALL have sinned.*' Moreover, when he declares that all are subject to death and condemnation by the sin of one, *it is a just inference that they are all partakers of his sin*, and are born in a state of moral pollution. In the 19th verse it is said: 'By the disobedience of one many are constituted sinners;' *now, to be constituted sinners, includes the idea not only of being made subject to the penalty, but partaking of the nature of sin; for they who are entirely free from the stain of sin, can not with propriety be called sinners.* Again: the Apostle in this chapter teaches, that 'while we were yet sinners Christ died for us, to deliver us from death and reconcile us to God;' *certainly he died for none but sinners: but if infants are not*

sinner, then Christ did not die for them, nor do they belong to him as their Saviour; which is most absurd."

Such was the doctrine taught at Heidelberg, immediately after the death of Ursinus, and during the *Emeritus* Professorship of the great Supralapsarian, Zanchius.

XII. JEROME ZANCHIUS. 1516-1590.

Zanchius, who, like Peter Martyr, was an Italian, (born at Alzane,) left the Roman Church some years after he did, and proceeded to Strasburg, where he succeeded Hedio, who died in 1552. While here, he prepared many of his ablest works for publication. He left Strasburg in 1563, and in 1568 accepted the Theological Chair at Heidelberg. *President De Thou* praises him for the moderation which, says he, "is observable in all his writings."

In relation to the matter before us, he speaks as follows :

"Because the whole human race, which is propagated by natural generation from Adam, were in his loins, *hence the precept, WITH ITS PENALTY, WAS NOT ADDRESSED TO THE PERSON OF ADAM ALONE, but also pertained to the whole human race.* Therefore, we believe and confess with the Apostle, *that in Adam sinning all men sinned; so that that disobedience WAS NOT PECULIAR TO ADAM, but was the common (disobedience) of the whole human race;* since his guilt has involved all men naturally descended from his loins," etc. "We therefore say that the disobedience of Adam, which was not ours in act, *yet as to the fault and guilt, became ours by imputation;* since God most justly imputes that sin of Adam, *as being the head to us the members.*" "For this is the reason why all men have sinned in Adam, *that is, were made guilty, because Adam first sinned by his own actual disobedience; so we also in him as in our origin are made guilty; and his sin becomes ours by imputation.*" De Peccato, (in his De Natura Dei.)

XIII. WILLIAM WHITTAKER.

Bellarmino said of Whittaker: "He is the most learned heretic I have ever read:" and indeed his erudition and subtlety were almost unequalled even in the age in which he lived. He was born in 1547, and at the age of eighteen was admitted to Trinity College, Cambridge. In 1582, he was admitted Doctor Theologiæ by the faculty there, and in 1586 he became Principal. He died, aged 48, in 1595. He was,

says an old writer, regarded as "l'Oracle de l'Universite." He says:

"Original sin is inherent and native depravity, but the actual free transgression of Adam is imputed to us. For we should neither be held under the guilt or depravity thence contracted, unless that act by which Adam violated the divine precept was ascribed to us by imputation. *But in regard that some scholastic theologians place original sin in imputation alone; in this they basely and nefariously err.*"

The testimony of this learned divine shows how the Church in his time regarded the attempt to explicate the doctrine of original sin from the stand-point of imputation alone.

XIV. L. DANÆUS. *Professor in Geneva and Leyden, 1580-1596.*

"There are three things which constitute a man guilty before God: 1. *The sin flowing from this, that we have all sinned in the first man, Rom. v: 12.* 2. *Corruption, which is the punishment of this sin, which fell upon Adam and all his posterity. Heb. ix: 27.* 3. *The (actual) sins which adult men commit, and which are fruits which this root of corruption brings forth, of which we are guilty before the judgment of God.*"

"That first sin rendered them, (our first parents,) guilty before God, then the corruption (which followed guilt in Adam) was transferred unto us; *on the account of this inhering in us we are now guilty, as infected with our own depravity—vile, and spotted, and hateful to God, not only in Adam, or as we are viewed as the fountain and root of the human race, BUT AS WE ARE CONSIDERED IN OURSELVES, AND FROM OURSELVES CORRUPTED.*" "All men, the posterity of Adam, *are by nature guilty before God, involved in that sin, and are children of wrath.* Hence, both in mind and body we bear the punishment which we before described: *for the opinion is false that punishment alone flowed to us on account of this sin, and not the guilt and fault,* for in that case we should be undeserving, but first the sin, then the punishment passes over and is laid upon us. Therefore, by one man sin entered into the world, that is guilt, and that indeed first in order, and by sin death, and so the penalty, both in soul and body, afterward pervaded all men also. *For in one, Adam, they sinned and are constituted guilty before God. But why was this? Because Adam not only was the propagator, but also the fountain and root of the whole human race, from which the pollution and vitiosity descended, as into the branches propagated from this root, not only by imitation, but by the actual communication of the first sin, first of the fault (culpæ,) then of the corruption and vitiosity both in mind and body.*"

"Original sin, then, does not consist merely in imitation, nor solely in imputation, but in inhesion, propagation, communication, and installation of that corruption and depravity which Adam himself had contracted, and the same descends to us, and dwells in us. Therefore, when he sinned, ADAM INSTILLED HIS POLLUTION INTO US ALL

This lengthy citation from this truly great divine, shows that though he sympathizes so closely in some respects with the theological views of his colleague, Beza, he yet does not attempt to explicate the doctrine of original sin except on the ground of the twofold relation of Adam to his posterity. And in expounding the doctrine, he does not separate what God has joined together, by making imputation causal of moral corruption, as Dr. Hodge does, but brings both into the account. And he urges that we are not only guilty of Adam's sin, *but of sinning in Adam*, which, as the great Chamier remarks, *is a very different thing*.

XV. FRANÇOIS JUNIUS, of Leyden. 1543-1602.

The elder Scaliger, who was rather more inclined to sneer at and ridicule everybody than to praise anybody, regarded Junius with high admiration, and without qualification pronounced him the greatest theologian of that age of illustrious divines. His influence was very great throughout the whole Reformed Church. He was the associate of Tremellius in translating the Bible. In his tractate in reply to Arminius, he evinces a modified Supralapsarianism. In his *De Peccato Originis*, Thesis 4, etc., he says :

"In the first Adam the whole species was, by God, naturally deposited; in whom all sinned, and became guilty, and the children of wrath, and of an eternal malediction." Again: "God, as in the order of his creation, placed the whole human race in Adam by nature; so, in the dispensation of his righteousness, *he said to the whole human race in Adam, in whom we have sinned: 'In the day thou eatest thereof thou shalt die.'*" Thesis 7. Again: "Hence it comes to pass, (namely, by the transgression of Adam,) that all of us who are born bear the stigma and brand of our rebellion; so that before we enjoy the light we partake of the injury of our origin. *For indeed we all sinned in him in whom we all were one man.*" "The personal sin of Adam has passed upon all, who according to nature are personally propagated from him."

XVI. THEODORE BEZA. 1519-1605.

We have already sufficiently adverted to the theological position of Beza. In our First Essay, pp. 414, 415, we have cited a passage from his *Apology for Justification*, which our readers will find, word for word, in the beginning of the foregoing citations from Danæus. On Rom. v: 12, etc., he also says:

"Two things should be taken into consideration in regard to original sin, *guilt and corruption*, (*reatus et corruptio*), WHICH, *although THEY CAN NOT BE SEPARATED* (*quæ ut non possent separari*) yet ought to be accurately distinguished. For as Adam, by the commission of sin, first was made guilty of the wrath of God, then, as being guilty, underwent as the punishment of his sin the corruption of soul and body, *so also he transmitted to posterity a nature in the first place guilty, next, corrupted.*"

Here, too, the imputation is based by Beza upon the fact, *that we all sinned and corrupted ourselves in Adam*: "*omnes peccavimus in Protoplasto*:" and therefore, corruption, which is the punishment of this sin, becomes the portion both of Adam and his posterity. And then, further, how lightly he regards the order of topics in stating the doctrine of original sin, and on which Dr. Hodge bases everything, so far as a right understanding of the matter is concerned, may be seen by his note on Rom. v: 12.

"Duo sunt in peccato originis: 1. *Corruptio*, quæ tollitur sanctificatione, etc. 2. *Reatus*: de quo hic propriè agitur cui opponitur imputatio obedientiæ Christi."

XVII. J. ARMINIUS. *Professor in Leyden*, 1560-1609.

"*This whole sin is not peculiar to our first parents, but is common to the whole race of their posterity; who, at the time when they sinned, were in their loins, and afterward descended by natural generation from them. For all sinned in Adam.* Rom. v. Whatever punishment, therefore, was inflicted on our first parents, has gone down through, and still rests on all their posterity; so that all are children of wrath by nature, being obnoxious to condemnation, to death temporal and eternal, and to a destitution of righteousness and true holiness." "Hence it comes, that all men who are their natural descendants, have become obnoxious to eternal and temporal death, and are destitute of original righteousness; which penalty is usually called, a loss of the divine image, and original sin."

Dr. Hodge likewise quotes a passage from the same writer, which concludes as follows :

"From these things the imputation of the sin of our first parents is necessarily inferred ; for wherever there is the punishment of sin there is the imputation of the same."

Observe the manner in which Arminius states the order of the topics in these passages.

XVIII. AMANDUS POLANUS. *Professor at Basel.*

This eminent Supralapsarian divine was born at Polansdorf, Dec. 16, 1561, and was colleague of the celebrated J. J. Grinæus, in the University of Basel. He died July 18, 1610. We present in the original the subjoined paragraph from his *Syntagma Theol. Christianæ*, (p. 1072,) the first sentence of which may be found reasserted by Turretin, in loco ix: quæst. 10, sec. 22.

"*Primum persona infecit naturam, sed post natura infecit personam. Peccatum Adami naturæ ipsius peccatum fuit, cæterorum peccata personalia sunt; ideo illius cum natura transfusum est, non aliorum. Sed quare Adamus peccando non personam modò, sed naturam perdiderit, quum alii homines, personas suas lædant, naturam non faciant pejorem, causa assignari non potest alia quam Dei justissima voluntas. Quam Adamus infelicitatem volens accersivit sibi, eam ejus posteris universis jure Deus inflixit. Sed quare? QUIA SIC FERT VOLUNTAS EJUS, QUÆ EST JURIS ET JUSTITIÆ NORMA. Nunquam aliter intelliges, justum fuisse, nos omnes nasci miseros propter hominis peccatum. Nam quòd illius (hominis) voluntas fuit nostra, et nos in illo voluimus, VERUM EST, SED RATIO HUIUS VERITATIS NULLA EST, PRÆTERQUAM VOLUNTAS CREATORIS. Proinde et peccato primorum parentum omnes homines facti sunt obnoxii morti æternæ, NON NATURALITER, SED VOLUNTATE DEI. Naturaliter enim hoc factum non est, ut nimirum ob culpam unius hominis tot hominum millia à salute excluderentur. Voluntate igitur Dei, de qua Christus Matth. xi: 29."**

* In opposition to this whole Supralapsarian speculation let our readers compare the following passage from the best and most thoroughly elaborated system of true Calvinistic theology which has appeared since the days of Calvin : "To us, no doubt all that God wills is right ; but in God himself there is a very wide difference between saying, he wills anything because it is right—that is, because it accords with all his Perfections ; and saying anything is right, that is, accords with all his Perfections—merely because he wills it. A distinction which draws after it—remote and subtle it may be supposed to be—the whole

Such was, and still is, the Supralapsarian method of applying its leading principle to the attempted elucidation of this doctrine. See also pp. 1075-1077. On page 1076 he uses the following language, in which he likewise teaches, that we are guilty and corrupt, because *we sinned and corrupted ourselves* in Adam :

"The parts of original sin are two: the crime of disobedience, or defection from God, while in the loins of Adam; and the corruption, consequent upon the lapse of Adam, in the whole of human nature. The fault of disobedience or defection from God, while in the loins of Adam, is the first part of original sin, which is iniquity, or a stain and blot, contracted from that first sin,* namely, a privation of the due honor which should be present, (*privatio nimirum decoris debite in esse*), of a nature of a bond obliging to punishment, and binding us to punishment. So that the sin was not that of Adam alone, but also ours; (*ita culpa non tantum Adami est, sed etiam nostra*;) because not only did Adam sin, but we also, as in Adam the root of the whole human race sinned and transgressed the law. Rom. v: 12, 19. *The first fall of Adam was not only the sin of Adam, but also ours.* For the transgression of Adam is imputed to us; otherwise we could be held neither by iniquity thence contracted, nor by any guilt, (*neque iniquitate inde contracta, neque reatu ullo*). The fall of our first parents should be distinguished from original sin, *which is in us as cause from effect*," etc. Syntag. Theol., lib. vi: cap. 3.

nature of moral good and evil, and the whole economy of salvation. For the necessary and immutable distinction between good and evil; and the foundation of all religion, both in God and human nature; and the rule of God's infinite justice; and the need of a Saviour; are all subverted, and every logical foundation taken away from them—as soon as the mere will of God is substituted for the perfection of all his attributes and the holiness of his adorable nature—as the ultimate ground of moral distinctions, and the fundamental basis of right actions. Good and evil depend on law, not on nature. (*Tò δίκαιον εἶναι καὶ τὸ αἰσχρὸν οὐ φέσκει ἀλλὰ νόμος*), was an apothegm of the ancient atheists—who only substituted nature for God in the proposition. *The number is not small among Christian teachers, who, under the guise of evangelical contempt for human reason, and extraordinary devotion to the honor of God's revealed will, still retain in a somewhat different logical form, and perhaps in a somewhat mitigated degree, the essential poison of the detestable paradox.*"—The Knowledge of God Objectively Considered, p. 293, by Dr. Robert J. Breckinridge.

* The original here is "quæ est iniquitas seu labes et macula ex peccato illo primo contracta." In the copy used by Dr. Hodge, the *et* must have been misprinted *ex*; for he renders the phrase, "a stain from a blot contracted from that first sin." See *Princeton Essays*, vol. i: p. 199.

XIX. ANT. FAIUS. *Professor in Geneva, 1615.*

This excellent man was also of the school of Beza, and survived him about as long as Beza survived Danæus. He remarks that,

"*All sinned in Adam, and by the sin of Adam death passed upon all men, because that sin had passed unto all.*" "We believe that the sin of Adam, while it was the act of an individual, *was common to the whole species*, inasmuch as Adam was not made a private person, *but was constituted by God the fountain of the whole race*. For the human race lying hid in the loins of Adam, was adorned by God with original righteousness and grace; but by the sin of Adam was despoiled of both.

"A double *disease* pervaded the whole human race by the sin of Adam. The first is guilt, by which all men are subjected to eternal death; the other is the corruption of the whole man and of all his faculties of mind and body:" etc.

J. DIODATI. *A highly venerated colleague of the foregoing.*

Pictet speaks of him as *Magnus ille Theologus*. He was a member of the Synod of Dort, and among the learned men in that body no one stood higher than he. He also strongly sympathized with Beza in his views, as the following passage will show, and which is quoted likewise by Dr. Hodge. In referring to Rom. v: 12, Diodati says:

"This is the general conclusion of the preceding treatise concerning justification by faith, in which the Apostle, after briefly repeating what had been said, at the same time declares their foundation, namely, that God out of his own good pleasure had constituted Christ the head of grace and fountain of righteousness and life to all his elect, by the imputation of whose righteousness they return into favor with God, and consequently are sanctified and glorified. For as Adam was constituted the head and root of the whole human race, so that by the imputation of his sin to all his posterity they became obnoxious to the divine curse, are deprived of original righteousness, corrupted in their whole nature, and liable to death."

XXI. DANIEL CHAMIER. *Professor of Theology at Montauban.*

This truly great French divine was the son of a highly esteemed clergyman who was drowned while riding to a Provincial Synod. Daniel still bears, as he has ever done, the

name of "*the great Chamier*" in all their references to him by the French ministers. He was a man of great prudence, indefatigable industry, and of vast learning. He was chosen scribe of the National Synod of Gergeau, (1601,) and moderator of that of the Gap, (1603,) and also of that of Privas, (1612;) a fair illustration of the esteem in which he was held. The National Synod of Rochelle (1607,) appointed him to prepare "a complete answer to the works of Bellarmine." He entered upon the work with great zeal, and success; but it was left unfinished at his death. This was his celebrated *Corpus Controversiarum*, which was edited at Geneva, by B. Turretin in 1626. The French church, and in fact the whole Protestant world, became extremely desirous to have this work completed in an equally able style; and the subject having been brought before the Third National Synod at Charenton (1644-1645,) the task was, after full deliberation, and near the close of the session, committed to *Garrisolius* (moderator) *Placcæus*, *Arnyzald*, and *Charles*; who completed it. During the siege of Montauban, (1622,) Chamier was slain by a cannon ball from the enemy's works; and the writers of that time frequently mention the circumstance that the ball being just the one hundredth which had been fired into the town, had the letter C marked upon it to indicate that fact.

To this eminent and learned divine the credit has been attributed of drawing up the Edict of Nantes, on which he is said to have spent continuously a number of months: and there seems to be but little ground for doubting that De Thou and De Calignon availed themselves of his assistance, to say the very least. In disputing with Bellarmine, (†1621,) he speaks on the subject before us as follows:

"We grant that by the disobedience of Adam, *all were truly and in fact rendered unrighteous by inherent depravity; but that the unrighteousness of Adam was not imputed we declare to be false.* On the contrary, we deny that we could be made inherently unrighteous by one man, unless the unrighteousness of this one man were imputed to us. Wherefore it is false that the disobedience of Adam was not imputed to us."

Then, after dwelling on this point, and stating that the disobedience of Adam and the obedience of Christ were personal acts, he adds:

"But for personal acts to be common to others, is absurd and contradictory. Therefore it behooves that they should be imputed. For this kind of communication is no how inconsistent with the proper personality of acts; it proceeds on an entirely different principle. Therefore the very sin of Adam, I say his own personal disobedience, must be imputed to his posterity. And so also in regard to the obedience of Christ: *because the whole human race was considered as in Adam by nature*; and because the whole multitude of believers were in Christ, by grace. Hence it comes to pass that we are not only made sinners by Adam, but are declared to have sinned in him, which is a very different thing. *I say then that it is certain that all men are really constituted unrighteous by Adam, and that all believers are really constituted righteous by Christ. But I deny that that is the point which the Apostle (in Rom. 5: 12-19) had under consideration; for his inquiry here is into the grounds of our condemnation and justification; for although he considers $\alpha\tau\alpha\rho\acute{\alpha}\chi\epsilon\tau\alpha$ as in Adam, yet not peculiar to him, but pertaining to the whole human race; for the meaning is, then, when Adam sinned, the whole human race was condemned, or made guilty of disobedience to God; whence also this by Augustine was called original sin, the punishment of the first sin; but how could it be punishment, unless that very first sin was imputed?"*

Strong as this language is, and widely as it, in form, differs from that of most of the preceding citations, it yet sustains our fundamental position, (from which Dr. Hodge professes so thoroughly to dissent,) *that though the sin of Adam is imputed to us, it is never irrespective of our nature and its inherent sin*; and that the Calvinistic doctrine of imputation does not require that we attempt to separate Adam's federal from his natural headship. It recognizes a wide difference between imputed and inherent sin; but admits that we have both; and that both alike are the ground on which we are treated as sinners. The reader will note his exposition of the analogy in Rom. v: 12-19.

XXII. D. PAREUS. *Professor at Heidelberg, 1548-1622.*

Pareus has sometimes been classed with Supralapsarians; but he occupies about the position of Danæus in regard to that scheme. He never adopted it, though some of his language has been supposed to point in that direction. But his dispute with Socinus, (which may be found in his Commentary on the first three chapters of Genesis, and on the Epistle of Paul to

the Romans,) thoroughly unsettled the whole scheme. In Eph. ii, he says:

"When ye were dead in sins. Being dead in sins, 1. On account of the guilt of death. 2. On account of corruption, and inaptitude to all good. But the cause of death is sin. He speaks also of spiritual death, in which all the unrenewed lie even while naturally they are alive."

Then in Rom. v: 12, he says:

"I have said that the first fall brought upon Adam immediately two pestiferous evils. Yet three would FLOW TOGETHER THEREIN: *culpa actualis, reatus legalis, pravitas naturalis*; or, in other words, transgression of the command, punishment of death, and corruption of nature, which is the loss of the image of God, and deformity and *δραζία* succeeding in its place. From none of these does his posterity remain free, but all at the same time come upon his posterity, not in one way, but in a threefold manner: to wit, *By a participation of the fault, by the imputation of guilt, and by the propagation of natural depravity, (PARTICIPATIONE CULPÆ, imputatione reatus, propagatione naturalis pravitatis.) By the participation of blame*, because all his posterity were seminally in the loins of Adam. *They therefore all sinned in Adam when he sinned.*" Again: "In our first parent we have all sinned, either by imitation, as the Pelagians think, or by participation of the fault. Not by imitation, for this can not be said of infants. *Therefore it was by a participation of the fault.*" "Original sin is properly defined, *the corruption of the whole human race, from the fall of our first parents, naturally propagated to all; making guilty of temporal and eternal punishment, unless there should be forgiveness on account of Christ.*" "Greatly this nodus perplexed the fathers, especially Augustine, nor could they find any other method of solving the problem, except the traduction of souls, and which, great as is the absurdity, finds advocates even in our day. But this is to move from Charybdis upon Scylla." "But they err who make the soul alone the seat of sin: since the whole man is flesh—that is, a carnal nature. . . . Then the soul, although it is not imparted from Adam materially, yet it is imparted from thence originally: because every human soul, as it is a part of the man himself, is imparted from the parents by reason of the whole: since, indeed, soul is not begotten from soul, nor body from body, but the whole man from the whole man."

XXIII. P. MORNÆUS. Professor at Sanmur, 1549–1628.

"We know whence proceeded the corruption of the human race; namely, *from our grievous sin and the punishment which followed it. We were all in the first man when he sinned.*"

XXIV. J. PISCATOR. *Professor at Herborn, 1569–1625.*

After Calvin, and perhaps Gomar, Piscator was doubtless the most perfect master of analysis that the Reformed Church has produced; and though reckoned with Supralapsarians he occupied on that question nearly the same position as that of his intimate friend Pareus. Twisse greatly admired him, and said that he held "the first place among the theologians of his day; and shows as far superior to the rest as the moon does to the stars;" though he at the same time wrote against him. Owen, referring to the points of difference between the two, says: "We are in general inclined to give our voice in favor of the sentiments of Piscator." In his *Questiones in Pentat.*, pp. 27, 28, (Herborn, 1624,) he treats the subject of the transduction of souls with great acuteness: and in his *Commentary on Rom. v: 12*, says:

"The Apostle properly speaks of that first sin, which our first parents committed in Paradise, *and we together with them*, (et nos unà cum illis,) as those who were in their loins, which sin is the fountain and origin of all other sins, to wit, of the corruption of nature, or the sin dwelling in us, and of other sins which are named actual; or what we by thinking, speaking, or by other actions commit." "*It entered into the world by imputation, and that by hereditary law, to wit, propagated by the succession of natural generation.*" "*And so death passed upon all men, to wit, by sin, or on account of sin.*"

Then, in his "Observations" on chap. vii: 7, and comparing the passage with Rom. v: 12, he says:

"From a collation of these two places, we may obtain a full description of original sin, *even that it is the defection of all the natural heirs of Adam, who, being in his loins, revolted from God to the Devil; and the corruption or vitiosity of nature inflicted on man by the just judgment of God on account of that defection:*" which both render man miserable and obnoxious to the anger of God and to eternal damnation, until he is delivered from that misery by Christ."

XXV. SIR. LUBBERTUS. 1556–1625.

The following remark is with just reason attributed to him: "We can not be guilty of the sin of another unless that sin is imputed to us." (See *Princeton Essays*, vol. I, p. 212,) and in

his reply to the *De Servatore* of Socinus, * he uses the following language :

"It is agreed between us and our opponents, that we are constituted sinners by the disobedience of Adam, and are constituted righteous by the obedience of Christ; the only question is respecting the mode in which this takes place. How are we constituted sinners by the disobedience of Adam? And how are we constituted righteous by the obedience of Christ? *We say that in both cases the effect takes place by imputation. For by the sin of Adam imputed to us we are constituted guilty.* When the Apostle says that all have sinned in Adam, *he means that the sin of Adam, as our head, was imputed to us when we were yet in his loins, and on that account we are reckoned guilty; and at the same time it is the will of God that, as Adam by his transgression was rendered averse to God, that is, corrupt and depraved, so we by the same transgression imputed to us, as I said, are born averse to God, corrupt and depraved.* Therefore the sin of Adam is imputed to us, and that corruption and depravity in which we are born, we call original sin. When Adam, by his total apostasy from God, became guilty of death, *all his posterity were implicated in the same guilt; no otherwise than if they had all sinned against God, by perpetrating the crime of murder.* It is manifest, therefore, that the same guilt is imputed; or which is the same thing, the same crime by which guilt was contracted."

We have adduced this blundering testimony, simply because it is one of those Supralapsarian announcements with which Dr. Hodge has sprinkled over (with the view of imparting a seasoning to) the mass of testimonies adduced from the Reformed divines. See Princeton Essays I, pp. 128-217.

XXVI. JOHN SCHARP. *A cotemporary, and Professor in the University of Die, in the Dauphiny.*

In his Theol. Comm., loc. xi, *De Peccato*, he says :

"Original sin is two-fold, imputed and inherent. Imputed sin is the defection of Adam, which is imputed to all his posterity that were in his loins; *which sin was actually in Adam, as in our root and stalk.*"

* Lubbertus sadly mistook his province when he attempted to refute that singularly acute work of Socinus, (which, however, Pareus and Dr. Owen have most effectually demolished). But he was very fair about it, and published it chapter after chapter with his own work, replying to each chapter *seriatim*. But the Reply was very unsatisfactory, and had the effect of leading many persons to embrace the soul-destroying delusions of Socinianism; for, on comparing the

XXVII. BENEDICT TURRETTIN, of Zurich. *Professor at Geneva*, 1588–1631.

"Our confessions include, under original sin, THE COMMUNION WHICH WE HAVE IN THE FIRST SIN, and the loss of original righteousness and purity which we have sustained, and the inherent corruption of the soul." (On Rom. v: 12.)

Here we have, substantially, a reiteration of the statement of Pareus, above quoted:

"*Participatio culpæ, imputatio reatus, propagatio naturalis pravitatis.*"

That is, the guilt of the first sin is imputed to us because we too participated therein, and it is ours.

XXVIII. DANIEL TILENUS. *Professor at Sedan*, 1563–1633.

"Original sin is that hereditary corruption of human nature, by which all who by natural generation are propagated from Adam, are infected; and so, in the loins of this first parent, they both SINNED TOGETHER WITH HIM, AND INCURRED THE GUILT of both temporal and eternal punishment;" unâ cum ipso et peccarunt, et pœnæ tum temporariæ, tum sempiternæ reatum contraxerunt. *Syntag.* p. 1037.

XXIX. GERARD JOHN VOSSIUS. *Professor at Leyden*, 1577–1649.

Vossius was born at Heidelberg, and became Professor of Eloquence and Chronology at Leyden, where he remained until 1633, when he accepted the Chair of History at Amsterdam, where he died. His learning was literally prodigious. He has been often thoughtlessly confounded with his son Isaac, (born in Leyden 1618, and died at Windsor Castle in 1688). He, too, was very learned, but very credulous. He came into England in 1670, and Charles II, who was very fond of him, used to say: "Vossius refuses to believe nothing but the Bible."

Soon after the appearance of the *Historia Pelagiana* of G. J. Vossius, exceptions were taken by his colleagues in Leyden,

arguments of Socinus with the Reply of Lubbertus, they saw that Socinus had the better of the argument. Hence, Lubbertus used to be named ironically, "*Magnus ille Socini Confutator.*" Yet he was an excellent man, greatly esteemed and beloved by Pareus, who dedicated to him (by the hand of his son Philip Pareus) his excellent but now unaccountably neglected and forgotten Commentary on Paul's Epistle to the Romans.

and other Calvinistic divines to some statements in lib. vi, especially *Thes.* 9, (which not only misstates the views of the Church before Augustine, but really conflicts with *Theses* 8, 10, 11 and 13 of the same work). The excellent John Forbes, of Scotland, (1593–1648,) in his *Instruct. Historico-Theol.*, (a work of great merit, and which the celebrated Maresius, of Groningen, styles "*aureum opus*,"") exposed the mistake of Vossius, (see lib. vi, cap. 28, 29,) but before publishing it, he being in Holland, laid the *Mss.* before Vossius. He read the two chapters over with very great attention, and evinced considerable agitation. And then, not only admitted his mistake to Forbes personally, but magnanimously united with Rivetus, Spanheim, Polyander, Hoornbeck, Maresius, and others, in commending it to the public favor, as a work of the greatest value. Men, whose claims to knowledge might reasonably lead to the belief that they knew better, have continued till now to charge upon Vossius, (in the passages alluded to,) the design to favor Arminianism. We have thought it proper, therefore, to state these facts.

In his *History of Pelagianism*, lib. ii, part 1, thesis 1, referring to the subject before us, he says :

"Seeing that two inquiries are here propounded, *Whether the sin of our first parents is imputed to all their posterity?* and, *How far it is imputed?* the Catholic Church has always thus decided, that that first sin is imputed to all; that is, that its effects are, according to the just judgment of God, transmitted to all the children of Adam: but it was believed that its effects are, that on account thereof we are born without original righteousness, subject to the necessity of death, and liable to eternal separation from God."

It is difficult to tell why Dr. Hodge has translated this testimony in the way he has done; for example, rendering "*sic SEMPER judicavit*," by "has ONCE judged," and inserting "*all*" before the word "*effects*;" but we subjoin the original, that our readers may decide for themselves :

"Cum duo quærantur; *An primorum parentum peccatum imputetur omni posteritati, et quatenus imputetur?* Ecclesia Catholica sic semper judicavit. Primum illud peccatum omnibus imputari, hoc est justo Dei judicio secundum effectus suos in omnes Adæ filios transmitti:

effectus vero ejus esse credebat, quod propterea nascimur expertes justitiæ originalis, necessitati mortis subjecti, et æternæ à Deo separationi obnoxii."

Then in *Thesis* 6, in the same connection, Vossius adds, that

"Augustine proves this dogma from the writings of the earlier fathers, from which he adduces such clear testimonies (though not less explicit are many which he omits to cite,) that it is greatly to be wondered that there should have been any found in former times, or any at the present time, who should esteem this doctrine to be an invention of Augustine, and should desire furthermore so to persuade others."

From such a source this testimony is invaluable.

XXX. FRANCIS GOMAR. 1563-1641.

The following is the testimony of this Prince of Supralapsarian divines. In his statement he does not quite come up to the standard of Dr. Hodge, who has improved upon, but not cited him. On p. 405 of his *Commentary on Romans* he says:

"The sin which entered the world through Adam, commonly called original, some say consists of two parts, the guilt of the sin of Adam, (*reatum peccati Adami*), and the corruption of nature: but less accurately: because original sin is that which we have from the origin of our conception and nativity: it also is twofold; the primary, and that which is raised from thence. The primary is transient and actual, even the sin of Adam, *which is ours by a just imputation*, because as he stood at the time both for himself and for us; so he sinned. *The other is permanent and habitual, proceeding from the defect of the former and from the natural traduction of corrupted nature, and the inherent moral corruption of our nature*: for which reason these may be as divers species of original sin; but not at all as parts. And guilt is the effect of sin; but not sin itself; even though by metonymy it is often understood by the name of sin."

Again, on p. 118:

"They are said to be dead in trespasses and sins on account of *original sin, which, as we have said, is the privation of spiritual life or original righteousness*, and as the hydra and congeries of all habitual sins and offenses; and at the same time the fountain of actual sins." See also p. 166, and *Thesis* 49, of his *Disput. xv.*

XXXI. NICH. VEDELIUS. *Professor at Franeker.*

Few men were more successful in exposing the errors of the early Arminians, than Vedelius, the keenness of whose pen bitterly excited their wrath. He was born in the Palatinate, and during fourteen years was Professor of Philosophy and Minister at Geneva. In 1630 he was called to the chair of Theology and Hebrew at Deventer, and in June of that year took his degree of Doctor of Theology at Basel. About 1638 he was invited to Franeker, where he died in 1642. He published his *De Arcanis Arminianismi*, in 1631, which greatly provoked the ire of that sect, and Episcopius attempted a Reply, the great ornament of which is a continuous strain of low scurrility. A single extract from the work of Vedelius is sufficient :

"The reason," says he, "why God imputes the sin of Adam to his posterity, is his justice, and not mere will, as the Arminians teach. The imputation of the first sin is such, that in fact the whole posterity of Adam is made liable to eternal condemnation, contrary to what the Arminians hold."

XXXII. M. F. WENDELINE. *Professor at Anhalt.*

Dr. Hodge speaks of this admirable theologian as "a strict Calvinistic Hollander." P. Essays I, p. 188. He was indeed a *strict Calvinist*, but why he should be called a Hollander I can not imagine. He was educated at Heidelberg under Pareus; and then settled at Anhalt, a principality of Upper Saxony, where he became Rector of the Gymnasium, and Professor both of Theology and Philosophy. His *System of Christian Theology* was published in 1628, some time after his *Exercitationes*, but I have forgotten how long, and have them not now at hand. His excellent *System of Theology* is well worthy of republication. In lib. i, cap. 10, thes. 2-6, he says:

"Sin is either original or actual. Original sin is the blot, (labes,) which man draws with him from the maternal womb from his first origin or nativity. It is either imputed or inherent. Original sin, imputed, is the disobedience of our first parents, which is imputed to all their posterity, not otherwise than as if they themselves had also by their own act violated the divine law respecting the forbidden fruit." "Original

sin, inherent, is the hereditary corruption from the fall of our first parents, *naturally propagated to us*; making guilty of temporal and eternal punishment:" pp. 242-266.

And then on p. 592, he utters the following clear announcement, that inherent corruption *is not the penalty of imputed guilt*, but results from our natural connection with Adam, and in this only gives utterance to the universally acknowledged sentiment of the Reformed Church. He is answering a cavil in which it is said that, "sin is not imputed to us by the disobedience of Adam, but truly impressed upon our nature:" and he does this by showing that it is both impressed and imputed. We give his own language:

"*Assumptio simpliciter vera non est. Nam inobedientia Adami non tantum imprimit nobis peccatum quod vocatur originale inherens; sed ipsa etiam illa Adami inobedientia singularis nobis imputatur, seu imputative naturam reatu involvit: quod vocatur peccatum originale imputatum.*"

XXXIII. JOHN MACCOVIUS, of Franeker. 1588-1644.

Maccovius, (or Makkowski,) was a native of Poland, and studied Philosophy at Dantzic, and Theology at Heidelberg. He spent considerable time at the most flourishing academies of Germany: Prague, Marburg, Leipsic, Wittemberg, etc., and was very fond of mingling Philosophy with his Theology; and wrote many works on Philosophy; and besides his *Loci Communes*, he wrote a defence of Perkins against Arminius, and the *Πρώτον Ψεῦδος Arminianorum*, etc., etc. He and Lubbertus both became very uneasy on account of the admission of their fellow Supralapsarian, Dr. Twisse, that God could have dispensed with a satisfaction for sin, and labors to save their scheme from its consequences. He was *not* a member of the Synod of Dort, though Dr. Hodge asserts the contrary. In his *Loc. Com.*, Dissert. xiv, he says:

"It is called original sin, because man derives it from his first origin, and it is imputed or inherent. The imputed sin of our origin, is the defection or first transgression of Adam and Eve, committed by eating the forbidden fruit; and afterwards imputed to the whole human race, naturally propagated from these two persons."

XXXIV. JOHN SZYDLOVIUS. *A Cotemporary of Maccovius.*

In a passage already quoted in our Second Essay, he says :

"Original sin is not propagated to us from Adam by the body : because that, in contradistinction to the soul, is incapable of sin ; nor is it propagated by the soul, because that is created pure by God, and can in no sense be infected by the body, as it is a spirit. Therefore it is propagated by imputation."

A remark seems called for here in relation to the use which Dr. Hodge has made of the Supralapsarian testimonies which he has cited in his catalogue of witnesses, occupying pp. 195-217, (P. Essays, vol. i.) He has presented in all fifty-four citations, and among them ten of the preceding who are Supralapsarian. And these are scattered over, without any regard to chronology, in the following order : Augsburg Confession, pp. 197, 198 ; Musculus, 198, 199 ; Polanus, 199 ; Beza, 203 ; Junius, 205 ; Scharp, 208 ; Lubbertus, 212, 213 ; Maccovius, 213 ; Zanchius, 214 ; Ursinus, 215, 216—thus making them cover nearly the whole ground, and in a manner speak for all ; as he does not give the slightest intimation that there is any difference between the Supralapsarians and Infralapsarians. Nor is this the only thing to be regretted here. It is true that Gomar's testimony is not cited by him, though he is certainly well acquainted with his writings ; but he introduces the testimony of two others in the following style : "S. Lubbertus, S. Theology, Dr. and Professor at Franeker, and a member of the Synod of Dort." "John Maccovius, Professor in the University of Franeker, and also a member of the Synod of Dort." We have not in our possession the treatise of Rivetus, from which Dr. Hodge has collected his citations, (our own edition of his works was issued in 1644, before that work had been prepared,) and we therefore do not know whether these sentences were taken from Rivetus. But whether they were or not is immaterial ; for Dr. Hodge certainly knows that Supralapsarianism was condemned by the Synod of Dort. And yet, in quoting these two Supralapsarians, he, in order to add weight to their view of imputation, states that they were members of the Synod of Dort ! *that is, of a Synod which condemned their distinctive doctrine.* And this, too, while one of them (Maccovius) not only was not a member of that Synod, but was, as shown in our Second Essay, specifically arraigned

and condemned for teaching some of the distinguishing tenets of the Supralapsarian school. What would Dr. Hodge think of an attempt to add weight to the testimony of Arius (against the Godhead of Christ) by alleging that he was a member of the Council of Nice? or of Episcopius, that he was a member of the Synod of Dort, when he was only cited there to be tried? The whole procedure is wrong, and tends only to mislead.

L.

(To be continued.)

ART. IV.—*The Immortality of Man.*

THE mortality of man and the frailty of the tenure by which we cling to this life, together with the immortality of the soul and its indiscerptible nature, are frequent subjects of disquisition and reflection. Pious homilies on the uncertainty of human life, with cogent reflections on the future life of the soul and the certainty of the judgment, are as frequent as they are solemn and well-timed. Two great facts continually force themselves upon mankind; one of them—the instinct of immortality—upon all ingenuous minds that give themselves to reflection; and the other—the inevitable occurrence of death—upon all classes and conditions of men. In order to reconcile these two incontrovertible facts, it is not uncommon to place out of view the only explication, God's revelation, and to so trim and pervert the doctrine concerning both of them, as that they may be adjusted to each other in the restricted horizon of reason. Death, which is before the observation of all, is explained to be only the dissolution of the body: while immortality is explained to be nothing more than the continued existence of the soul after its separation from the body. Hence the depreciation of the body, and the glorification of the immortal mind, is the theme of much crude philosophizing, and the subject-matter of much bad poetry. In order to arrive at correct notions upon the subject, it is well enough to inquire into the origin of our mortality, and see if

we can not discover the clue that will guide us through this labyrinth of perplexity.

Upon observation, death does not seem to be the normal condition of man. The instinct of immortality which we have just mentioned, fails to be extinguished by six thousand years' observation of death. We behold man with great toil fitting himself for usefulness among his fellow men. So soon as he has cleverly disciplined his powers, and attained some small store of knowledge, death either overtakes him, or sends his precursor to paralyze the energies, and by a gradual demolition waste that, to the acquirement of which, energy, ability, and opportunity had been skillfully combined. The imperfect condition of the œconomy in which we exist can not but arrest our attention. We behold means tending to results and not reaching them. The sword of justice is suspended mid-air, and its victim snatched from it. Right goes unrewarded, wrong unpunished, and there is altogether such a mixed condition of evil and good, and such a strong conviction resting upon us that things must be righted sometime, that we are driven to one of two conclusions: either death is abnormal and is forced *ab extra* upon us, in this unfinished condition of things; or, the condition itself is abnormal, with death as its natural result. On either of these views, death is an accident of our nature, and is not the primitive inheritance of man. To view it in any other light, is not only to shut our eyes to the light of revelation, but also to extinguish the torch of reason, and cover up the phosphorescence of instinct.

Beyond this, all is mere speculation without the word of God. That there was a pre-existent condition of man, eminent heathen philosophers have taught; yet not with a distinctness sufficiently clear to arrive at the truth concerning our present condition, or the true state of the previous one, erring not through lack of mental grasp and toil, but by reason of the insufficiency of reason itself, the doctrine in question being a matter of pure revelation. The error they make is in the character they ascribe, in predicating it of the soul instead of the human person; in ascribing it to all the individuals of the race instead of to the root and germ of it; and in predicating the pre-existence of this natural life instead of the estate in which we are. All this may perhaps be corrupted tradition, instead

of speculation. It would indeed seem strange if a fact of such immense moment to man, and once known to the whole race, should entirely perish from the face of the earth. It is also reasonable to suppose, that owing to the corrupted and depraved condition of mankind, that this or any other truth would in the lapse of ages become so distorted and disfigured as to be scarcely recognizable.

In the Scriptures we not only find the doctrine taught of an estate previous to our present one of sin and misery, but also everything concerning it that it could profit us to know. The origin of death is there accounted for, the mystery of our present condition is there laid bare. We learn there the native immortality of man. The true definition of death as deduced from Scripture teaching should at once teach us the nature of its opposite, life. And life being endless but for the occurrence of death, should teach us what immortality is. The true doctrine upon the subject was known as early as the time of Socrates, and has remained until the present without producing its fruit, unless connected with revelation, and then but partially. In the *Phædo* of Plato death is defined as being the separation between the soul and body. The intervening thousands of years have not improved upon this definition. The *Phædo* consists of three arguments for the immortality of the soul: the doctrine of opposites; of reminiscence; and the indiscerptibility of the soul. The first two are splendid sophisms. The last lies at the basis of Bishop Butler's argument. Granting that the first argument is a valid one, an insufficient conclusion is drawn from it. It is this, that relative things can not exist singly or without their opposites, as, there can not be a greater without a less, that joy would be meaningless without sorrow, light without darkness, life without death. And because life is the opposite of death, therefore, says he, our souls will live in orcus. The error in this is in assuming that the contrasted condition will inevitably ensue upon its opposite. But even granting this, the inference is a wrong one, for according to the definition of death given, the separation of soul and body, life would of course be the union of them, and not the separate existence of the soul. How a conclusion so obvious could have escaped the great Socrates is indeed wonderful, but that Christian philosophers, with the word of God

open before them, should commit persistently the same error in all of their arguments upon the subject is truly astonishing.

False views of Immortality arise from wrong doctrine concerning human personality. If the soul alone constitutes the human person, then the doctrine of the soul's immortality as commonly held is correct. But if the personality be compounded, and man made up of the two elements, soul and body, it is false. According to any received views of death, it is not predicable of any but a compounded being. Yet philosophers who teach that the soul constitutes man, speak of man as mortal and the soul as indiscerptible at the same time. An inextricable confusion reigns throughout their speculations, and at the expense of consistency one of two propositions must be forced upon them: either man does not die; or, he remains eternally under the power of death. Both of these propositions they reject, yet one or the other of them is inevitable, which we now proceed to show.

Firstly.—If the human person consist of the soul only, then the body is no part of it, and is only an instrument assumed for purposes of convenience. This view is common. The indiscerptibility of the living agent is thought to be a powerful argument for its immortality. That man does not perish with his body, is also stoutly affirmed. It is claimed that the body is but a mere tool or instrument, that the soul uses just as we use any mechanical implement, and hence the dissolution of it does not affect the soul, and consequently death which we behold occurring continually does not affect the soul disastrously, but is an advantage rather, setting it free from its prison-house of clay. On this view death is not the dissolution of the human person, or the man, which is the soul; consequently man is immortal, that is, he does not die. This view may not emerge into the distinctness of a clear statement, but is none the less held. The presence of this pernicious leaven will account for much of the current phrasology, and also some of the doctrine that we meet with. For instance, the longings of a crude and uninstructed *piety* (?) that longs to be freed from "this clay," and contemns most superciliously these "vile bodies." The penances, fastings, mortifications, and all manner of self-inflicted torture of Romanism and Heathenism, have their germ in this idea. It is doubtless true that our

bodies are to be kept under, and not pampered; but at the same time the mortification of the flesh must be understood of the carnal mind, and not of the body.

Secondly.—If it be acknowledged that the body is part of the man, and the immortality of the soul only taught, then is a lasting separation effected between them, and man left forever under the dominion of death. Herein is one of the chief glories of the gospel; every other system perpetuates the reign of death infinitely, but the gospel only teaches the immortality of man, and not a part of him. The body is redeemed as well as the soul. There is not only a regeneration of the spirit, but a *change* of the body also. It is not the souls of men, but *men* that are saved; the salvation of the soul is but a part of the process; the redemption of the body another. The work of salvation is not completed until the resurrection of the body.

The Saviour of sinners makes an argument in favor of the resurrection, which is utterly inexplicable on any other view than that of the compound personality of man here presented. Matt. xxii: 32. I am the God of Abraham, and the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob. God is not the God of the dead, but of the living. These men were dead; God is not the God of the dead; yet he is their God. They must certainly be regarded as living. There is a sense in which they are living. What is it? Their bodies are united to Christ, and Christ is risen. Their souls dwell with him. Though their souls and bodies will not be united to each other until the resurrection, they are both now united to Christ, and in this sense they are not dead, but living. This is the beginning of the triumph over death. The Lord Jesus is the first fruits of them that slept. He has risen. He and his people are indissolubly united forever. One fate awaits them. If they remain under the power of death so will he. If he rises so will they. He has already risen. If death could not retain him in its dominion, it can not claim him after he has conquered it and escaped. But it must do this, or let his people escape. This is impossible. His people will therefore rise from the dead. Now, on the supposition that the soul constitutes the man, God could be the God of Abraham, of Isaac, and of Jacob, without their bodies being raised, and still be the God of the living. We are driven,

therefore, to the doctrine of a compound personality, on the peril of attributing nonsense to the once meek and lowly, but the future most terrible judge of quick and dead. If the person, therefore, be a compound one, of what is the immortality predicable? Of the soul? or of the person, the man? Evidently of the person, and the soul attains its immortality, because it is part of immortal man; and not man his immortality, because his soul is quenchless and can not die.

The Lord Jesus destroyed death, and brought life and immortality to light through the Gospel. The fall brought mortality. It destroyed the being man. Through the work of Christ the whole race are restored to immortality. Some are raised up unto life eternal; others to shame and everlasting contempt. We can not escape immortality; we must live forever. Shall it be an eternity of blessedness, or of woe? The Lord Jesus magnified the law, and made it honorable. He not only satisfies the law completely, and delivers his own people from its curse, but through him its curse is visited upon those who are not his people. The temptation in Eden was not only malicious and diabolical wickedness, but was the most stupendous assault upon the glory and majesty of God, that it is possible to conceive. The revolt in heaven bears no comparison with it. Those fallen spirits but brought upon themselves the dreadful and endless punishment of inevitable law. But if a remedy had not been found for fallen man, the law itself had been rendered null, justice overthrown, the righteous dominion of God destroyed, and the whole universe reduced to anarchy, disorder, and inconceivable wickedness. The wages of sin is death; death natural and spiritual. Spiritual death was immediately inflicted: it does not destroy the human person. The infinite prolongation of it is eternal death. But in order that it may be infinitely prolonged in the human person, the person must continue to exist eternally. By the infliction of natural death it is destroyed. In destroying it, eternal death is destroyed. By inflicting eternal death, natural death is not incurred; and on either supposition a part of the penalty of the law fails of its infliction. If, after natural death is incurred, eternal punishment is inflicted upon the soul, the body escapes. Beside the chief glory of the law is its justice, and what justice is there in inflicting upon a single one of the elements of man,

the penalty due to man himself. The work of Jesus Christ reconciles this. Natural death is endured in obedience to the demands of the law. This part of the penalty being executed, death is destroyed. The elements of man are once more united, and in the body man suffers for the deeds done in the body; and inasmuch as the law is an infinite one, that suffering is of an infinite duration. *This is the second death.* The soul recoils in horror before the contemplation of that dreadful punishment, but in it we see the vindication of justice. How past imagination and more horrible than horrors had been the fate of the universe had not Christ interposed! The very conception is so terrible that it seems like blasphemy to entertain it. And what an exalted view does it give us of his work, when we think that he not only saves the redeemed, but magnifies the law which demanded their destruction, vindicates the ways of God before the universe, glorifying not mercy only, but justice also. If we ever get to heaven, it will doubtless be matter of increased and eternally growing astonishment that we were saved at all. As to the manner of that salvation, eternity must mightily invigorate our energies, to enable us to endure the amazement with which we shall contemplate it.

The true statement of the doctrine of immortality we take to be this: *Not the immortality of the soul, but the immortality of man.* And not that man *acquires* immortality through the Gospel, but it was his *original inheritance* of which he was despoiled in the fall, and it is *restored to him in the Gospel*. The nature of it, we suppose to be inscrutable. It is commonly explained in this way: The soul is a simple substance, and therefore indiscrptible; annihilation being the only thing which could rob it of immortality. The soul being redeemed by the blood of Christ, the body as its fit dwelling is raised up through Christ Jesus in the resurrection, and again united to the soul, the integrity of the human person remaining unimpaired through the three modes of existence, this natural life, death, and after the resurrection. In opposition to this, we believe: that immortality does not result from any such cause, but was in the nature of man; that that nature received a shock in the fall which, if not remedied, would have robbed him of it; and that the Gospel is that remedy; that mortality

is not natural to man, but is natural to that abnormal condition into which the fall brought him; that in the very nature of things this abnormal condition could not continue, but the integrity of God's law and the honor of his glorious majesty demanded its abolition; and that so far as we can see, or judge from what God has revealed us concerning himself, the work of Jesus Christ is the only mode possible of abolishing it, and that man once being created immortal, nothing could rob him of it as a finality.

As to the argument from the indiscernibility of the human soul, it is without doubt worthless. We know nothing as to the essential substance of things. That pure spirit is simple and indiscernible, may be assumed but can not be proven, and until it be proved, this argument is worth nothing. It is furthermore a mere begging of the question to argue that simple substances only are indiscernible, for compound substances may be so compounded as that no force in the universe is capable of discerning them, except that of omnipotence, which may annihilate also a simple substance. An example of this really occurs in the reunited soul and body after the resurrection. And there may be ten thousand other instances of it, of which we are ignorant.

The evidences of probation appear in all things. Not in man only, but in all nature. We have absolute knowledge—for it is matter of direct revelation—that the discernibility of man belongs only to the probation of the race, that after that he becomes indestructible. Is it not possible, nay, exceedingly probable, that a like probation, in adapted kind, belongs to all the works of God's hand, and that the period of their discernibility is limited to the period of their probation? Does not what the Scriptures teach us of a new heavens and a new earth favor this supposition? There is progress in all things towards perfection. There was first chaos, or everything discerned and confused. Then the six days of creation, alike progressive, bringing out of chaos, order, utility, symmetry and beauty. Since the creation the tendency has not ceased. The earth as it grows older is less and less torn by mighty convulsions and internal throes. The great changes that erst overwent her surface become continually less marked and less extensive, and she is now hastening to the period of her second

creation, awaiting her baptism of fire, from which she shall emerge an excellent and fair tabernacle, as much more stable, firm and beautiful than she now is, as what she is now surpasses what she was in her former chaos. And who shall say that her perfection in that future period shall not consist in this as much as anything else, that matter shall no longer be discernible?

Locke teaches that sloth is one of the greatest foes to the progress of the human understanding. It is possible that there is an opposite one just as fatal. Presumption leads us to waste our energies on that which is beyond our comprehension or observation, while if they were properly directed, a rich harvest might be garnered from what is within our reach. Philosophers speak as confidently of the human soul, and dissect and illuminate its powers and capabilities with as much confidence and certainty, as if it had been separated from the body and placed under the scrutinizing lens. It is attempted to show what the soul can do, separate from the body; that it can think, is susceptible of emotions, and may picture the glorious phantasy. Dreaming, somnambulism, trance, and coma are instanced as examples of the soul's action unconnected with the body. If this be true, what is gained to the argument is lost to the subject of it. For all of these so-called instances only go to show that the soul is better in the prison than out of it. For the understanding which when connected with the body is staid, dignified and sober, out of it, is very much given to inexplicable dumb-show and pantomimic caper. But that these are instances of the separate action of the soul, is a most baseless and gratuitous assumption. It is indeed difficult to conceive on what ground it is claimed, and were it not that it has been soberly advocated, would be scarcely worthy of attention. The evidences of the presence of the soul in the body in every one of them are clear. If it be claimed that in these instances the soul is less fettered by the body, and that the exhibitions of it at such times point in the direction of what it is capable when fully released, the answer is obvious, that the exhibitions are of such a nature as to render that total release the least desirable of all occurrences. That at such times the soul is less fettered by the body, is also perfectly gratuitous, for all will agree that—short of faith—reason is its

most dignified and ennobling exercise; and all will as readily see that, in the circumstances mentioned, reason is held in abeyance, and its exercises are of that nature which, when much indulged in waking hours, are thought to be least profitable, nay, even positively injurious. And whatever fettering of the soul there may be, it certainly occurs either by the morbid stimulation, or the stupefying effects of the above-mentioned principally diseased states of the body.

Men reason and speculate as much upon the capabilities of the soul as if the motions of the disembodied spirit had been the object of scrutiny for ages. This and that is affirmed of the soul, and this and that of the body, the same as if they existed separately, and were each different beings, instead of being parts of the same being. Science is phenomena classified, or rather theory deduced from the observation of phenomena. There must be nothing introduced which is not necessitated by the phenomena; there must be nothing ignored which the phenomena demand. Has any one ever had any observation of a disembodied spirit? Instead of affirming thus and thus of the soul, or projecting our speculations into the unseen world, and confidently predicting what it will then be capable of, is it not much more becoming the modesty which is the blushing handmaid of true attainment, to acknowledge that, in the first place, our knowledge upon any subject is exceedingly limited and uncertain, and in the second place, that of all subjects that of man is among the most inscrutable, and that in relation to him we should stop at the boundary nature has set us, and affirm our precarious opinions with diffidence? If man had never fallen, and consequently never died, and the body and soul never separated, what would have been the state of the sciences that treat of him? Is it not evident that then we should have heard nothing of the immortality of the soul? and is it not just as likely, nay, infinitely more probable, that the *immortality of man* would have occupied the place in our system of sciences which the immortality of the soul now does? Of the two estates, fallen and unfallen, we can not hesitate to decide which would lead us nearer the truth. It is not claimed that the fallen condition should be ignored in our speculations, but that it should not be made the basis of our knowledge. An abnormal condition might be observed forever,

without conveying to our minds the slightest idea of what the normal or true condition might be. He who would know nothing of man but what might be observed in a hospital, could not only form no idea of a healthy and perfect man, but could not ascertain anything correct as to the theory of disease, and would not know how to treat it. As in medicine, health must be taken as the standard, and disease treated as a variation from it, so in the sciences that relate to man, the healthy or unfallen condition must be taken as the standard, and the diseased or fallen condition treated as a variation or departure from it. Both periods are to be covered. Man must be taken as he is. As an anatomy of the body, taken exclusively from either a state of health or disease, would furnish us an imperfect knowledge of man as he is, so a science of man built exclusively on either the fallen or unfallen condition, would in like manner afford us an imperfect knowledge of him as he is. What we claim is, that the diseased condition be not taken as the sole and only guide.

In accordance with this idea, Consciousness in the science of Metaphysics, and Conscience in the science of Ethics, must be considered as belonging not exclusively to the soul, but to the soul as part of a human person. *I think, not my soul. I must render up account in the judgment, not my soul. The judgment occurs after the resurrection!* So far as the observation of any human being has gone, we are not able to affirm anything of the soul out of connection with the body. Indeed, it is much more than probably true, that *every* act of both soul and body, is influenced by, and has its influence upon the other. Even involuntary actions of the body, if continued long enough, have a weakening effect on the mind. The physician who leaves the mind out of view, in his treatment of the body, would meet with small success. Indeed, there are crises in diseases where the repose of the mind is absolutely essential to the recovery of the body, and complaints of the mind, where bodily treatment is of very salutary effect. We are not, therefore, to suppose that because the influence of the one upon the other is not such as to force itself upon the observation, that it does not for that reason occur.

One of the most difficult questions connected with this

view of the subject, is that of Personal Identity. How can a consciousness of personal identity exist when the person no longer exists? Can the soul, which is not a person, be conscious that it is a person? and would not consciousness be robbed of its value, testifying to a lie, and are we not driven, therefore, to the conclusion that the soul is a person? This question differs in no wise from that of the future existence of consciousness itself. By this we would not be understood as advocating the doctrine of Locke that consciousness constitutes personal identity. Consciousness is of the nature of testimony, and we venture to define it as the testimony of self, to self, concerning self. The relations of self are various. It may be related to its own entity, its own states of being, to the external world, and to time. The consciousness of self and its own states of being is called consciousness proper, or self-perception; the consciousness of self, as related to the external world, is called external perception; and the consciousness of self, as related to time, is called conscious identity. A clear distinction must be taken between the knowing subject, the act of knowing, the known object, and the relation between the knowing subject—the known object, and the act of knowing. The knowing subject is *self*; the act of knowing is consciousness; the object known may be various: the relation between them is knowledge. In the case of personal identity, the object known is a compound one—self-existence and time, or personal identity. The knowledge is conscious identity; the knowing subject is self; the act of knowing is consciousness. Thus the doctrine of Locke confounds the knowing act, and the known object. Now what is this knowledge thus gained in relation to personal identity, which we have called by the name of conscious identity? Is it not this? I remember having acted, or suffered, or existed in time past; I am conscious that I am now numerically the same person that I was then. That we have the same soul is matter of inference, and a deduction of reason; but not an act of consciousness. The act of consciousness teaches that *I*, not my soul, am the same. The question, then, of personal identity after death, and before the resurrection, falls under the consideration of consciousness during the same period. We now address ourselves to the consideration of this subject.

We have before said that all our observation of the soul is in connection with the body; that the science of metaphysics is built upon the results of this observation. It is therefore obvious that it is not adapted to the disembodied spirit, and what may be with safety affirmed of man, could not be safely hazarded of one of his discerpted elements. The consideration of this part of the subject passes out of the range of human science, and enters the domain of theology. Of the disembodied spirit we know nothing but what God has been pleased to reveal to us. And in all his revelation but two facts appear which bear upon the subject. The souls of the righteous are received into the immediate presence of God, and made instantly perfectly blessed, while the souls of the wicked are sent immediately to hell, and are inexpressibly miserable; the judgment is deferred until after the resurrection of the body, and the restoration of the human personality. As to the present life and the period after the resurrection there is no difficulty. Man, before death, and after death is destroyed, is essentially the same, besides the fact of the judgment shows, beyond the possibility of a cavil, on the supposition of a just God, the fact of numerical personal identity covering both periods. The fact of the existence of a hiatus of a third period between the two, does not invalidate it, for we are not at all times, even in this life, conscious of our personal identity, or even of our existence. Memory will bridge the gulf, and consciousness testify to our identity in both periods. The difficulty is not, therefore, the *fact* of an intervening period, but the *state of consciousness during it*. Two members of our race have escaped it entirely, and we have the voice of inspiration that many multitudes more shall escape it. It can not, therefore, be such an hiatus as will invalidate the uniformity of God's treatment toward the whole race. It can not be such as to materially affect the condition of man during the period that succeeds it. As to the period, therefore, itself: The Scriptures teach us that the blessed or miserable condition of departed souls depends upon the condition of the human beings of which they formed a part, before death, and that this condition is of the nature of both sequence and reward. We have, therefore, *consciousness* contained in the capacity of blessedness and misery, and *identity* in that of sequence and reward. The question

however, remains, is this consciousness a personal consciousness, and this identity a personal identity? We answer unhesitatingly they are not: that is, so far as we know, and if they are, it can not be proven. Neither does the burden of proof lie with us to show that they are not; but with those who claim that they are, to show it, for this reason: To believe that a law depending on certain conditions will not itself be modified when those conditions are altered, does not only require proof to be believed, but if true, is incapable of being proved in any other way than by observation; and as we have no observation of the period, it is incapable of being proved at all. We could not by any possibility know that the disembodied spirit could exercise consciousness at all if it were not for revelation, and we are so ignorant as that we do not know whether it exercises it by its own inherent powers, or whether it could ever exist if it were not upheld in some wonderful way by the power of God! The presumption of such an exercise of divine power is indeed violent, for the process of the restoration of immortality to man, is but the record of one divine interposition after another until it be accomplished. If the consciousness and identity of the disembodied spirit are not personal, what are they? We answer, they are of a kind answering to the condition of the soul. It is not a human person, and can not, therefore, exercise the functions of a human person. Inscrutably upheld by God, the soul, being the intelligent element of man, is still conscious; but not conscious of being a man, but the *soul* of a *man*. So in like manner, not being conscious of being a man it can not be conscious of being the same man that it was in this life; but is conscious of being the *same soul*, that once formed part of a given human person, in this life, so that it is a *numerical* but not a *personal* identity. After the resurrection, we suppose that the conscious identity will recognize, in the restored human person, the same soul that existed in the intermediate state of death, as identical there and in this life.

The fact of the judgment occurring after the resurrection, should influence our conception of the science of ethics. That the influence is in the direction of the interpretation of Conscience we have given, is evident. We have said that it pertains to the soul as part of a human person. Without

conscience we could have no sense of accountability; without a sense of accountability we could not be brought into judgment. The fact of the judgment taking place after the restoration of the human person goes to show that man, as such, is accountable for what he has done as man, and that the ends of justice would not be answered by permitting an eternal dissolution of the human person, and holding one of its discerpted elements accountable. But what relation does conscience bear to the disembodied spirit during the interval between death and the resurrection? The only answer which can be given is contained in the *revealed* fact, that the blessedness and misery of the departed soul is of the nature of reward. It is clear, however, seeing that the general judgment is to follow, that this reward proceeds not upon an entire adjudication of the whole case, but upon a partial and informal one. And that the measure of blessedness or misery which the soul experiences, is precisely adjusted to the share of human accountability, that one of the discerpted elements of man might be said to inherit; and that this share is so difficult of ascertainment that omniscience can alone determine it; and that the soul is the inheritor of conscience in a measure precisely answering to its sense of accountability. But all this, we repeat it, is inscrutable, and what we have said is not an attempt at explaining the mystery, but at discerning clearly where the mystery lies.

It may be objected to this view of the case that consciousness and conscience are indivisible, and the argument therefore falls to the ground. Indeed an eminent metaphysician has endeavored to prove the simple nature of the living agent from the indivisibility of consciousness that inheres in it. Even granting the premise, the conclusion does not by necessity follow, any more than that the personality of the Godhead could not be divided by reason of the unity of the God which exists in the personality. The divisibility of Consciousness and Conscience is not necessary to the integrity of the view above presented, for all will agree that however indivisible they may be, they do not act always with an equal force and power. They may both of them be wonderfully abated in force, so much so that we may scarcely be conscious of anything, and the sense of blameworthiness may be almost

entirely obliterated. The force of the latter may not be such as it will be in the general judgment, and yet it may be sufficient to render the soul inexpressibly blessed or miserable. If by this divisibility is meant, that the act is simple and not compounded of other acts, the assertion is peculiarly unfortunate, for it would be very difficult to show that comparison and apprehension are not combined in both of them. In an act of consciousness there is always self in relation to something, and then the apprehension of that relation. For instance, self-existence is not existence only, but something that exists; that existing thing is self. It is therefore apprehended in relation to the present. So of all our states of being, of the external world, etc. In an act of conscience there is, in like manner, the difference between right and wrong; our relation to either of them; and the apprehension of the relation. It is indeed perhaps possible to show, that a simple uncompounded act of the soul is incapable, in the very nature of things, of being exercised by itself; and although every act is compounded of other simple acts, yet these component parts never exist singly.

The consideration of one other question still remains: Whether the knowledge of man's immortality may be gained by the light of nature. The conditions of this question are peculiar, and of such a nature as to render its decision one way or another of but little practical value, and the consideration of the question a mere subject of abstract speculation. Of abstract speculation, we say, because we have no data of facts upon which to go, and all that may be said, must be *concerning* the subject, or if immediately upon it, it will be settled by our previous formed views on the sciences relating to the subject. The views of heathen philosophers upon this question are of no value, except as they deduce arguments from nature for the doctrine as already known, for the doctrine of immortality was not discovered by them, but received at the hands of an immemorial tradition. It was of course known to the race in the beginning; whether by the instinct, if we may so speak, of unfallen man, or by a revelation from God after he was fallen, or by both, is immaterial. It can not be doubted, as has been previously intimated, that the wisdom of the world by which it knows not God, would in the course of

ages corrupt any revelation he might make. Nor can this doctrine be claimed as an exception. Evidences are not wanting that the true Bible doctrine was once extensively known among the very nations and peoples that no longer retain it. Traces of a belief in the resurrection are numerous, and the strongest where the doctrine is least known. Among many instances, the habit of the American Indians of burying their dead with their feet to the east that they may rise facing the Son of Man in his coming, is not the least significant. And that he will come from the east, what attentive reader of the Old Testament Scriptures can doubt? The custom mentioned is but another proof that the human mind clings to forms and ceremonies not only long after the spirit of them has fled, but even after the knowledge of what was first intended by them is lost.

As to whether the unaided human powers could discover the doctrine of immortality, we have no fairer means of judging what it can do, than by reference to what it has done in the long ages, and under the varied and favorable circumstances in which it has been placed. Instead therefore of discovering the doctrine in question, after it was once known, with all the strengthening arguments which nature brings to bear, it has not even preserved it. The fall was a sad blow to our race; it not only crippled and maimed, but it staggered and blinded us; it robbed us of immortality, and threw discredit and uncertainty over the very doctrine itself. The instincts of our nature and the results of our observation are at war; what can troubled reason do but remain in suspended doubt, or settle down upon an unsatisfactory compromise? We have that within us which prompts to the belief of immortality; from many things that we observe, reason brings supports to the belief, but one fatal and continually recurring fact tends to obliterate the certainty of belief, and to extinguish almost the aspirations of hope; that fact is death—it is universal; we see the body decay, and assimilate itself again to dust; but yet there is something which will assert immortality still. We are driven therefore to the conclusion, that the intangible and evanescent part of our nature is that in which immortality dwells, or else remain in uncertainty, tormented by a volatile and rejuvenating doubt.

It would not be difficult to show that the arguments commonly adduced to prove the immortality of the soul are really worthless to such an end, but of great value to show the immortality of man. Of these, the first argument in Butler's first chapter is an eminent instance. Whatever force it has, it loses when wrested to the application which is there made of it. Nor must that wonderful book be interpreted as claiming that nature *teaches* a future state, but only as showing that the doctrine once known is not inconsistent with what we observe in nature. The utmost we suppose, therefore, which the light of nature can do, is to keep us from yielding to a crazy and imbecile infidelity. And he who does yield to it, does violence to his own nature, while the man who treads the heights of a sublime faith in all that the Christian's God has revealed us, is acting in accordance with his nature, and stands securely on the firm ground where nature feebly points us, but can not lead the way.

The unaided powers of the soul are capable of much more in every other direction than in that of religion. There, the malignity of sin specifically blinds us, and what the powers would otherwise be equal to, is by means of this kept from us. If it were not for this, it would be impossible to account for the meagerness of our attainments in this direction. When we compare what has been accomplished in other departments of investigation the highest attainments here seem meager indeed. The doctrine of man's immortality points so obviously at a resurrection as the means of accomplishing it, that the arrival at the conception of it seems almost inevitable. Yet the resurrection being once known to the whole race, and even then not retained, teaches us the depths of the depravity and the fierceness of the malignity against everything spiritual, of the fallen human soul. When the Apostle Paul discoursed at Athens, the multitude heard him patiently until he spoke of the resurrection of the dead, when some mocked, and others said, We will hear thee again of this matter. This doctrine interferes with the reign of death, and consequently with the dominion of the God of this world. And herein has the enemy of all truth manifested much cunning, in that he succeeds in destroying the doctrine of Christ, without attacking that which is more patent. For inasmuch as the Lord

Jesus proposes to save *men*, and man is a compound being, his salvation is equally thwarted, no matter which of the component parts fails of the redemption; and the adroitness of the deceiver is manifest in this, that he attacks that which is not brought so prominently before us, and in behalf of which we are less jealous.

In view of all that has been said, we arrive at the conclusion that there is no immortality save through Jesus Christ. He brought life and immortality to light through the Gospel. He did it by destroying death. As to what death is, all are agreed. It is the separation of soul and body. If immortality is brought to light by destroying death, it is by re-uniting soul and body. Immortality is the endless continuance of life, nothing else. Whether or not the soul after death, unkept by the power of God, would not fall into decay like the body, we can never know. The fact that it then exists, whether by its own force or because upheld by infinite power, is an earnest of the immortality that is to be perfected in the resurrection. The salvation of Jesus Christ is not only, therefore, the redemption of the righteous and their endless peace and joy, but a lasting triumph over death itself, accomplished by entering its dominions, bursting its bars, and leading forth from its demolished gates every human being ever brought beneath its power, and in changing millions of others in the twinkling of an eye, before they are smitten with its demolition. In meditating these high themes, let all men know that there is a second death not inconsistent with immortality, and unless they put their faith in Jesus Christ it is begun in them already; and let them seek now that endless life which begun in them here shall continue, and themselves live and reign with the Lord Jesus, when he shall have put all things under him, and there shall be no more death!

ART. V.—*The General Assembly of 1862, of the Presbyterian Church in the United States of America.*

SOME PRELIMINARY STATEMENTS.

A LARGE number of the readers of this Review are not members of the Presbyterian Church; but at the same time they are persons by whom that Church would naturally desire to be understood and appreciated; persons whose high culture and influential positions in life, make it at once a kind of duty on their part, and, we doubt not, a gratification to them, to accept the general information which we now propose to give. The rest of our readers—members of that Church—will readily observe that the following notes and comments on the General Assembly of 1862, are somewhat influenced by that consideration, as well as by others, too obviously connected with the state of the Church and the country, to need any special reference to them.

This Assembly convened in the First Presbyterian Church in Columbus, Ohio, on the third Thursday of May, being the 15th day of the month: that Thursday of that month being the day on which this great Court of that Church has always met, annually—and on which the highest tribunal of a number of the other branches of the great Presbyterian family throughout the world, annually convene. The body was dissolved, as usual, by its own order, on the 27th day of May,—after being in session two weeks, lacking one day. There were in attendance on its sessions, *about* two hundred and fifty ministers and ruling elders: the number of the former somewhat exceeding that of the latter; though, by the constitution of the body, the number of each class is designed to be the same. Both classes of members are elected by the Presbyteries to which they belong—according to certain fixed principles: both are ordained persons—both are Presbyters—both are Commissioners; the former sit under the designation of *Bishops*, the latter under that of *Ruling Elders*.

The body thus constituted is a *Court*—not a Legislative assembly. It is the highest tribunal, and the bond of union between and above all the parts of the Church—and is called the *General Assembly of the Church*: that is, the Church itself in

assembly : not by *all* its Presbyters, but by *delegations* representing whatever the whole of them would represent, if all were present. The power of *Rule* in the Church, is held to be a *joint* power, and capable of being exercised only by tribunals, constituted in the name, and by the authority of the Lord Jesus Christ. These tribunals are held to be composed only of ordained persons ;—all of whom are invested with such portion of the kingly office of Christ, as is delegated by him to his Church for her gathering, her protection and her advancement ; and one class of whom, namely, ministers, are held to be further invested with whatever portion of the prophetic and the priestly offices of Christ, have been delegated by him to his Church, for her comfort, edification, and sanctification, and for the evangelization of the world. These tribunals are created in the following manner. A complete congregation of Christian people, has a minister and a certain number of Ruling Elders ; all of whom jointly constitute the Court, or Tribunal, or Parochial Presbytery, or (as we call it) *Church session* : and every Presbyterian Church in the world is thus organized, when complete, under this Church session—created by election by the congregation, and an ordination which is in its nature Presbyterial. These congregations are not wholly independent of each other ; nor is this Church session the only tribunal of the Church. But a certain number of these congregations, each with its session, unite spontaneously, or by order of a higher tribunal, and form a much larger body, which is called a classical Presbytery, or simply a Presbytery, and which embraces all those congregations with the tribunals of all of them. A certain number of these Presbyteries unite spontaneously, or by order of a higher tribunal, and constitute a Synod. And the whole denomination unites, as before explained, in its General Assembly. Historically—this is the way in which a few Presbyterian congregations spontaneously constituted on this continent within the two last centuries—have been developed into the numerous and powerful Presbyterian denominations, which now compose so vast an element of the religious life of the American people. Theoretically, it is held by most Presbyterians throughout the world, that this is the divine model, set forth in God's Word, for the ordering of the Christian Church. It will be observed by the thoughtful reader, that a

Spiritual Commonwealth thus organized, is complete, no matter how small it may be—while it is also capable of being extended over boundless space, and innumerable multitudes. It is, in its nature, free, popular, representative—yet with elements of stability and endurance, apparently perfect: an institute, very hard to derange, very easy to be rectified, almost incapable of destruction.

The Assembly, after being opened by a sermon by the retiring Moderator, the Rev. Dr. John C. Backus, of Baltimore, and being regularly constituted, held its sessions in the hall of the House of Representatives of the Ohio Legislature, which that body had invited this Assembly to occupy. The Rev. Dr. Charles C. Beatty, of Steubenville, Ohio, was elected Moderator this year. The unalterable habit of the body, prevents the election, a second time, of any Moderator; a habit founded in wisdom—but having some inconveniences, among the rest, that of exposing the court to the constant risk of having an unskillful presiding officer. Having sat in many Assemblies, and been present at most of the remainder, during thirty years, it is only just to say that we have seen few better Moderators of the Assembly, than Dr. Beatty. Dr. McGill, of Princeton, N. J., was elected stated Clerk of the Assembly (he had served for some years, with great credit, as its permanent Clerk), in place of Dr. Leyburn, late of Philadelphia—who had removed into the revolted States, and gone into the service of the schismatical Assembly lately set up in that region. We are not in possession of the minute of the Assembly touching this matter. There was some conversation in the Assembly about Dr. Leyburn's case—and about the general course proper to be pursued concerning the schism on several occasions. In the formal minute on the state of the Church and the country, which we print on a subsequent page—the Assembly expressly declined to take special action concerning that schism, at this time. In certain individual cases, it seemed necessary to remove persons charged with special duties which they had neglected, or could no longer perform, and appoint others in their place. It was the manifest feeling of the Assembly, that the restoration of the country ought to be followed, and might be followed by the restoration of the Church; a feeling which made itself manifest on the numerous occasions, and in the variety of ways, in

which the body found it necessary to look at the subject. The Rev. Mr. Schenck, of Philadelphia, was elected permanent Clerk (to succeed Dr. McGill), after a pretty active canvass, out of doors, between his friends and those of Dr. Nevin, of the same city. There seemed to be a good deal more involved in this election than the clerkship itself—important as that confessedly is. But as very few of us who live west of a certain line of longitude, understood what the matter was, well enough to be much excited by it, the only remark we will make is, that our brethren in certain localities in the East, would probably consult the permanent interests of the Church, and their own lasting influence in it for good, by avoiding, instead of urging, the concentration of office, influence, patronage, and power, in any one section—much less city. The Church has no longer any metropolis. The meeting at Columbus, was about the twentieth proof of that. The choosing of Peoria, Illinois, as the place of meeting next year, and the manner of doing it, furnish another most pungent proof. Let us accept, as a finality, the pregnant truth—and make whatever local and personal sacrifices are required in working it out. We grant, it is an immense change—this delocalizing our great common interests. But it will have immense results, if we can but frankly accept it, and faithfully execute it. It was apparently a small step, but it was a most decisive one, in the right direction, to put a stop to the persistent endeavors, to transfer from the custody of the Church, to the custody of a local and mixed corporation, any portion of the papers, records, movements, or illustrative exhibits, of the glorious past of the Church.

There was no representative in this Assembly from the Presbyteries in the revolted States. Of our thirty-five Synods, twenty-four were represented, and eleven were not: of which, however, one was a foreign Synod—that of Northern India. The *border* slave States were all represented, most of them rather fully: and the case was nearly the same, with regard to the border Church Courts. All six of the Presbyteries of the Synod of Kentucky were represented: all four of the Presbyteries of the Synod of Wheeling—which covers parts of Pennsylvania, Virginia, and Ohio: four out of five of those in the Synod of Baltimore, which covers most of Maryland, with parts of

Pennsylvania, Virginia, Delaware, and all the District of Columbia: four out of five of the Presbyteries in the Synod of Missouri: two out of four of the Presbyteries in the Synod of Upper Missouri: the Presbytery of New Castle, which embraces portions of Delaware, Maryland and Pennsylvania;—and that of Carlisle, which embraces parts of Maryland and Pennsylvania, were fully represented by four Commissioners each. We have not, at this moment, the means of making an exact comparison of the representation in the Assembly of 1861 with that of 1862: but our strong impression is, that so far as a judgment can be formed of the state and prospects of the Church, from facts of that description, it is manifest that no progress has been made, within a year, by the schism in the revolted States. The wicked attempts set on foot, to seduce the Presbyterians of all the border slave States into a certain co-operation with the treason and schism in the States farther South, were among the topics which—though not much discussed openly, lay underneath some of the most extended discussions, and were embraced in the most important deliverance of this Assembly. We naturally, therefore, give that deliverance the prominence due to its acknowledged importance.

Minute of the Assembly on the State of the Church and the Country.

On the 19th of May, being the fourth business day of the session, Dr. Breckinridge obtained the leave of the Court to read in its hearing the paper printed below. By general consent its consideration was made a special order for the afternoon of the 22nd instant, the seventh business day. It was discussed during portions of three days: and extremely violent opposition was manifested against its adoption, by a small number of persons—of whom, strange to say, some afterward voted for it, and some who voted against it professed to approve all its principles and statements. The final vote of the body was more than ten to one in favor of the deliverance—over two hundred votes to twenty—just as it came from the pen of its author, except the change of a single word suggested by himself. The yeas and nays were taken, and will, we suppose, be recorded in the Assembly's minutes: but no list of them

has yet been published, as far as we know—and we have none:

“The General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church in the United States of America, now in session at Columbus, in the State of Ohio: considering the unhappy condition of the country in the midst of a bloody civil war, and of the Church agitated everywhere, divided in sentiment in many places, and openly assailed by schism in a large section of it: considering, also, the duty which this chief Tribunal, met in the name and by the authority of the glorified Saviour of sinners who is also the Sovereign Ruler of all things, owes to him our Head and Lord, and to his flock committed to our charge, and to the people whom we are commissioned to evangelize, and to the civil authorities who exist by his appointment: do hereby in this deliverance give utterance to our solemn convictions and our deliberate judgment touching the matters herein set forth, that they may serve for the guidance of all over whom the Lord Christ has given us any office of instruction, or any power of government.

“I. Peace is among the very highest temporal blessings of the Church, as well as of all mankind: and public order is one of the first necessities of the spiritual as well as of the civil commonwealth. Peace has been wickedly superseded by war, in its worst form, throughout the whole land; and public order has been wickedly superseded by rebellion, anarchy, and violence, in the whole southern portion of the Union. All this has been brought to pass in a disloyal and traitorous attempt to overthrow the National Government, by military force, and to divide the nation contrary to the wishes of the immense majority of the people of the nation, and without satisfactory evidence that the majority of the people in whom the local sovereignty resided, even in the States which revolted, ever authorized any such proceeding or ever approved the fraud and violence by which this horrible treason has achieved whatever success it has had. This whole treason, rebellion, anarchy, fraud, and violence, is utterly contrary to the dictates of natural religion and morality, and is plainly condemned by the revealed will of God. It is the clear and solemn duty of the National Government to preserve, at whatever cost, the National Union and Constitution, to maintain the laws in their supremacy, to crush force by force, and to restore the reign of public order and peace to the entire nation, by whatever lawful means that are necessary thereunto. And it is the bounden duty of the people who compose this great nation, each one in his several place and degree, to uphold the Federal Government, and every State Government, and all persons in authority whether civil or military, in all their lawful and proper acts, unto the end herein before set forth.

"II. The Church of Christ has no authority from him to make rebellion, or to counsel treason, or to favor anarchy in any case whatever. On the contrary, every follower of Christ has the personal liberty bestowed on him by Christ, to submit, for the sake of Christ, according to his own conscientious sense of duty, to whatever government, however bad, under which his lot may be cast. But while patient suffering for Christ's sake can never be sinful, treason, rebellion, and anarchy may be sinful—most generally, perhaps, are sinful; and, probably, are always and necessarily sinful, in all free countries, where the power to change the government by voting, in the place of force, exists as a common right constitutionally secured to the people who are sovereign. If in any case, treason, rebellion, and anarchy can possibly be sinful, they are so in the case now desolating large portions of this nation, and laying waste great numbers of Christian congregations, and fatally obstructing every good word and work in those regions. To the Christian people, scattered throughout those unfortunate regions, and who have been left of God to have any hand in bringing on these terrible calamities, we earnestly address words of exhortation and rebuke as unto brethren who have sinned exceedingly, and whom God calls to repentance, by fearful judgments. To those in like circumstances, who are not chargeable with the sins which have brought such calamities upon the land, but who have chosen, in the exercise of their Christian liberty, to stand in their lot, and suffer, we address words of affectionate sympathy, praying God to bring them off conquerors. To those in like circumstances, who have taken their lives in their hands and risked all for their country, and for conscience sake, we say we love such with all our heart, and bless God such witnesses were found in the time of thick darkness. We fear, and we record it with great grief, that the Church of God, and the Christian people, to a great extent and throughout all the revolted States, have done many things that ought not to have been done, and have left undone much that ought to have been done, in this time of trial, rebuke, and blasphemy; but concerning the wide schism which is reported to have occurred in many Southern Synods, this Assembly will take no action at this time. It declares, however, its fixed purpose, under all possible circumstances, to labor for the extension and the permanent maintenance of the Church under its care, in every part of the United States. Schism, so far as it may exist, we hope to see healed. If that can not be, it will be disregarded.

"III. We record our gratitude to God for the prevailing unity of sentiment, and general internal peace, which have characterized the Church in the States that have not revolted, embracing a great majority of the ministers, congregations, and people under our care. It may still be called, with emphasis, a loyal, orthodox, and pious Church; and

all its acts and works indicate its right to a title so noble. Let it strive for Divine grace to maintain that good report. In some respects, the interests of the Church of God, are very different from those of all civil institutions. Whatever may befall this, or any other nation, the Church of Christ must abide on earth, triumphant even over the gates of hell. It is, therefore, of supreme importance that the Church should guard itself from internal alienations and divisions, founded upon questions and interests that are external as to her, and which ought not by their necessary working to cause her fate to depend on the fate of things less important and less enduring than herself. Disturbers of the Church ought not to be allowed; especially disturbers of the Church in States that never revolted, or that have been cleared of armed rebels: disturbers who, under many false prettexts, may promote discontent, disloyalty, and general alienation, tending to the unsettling of ministers, to local schisms, and to manifold trouble. Let a spirit of quietness, of mutual forbearance, and of ready obedience to authority, both civil and ecclesiastical, illustrate the loyalty, the orthodoxy, and the piety of the Church. It is more especially to ministers of the Gospel, and, among them, particularly to any whose first impressions had been, on any account, favorable to the terrible military revolution which has been attempted, and which God's providence has hitherto so signally rebuked, that these decisive considerations ought to be addressed. And in the name and by the authority of the Lord Jesus, we earnestly exhort all who love God or fear his wrath, to turn a deaf ear to all counsels and suggestions that tend toward a reaction favorable to disloyalty, schism, or disturbance either in the Church or in the country. There is hardly anything more inexcusable connected with the frightful conspiracy against which we testify, than the conduct of those office-bearers and members of the Church who, although citizens of loyal States, and subject to the control of loyal Presbyteries and Synods, have been faithless to all authority, human and divine, to which they owed subjection. Nor should any to whom this deliverance may come fail to bear in mind, that it is not only their outward conduct concerning which they ought to take heed; but it is also, and especially their heart, their temper, and their motives, in the sight of God, and toward the free and beneficent civil government which he has blessed us withal, and toward the spiritual commonwealth to which they are subject in the Lord. In all these respects, we must all give account to God in the great day. And it is in view of our own dread responsibility to the Judge of quick and dead, that we now make this Deliverance."

When this minute was taken up for consideration, and as soon as the Clerk had finished the reading of it, Judge A.

Gamble, a Ruling Elder from the Presbytery (and city) of St. Louis, offered, as a substitute for it, as the proper deliverance of the Assembly on the whole subject, the resolution which we print below. The Rev. Dr. J. M. Macdonald, of the Presbytery of New Brunswick, seconded this resolution. The Moderator decided that, upon this motion, the merits of both papers, and of the whole subject, might be discussed: and under this decision, an extended discussion, in which a number of persons took part, occupied a large portion of the afternoon session of the 22d, and of the forenoon and afternoon sessions of the 23d; when, on motion of the Rev. William P. Breed, of the Presbytery (and city) of Philadelphia, Judge Gamble's resolution was laid on the table, by a large majority of the Assembly. That resolution is as follows:

"Resolved, That in view of a past deliverance of the highest tribunal of the Church, on the subject involved in the paper just read, it is deemed by this General Assembly, with the highest respect for the venerable minister from whom the paper comes, and a deep sense of the great value of the services he has rendered to the Church and the country, inexpedient to take further action on the subject at present."

Before that vote was taken, the Rev. R. A. Johnston, of the Presbytery of Transylvania, Kentucky, in discussing the general subject, read, as part of his argument, a minute which he had prepared—which was in some respects, similar to that previously offered by Judge Gamble; but differed from it, essentially, in that, while it declined complete action on Dr. Breckinridge's paper, it commended it in part, and for the rest recommended its contents to the attention and serious consideration of the people of God. This minute was never before the Assembly, so as to be voted on. It presented a shade of opinion, and mode of action, coming nearer the mind of the body, no doubt, than Judge Gamble's resolution presented: but the Assembly had no mind for any sort of substitute for Dr. Breckinridge's paper.

Nor had it any mind for any amendments to that paper, such as had been indicated in the numerous and totally variant grounds of hostility to it, suggested during the discussion. By a special vote of the Assembly, a particular hour of the afternoon of the 24th instant, had been set, for the final vote on

that paper. When—after the discussions of the third day—the hour came, the Moderator intimated that the order precluded everything except that vote: and it was only a generous concession of the House to a small and very earnest minority, that led the Moderator to allow every one to offer any amendments he thought fit, provided the voting on them should immediately proceed, without debate. Under this concession, the author of the paper was allowed to propose the change of the word “*all*” into the word “*the*”—in the last sentence of section I; which the Assembly would not vote, till he had explained that his only object was to clear the sense, so as to stop a quibble that had been urged in debate. Dr. Macdonald, of New Jersey, who is reported (in the Presbyterian of May 31) to have said, while supporting Judge Gamble’s substitute, “the paper of Dr. Breckinridge is unwise, uncalled for, inexpedient, rash;” naturally desired to ease it of some of its bad qualities, as far as he could, before so far departing from his first opinions of it—as to vote for it. He, therefore, moved to amend it, by striking out several sentences—three, we believe: being those, no doubt, in which so many bad qualities chiefly lay. The Assembly was set in an opinion of the paper, different from that attributed to Dr. Macdonald; and refused to strike out either of the obnoxious sentences. Here the efforts to *amend* ceased, so far as we remember, or can discover from the printed reports. The truth is that the paper was not very easy to amend *in parts*: it stuck together in such a way, that (Dr. McPheeters is our authority) though full of insuperable difficulties to a certain class of minds, it had a singularly religious and coherent look, and as for ability—it is not proper for us to repeat his words.

The resistance, therefore, went back to substitutes: and the Rev. Dr. Backus, of Baltimore, whose opposition was really vehement and liable to severe retort, by the use of a pair of scissors freely applied to Dr. Breckinridge’s minute and then to the Westminster Confession of Faith—produced a new substitute, to which we, at any rate, could have no other objection, than that the parts cut out were fully as good as the parts left in, and that the parts left in were hurt and not helped by cutting out the rest. Dr. Backus seemed to appreciate this difficulty: for he wholly declined the usual—and only allowa-

ble process—of moving first to *strike out*—but would be content with no mode of proceeding, but the reading connectedly of what he desired to keep in—being somewhere about half of Dr. Breckinridge's minute—taken in parcels, here and there; to which were added some capital sentences from our Church Standards. Some confusion was produced, and some time consumed, in these vain attempts—to ward off a result which was as necessary as it was certain. We have observed that ministers, as a class, are not apt to be tranquil, clear-sighted, and calm—nor even always just—when they miscarry. In this case; the Assembly thought the struggle ought to end. Dr. Breckinridge moved to lay Dr. Backus' paper on the table, but Dr. George Junkin moved the previous question: the House ordered it: the vote was taken—and resulted as we have before stated, more than ten to one for the minute. Every good man must desire that God will bless whatever is right, and overrule what may be wrong, in what the Assembly did. Every bad man will, of course, be glad to see the good defeated, and the evil made effectual.

Various papers in the form of dissents, or protests, were filed by portions of the minority, who voted against the adoption of Dr. Breckinridge's minute. There were, as we have said, but twenty of them in all; and although at least four papers—possibly more—by way of explaining the grounds of their opposition, were filed, we doubt whether many more than half of the twenty signed any paper at all; and we feel sure not over half of the twenty could have agreed in a clear statement of any grounds of dissent or protest, common to them all, and important enough, in their own judgment, to reduce to formal record. The Assembly admitted all that were offered to go upon its minutes: but declined, by vote, any notice of them. No one seemed to think there was any need that the Assembly should adopt the usual course in cases of importance—and answer, by committee. The discussions in the House abundantly showed how feeble and disorganized was the opposition to the course of duty which lay before the Assembly; and how captious, incoherent, and futile were the grounds upon which a great denomination of Christian people were attempted to be silenced, or to be made to falter in some equivocal sense, when the glory of God, the edification of the Church, the safety of the

State, the peace of society, and their own fidelity, all demanded that their voice should be lifted up like a trumpet, as King Jesus shook heaven and earth around them. For our own part, it no more occurred to us as possible, that such an Assembly should convene, deliberate, and be dissolved, in such times as these, and under such circumstances as existed, without making some such deliverance as it has made; than it occurred to us that it could renounce its country, or betray its Saviour. Perhaps it would have satisfied some, if we had imitated the example set us by traitors in the South—first voting ourselves temporarily from under the headship of Christ as a court of his kingdom, and then voting whatever atrocity the Devil might suggest to us. For our part, we waited four days that some one better qualified than ourself, in some form wiser than we could suggest, might speak in the name of the Lord, and show us what to do. On the fifth day—without previous consultation with flesh and blood—without the knowledge of any creature—shut up of the Lord—we asked leave of the Assembly to lay on its table, that whereunto the Lord had led us—and whereby, let others do as they might, we would stand or fall. There is the testimony, indorsed by one of the most remarkable votes, ever given in any Assembly of the Church—by an Assembly worthy to be ranked among the greatest that ever convened. What use God will put it to, we are not able to say. That he condescended to use us in bringing about what has occurred, we account one of the most precious and illustrious tokens of his love, ever bestowed on us. As to the merits or demerits of the harangues, the dissents, the protests—against us and against our work—delivered in the Assembly we have nothing to add, at present; possibly may never have. If we had copies of the formal papers, we would either print them here, or fairly state their contents. We esteem the signers of some of them highly, and would treat all of them with forbearance, even when they are in grave and dangerous error.

The chief opposition to the minute adopted by the Assembly, was made professedly in the interest of the border slave States, and came especially from the cities of Baltimore, Md., Louisville, Ky., and St. Louis, Mo. Yet, when the vote of the Court came to be taken, eight of the twenty negative votes came from the North; and of the twelve which came from the slave

States, three were from the Synod of Missouri, while five others from that Synod were with the majority: three were from the Synod of Baltimore, while six others from that Synod were with the majority: six were from the Synod of Kentucky, while five others were with the majority. From the border Synods of Baltimore, Wheeling, Kentucky, Missouri, and Upper Missouri, there were forty Commissioners in the Assembly—to which adding four from the Presbytery of New Castle (of the Synod of Philadelphia), which embraces parts of Maryland and Delaware, with part of Pennsylvania, the aggregate was forty-four Commissioners from the region which was assumed to be most deeply interested; and which some half a dozen persons in the Assembly assumed to protect against the deliverance which they denounced. Yet, out of these forty-four Commissioners, but twelve could be rallied against the minute; while of the remainder who voted for it, we happen to know, personally, that a larger number of actual residents of Maryland, Delaware, the District of Columbia, Kentucky, and Missouri, voted with the majority. We ventured to believe, and to assert, that as many of those twelve Commissioners as were acting in good faith, would find that they were wrong in their statements, and deceived in their apprehensions of evil from the passage of the minute; and that those who were opposing it because they feared it would arrest their mischievous schemes, would find its influence in that way, even more serious than they then supposed. And we now venture to believe, and to assert, that when, within a few months, our Synods come to take their usual action on the minutes of the Assembly, no *loyal* Synod can be gotten to disapprove what the Assembly has done. We use the word *loyal* on purpose—and with distinct allusion to the hatred it inspired, and the malignant nonsense it caused to be uttered, in the Assembly. LOYAL CHURCH: *loyal* to Christ—*loyal* to his truth—*loyal* to the free and noble civil institutions he has given us—*loyal* to the magistrates he has set up over us—*loyal* to the flock committed to her charge—*loyal* to the fallen race it is her sublime mission to evangelize! Yes, *loyal* and not perfidious: *loyal* and not faithless: *loyal* and not lawless: *loyal* and not traitorous. A term most comprehensive, most precious, most distinctive of a true patriot, a true gentleman, a true hero, a true Christian, a true race, a true

Church: nay, of everything that is faithful to duties, faithful to obligations, faithful to trusts, faithful to oaths! Come, now, cavillers—try yourselves upon *loyal*. The Church has refused to go a whoring, either with heretics or traitors. We will stand or fall by—*loyal*: and so will you.

We have not the time, nor the space, to enter into extended expositions of the principles and doctrines set forth in the minute of the Assembly. Nor have we any fears about the reception it will meet with from the people of God—and from the patriots of the land. Nor do we desire to forestall any criticisms that may be made on it, from any quarter. Nor do we think it necessary, at this time, to show how far it agrees or disagrees with the deliverance of the Assembly of 1861, or the deliverance of the Synod of Kentucky, or any other Synod, on the same subject; or with previous opinions uttered by ourselves, or by any body else. Practically the deliverance is of the highest importance, as we suppose: and we calmly await the course and result of Divine providence touching its practical effects. Theoretically, it is, to a certain extent, and from the point of view of a great Christian Church, an *exposition of Christian doctrine and duty*, in the face of treason, rebellion, anarchy, civil war, ecclesiastical schism, and the heresies which defend them all, and the sins to which they all lead. If it is substantially true, it is as much as human productions commonly are. If it is more than that, it is a blessing, and may promote many other blessings—if so be that we are found worthy of them.

Human society and government are as really institutes of God, as the communion of saints and the spiritual commonwealth they compose are. The Divine Redeemer is equally the Creator and Ruler of all things, as he is the Saviour of sinners, and the Head and Lord of the Church. And thus as glorified Redeemer and as sovereign Lord of all things, it is from him that all providence takes its rise, and by him that all faith and all duty are taught and enforced. The State and the Church are, no doubt, distinct: but they have many relations, and owe many duties, each to the other—as institutes ordained by the same God, and ruled by the same Lord, and to be judged by the same Christ. Nor can individual persons even conceal, or evade, or violate, what they owe to one of these institutes, by

reason or under pretext of what they owe to the other: because it is one and the same glorious God, who has taught them, who commands them, and who will judge them, in regard of both. Now, beyond all doubt, the Church of God, which is the pillar and ground of the truth, is expressly charged by God with the duty of evangelizing the world; and is bound to expound all duty and all faith, unto salvation, as revealed by God, and as obligatory on men. The pretext that certain duties have civil and political aspects, as well as moral ones, is no excuse for the Church omitting to expound and enforce the *moral* aspects of them: nay, it is a *moral* duty to obey the civil law, and to perform political obligations. And as long as treason, rebellion, conspiracy, anarchy, civil war, robbery, and murder are, or even *may be sinful*—and do not cease to be sinful because ignorant and depraved men call them natural rights, civil rights, or political rights; the Church of God is bound to say when, and wherein they are sinful, according to the revelation which God has made to man, and committed to his Church for the salvation of the world. Whether or not the deliverance of the late General Assembly is *true*, is a question depending absolutely on the word of God. Whether or not it is *timely*, depends mainly on its truth, and slightly on considerations of human prudence. Whether or not the *subject-matter* of it is in the competency of the General Assembly, depends on two facts, namely: (1.) *Is the Bible the word of God?* (2.) *Is the Presbyterian denomination, a Church of Christ?*

The relation of the Presbyterian Church to other Christian Denominations.

It has been the common doctrine of the Christian Church always, that as there is but one Shepherd so there is, essentially, but one flock; and that article of the Apostle's Creed wherein, from the earliest ages, every follower of Christ has professed his belief in the *holy Catholic Church*, is the true expression of one of the fundamental truths concerning the kingdom of God's grace. In proportion as the spirit of God dwells with his people, and the truth of God reigns in their souls, they become more and more like Christ—and in the same degree, more and more like each other; and then the

doctrine of the Unity of the Church ceases, in like degree, to present any difficulty, whether theoretical or practical. But as the sanctification of all Christians is imperfect, and their average attainments in the divine life are exceedingly low—difficulties arise, apparently of necessity, which find their expression in denominational organizations. There are other difficulties, apparently insurmountable, which render it impossible for the Church of Christ to disregard, in its outward organization, those facts concerning race, and country, and nationality, and civil organizations, which find their expression in national churches. Upon neither point can there be any reasonable doubt, that we must accept these overruling necessities of the providence of God, and confess that both the element of denominationalism, and the element of nationality, are compatible with the Unity of the Church in the present dispensation of divine and human things. What remains is, that all portions of the true Church must be careful not to isolate themselves from the universal body of Christ—and careful, at the same time, not to forfeit their own peculiar mission, whether national or denominational, in sinful compliances with heresy, or vain endeavors after a wider organic unity, even of the orthodox, than is compatible with the adorable providence of God. The principles which ought to direct our conduct are not difficult to discern: it is our liability to great mistakes in their application, that creates all the danger.

There have been two opposite tendencies manifested, in our times, upon this great question. On one side a tendency, very intense, in the Papal Hierarchy to reassert the exclusive claims of that apostacy to be *the Church* of God; in which general direction of movement, all Episcopal Churches in the world have shared with considerable earnestness, and all established Churches, whether Papal or Protestant, have partaken. It is a movement essentially contrary to the nature of Christianity—and is therefore not only an obstruction to its course, but a proof of indwelling elements incompatible with its true mission on earth. The other tendency has been to disregard and to set aside all denominational peculiarities, to disallow all denominational efficacy or fitness for any great or important undertaking, to reduce the Church considered as organized as near as possible to a nullity, to treat her most venerable standards

as useless compared with the zeal which is wiser and truer than they, to fill the world with a loosely organized and merely voluntary Christian activity, and to make an affiliation with the spirit and forms of this irresponsible activity the only effectual Christian life, on one hand, and the only attainable Christian unity, on the other. It is a movement essentially destructive of the organic life of the Church of God; and though certainly compatible with a high type of personal religion and with great results, its general acceptance would necessarily revolutionize Christianity itself, and place the kingdom of Messiah exactly in the condition which human society would occupy, if all human authority were at an end. There has, of course, been a reaction against both of these dangerous tendencies: and the contest—though far from being ended—has steadily developed the self-consciousness of Christianity, that it involved, in effect, not only her nature, but the very ends of her organized existence.

There has probably never been much tendency in the Presbyterian Church in the United States, in the first of these two directions: and she may be said to have well nigh extirpated the other from her bosom long ago. The distinction which the Scriptures so broadly assert between ministerial communion and private communion—between qualification for teaching and ruling in the Church of Christ, and qualification for membership therein, which that Church has always accepted and asserted; has helped to keep her in a condition, very favorable to the discharge of her double duty, considered as a separate Church, and considered with reference to others, as one of the Christian denominations making up the universal Church. The experience, in both respects, has been such as ought to be sufficient to guide her safely in time to come. She has endured two calamitous schisms, and is now suffering under the third: she has made two organic unions with other denominations, and a third one was attempted, and a fourth also, and a fifth one has been very lately urged upon her: she has interchanged Commissioners, held correspondence, cultivated official intercourse—long, widely, variously, with many Christian denominations in this and other countries, and with a great variety of results. It is hardly necessary for us to dwell on this experience, or to attempt to expound it. But it

seemed best to recall it, in this general way, and to make the preceding observations on the great truths which governed the past course of the Church ; that the whole subject might be in the mind of the reader, as it is in our own, in the brief statements proper to be made, concerning the action of the late Assembly with regard to a nearer intercourse with the General Assemblies of the *Presbyterian Church, New School*—and the *United Presbyterian Church*.

For a number of months preceding the meeting of the Assembly, a movement, which had all the appearance of being concerted, was made both in the Old and New School Presbyterian Churches, having for its object the organic union of the two. Among the earliest steps taken, one seems to have been a joint meeting of a Presbytery of each Church, in or near Ogdensburg, New York—in which resolutions of mutual confidence, and of the desirableness of a closer union were passed, and, we believe, afterward ratified by each Presbytery acting separately. The religious weekly press of both denominations took the subject up—and editorially and through correspondents, discussed it with a certain earnestness. We are not very familiar with the press of the New School body, nor with the state of opinion on this subject in that denomination. Our impression is that the organic union of the two bodies, did not commend itself to the cordial support of any considerable portion of the New School Church ; and that, under any circumstances there would be a large party warmly opposed to it. Moreover, it is probable that the whole body would expect the union to take place, if at all, by means of a treaty, or something of the sort; in which something equivalent to a retraction—apology—repeal of obnoxious acts, weakening of strict principles of action, and of subscription ; in short “satisfaction for the past, and security for the future”—should be implied, if not expressed by us, for the satisfaction of the other Church. We add that a certain number of ministers and members of that body, were probably very desirous of seeing a union effected with our body, and not very particular about the conditions. And this completes the expression of our idea of the case, as it stood in the New School Church. If our idea is any way near correct, the proposed union was impossible, from the New School point of view. In our own denomination, which

we understand better—there was no possibility of an organic union. Of this signal proofs were furnished by two distinct actions of our late Assembly. The first occurred on a report from the Committee of Bills and Overtures, the second on a report from the Committee on Foreign Correspondence; in both instances the House reversing recommendations of its Standing Committees. In the first case, it refused to say the proposal for organic union might be favorably considered hereafter; refused to refer the subject to the next Assembly; and distinctly said the union ought not to take place. In the second case it refused to adopt a recommendation of its Committee, to appoint a Commissioner to the New School Assembly then in session—and thus abruptly, and for reasons and in a way the Assembly did not approve—open a correspondence under a discussion for a union. It made the matter emphatic, that what was probably intended and expected to be passed and executed with a rush, could not pass at all; and that the persons who most decidedly opposed what was proposed—and suggested what was the proper thing to do (which was afterward done) were added, by order of the House, to the Committee.

We print below, the minute afterward reported by the Committee (on Foreign Correspondence), and unanimously adopted by the Assembly, proposing a *correspondence* by way of annual delegates, with the General Assembly of the New School Presbyterian Church. The latter body had been dissolved before this action of our Assembly took place; a result to be regretted, and which was produced by the singular and unfortunate fact that two Standing Committees had, in succession, wholly misunderstood the mind of the Assembly, and in succession recommended the adoption of measures on this important subject, which the body refused to approve. It is to be hoped, that the New School Assembly will, at its next annual sessions, adopt the course proposed by the Old School Assembly: but whether it does or not, it was none the less proper for the latter body to do what it has done. The overture sent to the General Assembly of the United Presbyterian Church (a body recently formed out of the larger portions of the Associate, the Associate Reformed, and perhaps some of the Reformed Presbyterians) found that body still in session—and was

promptly and, we understand, unanimously adopted by it. This overture was essentially the same as the one printed below; omitting only such sentences as relate to the peculiar relative positions of the Old and New School Assemblies; but making the same proposition for correspondence. We do not, therefore, print it. As to the plan proposed, in both cases, it will be observed that the strictly Presbyterian element, of being represented, in part, by Ruling Elders, is introduced, probably for the first time, in these denominational correspondences. And we may observe, that in the whole matter of such correspondences, the immediate benefit which will be first realized, will probably be the drawing of the great Presbyterian family of Churches, nearer to each other. When it is considered how immense this great branch of the Christian Church is—how widely it is dispersed throughout the world—and how terribly the aggregate influence it ought to exercise is weakened by its divisions; it is not easy to understand why it should contentedly part with the vast advantages which are in its reach, nor to calculate the greatness of the effects which an opposite course would produce. The minute of the Assembly follows:

“The following minute, proposing correspondence, by Commissioners, with the New School General Assembly, was unanimously adopted:

“In the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church in the United States of America, in session at Columbus, Ohio, the matter of a fraternal correspondence, by Commissioners, with the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church (N. S.), in session at Cincinnati, Ohio, being duly considered, is decided as follows:

“This Assembly, having considered certain overtures sent to it by a few of the Presbyteries under its care, proposing that steps should be taken by it toward an organic union between this Church and the Church under the care of the Presbyterian General Assembly (N. S.); and, having determined against the course proposed in said overtures, has also been informed that the other General Assembly has, about the same time, come to a similar conclusion on similar overtures laid before it by a certain number of its own Presbyteries. Of its own motion, this General Assembly, considering the time to have come for it to take the initiative in securing a better understanding of the relations which it judges are proper to be maintained between the two General Assemblies, hereby proposes that there shall be a stated annual and friendly inter-

change of Commissioners between the two General Assemblies—each body sending to the other one minister and one ruling elder, as Commissioners, year by year; the said Commissioners to enjoy such privileges in each body to which they are sent as are common to all those now received by this body from other Christian denominations. The Moderator will communicate this deliverance to the Moderator of the other Assembly, to be laid before it, with our Christian salutations."

This, in our opinion, is the proper relation for these two denominations to sustain to each other. It was hardly an open question with the late Assembly, whether it was proper for it to hold correspondence with the New School body. For having, before that, established a correspondence with the Cumberland Presbyterian body—the propriety of the correspondence with the New School body, was a foregone conclusion. We admit, however, that if no such reason had existed, we should not only have favored, but should have proposed the very action, in the very way, taken by the Assembly. Great changes have occurred in the last twenty-five years, in the New School body—the most of them—and the most important—undoubtedly favorable. It is impossible—at any rate—to deny that it is a Christian Church—a Presbyterian Church, a Church four-fifths of whose original elements went voluntarily from us, without ecclesiastical censure—a Church whose ordinances have never been questioned by our Church, and ought not to be questioned. This is conclusive: and obliged the Assembly to do as it did—first or last. We confess it was a great satisfaction to us—and we accepted it as a special and kind providence that the time and way of terminating thus—as we think it should terminate forever—the painful part of the events of 1831–1839, fell in some degree to a few survivors of the great men who achieved those events. They will all soon be gone. May their works follow them—in the best of all senses. We confess, also, that it adds to our satisfaction in what has occurred, to hope that the question of an organic union, will now find rest. We are fully persuaded that the differences, in nearly all respects, between the two denominations, are too great for them to constitute one denomination sufficiently harmonious, to work together either with great efficacy or great comfort. These differences are not as great as they were—and

they may be less in time to come. But beyond a doubt, every enlightened and candid mind ought to see, that New School Presbyterianism is a type to itself—and occupies a posture of its own, as really as any other denomination—and that while it may be fairly doubted even by us, whether more harm than good would not result from absorbing that type and destroying that posture; it is not, perhaps, possible that this should happen at all; and positively certain it can not happen by an organic union with Old School Presbyterianism without convulsing, if not revolutionizing that. Let us confess that it is the prerogative of God, to bring good out of evil. We are not sensible of uttering a paradox when we say, that the Presbyterian Church can never recall or regret what she did in 1837 and 1838, while she continues faithful; and yet that her very fidelity required of her precisely what she has now done in 1862. And we thank the Lord for our share in both series of events.

*The working of the General Assembly considered with reference to
Internal State and Progress of the Church.*

Some account of the internal state and progress of the Church, with such comments as may appear needful, seems to follow naturally after what has been said concerning its organization, concerning its testimony, and concerning its relation to other Christian denominations. And this has all the more importance, the more carefully we reflect on the nature, design, and posture of the Church of God militant in its present dispensation—and on the special history, doctrine, and labors of the great family of Presbyterian denominations in all time, and on those of this Church in particular. In doing this, very briefly, we shall not occupy our limited space with details, which are very similar to those which are made public each successive year—and which every one has access to, in various publications. But shall rather attempt to give clear ideas of the subject-matter itself, with such comments as may be required by any special occurrence, and with such suggestions as a large experience might possibly render useful, and as may perhaps be excused in an old servant of the Church, whose labors for her draw rapidly to an end.

The Church of God now existing in what we call the Christian Dispensation of it, is a mighty power not only ordained, but organized of him. It is the special inheritance of the Christ of God, purchased back with his blood, out of the ruined world and the fallen race, whose dominion Satan had usurped. But all its power is valid, only when exercised in the name and by the authority of Christ: it is efficacious only when approved and blessed, in its exercise, by the Spirit of God: and it is lawful only when it is vested by the Word of God contained in his inspired scripture. With reference to God—the sum of the duty of the Church is, to obey him: with reference to Christ, it is to follow him and glorify him in all things: with reference to the human race, it is to evangelize it: with reference to herself, it is to keep herself perfectly pure in faith, in life, and in worship. It follows, therefore, that whatever authority, or function, or power is, or can be, in any office-bearer—or any tribunal of the Church—must necessarily be exclusively unto these ends—and of such kind as God himself has appointed thereunto in his Word. *Sin* is that accursed thing which God hates: *Grace* is the manifestation of God's infinite beneficence to man, considered as a sinner: Christ crucified is the only Saviour of sinners, and that only by Grace through Faith: the Church is the Bride of the Lamb—God's everlasting Witness concerning Sin, and Grace, and Truth—the depository of whatever power, authority, or function he has committed to man concerning the evangelization of the world, and the sanctification of the saints.

It is very obvious, therefore, that the great and habitual practical work of every tribunal of the Church, is the keeping of the body of Christ itself in the highest possible state of conformity to him, and the using of it with the greatest possible efficiency in evangelizing the world; and that this habitual practical work, obligatory upon every tribunal as its chief ordinary business, should become only more intense as the tribunals rise above each other in their scope and power, and should culminate in the great tribunal in which the whole Church assembles. It is equally obvious, that in proportion as the divine wisdom pervades the Church, will be the harmonious co-operation of all these tribunals, each in its appropriate sphere, and about its own special work; and the

scrupulous care of every one in avoiding all disturbance of the functions, and usurpation of the powers of any of the rest. And in like manner will the higher tribunals, sedulously strive that those below them shall fully occupy their own great fields of usefulness; while the highest tribunal of all, will the most sedulously of all, take care that all are about the Master's work. When we consider that these great principles and truths may be said to be almost self-evidently true, it may well seem strange that their adoption and enforcement should ever have encountered serious opposition. Yet the living generation has witnessed a protracted struggle, in the bosom of the Church, on the part of voluntary and temporal organizations of various sorts (which, to a certain extent, are necessary in supplying the deficiencies of some forms of church government), to set aside the tribunals of the Church, and all ecclesiastical supervision, in carrying on many of the most important parts of evangelization. And it is not less remarkable, that after the Church awakened to her great duty of *doing* her Master's work, insisted on the *ecclesiastical* in opposition to the *secular* principle; she should linger on the skirts of that controversy, and suppose that by substituting the word *Board* for the word *Society*, she had gathered all the fruits of a victory won for the Church as such, and her *tribunals*, as divine institutions. Undoubtedly, a great deal has been gained. But assuredly much remains to be accomplished, in still further rectifying the principles upon which some of our ecclesiastical Boards are constructed,—in increasing their efficiency and responsibility if they are to be permanently retained—and above all in ceasing to substitute them in the place of the tribunals of God's Church, as an agency of the General Assembly in doing anything it can and should do itself—or in doing anything it can and should do through other divine tribunals under its care. It is a glorious motto—*Cunctando restituit*: and during more than thirty years, we have never ceased to plead for its application, whenever it was possible, to all ecclesiastical reforms—of which the number has been so great. But the truth is still more glorious—that the Church of Christ is a Divine institute, competent and bound to *do as such* the work which her glorified Lord, has made it her duty, her felicity, and her great glory to *do as such*.

This work, as it appears in the General Assembly, from year to year, with reference to the internal state and progress of the Church, is manifested in a great variety of ways. All of these, however, are capable of being classified under two general heads, responsive to the two great functions of the Church, namely: that of perfecting the saints, and that of evangelizing the world. In effect, these two functions lie so close together, that many good works are nearly equally important to them both; and many others result, in some degree, from the union of them both; for indeed the work of protecting, defending, and advancing the kingdom of Messiah—embraces alike all that belongs to the comfort and edification of the saints, and all that belongs to the evangelization of the world. Still, however, there are differences in the works, whose condition discloses the internal state of the Church, as well as in those whose condition discloses her progress; which lay the ground of the classification we have made, in order both to brevity, and to a clearer general view of the Church.

There are two reports made annually from every Presbytery to the General Assembly, one *statistical* and the other *moral*. The facts embraced in these reports, are obtained in the Presbyteries, from statements made to them verbally, by all the ministers and ruling elders who are members of them, and reports made to them in writing by all the congregations under their care. From the General Assembly these statistical reports pass into the hands of the clerks of the body, and are thoroughly digested and published in tabular form as an appendix to the printed minutes. Thus, very complete information is given to every one, of the progress of the Church during the preceding year, and of its actual condition, in all respects that appertain to its state and movement as a spiritual commonwealth—so far as that can be done in that manner. Great efforts have been made, for many years, to secure both accuracy and completeness in these lists and tables; and they have been brought to considerable perfection. It may be observed that similar lists and tables are reported every year to the Assembly, from its numerous corporations, and Boards, and committees, having charge of its different enterprises and interests. In the aggregate the interests are

immense—and the skill and integrity exhibited in their management, very high. The whole result is an astonishing exhibition of the fruits of wise, earnest, and devoted labor, attended, for a long course of years, by the blessing of God. The *moral* reports, before spoken of, are called *Narratives on the State of Religion*; and from the whole of these, a committee of the Assembly condenses the general spiritual progress of the Church during the preceding year, and exhibits its actual state. This last *Narrative* is published with the annual *Minutes* of the Assembly, and very widely in other ways. Supposing it to be executed, from year to year, as it should be, the whole series would constitute, in the aggregate, the most complete and reliable cotemporary history of the spiritual progress of the Church, from age to age. The one for the present year is above the average. Is it not to be desired, that they should be carefully examined, from the foundation of the Church in America—and, if found worthy, published at large, or compiled and digested into short annals? In this, as in the preceding case, the knowledge of the spiritual progress and actual condition of the Church, is greatly increased by the annual reports made to the Assembly, by the numerous Boards, etc., which are particularly charged with its various enterprises of a specially religious kind. Besides all these reports—some purely statistical, some purely moral, some uniting both characters, there are other and entirely distinct elements of knowledge on the subject we are endeavoring to explain. One of these is found in the fact that every tribunal of the Church is a *Court of Record*; and that every one of these courts is required to submit its records periodically to the court next superior to it, for approval, correction, or condemnation. In this manner, the records of all the Synods, which unitedly embrace the whole Church, come before the Assembly every year: and in this way, the state and progress of the whole denomination comes, by means of committees of the Assembly, to be continually inspected. It is a perpetual system for preserving exact knowledge, and making it public. But besides this, the nature of the divine organization of the Church, brings whatever is dangerous or hurtful in the Church, very specially and in a variety of ways, to the immediate notice of its tribunals; and as soon as

this occurs, the evil or the danger, in the regular course of affairs, comes at last to be inspected by the tribunal that embraces the whole. These tribunals are courts of review and control—courts for the trial of offenses and the infliction of Church censures—courts having appellate jurisdiction over all below them. In the Church of God, *discipline*, in its special sense, bears to the threatenings of God's Word, a relation somewhat analogous to that borne by the sacraments to its promises. Every Church tribunal is a *Court of Conscience*, whose rule of judgment is God's Word; and by the spontaneous action of the tribunals, or by the interposition of individuals—whatever in the faith or practice of a member of the Church is supposed to be contrary to that Divine rule, subjects him to scrutiny. It is not, therefore, the good only, but the evil also, which necessarily stands revealed to those who have eyes, and will see. And in these numerous, diverse, and singularly effectual ways, the internal state and progress of the Church, for good or for evil, can hardly fail of being matter of certain and continual knowledge, to those whose spiritual condition inclines and enables them to form an enlightened judgment in the case. We may venture to say, that if no spiritual system administered by human beings can completely exclude iniquity—here is one which comes very near to rendering the permanent concealment of it impossible. And if the perpetual tendency of a spiritual system to establish, to extend, and to exalt righteousness in the earth, is the supreme proof of its own purity—here is one whose claim to be of God, has this singular confirmation, that it is incapable of being effectually administered except by such as know and love him.

We need not specially discuss the ordinary and divinely instituted means whereby the Church of God is perfected and extended in the world. Concerning these, the Word of God is perfectly clear—and most Christian denominations are substantially agreed. Nor will we here moot the question, how far the faithful use of these would supersede the necessity of every human device, and provide at every moment, and under every contingency, the most efficacious of all means unto every end appointed to the Church by God. For our own part, we acknowledge our total incapacity to discern the

will of God unto salvation, except by means of the revelation he has given us; and, therefore, while we strive to go to the entire limit of his revealed will—we hesitate, and become perplexed, and fear to venture any farther, when we seem to have reached that limit. In alluding, therefore, very briefly to the various organizations created by the Church, and used by her, in promoting many of the objects undeniably committed to her by the Lord Christ; we refer to what we have said on a previous page, concerning them. The most important of these organizations are the Board of Foreign Missions; the Board of Domestic Missions; the Board of Education; the Board of Publication; and the Committee (perhaps its name has been changed to *Board*) of Church Extension. Lately an operation has been set on foot, and pushed with success, under the auspices of the Pennsylvania Board of Trustees of the General Assembly, looking to some better provision for aged and infirm ministers, and their families, who are in destitute circumstances; and the apparent tendency is, to another Board—or something equivalent—on this subject. And several things occurred during the late sessions of the Assembly, with relation to the subject of systematic benevolence, which produced the impression, more or less extensively, that another Board—or something equivalent to one—was in contemplation, for the more effectual promotion of that object. Rejoicing in the success of these great enterprises, there are many things we would like to say concerning them; but we will forbear to do more than offer some suggestions which apply, in some degree to them all—and in some degree more particularly to one or other of them.

It has occurred to us, upon many occasions, that the mode of bringing these great causes before the Assembly, and of treating them there, is not fortunate. The report of a certain board is read to the body—and then it is referred to a committee, and then the committee makes its report accompanied with resolutions, often a great many, and not always very wise—and then upon a set day this report and the resolutions are acted on by the Assembly, and the executive officer of the board present is heard at length, and speeches, chiefly exhortatory, are made by members, usually engaged beforehand for this service. Sometimes important business matters connected with the

board, come up in connection with the final action on the report; and sometimes great principles have to be discussed, in the middle of financial statements, or statistical tables; and sometimes violent personal controversies have been heard in the midst of hortatory appeals; and nearly always, a very large portion of the time of the House is consumed by the repeated coming of the business of the same board before it; and almost without exception, the business of one or more of the boards, gets entangled with other important business, in their respective and somewhat perilous transits through reports, resolutions, orders of the day, unfinished business, adjournments, and what not. It seems to us that the supervision of the Assembly could be adequately secured in some simple and effectual manner—and with a very great saving of its time; and that the business of the boards before the House, could be arranged and transacted without confusion, and to the satisfaction of all concerned. If it is not necessary that the Assembly should make itself responsible for every sentence uttered by every board—as it certainly is not—let the report, in its printed form, be laid before the body and furnished to the members: and let its executive officer content himself with a brief statement of a general kind. If it is not indispensable that the Assembly should solemnly reiterate every year, six or seven times, its great devotion to these objects, its great confidence in these boards, its great shame that they have done no more, etc., etc.—which it hardly can be; let the committees on the reports of the boards omit preaching in resolutions. If it is very important to have exhortatory speeches in the House, on every board, every year; then devote a day to hearing them all; and devote another day to the doing of the *business* of all the boards, expressly; and when it is done, let it be done as a *supervision*, and not as an explicit and annually repeated *indorsement*. These suggestions, if adopted, would save about four days time at every Assembly; would save everybody an immense amount of needless trouble; would give the Assembly a far better idea of what all the boards, and itself, are doing; and above all—would place its actual relation to all these subjects, upon any theory whatever, and especially upon the theory of boards, upon a practical, working footing.

We beg to offer a suggestion on the tendency to increase the

number of causes which the Assembly will take under its immediate supervision—or will even indorse for the universal support of the Church. In respect to the former part of that statement—it ought to be borne in mind that the Assembly's most pressing and most immediate duties are already not a little slighted, by reason of a class of new duties, arising from the the peculiar manner in which it has been seduced into the consumption of its brief annual session : and it seems far more important to rectify this evil, than to increase it by drawing under its special supervision, new causes, not absolutely pertinent to it. Moreover, every principle and every dictate of prudence, upon which the Assembly should proceed in taking the immediate oversight of any cause, as being specially appropriate to it, would compel it to decline resolutely, any such supervision over any cause which belonged more appropriately to some other tribunal of the Church—or to some existing board—or even to some secular corporation. Of the five great benevolent causes already under the special care of the Assembly, it may well be doubted whether one of them (the cause of Domestic Missions), could not be far more efficiently managed, by limiting the interposition of the Assembly to a more general oversight, and bringing up the Synods and Presbyteries to a thorough participation in it, each in its own bounds—and each as a court of the Church. And there is of the five, a second one (the cause of Church Extension), which seems to us specifically relevant to the Synods, and especially the Presbyteries that is to local supervision, and specifically irrelevant to the Assembly that is to general supervision by the whole Church. With regard to the matter of disabled ministers and their families, besides what occurred in the Assembly, a committee of that body now exists, and will probably report next year, among other things, upon a proposition much urged on the Assembly, to raise a permanent fund of \$500,000, the interest of which should be appropriated to this class of persons. It was extremely curious that such a suggestion should be seriously made, when the reports before the Assembly showed that a very large comparative surplus of the small income for this object, remained unexpended. And perhaps it would be hard to show any necessity for the Assembly to meddle with the matter at all, while the reports before it showed that its

Board of Trustees had proved competent to originate an agency, and to carry the enterprise to a point, where the income realized exceeded all actual demands on it. It seems to us, we will add, that the class of persons to be benefitted by this proposed movement, however meritorious they may be—must forever be far too limited in number, and far too much removed from want, for it to constitute an object bearing any proportion to the demands made and suggested on their behalf; and that the Assembly, by arranging the business affairs of the Board of Publication, upon fixed and proper principles, might readily secure from the profits of that great enterprise, a yearly income many times greater than this class of meritorious sufferers would have any just claim to receive. There would be, also, a suitableness in such a mode of relief, which would justify much saving of expense, and the cutting off of many dubious enterprises.

The question of revenue—income—is one which enters more or less deeply, into every enterprise of the Church, as well as every one of all considerate individuals. In all countries where civil and religious institutions are wholly independent of each other, it is upon the voluntary contributions of the people, that the latter must depend: and this is especially the case in countries newly settled, and before the excess of yearly contributions above yearly expenditures, can be accumulated into permanent investments. The experience concerning permanent endowments in the form of income, for all objects, in all ages, is not favorable to them—unless in exceptional cases; and in free countries less so than in others—and for literary and religious purposes, less so than for others. We speak of *income*—not of unproductive property—such as buildings, books, scientific apparatus, a certain moderate amount of lands, and other dead property; and where instruction itself is a charity—there may be greater doubt whether the means that sustain it may not safely assume the form of an investment of the gifts of successive generations. Right or wrong, the great resource of all the churches in this country, is the voluntary payments of the people, made by way of free contribution to the support of the Gospel. The first condition of the adequate payment of these contributions is, that they who give them—for example in the form of pew rents, the aggregate amount of

which is so vast—should be satisfied with the spiritual returns they receive for what they give; and that they who give—for example, more strictly speaking to religious charities—should be satisfied that what they give is faithfully administered and applied. The Church has, therefore, the very highest inducements to enforce wise, economical, and absolutely faithful management and expenditure of money, by every board and agency connected with it. Moreover, the highest, or strictly speaking, the only adequate ground on which a pure Church can rely for contributions from an enlightened Christian people, to objects it desires to promote, is a purely religious ground: namely, that *it is their duty to support the Gospel, in the widest sense*. Not to give to the cause of the Lord is, doctrinally a heresy, and morally a sin. And the elements that regulate this great duty of *giving* are as clear and precise, as the commands of God to practice it are positive and reiterated. In proportion, *first* to our piety, *secondly* to our ability, *thirdly* to our opportunity—will all Christian people be found ready to bestow of their substance, in the promotion of every good work, and in the manifestation of their own new obedience to Christ. Knowledge to discriminate wisely, will doubtless add greatly to the efficacy of our charities; but the world is so full of suffering and sin, that no one can ever be at a loss for proper objects of Christian charity. And while it is our privilege to enjoy the blessedness of giving, so to speak, by surprise, even as God's providence opens from day to day the sudden occasion; it is also a manifest duty to put some order and system, both in our works and our gifts, whereby steadfastness in the perpetual work of the Lord may be more and more realized. Behold then what is meant by *systematic benevolence*, as applied to the endeavors of the General Assembly to improve the condition and augment the progress of the Church, on one hand, and to execute one portion of its work of evangelization, on the other—by means, in both respects, of these *boards* of which we have been speaking. It was by means of a patient, and persistent development of these ideas, that the *agency system* was effectually reduced to its proper limits in the Church; and by means of them faithfully expounded to the people of God, they will, under all circumstances, do more toward providing an income for every object the Church ought to support,

than they will ever do by means of all the contrivances of human wisdom, combined. It was, therefore, with great astonishment we heard the statement made on the floor of the Assembly, and on the highest authority, that imposing efforts had been seriously made, perhaps in some of the existing boards, to organize some new agency or board, or both, over and concerning systematic benevolence. And it was with sincere grief that we heard the opinion not only expressed, but urged in the body by some of its influential members, that the doctrine and practice of systematic benevolence in the Church, were a failure—and that something else, or something additional, must be resorted to. If these last statements (which are expressly contradicted in the *Narrative* of this year), were correct concerning the supposed "*failure*"—which we are well convinced they are not—to the extent asserted; they would prove no more than that havoc is being made of every good work, by the calamities which treason has brought, temporarily, we trust, on the country. And the suggestion, either of something else in the place of systematic benevolence, or the organizing of it under a board or an agency, as the true remedy for the evils of these sad times; is merely equivalent to superseding the *immediate* control of the Assembly over the existing boards, and appointing a new board and agency to supervise them. This would be a poor remedy for the want of piety, or the want of ability, or the want of opportunity, in the Christian people, to carry on the work of the Lord.

It may prevent misconception, to add a few words concerning the relations of the General Assembly to the whole matter of property and income. Properly speaking, it has neither one nor the other—and is legally incompetent to hold either. Whatever estates are held by the congregations under its care, belong to those congregations respectively. Whatever incomes are received by its ministers, are their private property—given to them, in every instance, for services performed—in no instance given by the Assembly—for it has nothing to give. Whatever permanent funds and estates, have been given and invested for the uses or on the trusts recommended by the Assembly, are held by corporations, most of which are not at all subject to its control—and only a very few of them so far dependent on its action, that their members are elected by it

under various restrictions. Whatever funds are given, from year to year, for promoting the various benevolent objects it recommends, or supervises—are not paid to it—but are paid directly to those who conduct the particular enterprise to which the money is given. It has nothing: it desires nothing: it would accept nothing—on the condition that it should hold, manage, and use it. And yet utterly destitute as it is—it has the means of making many rich, in the best of all senses. By the force of its character, and by the power of its doctrine, and by the blessing of Him to whom all the silver and all the gold belong, there is nothing that concerns the glory of God that is too costly for it to ask—nothing that concerns the good of man that is too hard for it to attempt. What a sublime position has the Lord given to this body! With what abounding fidelity should it occupy and use it!

The relation of the Assembly to the Training of the Church and its Ministers.

These Christians were once the enemies of God. This Church of Christ has been redeemed by his blood: its true members have been regenerated by his Spirit: they have all to be trained in his fear and nurture: and if he should forsake them, every one of them would apostatize and perish. To know God, and Jesus Christ whom he has sent, is eternal life: and it is through the Church that this knowledge of God and of Christ is imparted to men, and this eternal life is brought near to them; and it is through the preaching of the Gospel, by men called and sent of God,—and by means approved by him—that the Church accomplishes this part of her mission. To perpetuate herself in the world, and to perpetuate through all time a succession of godly ministers of the Word, and of needful means of evangelization, are duties upon the right performance of which, the possibility of every other duty depends. The General Assembly, therefore, has no function more important than the oversight of the right training of the Church and her ministers,—with respect to her perpetuation as the faithful witness for Christ, and their fitness for their great work. In some respects, the whole work of the Assembly has this aspect; but there are portions of its work which relate more particularly to it, and still other portions which, in a manner,

relate to nothing else. Under these two last classes what we have now to advance, will fall.

Concerning the ministers of the Word, the doctrine of the Scriptures is that they are one of the ascension gifts of Christ to his Church, in its present dispensation : that they are ordinary and perpetual office-bearers in the Church : that besides being effectually called, like all other saints, by the Word and Spirit, unto union and communion with the Divine Saviour, they are specially and divinely called unto this ministry, wherein God appoints them, according to his Word, to be witnesses for Christ, to be laborers together with him, and to suffer great things for his name. Now the particular business of the Church concerning these laborers in the harvest of the Lord is, in the *first* place, to pray the Lord of the harvest to multiply them, to make them known, to qualify them, to send them forth, and to bless them abundantly : and in the *second* place, to provide them with all possible advantages, in the way of all necessary training for the great work before them : and in the *third* place, to use all fidelity and diligence, in ascertaining the reality of the divine call they profess to have received : and in the *fourth* place, to see that they are duly set apart to their work, that they are properly prepared for it, that they are diligently engaged about it, and that they are adequately sustained in it. It will be seen at once, that all parts of this business of the Church, involve, first or last, the tribunals of it ; and that most parts of it fall to be supervised, in a general way, by the highest of those tribunals. There are many reasons which we need stop to repeat, why the matter stated under the *second* head, and part of that under the *fourth* head—especially the former, to wit, the training of the candidates for the ministry—particularly that part of it which is strictly professional—should be provided for by the co-operation of the whole Church, and should be committed to the General Assembly. More than fifty years ago, the Church determined to make this professional training of its ministers more uniform, more exact, and more extensive than had previously been common in this country ; and in the execution of that purpose four institutions for their separate professional training, have been established by the General Assembly, and more or less adequately endowed by the contributions of God's people. The first of these, was the Seminary at

Princeton, N. J.: the second, the Seminary at Allegheny, Penna.: the third, the Seminary at Danville, Ky.: the fourth, the Seminary at Chicago, Ills. Detailed reports from these Seminaries, are laid, every year, before the Assembly. Two others, one in Prince Edward County, Va., and the other in Columbia, S. C., were established by certain Synods; but the former was related to the General Assembly only in a very general way, while the latter never had any relation at all to it; and both of them are so situated at the present time, as to render any further allusion to them here unnecessary. It should be stated that other efforts have been made in the Church, at sundry times, and in divers ways, to establish institutions similar to these—none of which now exist.

The four existing Seminaries were attended during the past year, ending about the 1st of May last, by about 350 students of theology, in various stages of their three years' course. The whole of these, except about twenty divided between the Seminaries at Danville and Chicago, were in attendance upon the Seminaries at Princeton and Allegheny—and, as far as we remember, were divided not very unequally between them. The Seminary at Chicago had suffered the great loss of two of its best known Professors. The Seminary at Danville, besides suffering in a somewhat similar way, was on the immediate skirts of the civil war—and escaped being occupied by the rebel forces on two occasions, only by bloody victories won by the Federal troops, a short distance off. Nothing, we believe, of particular importance (for we have to trust very much to our memory) was done in the Assembly with respect to the Seminaries of Princeton and Allegheny; except the recognition (in a manner somewhat energetic, as it seemed to us) of a very large donation to the former, by Mr. Stuart, of New York. At the request of the proper local authority, the Assembly omitted to fill the vacant chairs in the Seminary at Chicago—mainly perhaps on account of the state of the funds of that Institution. The vacant chair of *Pastoral Theology and Church Government* in the Seminary at Danville, was filled by the election of the Rev. Dr. R. L. STANTON—thus making the faculty of that school complete. The names of a number of distinguished ministers, and others of a class younger and less known, were canvassed by their friends and

those of the Seminary, for this important chair; and five or six persons were nominated for it. The vote of the Assembly, however, was taken only between Dr. Stanton and Dr. R. Davidson, now of New York, but for many years a pastor in Lexington, Ky.; and resulted in a very large majority for Dr. Stanton—who was not a member of the body. Dr. Stanton is at present pastor of a church in Chillicothe, Ohio—which he has served with the great blessing of the Lord for some years past; having resided before that in the East, and formerly in the South, where he had been pastor of a church in New Orleans, and afterward President of Oakland College in Mississippi. No one doubts his great qualifications for the very important duty to which the Church, and, as we believe, the providence and will of God, assign him; and every one who desires the prosperity of the Danville Seminary, and a continual improvement in the qualifications of our ministers for their work, will unite in the wish that he may accept this appointment. We believe he will do so: and our hope is, that by the favor of the Lord, the Danville Seminary will immediately resume the prosperous career which the calamities of the times have temporarily interrupted; calamities in the midst of which the Institution has signally established its title to the confidence of all loyal, orthodox, and pious men.

We have already said that the Church has no duty higher, than that which relates to the proper and adequate training of her ministers. The plan which she has adopted, therefore, for the important portion of that training which is strictly professional—ought to be watched with singular care—confirmed wherein experience approves it—rectified wherein it may reveal any defect—and carried through with a vigor, constancy, and liberality, bearing some just proportion to the immense issues which are at stake. This great Seminary interest is, above all others that are managed by the exclusive authority of the Assembly, a common interest of the whole Church. It is above all others, an organized influence, which must permanently act upon the character of the Church, by its own action upon nearly the whole of its future ministers. Insensibly, the most serious impressions are capable of being made through them, upon the whole doctrine of the Church. The whole manner of preaching can hardly fail to be influenced,

by what the candidates for the ministry are taught by precept and example, during three years in the Seminaries. The general state of piety in the ministry of the Church—must ultimately be responsive to the established spiritual condition of the Seminaries. And whatever spirit shall become traditional in these Seminaries, and pervade them—will be finally established in the Church, and pervade it. There is but one way in which all this immense force can be used for the constant advantage of the Church, and turned to the great glory of God. It is that the Assembly shall keep all the Seminaries so close to itself—so immediately in its control—so directly under its power and constant supervision—so thoroughly dependent on it and responsive to it—that the spirit of the Church shall infuse itself continually into the Seminaries and pervade and control them: whereby the influence, of every sort, that comes forth from the Seminaries, and operates upon the Church, shall have first gone into the Seminaries, from the Church itself: whereby, in one word, not the corporate spirit originating in the Seminaries; but the Church spirit passing through the Seminaries, shall forever characterize the denomination. We have God's promise that *his spirit* shall dwell always in *his Church*: but we have no such promise that *his spirit* shall dwell always, even in any particular part of his Church, much less in any permanent commission, faculty, board, or corporation. We the more insist upon these statements, and the pregnant truths they involve—because the manifest tendency of events, and drift of opinion, has been in the opposite direction: a tendency to localize the Seminary interest, instead of treating it as an interest most essentially universal—a drift of opinion toward a certain independence of the Seminaries, instead of their absolute dependence on the General Assembly. If there is anything in the topic we are illustrating, namely: the relation of the Assembly to the training of the Church and her ministers, then there is everything in the assertion that the great instrument of that training—namely, the Seminaries—should itself be trained the most sedulously of all. It is an instrument of unspeakable value, when kept in order, and rightly used: but of boundless peril, when used amiss, or left to itself.

The Board of Education under the care of the General Assembly, has for its object the selecting, the supporting, and the

supervision, in some degree, of the training, of the same class of persons who are professionally trained, afterward, in the Seminaries. It ought to be remarked that it is not obligatory on the students of theology to attend the Seminaries at all—and that many never do it; a certain period of private study, especially if it be under the care of an approved minister, being accepted as sufficient; that having been the original method. It will also be understood that the Presbyteries which have the special charge of licensing and ordaining candidates have the oversight of all candidates for the ministry; and it is of great importance that these candidates should put themselves under the care of the Presbytery, at the very commencement of their professional studies; and the Presbyteries should put a stop to the growing habit of licensing candidates of whom they have no personal knowledge—and who have been only a few months—or weeks—instead of two years (as required) under their care. The Board of Education, however, is a charity; and it is only indigent students, who desire to become ministers, and for whose support it makes provision, that have any connection with it. This class of students for the ministry is taken under the care of the Board, and supported through their academical and collegiate, as well as Seminary course—frequently occupying from seven to ten years. Properly speaking, it is only in a popular sense that these students can be called *candidates* for the ministry—before they commence their professional studies, and are taken under the care of some Presbytery. The number is very large; during about thirty years past, not having fallen, probably, under 300, and having risen as high, probably, as 600 or more, at a time. It has pleased God to select from those who are poor in this world's goods, a great number of ministers of the Gospel; and the profound sense of this settled course of Providence, has shown itself always in the bosom of the Presbyterian Church, in a certain aspect given to all its great efforts to promote the cause of education, and to establish institutions of learning, of all kinds. The idea of a religious education, the idea of charity connected with learning, the idea of a training that will be in the highest degree available to learned and able ministers of the Gospel—is never lost sight of—from the humblest congregational school to the highest university.

It is impossible to estimate the increased force which has, in this way, been imparted to the ministry of this Church—or the power of the solid and superior culture which has, under such ideas, become hereditary and universal in its bosom. That a certain restlessness—if even a stronger term would not be more appropriate—should exist in the Church, with relation to this Board, is perhaps to be attributed, mainly, to the sturdy and fixed convictions of the Presbyterian people, that habits of self-support and self-reliance, are in the long run, better for men, than anything that charity can do for them; and that the practical working of this enterprise does not appear to them to conciliate this great truth safely, with the equally important truths upon which the enterprise itself is founded. Some cause is also to be found for uneasiness, in certain extravagant and dangerous modern ideas, touching the relation of such enterprises as this to the true notion of a Divine call to the Gospel ministry—as if it were the universal duty of pious young men to preach—if they can be adequately trained—unless they can show reason to the contrary: a perilous heresy, which if accepted would fill the ministry with intruders. Some further cause for disquietude arose from a misdirection—generous in its origin and noble in its desires—given to the labors and objects of the Board; as if it was its design, or at all suitable to its nature, or to the circumstances of the Church or the country, to make it an instrument of nearly universal application, in promoting the general cause of education. All such things have appeared to us to be great misfortunes, which it was the province of the Assembly to have averted. The real ideas on which this enterprise rests, are simple, true, and of very great importance. They have operated from the foundation of the Presbyterian Church; and are capable of being developed and applied to her lasting benefit.

There is another enterprise, of the greatest importance, conducted by the General Assembly, and having a direct bearing both upon the moral and mental training of the whole Church, and to a certain extent of the whole country. We allude to its enterprise directed to the publication and distribution of books and tracts, called the Board of Publication. To a certain extent, efforts have always been made, under the supervision, more or less direct, of this Church, to use the produc-

tions of the press—books, tracts, and periodicals—as a means of culture for the people under its care. The organization now intrusted with this important work was created about twenty years ago, on the occasion of the general celebration of the two hundredth anniversary of the Westminster Assembly, by most churches in the world, which adopt the standards prepared by that great Synod. In this Church, which first suggested the celebration, there were peculiar reasons connected with the then recent, protracted, and violent semi-Pelagian controversy, which had just been brought to a triumphant conclusion; why these standards should be held in the highest estimation, why the Synod which formed them should be particularly revered, and why special gratitude to God should be openly expressed for the deliverance he had just wrought. The occasion was therefore used, not only to praise God and to instruct the people, but to make gifts by way of thank-offering, and out of the larger part of them to endow this Board of Publication. It is a monument of the faithfulness of God and the love of his people; and an instrument for the effectual preservation of the faith of the Church, by the creation and the perpetual dissemination of a literature worthy of that faith. We are not able to state the precise amount of the endowment then created—nor the amount of that afterward received: both were very large. These were great ideas, and great acts. They illustrate well that generation—and those times. The fashion has grown up, of late, and is spreading, as every leprosy is wont to do—to speak of that mighty controversy, and of that signal deliverance of the Church, and of the great and faithful servants of God who illustrated both; slightly—almost with compassion—as of that which the time is drawing near for the Church to draw a veil over—seeing that a peaceable spirit is now in her, and a generation no way responsible for the turbulent past—are now treading her courts. This Board of Publication—this mighty engine of the training of the Church—may, perhaps, be considered one of the last peculiar works, springing directly out of the state of the Church produced by the sharp discipline through which the Lord conducted her. The Board of Foreign Missions had a little preceded it; and the Boards of Domestic Missions and Education had been re-invigorated—all by the same genera-

tion. It will be time to forget, to revile, or even to excuse the past—when such monuments are excelled, or destroyed.

It is after about twenty years of great and generally successful labor, that the Church is now enabled to appreciate the nature of this enterprise, and to form some just conception of its boundless capabilities. With a great endowment—with one of the largest and finest reading communities in the world as its immediate patrons—with the richest religious literature that exists already prepared and at its use—with a large number of highly educated men, ministers, and others, at its command, who are capable, if anybody ever was capable, of reproducing the whole of that literature, if it were all lost; it is impossible to imagine higher facilities to be possessed, or greater inducements to be offered, than exist in the case of this Board. It can not be pretended that a very great work has not already been accomplished by it. But it ought not to be imagined, for a moment, that a much greater one is not capable of being done. There ought to be no spirit of fault-finding—when those who manage it, for the time being, commit mistakes: much less should they be treated with indignity, injustice, and cruelty—under any circumstances or pretexts whatever. On the other hand, nothing should prevent the Assembly from placing highly competent persons in charge of every department of a work so important, and so easily injured or abused; and from requiring of every one of them, the strictest fidelity to the immense interests committed to them. The scrutiny into the affairs of this Board, ordered by the last Assembly, will, we trust and believe, result to the credit of those who have it in charge, and to the satisfaction of the Church: while, it may be possible, it may also lead to improvements in various respects. We have always had the impression, that this Board, besides sustaining itself, and besides making the accumulations which its usefulness requires—ought also, to be able to do a great deal in the gratuitous distribution of its publications, and over and above all—have an annual surplus in the way of profits, subject to be applied to other charities, by the Assembly. It is very easy to overpay for all the work done for the Board; very easy to lose money in bad contracts; very easy to spend money in publishing books that have no saleable value. But it is very possible to avoid these

and similar errors. For ourself, however, we admit that it is the character and quality of the publications of this Board, that should be chiefly considered. And upon this point, after making all proper allowances, and after admitting that there is much to be commended; we suppose the general judgment of the Church would be, that, upon the whole, there is a good deal to be regretted—a good deal to be amended. Could it well be otherwise?

The Unfinished Business of the Assembly.

The habit of refusing to entertain questions which do not require to be immediately decided, and of declining to do business which belongs as appropriately to inferior tribunals, and of turning over affairs to the various agencies of the Assembly when they can be as well attended to by them: is becoming fixed in the Assembly—and is, we think—to be commended as wise. But the habit of laying over, from one Assembly to another, and even for a number of Assemblies, matters of importance which are regularly before the body; is every way inconvenient and evil—and seems to be fixing itself, from year to year. Important, too, as it may be, to have affairs of a particular kind examined by committees in the interval between one Assembly and another; it is unbecoming any tribunal—more especially one sitting in the name of Christ—to allow great interests to suffer by factious resistance, manifested under pretext of more careful consideration—when the real design is to prevent any decision. The sessions of the Assembly will have to be prolonged—or its time, when in session, more carefully husbanded—or its attention more scrupulously confined to matters that are at once pertinent and important; if the body is to remain as large as it now is, and desires to do its work satisfactorily, either to itself, or the Church. It would be of immense benefit, no doubt, to enforce all three of the remedies just suggested. But, undoubtedly, the permanent remedy would be, to adopt the annual commission of the Assembly—so long and so beneficially used by the Church of Scotland; which would, of itself, cure the evils we have mentioned. Or if some further remedy should be found necessary, by reason of the Assembly becoming too numerous to discharge its duties with decorum, comfort, and intelligence;

that would be found in a simple transfer of the representation from the Presbyteries to the Synods. Just as it was transferred from the Church sessions to the Presbyteries, when the original Synod divided itself into four, and created the Assembly.

Among the unfinished business which has been long depending, and which was neglected this year—is the overture to prepare a commentary on the whole Scriptures, in the sense of the standards of the Church—and designed to be complete, popular, and yet thorough. We do not know, exactly, in what way this subject stood on the minutes of the late Assembly; and, not being present when it was disposed of, in its last sitting, we only follow newspaper statements in saying it was laid over for consideration hereafter. It has been a number of years under consideration; sometimes in a detailed plan on the docket of the Assembly—sometimes in reports from committees—sometimes under consideration by those committees. Always a factious, often a virulent opposition has been manifested to the proposal, from certain quarters; always an earnest support from other quarters; always a serious interest on the part of the Assembly and the Church. The delay of any decision by the Assembly, that has been created in the manner just stated—has been favorable to the final success of the proposal, in so far as *time* has answered not a few of the arguments urged against it. For example, the Assembly's Board of Publication has actually begun, of its own accord, to publish commentaries;—whereas horror at even an apparent approval of the proposed commentary by the Assembly, was exhibited in the most energetic manner. And moreover, the commentaries that have been published, both in this and foreign countries, since this proposal was first made—have, on one hand, furnished some additional materials toward the great work contemplated; and, on the other, proved more and more clearly, how utterly futile it is for the Church to expect, or any body to promise, as the fruit of private labors—such a work as the people must have—and the Church must have prepared. In a more general sense, it is not saying too much to intimate that if this generation had possessed such an exposition of the whole Scriptures as the Presbyterian Church has been long competent to prepare; we probably never should have seen such times as we are passing through—and certainly

never would have seen Presbyterian ministers, the leaders and teachers of conspirators and traitors, over half this continent. And if this generation, even now, could suddenly receive such a treasure—upon how many questions now agitating the public mind, and full of danger to the country, would a clear light be thrown—to guide the members of our own communion, at least? How small, and how futile, do such considerations make those pretexts appear—upon which this great proposal was suppressed twenty years ago—and upon which it has been baffled for the past five years—and upon which, it is not improbable, it will yet be worn out by delays! If it pleases God—though this generation may not possess what it could illy do without—another generation may possess it.

The revision of the *Book of Discipline* has been depending before the Assembly, still longer than the overture for the preparation of a commentary: and, like it, has been again and again recommitted, with repeated changes in the committee. In this case, great labor has been bestowed on the work, by the committees which had it in charge. The Book of Discipline, in its revised form, has been three times printed; twice laid before the Assembly in that form; once distributed among the Presbyteries; and, at this Assembly, was ready to be reported in that form, and was actually distributed among the members of the body. The Assembly postponed the consideration of it—recommitted it—made changes in the committee—and directed it what course to take with the matter. It is doubtful if the Church is any nearer to the possession of an amended Discipline, than it was when the original committee was appointed: though probably the opinion is nearly unanimous, among the more experienced office-bearers of the Church, that the book in use stands greatly in need of amendment—and that the revised book reported, is—as a whole—a very great improvement. There are probably certain reasons, explaining this delay and hesitation, on the part of the Assembly—in addition to those we have before explained; but we shall not go into that part of the subject—nor into the merits of any of the points upon which a difference of opinion has manifested itself. We will only remark that the course into which the Assembly at Rochester (we think) fell, and which was still farther pursued by that at Columbus—of inviting the criti-

cisms of the whole Church upon the work of the committee before the Assembly itself could see it—nay in a manner making all the Presbyteries members of a *select* committee of the Assembly, appointed merely to deliberate and report to it, was as effectual a way to create delay—engender opposition to whatever might be agreed on—spoil the work—and finally defeat it—as could well have been devised. The proper course was, for a competent committee to compile a book, and report it to the Assembly: for that body to consider this book—amend it—reject—or adopt it: if it adopted it, then to send it down to the Presbyteries—that they might consider and reject it—or adopt it by their constitutional vote, and make it the law of the Church. If either the Assembly or the Presbyteries rejected the revised book—everything remained as it was. In either alternative of adoption or rejection—the sense of the Church would have been reached, in manner most likely to be deliberate and wise.

The Church does not punish—it *censures*: it does not treat sins as crimes, but as *offenses*—offenses against the laws of God, as expounded in the standards of the Church. *Discipline*, in its strict sense, is the administration of this law of God, against offenders—and the infliction of these censures upon those who are found, *upon trial*, to deserve them. And a *Book of Discipline* is, with reference to ecclesiastical courts, analogous to a *Code of Criminal Practice* with reference to civil courts. It makes no law—except to administer law already made. Standards of *Faith* and *Morals* are, in their very nature, unalterable—if right: the only possible ground of changing them being, that they had misconceived the Word of God. Standards of *Government*—become more liable to alteration, the more minute they are, and the more they enter into details: because the Word of God does not define the form of the Church, in all respects, as minutely, and as much in detail, as it does her faith and morals. Standards of *Discipline* are necessarily by far more minute than those of *Government*: moreover God corrects offenders, himself, by bringing them to repentance—and will punish them himself, in the great day: so that the field to be occupied by a Book of Discipline, is narrow, peculiar, extremely difficult, and very liable to be much misunderstood: and, therefore, the standards of all the Churches of the

Reformation—our own among the rest, on this subject, have fluctuated and remained imperfect. It is striking and humiliating to reflect, that of all Divine things—the part that has been left most to human wisdom, is the one that has been most variable, and that alone remains incomplete and unsatisfactory. Nor is anything in the history of the Church more remarkable, than the manner in which the principles upon which the administration of her discipline has proceeded, have been controlled by the great events in the progress of the world, and the career of the human race. The *form* of the Church and her *doctrine*—though both were corrupted—yet both were exempt from the necessity of resorting to human wisdom for support. It is into the discipline of the Church—everywhere over the earth—that human institutions, and human ideas, have most deeply penetrated. The moment you enter a Church Court that is engaged in trying an offense—you go back two thousand years, to the Roman Jurisprudence—carrying with you the peculiar notions of the Scottish Judicatures of the era of the Reformation—and gathering as you ascend the stream of time, the fruits of the subtleties of the middle ages. Are all these things sacred? On the other hand, are the fruits of so many ages to be despised, and to be cast ruthlessly upon the dunghill? Must we not discriminate that which is of heaven, and revere it: that which is of exalted human wisdom, and cherish it: that which is mixed of good and evil, and amend it: that which is simply a remnant of Roman sternness—or scholastic subtilty—or minute Scottish rigor—and reject it? Alas! must such a work for the Lord be abandoned, as exceeding our own ability? Must the learned, and patient, and godly labors which might have achieved it, be overwhelmed by innumerable crudities—invited by the Assembly—and poured like a destructive flood, upon a small measure of precious ointment?

There is one item more, among the unfinished business—which occurs to us too important to be omitted in a statement of this sort. It relates to a matter of the greatest interest—namely, *who are electors in the vocation and settlement of pastors of the congregations?* This subject came before the Assembly of 1861, by complaint (and probably by appeal) the Synod of Kentucky: and was discussed in that Assembly—and then

continued to the Assembly of 1862; on the last day but one of whose sessions, it was further continued, without discussion, to the Assembly of 1863. It was, if our recollection is correct, originally brought forward in the lower court (the Synod of Kentucky, or the Presbytery of Louisville—we think the former) *in thesi*: that is, not upon any case—but by way of establishing an interpretation of the standards of the Church. The interpretation given was, that no person can vote in these elections, who is not a member of the Church in regular standing, and who does not, in addition, contribute to the support of the Gospel in that congregation. This interpretation was believed to be, not only indiscreet and untimely—but also erroneous: and therefore the case was carried up to the Assembly, in order that the decision might be reversed, or corrected, or wholly set aside, as the wisdom of the Assembly might decide. The very great importance of the subject, both theoretical and practical—will excuse—if it does not require—a brief exposition of it.

The provision in the *Form of Government* which was intended to regulate the matter, and whose interpretation was given *in thesi*, by the Synod of Kentucky; is contained in the last clause of *chap. xv, sec. iv*, of that standard, and is in the words following, *viz.*: “In this election (that is, of pastor), no person shall be entitled to vote who refuses to submit to the censures of the Church regularly administered; or who does not contribute his just proportion, according to his own engagements, or the rules of that congregation, to all its necessary expenses.” In determining the meaning of this provision, it is to be observed, that it takes for granted that it is “*the people*” (see sections i, iv, v), who are “*the electors*”; the people, namely, who constitute “*any congregation*” (sec. i); who make up “*all the members of that congregation*” (sec. iii);—and whom the presiding minister notifies that “*he will immediately proceed to take the votes of the electors of that congregation*” (sec. iv). The provision above quoted, is a limitation of this universal right to vote in this election. First, *disorderly* members of the Church, are disqualified: for no one is liable to Church censures but a Church member—and no one else can refuse to submit to them, after they are regularly administered. Secondly, *whoever does not contribute*, etc., is disqualified. As to the

amount any one must contribute, that is determinable in one of two ways: (1) by "his own engagements," (2) by "the rules of that congregation." Whoever is a member of the Church—is, of course, a member of the congregation—and is one of the people—and so an elector;—unless disqualified, as above shown. Whoever—not being a member of the Church—is a member of the congregation, would be a qualified elector, but for the limitation stated above, namely, if he does not contribute, etc.: this omission of a plain and indispensable duty disqualifies him. To state the law positively, instead of negatively, there are two classes of qualified electors for the pastor of the congregation: (1) all the people being members of that congregation, who are in good standing in that particular Church; (2) all of them, who—not being Church members—are regular contributors to all its necessary expenses. And the Synod of Kentucky erred (1) by excluding every one but a Church member, and (2) all Church members who do not contribute. Its error lay in making the two disqualifications apply to one single class of persons—namely, Church members: when the law makes two classes of persons—namely, Church members—and contributors who are not Church members—and applies to each class, one disqualification, suitable to it. And that error of interpretation by the Synod, lay in a previous error of principle, namely, that only Church members are qualified or entitled, to judge of the suitableness of their own religious teachers,—or to express their own preferences by a vote. And that error of principle is founded on a total misconception of the true nature of the Christian Dispensation, with reference to the evangelization of the world. The Gentile world found entrance into the Christian Church, instrumentally, by one Roman Centurion, calling the Apostle Peter, from Joppa to Cesarea. And European Gentiles had the Gospel first preached to them, by means of two Greeks calling the Apostle Paul, in a vision, from Asia Minor into Macedonia.

If our space permitted, there are many things we would like to say on this subject. For though it seems to turn on the very narrow point we have just presented, it really involves interests of the greatest magnitude, and principles of the widest scope. If the interpretation of the Synod of Kentucky should be practically enforced by the authority of the Assembly, it

would produce a sweeping revolution, that would involve the whole Church. It would, moreover, make this revolution support a doctrine which is clearly false and abundantly hurtful; a portion of an absurd theory of the Church—which is partly founded in ignorance, and partly devised for mischief.

The matter of the Calumnies of Messrs. Robinson and Hoyt against Dr. Breckinridge, and the Action of the Assembly in the Case.

The public are aware of what occurred about the commencement of the past spring, in the attempt to suppress the *Danville Review*, and how the attempt was defeated by the publication of the card of Dr. Breckinridge, first published early in March. In that card (which will be found in the March number of this work), the following sentence occurs: "Before the first number of the work was issued, the Rev. Messrs. Stuart Robinson, Thomas A. Hoyt, and John H. Rice withdrew from the Association, of which they were members, because they understood the majority of its members desired me to advocate in its pages the loyal principles of my Discourse of the 4th of January, 1861—that is, because they were Secessionists." Let it be borne in mind that those three words—"they were Secessionists"—constitute the original offense which led Messrs. Robinson and Hoyt to publish their atrocious cards of about March 7th—and to issue the infamous and disgraceful publications with which both of them, and especially the former, followed up those cards. Let it also be borne in mind, that this statement at which they took offense, was literally and unquestionably true: that it is not clearly denied by either of them: that its truth has been unquestioned, since long before it was published, as above set forth—and confirmed by all that has happened since. And let it be further borne in mind, that the utterance of that truth in Dr. Breckinridge's card, was not only timely, necessary, and of the very essence of his appeal to the public in support of the *Danville Review*; but that the suppression of it by him, would have been an act of cowardice, a mere self-stultification, a gratuitous and injurious suppression of the truth, an ignoble trifling with the public and with vast interests in support of which he was risking his fortune, his life, and his character. Providence did not allow him to refuse to

issue that card: which his colleagues know he issued at the last extremity. Neither honor, manhood, nor truth, allowed him to practice deceit, least of all, in order to screen men who, as the event has proved, were ashamed of their principles, afraid to avow their convictions, and utterly unscrupulous concerning the means used to avoid just responsibility for both.

In the number of this work for March, 1862, is an article written by Dr. Breckinridge, under the title, "*In Memoriam. A Tribute to the Rev. Stuart Robinson: With Notices of the Rev. J. M. Worrall, the Rev. T. A. Hoyt, the Rev. R. L. Breck, and some others.*" Toward the close of that article, Messrs. Robinson and Hoyt are specially designated as having made charges peculiarly infamous, bearing especially upon the official conduct and character of Dr. Breckinridge, as a Professor in the Danville Theological Seminary. After dealing with these charges, the article closes with a paragraph containing the sentences which follow: "Upon this issue I shall put myself at the bar of the great tribunal of my whole Church, which of its own motion called me to my office, and whose good pleasure is the tenure by which I hold it. And I shall ask that illustrious Court, convened in the name, and by the authority of the Lord of lords, to do unto me, and unto my accusers, as they will answer to God in the great day. And that no obstacle I can remove, may stand in the way either of a full ability or a clear necessity, to meet the issue and decide it; I shall place the resignation of my office, with a brief memorial to the effect of this statement, in the hands of the Moderator of the Assembly, as soon as may be proper after it shall be constituted, at its immediately approaching sessions. Let my accusers take heed to this notice. And let God's people discern, by this case, the spirit that now worketh in the children of disobedience."

The Assembly convened on Thursday the 15th of May: and on the morning of the following Monday, the 19th inst., being the fourth business day, the paper printed first of those which immediately follow, was laid before the body by the Moderator, read at its bar, and referred to the committee named below. The first named member, and the two last, are Ruling Elders; the other four are Ministers of the Gospel; the whole so widely scattered as to represent nearly as many

Synods and States, as there were persons. The second and third of the printed papers, were filed with Dr. Breckinridge's memorial. The fourth printed paper, is the replication of Mr. Robinson to the memorial, filed that afternoon, and referred to the same committee. The printed card of Mr. Hoyt, alluded to in the replication of Mr. Robinson—and which went to the same committee, was published before the Assembly met; and could, of course, have no particular relation to the memorial of Dr. Breckinridge, written long after its publication; nor the memorial to it, as Dr. Breckinridge had never seen the card. A few words will be said of it presently: although the whole proceedings and utterances of Mr. Hoyt—his vile charges, and his mean way of backing out—are so thoroughly contemptible—that we are almost ashamed to mention him:

Memorial of Rev. Dr. Robert J. Breckinridge.

The following memorial from the Rev. Dr. Robert J. Breckinridge was then read:

“TO THE MODERATOR OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, IN SESSION AT COLUMBUS, OHIO:

“It is now just nine years since I was elected by the General Assembly one of the first Professors of its Theological Seminary at Danville, Kentucky. Being also, by Charter granted by the Legislature of the Commonwealth of Kentucky, one of the first Trustees of that Institution, I have devoted myself with great earnestness, and such success as it has pleased God to give me, to the work of founding, endowing, and managing that Institution, and to the instruction of nine successive annual classes of its students.

“Suddenly, and without any provocation on my part tending toward such accusations, but solely as the effect of personal malignity and public disloyalty, on the part of *Thomas A. Hoyt* and *Stuart Robinson*, both of them ministers in regular standing in the Church under the care of this venerable Court, and the latter now sitting as a member of this body, I find myself accused of immoralities and crimes, by both of them, in the most offensive terms, and in the most public manner, the bare suspicion of whose perpetration by me would render it unfit that I should hold my office of Professor; and concerning reparation for which

atrocious accusations, my direct and immediate way of redress as a *Professor*, brings me to the bar of this General Assembly.

"These accusations on the part of Thomas A. Hoyt, are contained in a publication signed by him, dated March 7, 1862, and published first in the *Evening Bulletin* and *Daily Journal*, both of Louisville, Ky., and about that time, and afterward, in other public journals. The accusations on the part of Stuart Robinson are contained in numerous publications, one of which has been distributed in pamphlet form to the members of this Assembly—utterly shameless in its character; but they were first published in the *Louisville Daily Journal*, over his signature, about the 7th of March, and afterward very extensively in the public journals.

"It is, more particularly, that aspect of these disgraceful accusations, intended to implicate my official character and conduct, as a *minister teaching theology by appointment of the Assembly*, to which I direct the attention of this tribunal; at the same time I would prefer that the deliverance of the Assembly should embrace every charge of every sort, contained in the publications now brought to its notice, and which I solemnly declare before God are, without exception, false and scandalous.

"The most distinct of the accusations made by Mr. Hoyt, in the sense above stated, are—that, as a *Theological Professor*, I have used my position and the sacred funds of my Institution as the means of hurling fire-brands among the Churches that raised me to that position and contributed those funds. The most distinct accusations of Mr. Robinson, in the sense above stated—some of them clearly put forward, some artfully insinuated, in verbose sentences, are—that, as *Professor of Theology*, I had by art, in an *immensely and unchristian way*, hounded on popular passion against my brethren—that, as a *Professor of Theology*, and a *teacher of religion generally*, I had used the position, given to me by the Church, to inculcate political dogmas—that, as a *Professor*, I had taken advantage of the pulpit and theological chair as a politician, and that I had claimed the solemnity and dignity of a *Theological Quarterly* and a *Theological Seminary* to invest my political views with a fictitious solemnity.

"The substance of these charges is, that being a Minister of the Gospel, exercising the office of a Professor of Theology, I have abused my position and perverted sacred funds, to the promotion of wicked and cruel ends, degrading both the pulpit and the theological chair, to the advancement of improper public objects, and unworthy personal aims. Against these libelous accusations, I come to the bar of this supreme tribunal of the Church, during whose good pleasure I hold my office of Professor of Theology; and pleading that they are false, and

that within the personal knowledge of Thomas A. Hoyt and Stuart Robinson, who have made them, I ask the Assembly to make such a deliverance in the premises, as in their judgment righteousness demands, and as my character, services, and office entitle me to expect. And in order to relieve the case, as far as I can, of all embarrassment, I hereby resign into the hands of the General Assembly my office of Professor in the Danville Theological Seminary, desiring the resignation to take effect at the end of the current Seminary year, namely: on the 1st of September, 1862.

"I deem it to be not only my clear right, under the circumstances which exist, to bring this matter, in this form, before the General Assembly; but my clear duty, both to myself and to the Assembly, to do so. What I have done, appears to me to have been not only right and commendable, but of that imperative necessity, that its rancorous condemnation involves impious disloyalty to the country in its hour of extreme peril, and the betrayal of God's cause and ordinances, as the Ruler of the Universe. No Christian man can, with a good conscience, hold any office which forbids him to attempt such service as I have been traduced for rendering to my country. And no tribunal of the Church of God can, without sin, refuse to protect the character of its children and servants, when they are pursued with ferocious and organized calumny, for doing that which is right in itself, unto which they are shut up by Divine Providence, and which is in full accordance with the sentiments of the Church herself.

"I file herewith, the action of the Board of Trustees, and that of the Board of Directors of the Danville Theological Seminary, with regard to the matters involved in this memorial. The second of these two papers discloses an action not yet completed; and it need not to have been filed now, but for a false and injurious statement concerning it, contained in the libelous publication of Mr. Robinson, which has been circulated among the members now sitting in this Assembly.

"[Signed,]

"ROBT. J. BRECKINRIDGE."

Action of the Board of Trustees of Danville Theological Seminary.

"An order, unanimously passed by the Board of Trustees of the Danville Theological Seminary, at the annual meeting at Danville, April 30, 1862:

"The attention of this Board has been called to certain publications recently made by responsible persons, in which an imputation is cast on

the Rev. Dr. Robert J. Breckinridge, in regard of his 'ideas of the extent to which ministers and Theological Professors may use their spiritual power or influence for the propagation and defense of their political opinions;' and in which it is charged that he has used 'his position,' as Theological Professor, and 'the sacred funds of the Institution, as the means of hurling fire-brands among the Churches that raised him to that position and contributed those funds.'

"Whereupon, this Board now declares that, if it be meant, which they are unwilling to believe, that Dr. Breckinridge, acting as trustee, has perverted the funds of the Seminary to improper uses, then the charge is without color of truth. And if it be meant that in his capacity as Professor, he has from his chair inculcated his political opinions, or that in his office, as a preacher in the Seminary, he has used the pulpit for such purposes, or that as a citizen, he has in this time of supreme peril to the Church and the commonwealth, done aught which is incompatible with the strict proprieties of his position in the Seminary, or is inconsistent with a true devotion to the welfare of the Church and the country, then, in either case, the charges and insinuations are all without foundation, and ought not to have been made.

"It was further ordered, that a copy of this minute be laid before the Board of Directors, and that it be published in the *Louisville Journal* and the *Philadelphia Presbyterian*.

"H. H. ALLEN,

"*Assistant Secretary Board of Trustees.*"

Action of the Board of Directors of Danville Theological Seminary.

"A minute of the Board of Trustees of the Danville Theological Seminary, touching certain grave charges made publicly against Dr. R. J. Breckinridge, was laid before the Board of Directors by order of the Board of Trustees; whereupon, at the suggestion of Dr. Breckinridge, who was present, and considering that this Board received this minute after most of the members who had been in attendance had departed, and at the moment of its adjournment, when only two members beside the presiding officer remained—it is ordered that said minute be referred to the next meeting of this Board.

"The above is a true copy of the action of the Board of Directors on the paper of the Board of Trustees, which was ordered to be laid before the Board of Directors (relating to certain charges publicly made against Dr. R. J. Breckinridge) at their late meeting.

"STEPHEN YERKES,

"*Danville, Ky., May 6, 1862.*

Secretary of the Board."

The foregoing papers were referred to the following select committee of the Assembly: Judge H. H. Leavitt, Chairman; J. M. Macdonald, Geo. Marshall, M. W. Staples, J. McDougall, H. K. Clarke, A. B. Belknap.

Rev. Dr. Stuart Robinson's Reply to Dr. Breckinridge.

The Moderator laid before the Assembly the following communication from Dr. Robinson: .

"Columbus, O., May 19, 1862.

"TO THE MODERATOR OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY:

"*Dear Sir:*—The General Assembly having to-day received, read, and referred to a select committee, an extraordinary letter from Dr. Robert J. Breckinridge, concerning a personal controversy now pending between himself of the first part, and the Rev. Messrs. Hoyt, Robinson, and others of the second part—which letter contains charges against the undersigned grossly unjust, and, if allowed to pass unchallenged upon your records, obviously injurious to the good name of four ministers of the Synod of Kentucky—the undersigned, therefore, begs leave through you to submit to the Assembly his solemn remonstrance against further proceedings in the case, with the grounds of it.

"1. The undersigned denies that any higher obligation rests upon the Assembly to protect the character of professors in its Seminaries than that of the pastors of its Churches. Much less can there be any obligation to adopt extraordinary methods for the protection of a professor's good name at the expense of the good name of four pastors of the Church.

"2. That in the present case, the call upon the Assembly is for not only extraordinary but extra-constitutional interference, is manifest enough, when it is remembered that, on the one hand, the assault upon these pastors involves charges of moral delinquency which the constitution of the Church requires to be tried by judicial process before the Presbytery to which they belong, and not to be decided by mere resolution of the General Assembly; and, on the other hand, the resignation of a professorship, by means of which this case purports to come before the Assembly, should, according to the constitution of Danville Seminary, be laid before the Board of Directors of the Seminary, on six months' notice, to be by them referred to the Assembly.

"3. And what renders this call for extraordinary and extra-constitutional methods of procedure the more unreasonable, is the notorious fact that the whole difficulty was begun by Dr. Breckinridge himself, in the first instance by a gross assault upon four of his brethren in a card

appealing to the whole country against them. And they have published nothing except in self-defense—first against the groundless charge of his card, and secondly in response to a highly injurious article in the *Danville Review*, which article of itself should exclude its author from all claim upon any special sympathy and countenance of Christian men. And the undersigned respectfully submits to the candor of the General Assembly whether one who has stirred up a disgraceful strife with his brethren and appealed to the tribunal of public opinion through the press, now when his assault is successfully repelled before the tribunal of his own choosing, has any claim to an appeal, in this extraordinary manner, to the highest tribunal of Christ's Church, for a decision to set aside the verdict of the public against him.

"The undersigned, therefore, solemnly remonstrates against any action of this Assembly in the premises which may add to the damage already done to religion, by disturbing this court and the Church with a disgraceful personal quarrel, except under the restrictions of judicial trial, according to the forms of the constitution.

"At the same time, however, he does not mean, by this remonstrance to waive any right, should the Assembly entertain the question further, to defend himself and assail his accuser, within the limits of any method of procedure adopted.

"Nor does he feel the least concern touching the question whether he shall be able to justify his conduct in the premises before any impartial tribunal.

"In behalf of Rev. T. A. Hoyt, who is not present, the undersigned requests that the card of Mr. Hoyt, of May 11th, explanatory of his course, be made a part of this letter, and receive the same direction that the letter may receive.

"Respectfully, yours,

"STUART ROBINSON."

This replication of Mr. Robinson, when compared with his previous conduct, with the position which he and the whole subject occupied, and with the line of conduct which every one must see a conscientious man, in his place, was shut up to pursue; is as thorough a proof of his guilt, as if he had openly confessed it all. There he was on the floor of the Assembly: there were his specific charges, widely made, and insolently published anew in a pamphlet distributed in the House, nearly as soon as he took his seat in it: there was Dr. Breckinridge facing him, not only with a direct denial of them all, and an emphatic denunciation of him as a shameless calumniator, but

with a demand of judgment as to himself, to the utmost extent he could require it. Now, what could a sincere man do, in Mr. Robinson's place, but assert the rectitude of what he had before done? What could a truthful man do, but reiterate his former accusations? What could a brave man do, but face the responsibility he had ostentatiously assumed? What could an honest man do, but accept the issue directly put to him by Dr. Breckinridge?

On the contrary, what course does Mr. Robinson take when brought to the bar of the Assembly? He first circulates a libelous pamphlet—then breaks down, and files an evasive, false, and despicable plea against any further proceedings in the case! He does not pretend to deny that he is a Secessionist—he does not dare to deny that he had made the accusations against the *official* conduct of Dr. Breckinridge—he does not admit that he made them—he does not offer to maintain them—he does not even avow his belief that any of them are true! He pleads falsely that Dr. Breckinridge was the aggressor—and in bar, and falsely again, that the whole affair was merely a “personal controversy.” He submits “*to the Assembly his solemn remonstrance against further proceedings in the case*”—and enforces that remonstrance by pleas purely technical in part, utterly false in part, supremely ridiculous in part, and personally disgraceful to himself as a whole, and in particular. Namely: such as that Dr. Breckinridge had not resigned in the right way; that a pastor ought to be as much protected as a professor; that the case “*involves charges of moral delinquency*” against him (Mr. Robinson); that he had a constitutional right to be tried by his Presbytery; that Dr. Breckinridge had forfeited all right in the premises, by appealing to the public; that the country had decided against him on that appeal; that he was not entitled to the sympathy of Christian men; that the Assembly ought not to reverse the judgment of the public. Having filed such a replication as soon as he clearly discovered that the matter was not in a condition to be helped by his usual resort to bullying and insolence; he then so far put constraint on himself as to be quiet in public, while he used all diligence in private to get as easily out of the difficulty as possible. He said little in the Assembly: nothing, heard by us, that was personally offensive. He even retracted publicly

one of his slanders—and contrived a scene in the Assembly in order to do so with effect. His last effort—if fairly reported (we did not hear it)—was an attempt to escape complete disgrace, based on a sense of total defeat. What a contrast had three months produced, in the utterances of this man!

This replication, along with the card of Mr. Hoyt, which was filed with it, went to the committee of seven—whose names have been printed on a previous page. This committee made a report to the Assembly, embracing their view of the whole case on Friday morning, the 23d of June, being the eighth business day of the session. At the same time, a report was made by a minority of the committee, consisting of the Rev. Dr. J. M. Macdonald, of the Presbytery of New Brunswick, and the Rev. M. W. Staples, of the Presbytery of Chicago; which they offered as a substitute for the committee's report; and the case lay over till Monday, the 26th of May, the tenth day of the sessions. It was discussed during that day, and decided in a session held at night. On the final hearing, Dr. Macdonald made an attempt to offer for adoption by the House, something which he denominated "*a compromise paper*"—which the Moderator ruled to be out of order, as a substitute for the two pending reports; and also ruled that Dr. Macdonald could not be allowed to withdraw the minority report and let his "*compromise paper*" take its place. Dr. Macdonald appeared to have fully accepted Mr. Robinson's notion, that the affair ought to be considered merely as "*a personal controversy*;" similar, perhaps, to Mr. Robinson's attack on one of Dr. Charles Hodge's patriotic articles, which he denounced as a compound of Jesuitism and Black Republicanism. At any rate, we are his debtor for reading to the Assembly, while opposing the report of the committee, some extracts from our writings on the subject of slavery; the exact object of which was not very obvious—and which was the more noteworthy, because it was the only occasion on which that exciting topic was brought to the notice of the Assembly, and because the somewhat extended reading (of good doctrine, as we think) failed to excite a single remark from any quarter. The Assembly, however, rejected the minority report. It also rejected various suggestions, motions, and proposed amendments. It adopted the *first* and *second* resolutions of the committee, we

believe, unanimously. It amended the *third* resolution, by striking out at its close a specific allusion to the action of the Board of Trustees of the Danville Seminary. It amended the *fourth* resolution, by making *our conduct* (which was precisely what Mr. Robinson attacked), instead of our *utterances* touching the great rebellion, entitle us "*to the gratitude of the Church and the country.*" And it amended the *fifth* resolution by omitting, on the motion of Dr. Hoge, eulogium on us, which he said was too great for that court to bestow on any man, during his life; and which we, with many thanks to the committee for their good opinion, asked the Assembly to omit, as being far more than we deserved. In its amended form, the report was adopted unanimously, we believe; certainly without declared opposition. It is, of course, needless to say that the minute adopted by the Assembly, was all that we—or any man—could possibly ask: all that truth and righteousness required the Assembly to do. We are left free to pursue our personal redress, if we see proper, and as we see proper. The principles involved are all decided as we think they should be. Notwithstanding all that all the conspirators against us have said and done—the confidence of the Assembly in us remains unimpaired; and our conduct entitles us to gratitude. As the result, and in view of the whole case, that body declined to accept our resignation. Whether we shall continue to hold our office as Professor, or to lay it aside—is matter for our own personal decision; acquitted and honored by the General Assembly of the Church, in either case. If our calumniators feel encouraged by the progress of the affair thus far—they can either proceed as heretofore, or select some new method of attack, as may be most agreeable to themselves. The speech of Mr. Robinson, on the amendment to the *third* resolution, as we find it reported in the Presbyterian of June 7th, to which we have before referred—besides the purpose already attributed to it, was the announcement of his pretext for leaving the ministry, when he got ready—or for staying in it till he was ready. The alteration made in that resolution was perfectly immaterial both to its sense, and the sense of the whole minute; as will readily be seen by comparing the report as it came from the hands of the committee, with the same report as it was amended and adopted by the Assembly. We

print both; the latter in the text, the former in a foot-note; the one as *reported* is taken from the *Presbyterian* of May 31st, the one as *adopted*, from the *New York Observer* of June 7th:

Report as Adopted.

"The Committee, to whom were referred the papers relating to the resignation of the Rev. R. J. Breckinridge, D. D., as a Professor in the Danville Theological Seminary, with a communication from the Rev. Stuart Robinson, D. D., in behalf of himself and the Rev. T. A. Hoyt, recommend the adoption of the following resolutions:

"1. *Resolved*, That in so far as these papers involve the personal relations or controversies of the parties named, the Assembly can take no cognizance of them, unless in a judicial proceeding, prosecuted in the mode prescribed by the Constitution of the Church; and, as to these, the Assembly therefore express no opinion.

"2. *Resolved*, That as the office of Professor in our Theological Seminaries is held under the authority and by the appointment of the General Assembly, it is competent for that body, at the request of any one holding that position, or, on their own motion, to inquire into his acceptability and usefulness in that office.

"3. *Resolved*, That, in the judgment of the Assembly, no facts have come to their knowledge which impair their confidence in Dr. Breckinridge as a Professor in the Danville Seminary.

"4. *Resolved*, That the Assembly do not concede that, in accepting a Professor's chair in the Seminary, Dr. Breckinridge did necessarily yield the right of expressing freely his views in relation to matters of great national concernment; and that, in their judgment, his bold and patriotic stand, in reference to the great conflict now in progress, entitles him to the gratitude of the Church and the country.

"5. *Resolved*, That, in view of the whole case, the Assembly declines to accept his resignation."*

The pamphlet which, as we have before said, Mr. Robinson caused to be carried to Columbus, bears the imprint of Hanna

** Report as made.*

"The Committee to whom were referred the papers relating to the resignation of the Rev. R. J. Breckinridge, D. D., as a Professor in the Danville Theological Seminary, with a communication from the Rev. Stuart Robinson, D. D., in behalf of himself and the Rev. T. A. Hoyt, recommend the adoption of the following resolutions:

"1. *Resolved*, That, in so far as these papers involve the personal relations or

& Co., Louisville, Ky.) and distributed in the hall in which the Assembly sat, contains thirteen closely printed pages, taken from the columns of his newspaper for 8th of May, 1862; with a *note* added, concerning some recent proceedings of the *West Lexington Presbytery*; wherein that body, by the solid vote of as many Secession ministers and elders as could be got together, and the help of certain Union members of the body, refused to lend the aid of the Presbytery toward supplying the Churches with a proper religious newspaper, in place of the one which Dr. Hill sold to Mr. Robinson and his partners. The pamphlet is entitled, "*An Appeal to the Christian Public, etc., by Stuart Robinson.*" Speaking of the action of the *Board of Directors* of the Danville Seminary, on the action of the Board of Trustees (certified copies of both of which we filed with our memorial, and have printed on a previous page); he grossly misrepresents that action—as of his own knowledge—and as if repeating not only an undoubted fact, but one very injurious to us. His words are: "But though it was voted "(that is, by the Trustees) to lay this action before the Direct-

controversies of the parties named, the Assembly can take no cognizance of them, unless in a judicial proceeding, prosecuted in the mode prescribed by the Constitution of the Church; and as to these, the Assembly therefore express no opinion.

"2. *Resolved*, That as the office of Professor in our Theological Seminaries is held under the authority, and by the appointment of the General Assembly, it is competent for that body, at the request of any one holding that position, or on their own motion, to inquire into his acceptability and usefulness in that office.

"3. *Resolved*, That in the judgment of the Assembly, no facts have come to their knowledge which impair their confidence in Dr. Breckinridge, as a Professor in the Danville Seminary; and they are fortified in this conclusion by the official declaration of the Board of Trustees of the Institution, that all the charges and insinuations against him are without foundation.

"4. *Resolved*, That the Assembly do not concede, that in accepting a Professor's chair in the Seminary, Dr. Breckinridge did necessarily yield the right of expressing freely his views in relation to matters of great national concernment; and that, instead of censure and condemnation, his lucid and able utterances on the rise, history, and character of the great conflict now in progress, entitle him to the gratitude of the Church and the country.

"5. *Resolved*, That the Assembly, duly appreciating the eminent qualifications of Dr. Breckinridge as a teacher of theology, and his great usefulness in that department, would deeply regret his withdrawal from his present position, and therefore decline the acceptance of his resignation."

“ors—the proper judges of such a question for the Seminary—
“unfortunately these Directors declined to have anything to
“do with it!!” In our *memorial* we call attention to this
falsehood, and file the certified copy of the minute of the
Directors just now alluded to, wherein it is shown that so far
from having “*declined to have anything to do with it!!*” they
received it, treated it with all respect, and then, *at the suggestion*
of Dr. Breckinridge—as they state—and for perfectly conclusive
reasons also stated, laid the minute of the Board of Trustees
over for consideration at the next meeting of the Board of
Directors. Two things induce us to take special notice of this
matter; one illustrating the character and conduct of Mr.
Robinson—the other illustrating a supposed affiliated element
of his in the Board of Directors of the Seminary. Some days
before the matter of our memorial was decided, Mr. Robinson
asked the leave of the Assembly to make a personal explanation;
the object of which seemed to be, to show *probable*
cause why the positive falsehood he had circulated to our
injury, might agree *substantially* with the directly opposite
truth to an advantage, which was established by a record in
possession of the House. The sum of his explanation was,
that what he had stated was derived from a member of the
Board of Directors—and that another member of that Board
had written him a note, delivered as he came through Cincinnati,
reiterating the truth of the former information, and referring
him to a third Director who would prove it, if it was called in
question. Upon this, we recapitulated the facts of the case,
as within our personal knowledge, as well as that of two
members of the Assembly (Rev. Messrs. Caldwell and Hogue,
of Kentucky), and as made certain by the record filed:
and Mr. Caldwell, who had presided at the meeting of the
Directors, made a statement. Mr. Robinson’s first evasion
was, that in *our absence* from the Board, the alleged hostile
decision *might* have been made: driven from this, his next
evasion was, that it *might* have been come to at some informal
and private meeting: driven from this as neither responsive
to the printed charge, nor reputable to the Directors—he
acknowledged he had been mistaken—and took back the printed
falsehood. Now it is useless to remark on the characteristic
recklessness of the man (and his comrades, if he reports them

truly); and equally useless to show that there is no certainty whether these Directors, whose names are concealed, are any more truly reported by him in his explanation, than in his pamphlet. But it is not useless to bear in mind, supposing him to have told the truth either time, what a condition of things is revealed as existing in the bosom of that Board of Directors. There are fifty-six members of that Board. They are our official superiors. How many of them may be Secessionists, we do not know. How many of them are secretly helpers of Mr. Robinson, in his diabolical pursuit of us, we do not know; but if he is to be believed, a considerable portion of the very small number, who composed the last meeting: and that number probably not much diminished, by certain elections made in the last Assembly, contrary to our individual remonstrance in the Board, and when matters were so arranged in the Assembly, that it was impossible for us, consistently with self-respect, to appeal to the Assembly against objectionable and inimical persons, put over us by its vote, in ignorance of the facts of the case. And yet, assuredly, we have no idea of allowing ourself to falsify that Scripture, which tells us it is in vain that the net is spread in the sight of any bird. Is the conspiracy whose first attempt was crushed by the public, and its second attempt defeated by the Assembly, about to make its third attempt through the Board of *Directors* of the Danville Theological Seminary? Is that the meaning of Mr. Robinson's recent professions of solicitude for the prosperity of that Institution—explained by his intrigues with certain Directors of it, and their alleged espionage over us, for his edification?

It has been stated already that Mr. Robinson made "*the card of Mr. Hoyt, of May the 11th, explanatory of his course,*"—as he expresses it, a part of his own replication to the memorial of Dr. Breckinridge. In his speech in the Assembly on the evening of May 26th, as reported in the *Presbyterian* of June 7th, while opposing the third resolution of the committee on our memorial (see the report of the committee, and the minute of the Assembly, on a previous page), he took occasion to eulogize Mr. Hoyt as "*the noble and manly young brother,*" and to indorse his card of May 11th as "*his dignified and triumphant refutation of the very charge here pronounced*"—which he predicts

"the public at large will judge to be a triumphant refutation in face of all General Assembly decisions." What charge does he mean? What is it that is refuted in a manner so dignified and so triumphant? And what is the refutation? We state the charge with perfect clearness in our *memorial*, thus: "*The most distinct of the accusations made by Mr. Hoyt in the sense above stated are, that, as a Theological Professor, I have used my position, AND THE SACRED FUNDS OF MY INSTITUTION as the means of hurling fire-brands among the Churches that had raised me to that position and contributed those funds.*" And we had stated in a previous paragraph of that memorial, that, "These accusations on the part of Thomas A. Hoyt, are contained in a publication signed by him, dated March 7, 1862, and published first in the *Evening Bulletin*, and *Daily Journal*, both of Louisville, Ky., and about that time, and afterward in other public journals." We have before us now, and copy the words of that original publication, which the reader will see we copied as nigh as possible, verbally, in stating, in our memorial to the Assembly, Mr. Hoyt's most distinct accusations. Mr. Hoyt's words are, "It is additional and mournful evidence of the violence of existing passions, * * * * that a Theological Professor should use his position AND THE SACRED FUNDS OF HIS INSTITUTION, as the means of hurling fire-brands among the Churches that raised him to that position, and contributed those funds." We suppose it surpasses even the effrontery of Mr. Robinson and Mr. Hoyt, to deny that the charges are accurately stated by us, from the published card of Mr. Hoyt of March 7, 1862: and it certainly surpasses any power of lying ever acquired by a mere man, to deny that he meant us by "*a Theological Professor,*" when his card has for its caption, "Rev. Dr. Breckinridge's Card," and the entire pretext of it is to defend the author of it from the three words—"they were Secessionists"—used by us. In such a contingency, how does Mr. Hoyt escape? Why, in a way, that in a criminal court, and about matters *ex delictu*, as the law books say—has a very ugly name, and very disagreeable consequences. *He altered his published card.* After getting all the advantage possible, from the slander in its actionable form—he surreptitiously, and without notice, altered it. And both he and Mr. Robinson now put forward the altered card—not only as proof that he never made the alleged charge against us; but as the basis

of the "*dignified and triumphant refutation*" of the allegation that he did make it! This is the conduct of one Presbyterian preacher, under the inspiration of treason—that so delights another one, under extra spiritual enlightenment! How Mr. Hoyt came to commit such an outrage as to publish a libelous attack in the newspapers, and then, without notifying the public, or even the person attacked; surreptitiously change the sense of the charges; he shall state himself. In his card of May 11th, as denominated by Mr. Robinson in filing it with the Assembly, he speaks thus: "And lest any ambiguity should attach to the use of the word '*funds*,' in sending my card to the *Philadelphia Presbyterian*, and afterward to the *True Presbyterian*, I substituted the word '*prestige*,' thus avoiding, as I thought, the possibility of misconception, and conveying the exact meaning that I intended: etc." We would quote, and expose the remainder of the disgraceful subterfuge—if it was shorter, or if it was any way material. Now Mr. Hoyt and Mr. Robinson profess to believe, that to accuse a Theological Professor with using "*the sacred FUNDS of his Institution*" for cruel and unlawful purposes, is *ambiguous*; and that the *ambiguity* is totally removed by substituting the word "*PRESTIGE*" for the word "*funds*!" Nay, they profess to believe, that after this substitution is made—it is impossible for all Mr. Hoyt's accusations to mean anything that Dr. Breckinridge, or the Board of Trustees, or the committee of the Assembly, or any one upon earth, might suppose he meant; except simply, and merely, and exclusively, that he meant that Dr. Breckinridge published a violent personal assault upon the pastors of four churches! There were, however, but *three* pastors—and the assault was contained in three words—viz.: "*they were Secessionists.*" Is it capable of belief that Mr. Hoyt or Mr. Robinson, even imagined that the four churches of Louisville—which they use as a subterfuge, gave us our position in the Seminary—or gave the Seminary its sacred funds,—or its "*prestige*?" Is it capable of belief that either of them really imagined, that the statements of the Danville Board of Trustees, condemning their malignant accusations of us, were *merely hypothetical*? Is it capable of belief, that Mr. Hoyt who surreptitiously changed his published accusations, or Mr. Robinson who ignored the original publication of March 7, and used as the original, the falsified one afterward published in his

own paper—actually supposed that the change was honestly made by the former, and honestly represented by the latter? Alas! no: these things are not capable of belief. God alone can read the heart of man. It is not for us, therefore, to say that men who profess to be followers of Christ, and pretend to preach the Gospel in our own Church, are really children of Satan. But it does become us to say, that the line of conduct they have allowed themselves to adopt in this matter, is utterly disgraceful. And although the card of Mr. Hoyt of May 11th, filed by Mr. Robinson, is a retraction of his charges made on the 7th of March, upon which we went to the Assembly; and Mr. Robinson's final speech in the Assembly, on the night of June 26, as reported, thoroughly indorses Mr. Hoyt's retraction—and as thoroughly denies the sense put generally, if not universally, upon his own accusations, which took us to the Assembly; we honestly confess, that the conduct of both of them in their attempts to evade the responsibility of what they had done—however it may increase our triumph—increases the bad opinion we had of them before. How is it possible to judge, or feel, otherwise?

The true nature of Mr. Robinson—irrespective of what any one may suppose Divine grace has done toward correcting its specific tendencies—has been strikingly illustrated by the successive steps he took from the issuing of Dr. Breckinridge's card about the 5th of March—till the unanimous adoption of the deliverance of the Assembly, on Dr. Breckinridge's memorial about the 26th of May. Within less than three months, his conduct exhibited in the clearest manner, the successive phases of his peculiar nature, which the following brief summary of facts will place distinctly before the reader. His *first* exhibition was his card (perhaps we should rather say *cards*—for he, like Mr. Hoyt, issued amended editions—one or more); in which, assuming the illustrious—the extra spiritual—and pretending to take the highest offense at the explanation (namely, that *he was a Secessionist*) which Dr. Breckinridge gave of conduct of which that was not only the true explanation, but, in the *temper* of the times, the least hurtful one that could be given; he launched defiance, proclaimed triumph, and announced a glorious career! His *second* exhibition was "An Appeal to the Christian Public"—first printed about the 8th of May in the newspaper he had then recently

purchased from Dr. Hill—and afterward published in pamphlet form—and distributed among the members of the General Assembly, which met on the 15th of that month. This exhibition was made, professedly, in reply to an article in the March number of the Danville Review (issued about the middle of April), entitled "In Memoriam," etc., in which Dr. Breckinridge—*confining himself absolutely* to the matters already published against him, made his defense. The coarse and vulgar element in Mr. Robinson's nature—disguised by the assumed grandeur and spirituality of his previous exhibition—now burst over all bounds. His card was infamous; but his appeal was shameless and atrocious. The descent from the sham spiritual hero—to the mere bully, though natural, was dreadful. And the effect upon the members of the Assembly though perfectly incomprehensible to Mr. Robinson—was so obviously—astonishment and disgust; that in his folly and alarm, he published and distributed among them, by way of excuse for his brutality, a four page tract, containing some of the best paragraphs of Dr. Breckinridge's "In Memoriam," etc. His *third* exhibition was his replication, filed about the 19th of May (printed on previous pages of this article), in answer to Dr. Breckinridge's memorial to the Assembly. The sham hero having previously developed into the ruffian, now developed into the pettifogger. He had committed unprovoked outrages enough to disgrace a hundred respectable men—supposing any respectable man would commit either of them. But no evasion was too silly or contemptible, too false or unmanly, to be eagerly embraced, if it offered any chance of escaping the responsibility he had boastfully incurred. His *fourth* exhibition was made in his speeches, explanations, and whole conduct relating to this subject after filing his replication in the Assembly, and discovering that all his attempts at evasion, all his pettifogging, all his protests against any further proceedings in the Assembly, would not prevent that body from making a deliverance on it. We have, on previous pages, described the scene he got up, in order to open the way for a retraction for effect, of one of his miserable calumnies; and we have alluded cursorily to that portion of his final speech, in which upon an immaterial amendment, he glorified his past ministry, and disclosed his ulterior course and views, *in the prospect of giving it up, in case the Assembly should suppose the Danville*

Trustees meant anything more than a hypothesis, in their minute against his calumnies. These, however, are but illustrations of a whole course of behavior—temporary it is true, and for effect—in which, after the hero has turned braggart—and the braggart has turned pettifogger—the pettifogger becomes sentimental, and resorts to tragic sorrow!

Now, taking all the case together—all the publications—all the circumstances—all the conduct of all the parties—all the deliverances, from that of the public to that of the General Assembly; is it incumbent on Dr. Breckinridge, to go back upon the calumnious "*Appeal*," etc., of Mr. Robinson, which he distributed first to mankind through his newspaper, and afterward in pamphlet form to the members of the Assembly, and confute, one by one, the shocking falsehoods with which it is filled? Calumnies which have no connection whatever with the original cause of the difficulty, nor any bearing on it; and the whole of which we could have gotten Mr. Robinson's own testimony to disprove, any time before he became a Secessionist. Calumnies before which decency, the ties of blood and friendship, even death is nothing. Calumnies, against which the grave of Dr. Young, and the feelings of his family, oppose no obstacle. Calumnies, which the savage desire of wounding the mutual affection which has long existed between Dr. Humphrey and Dr. Breckinridge, only stimulates. Calumnies, which the diabolical hope of alienating from Dr. Breckinridge the love of his only living brother, stigmatizes as fiendish. Calumnies, perfectly irrelevant to anything he had to prove or disprove—utterly gratuitous and unprovoked—covering the exact and entire period during which he long professed the greatest admiration for Dr. Breckinridge, and the warmest devotion to him—knowing all the time, as he now testifies, that Dr. Breckinridge was wholly unworthy of either. Calumnies, for redress of which this man—in all respects, and in every way, is nearly as completely out of the reach of any further responsibility—whether personal or official—whether in his body, his goods, his office, or his character, as he ought to be held thoroughly degraded by the transactions and events of the past few months. *At this time, and in this way*, is it incumbent on Dr. Breckinridge to pursue that part of this general matter?

Our judgment is, that it is not even proper to do so. As we

have already said, the General Assembly, while approving and indorsing our *official conduct* and awarding us praise and thanks for that which Mr. Robinson and Mr. Hoyt had traduced and villified us for, expressly decided that the *private and personal* aspects of the case were not subject to its cognizance—as they then stood. We are aware that Mr. Robinson pretends to believe that a decision in this form, does not condemn him, but only justifies Dr. Breckinridge. We are equally aware that every one having either conscience, honor, or sense, readily sees that no one can have either, who, situated as Mr. Robinson is, can be satisfied with what he would have it believed, satisfies him. For the rest, we reserve to ourself the whole question of further personal redress, and the time and manner thereof, against these men, and their comrades. It is not our habit to use menaces. It is our habit, when we seek redress, to get it: perhaps what occurred at the late General Assembly, may be considered an illustration. As to vengeance—God has said it is his: and he has promised to repay to those who abuse his name and outrage his laws, in their malice against his children, the full measure of their iniquities. In his righteous dealings with the wicked, he often uses instruments; and he may judge fit to use us, in this case. We shall see. To us it is perfectly evident, that if he cares enough for these men to save them from destruction—he has dealings in store for them, of which they, in their present fearful backsliding, have little thought: and at this bare suggestion of which, their deluded supporters will, no doubt, scoff. If among those supporters there be any children of God—or any loyal to their country—it would be well for them to take to heart the fate of those, who are willingly partakers of other men's sin's. It is easy to say that all this matter is *political*—all this difficulty is *personal*, and so content themselves. On the contrary, it is *sin*. It is heresy and schism in the Church; it is conspiracy and treason in the commonwealth; it is malice, and false witness, and hatred, and envy, against God's children. It is sin—*grievous sin*. And God will require it of his servants, and will exact it both of the Church and the State—if the leaders in such sins go uncensured and unpunished.

ERRATA.

The reader will please correct the following errata in our article on Imputation, in the Number for March.

On page 60, line 25, for *ab* read *ob*.

P. 65, second line of note, for *those* read *that*, and omit *the*.

P. 69, l. 8 from bottom, for *sins were* read *sin was*.

P. 71, l. 18, for *mediate* read *immediate*.

P. 71, l. 22 and once in the note, for *affirmanus* read *affirmamus*.

P. 71, l. 3 of note, for *tantum* read *tantum*.

P. 72, l. 20, for *statement* read *statements*.

P. 73, l. 22, dele *it*.

P. 75, l. 8, for the second *of* read *to*.

P. 80, l. 7, for *in this* read *in thesi*.

P. 80, l. 17, for *perpetuate* read *perpetrate*.

P. 85, l. 16, for *ancestors* read *ancestor*.

P. 96, l. 23, for *perfection* read *perfections*.

P. 99, near the bottom, read *Bugenhagen*.



DANVILLE REVIEW.

No. III.

SEPTEMBER, 1862.

ART. I.—*The Secession Conspiracy in Kentucky, and its Overthrow: with the Relations of both to the General Revolt.*

A Memoir of Civil and Political Events, public and private, in Kentucky; To serve as a History of the Secession Conspiracy which had its center in Kentucky: Commencing in 1859, and extending to the overthrow of the Conspiracy, and the breaking out of the Civil War in that State in 1861.

PART THIRD.—The final struggle of Parties: Complete success of the Counter Revolution against the Conspirators: The Legislature declares for armed support of the National Cause: The Civil War breaks out in Kentucky.

I.—1. Conference of loyal citizens at General Nelson's Camp at Dick Robinson, on the 29th of August, 1861: The effective Loyal Force: The Stake and the Risk.—2. Preliminary Considerations and Decisions, in the Conference.—3. Detailed statement of the Plan of Defense agreed on, and executed.—4. Invasion of Kentucky by Polk and Zollicoffer, simultaneous with the Rebel Demonstration in Owen, and the Loyal Conference at Nelson's Camp: Alarming Hesitation of the Legislature.—5. Alarm and Hesitation of the Rebel Leaders: Indignation of the people at the Invasion of the State, and the apparent stupor of the Legislature: Recoil of the Owen Meeting, from its war policy: It procrastinates—changes its Strategy—is a Failure.

1. Six clear days—August 29th, September 5th—were all that remained after the Conference at Camp Dick Robinson met, until the great Owen demonstration of the Secessionists.

Besides General Nelson, and the chief persons, then or since engaged in the military service, we do not feel it to be proper to mention, without their consent, the names of other persons then present. Colonel Bramlette, for many years a distinguished Judge, and at that time Colonel of the Third Regiment of Kentucky Infantry, was in the Conference: so also was Colonel Fry, then commanding the Fourth Kentucky Regiment, and afterward promoted for his gallantry at Logan's Field and Mill Springs. There were present, also, several influential members elect of the Legislature, which was to assemble on the fifth day afterward. The remaining persons present, were gentlemen holding, at that time, no civil or military office; a portion of them were professional men of distinction—one of whom, both before and since that meeting, has been called into the political service of his country, and another was the present General Boyle, who having raised a brigade of Volunteers—led one to victory at Shiloh—on the second day—the day of triumph, at that place of carnage. The writer of these pages—admits that he has personal knowledge, of what occurred at this Conference: and it may be as well to add in this place, that another meeting was held by General Nelson the day following, in the county of Jessamine, composed of a different set of gentlemen; which ratified the conclusions reached at the present one. Upon careful enquiry it was ascertained, that Nelson's force consisted of four regiments of Kentucky troops, one of them being mounted—and two regiments of Tennessee exiles—one of them very weak; allowing for detached service, a column four thousand strong, was the most that could be suddenly put in motion from Camp Dick Robinson. It was believed that Rousseau's force in Camp Joe Holt, across the Ohio River, near Louisville, scarcely reached two thousand effective men.* It was thought that four or five thousand Home Guards, organized into companies, and tolerably well armed and drilled, could be concentrated on any central point

* On the 16th of June, 1862, the Union citizens of Louisville, Ky., entertained *General Lovell H. Rousseau* at a banquet given to him; during which he made a noble speech which was published in the *Louisville Journal* of June 18th. We subjoin a few extracts taken from various parts of that speech, illustrative of

with sufficient certainty. A force of about ten thousand troops, of which one incomplete regiment would act as mounted riflemen, and with whom would be perhaps two batteries of light

statements made by us, in this *memoir* ; regretting our inability to make these extracts much more copious :

"It is now a little more than a year since I asked leave to enlist troops in Kentucky for the defense of the nation. My commission of Colonel, with authority to do so, dates from June 15, 1861. You can never fully comprehend the magnitude of the trials through which I passed. Old friends whom I had known well for many years passed me in the public streets of my own city, without recognition, because they had turned traitors and I had remained loyal to the Government of our fathers. I walked the streets of my own city as if in a strange town, and I tell you, my fellow-citizens, that little as I love battles and danger, I would prefer fighting a battle once a month to going through what I did in raising my brigade. My enemies were ever on the alert. The friends of the Union were bewildered, and most of them silent on the issues of the day; but I was doing my duty, and never faltered for a moment.

"On my return from Washington, with authority to enlist soldiers in Kentucky, the leading men of the State who were for the Government met at Louisville, and, after mature deliberation, resolved that it was impolitic to enlist soldiers here at that time. I was instructed from Washington to act in harmony with the Union men of the State. With much reluctance I abandoned the project of enlisting my soldiers on Kentucky soil, and went to Camp "Joe Holt," in Indiana.

"At that time the rebels had their recruiting stations openly established in many places in Kentucky; they were paying large bounties to those who would join them in this city. I saw that our young men were flocking to their standard, I observed that every one they seduced into the ranks of treason, took with him more or less of the sympathy of his kindred and friends. I saw the necessity of counteracting this by enlisting men on the side of the nation, thereby giving a loyal direction to the sympathies of our people.

"I raised my troops and equipped them. The traitors hated us intensely—called them "Rosseau's Silver Creek Ragamuffins," "Lincoln Hirelings," "Abolitionists." They were drilled and disciplined, and on the field of Shiloh they repaid me, and their enemies, too, for all I and the soldiers had suffered. I am proud to say that a braver or more gallant regiment never entered a field of battle.

"My command at Camp "Joe Holt" was ordered to Missouri, and then my friends, who had rather stood aloof, awoke and came forward, and wisely, as events showed, and got the President to countermand the order. Soon after Buckner came into the State with his army of double traitors—traitors to their State and to the Nation—and on the memorable night of the 17th of September, we crossed the Ohio River and marched out under General Sherman to meet them. By some means that ardent desire of our hearts was never fulfilled, but Buckner never came to Louisville."

artillery, might be so handled that the whole could be concentrated at, or near Frankfort, within the six clear days that remained, and upon an order to move, received by the most distant corps twenty-four hours in advance of the hour of concentration. It was a great venture—and with apparently small means—against immense odds. But it was not only the best—but the last alternative. And however desperate it might seem by itself, yet as the elemental portion of the plan adopted, probably every one in the meeting felt great confidence in its immediate success, and an undoubting conviction that the ultimate deliverance of the State would be wrought out.

2. Various suggestions were made: several plans were considered: some preliminary acts were performed. General Nelson openly declared that so far as concerned himself and the force under his immediate command, he felt no solicitude, for he was able to maintain himself where he was; or to fight his way into the loyal mountainous region of the State; or to the Ohio River. His solicitude was, to know in what manner his duty toward the State, situated as public affairs then were, could be performed most effectually; most for the preservation of public order, and the life, liberty and property of all; most in accordance with the wishes of the people of the State, the great majority of whom appeared to be loyal—while it was difficult to understand the politicians, and impossible to act by their contradictory and urgent opinions. For himself, his belief was that the Owen demonstration, six days off, was military in its nature, traitorous in its objects, and too dangerous to be allowed to proceed unmolested: and his impulse was to lead his troops against it—capture the leaders of the conspiracy in a body—and disperse their force. This suggestion did not commend itself to the Conference: their opinion being that the distance to be marched was too great,—and the Secession spies too numerous, diligent, and acute, to render a surprise, and important success possible; and, moreover, that even complete success, by a movement so thoroughly aggressive, would not find the general information and opinion of the people—ripe for its maintenance,—nor the actual military posture of the loyal party adequate to face a serious reaction if it should follow. Before any final decision was reached,

Gen. Nelson exhibited the evidence of the ample authority with which he was clothed by the General Government; and wrote, and caused to be published, the following day, a short note, along with one addressed to him by Dr. Breckinridge, at the request of the meeting, the two notes explaining the nature of his powers, and the manner in which, and the ends for which, it was his purpose to exert them. It was the unanimous opinion of those present, that nothing short of a precise order from the authorities at Washington, or a distinct resolution of the loyal Legislature of the State about to meet, would justify even a thought of disbanding, or removing the troops; but, on the contrary, that the safety of the State demanded that the force should be rapidly and largely increased, and made as efficient as possible.

3. Using this force as the base of a general plan of defense, in response to General Nelson's requisition for the freest suggestions, and in full consultation with him; the chief points unanimously agreed on, and recommended, may be stated, briefly, as follows:

(1). The Owen meeting should be considered as part of a wide conspiracy, and be dealt with as strictly military in its nature, intended to lead to immediate war, as part of a plan which involved a rising in the State, an invasion of it in force, and its conquest and occupancy by rebel forces as one of the main theaters of the war, and its incorporation with the Confederate States. To forestall and defeat the objects of that meeting, if it was still possible to do so—and if not then to repel, by force, whatever warlike movement might grow out of it—was an absolute necessity:

(2). General Nelson ought to take instant, and the most efficient measures, to have his own force, the force of Colonel Rousseau, and a force of Home Guards large enough to make an aggregate of ten thousand troops, in complete readiness to act at an hour's notice, so as to be concentrated on any point required, with the utmost celerity. In the mean time, he ought to keep himself informed of the operations of the conspirators in striking distance of his camp and of the capital, and be prepared to repress instantly any movement of armed bodies of Secessionists, who might possibly penetrate his designs, and attempt to anticipate them:

(3). A special messenger—some member of the meeting—should be sent immediately to Governor Magoffin, and warn him on behalf of General Nelson and a responsible meeting of loyal citizens, that the plans and designs of the Secession leaders in connection with the Owen meeting were understood; that any movement, in force, by armed men, would be promptly met by force; and that the Governor would take notice, that his being thus advertised beforehand, was meant, among other things, to signify that he would be held personally responsible for whatever evil might happen, through his neglect, or connivance. It was believed that such a notice—backed by the state of preparation which could be actually made—and which would probably not be underrated by the conspirators, who were, of course, expected to have early knowledge of the notice; might, possibly, delay the explosion at the Owen demonstration. An opposite result, however, was equally possible. Wherefore, the messenger to the Governor, ought to take an order from General Nelson to the commandant of the Home Guards at Frankfort, to the effect, that he must occupy the State Arsenal there with a sufficient force to hold it and defend it to extremity, relying on immediate assistance if attacked in force; that in the mean time he must keep himself informed, and keep General Nelson advised, of whatever was needful to be known; and that if overpowered before he could be relieved, he must spike the State ordnance, and blow up the Arsenal:

(4). Messengers ought to be sent, immediately, to General Rousseau,—and to the commandants of the Home Guards at Lexington, Louisville, Covington—and other places sufficiently near in point of time—and having the most numerous and effective bodies of troops, carrying such information and requisitions, as would secure the number of good troops at the moment and for the emergency anticipated; and such further steps should be taken as would secure the rapid increase and complete preparation of all the loyal corps throughout the State, in order to meet the shock which appeared to be inevitable, and for which the authorities at Frankfort had made no preparation, nor those at Washington, any that were adequate:

(5). One of the best known of those composing the Conference, should go immediately (Mr. now General J. T. Boyle went), and with the least possible delay, to the Governors of

Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois,—notify them of the perilous condition of affairs in Kentucky, explain to them the course that would be taken and the means relied on, ask of them in the name of the unconditional loyal men of Kentucky, ten thousand troops from each of those States, to be held in hand at once, and moved rapidly into Kentucky the instant their services were required. He should also frankly advise those Governors, that a fierce and bloody struggle for the mastery in Kentucky, appeared to be certain and imminent; that immense preparations were believed to be ripe, on the part of the Confederate States, to aid the rebels in Kentucky with their whole disposable force; that without very large and prompt military aid—after the first shock which we thought we could successfully encounter,—Kentucky would probably be overrun, and the whole civil war assume an aspect of immensely increased peril to the nation. We have said the force at Camp Dick Robinson was the base of all possible operations, for the safety of the State; and with that fact always palpable as light, we have had small scruples in branding as either treason, treachery, or complete delusion, all the efforts that were made in so many, and such persistent ways, to disperse that force. It is equally true that the immediate and effective response of the States of Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois, was the crowning proof of the wisdom of the daring plan, that risked and saved Kentucky, upon the trust that those States would stand by us in our extremity. We have had, therefore, small scruple in branding as ignoble, unfounded, and seditious, all the clamors which a certain class of Union men are never weary of uttering—that the slaveholders of Kentucky have just grounds of apprehension and suspicion against their heroic comrades and deliverers. Did such Union men as these—save Kentucky? Do they expect to be joined by those who really did save Kentucky—when they set about enforcing their insane menaces, with arms?

4. We have no authority from General Nelson for saying that all the vigorous and comprehensive preparations for defense, agreed on at Camp Dick Robinson, were precisely executed. Nor have we any authority from Governor Magoffin for saying that he received and promptly communicated to his leading friends, the notice which was intended for them as well as for himself. But every one knows that the main feat-

ures of such a plan as that we have said was agreed on at the camp, were punctually reproduced in prompt and eminently successful action. The Legislature convened at Frankfort on the 2nd of September—the fourth day after the meeting at Dick Robinson. The same day, and for two following days, closing the day before the Owen demonstration, a Confederate army under Bishop Polk, estimated at forty thousand men, and composed chiefly of Tennessee troops, suddenly crossed the Mississippi River from Missouri, and seized on Western Kentucky, which it held and desolated, until Fort Henry and Fort Donelson were stormed, and their intrenched camps at Bowling Green and Columbus were obliged to be evacuated, during the winter and spring of 1862. Zollicoffer had seized the Cumberland Gap, with his army, at the opposite end of the State, some days previous to Polk's invasion. Although the loyal people of Kentucky were excited almost to phrenzy by these invasions, the Legislature permitted weary—perhaps we ought to add shameful days, if not weeks, to be consumed in fruitless debates, before opinions could be conciliated upon any adequate practical conclusion: and General Robert Anderson, sent by the Government at Washington to assume the chief military direction of affairs in Kentucky, was kept waiting at Louisville, to enable the Legislature, fresh from the people, to deliberate on the reception our own hero should receive, at the instant that the honor of the State was outraged, and its independence menaced. It was not till the 16th of September, that decided action was taken. Proofs these—terrible proofs—to all who sympathized with the spirit and plans of the Camp Dick Robinson movement, how utterly the fate of the State depended on the success of that movement; and how clearly we were lost, if it had been left to the patriotism of the disloyal Governor, and the promptitude of this loyal Legislature, to meet the crisis prepared for us by the Scott meeting.

5. The Owen county demonstration occurred on the 5th of September—the day after the invasion of the State by Bishop Polk, was fully accomplished; and was obliged to act before its leaders could be aware of the state of doubt and hesitation which the Legislature would manifest on receiving the news of that invasion: and so far from anticipating a state of case so extraordinary, they would naturally suppose that the move-

ment from Camp Dick Robinson, was in sympathy with the spirit of the Legislature. The traitorous schemes of those leaders were baffled far more effectually than they were then aware of: but what they knew, and what they naturally conjectured, put them into a condition of at least as much doubt and hesitation, as the Legislature was thrown into by the sudden news of the invasion of the State. It added to the embarrassment of the case on both sides, that the commissioners from Governor Harris of Tennessee to Governor Magoffin, were in Frankfort, diligently protesting all kind and fair things on the part of Tennessee, and skilfully preparing for their attempt upon the Legislature; when the news of the double invasion by the Tennessee troops, fell like a bombshell among both the deceivers and the deceived, and a wild cry of rage and vengeance from the people, seemed for a moment to stupify them all. In the midst of these events, so pregnant, so rapid, so startling,—General Nelson and those who co-operated with him, knew perfectly well that but one issue was possible—though it might come about in several very different ways. The leaders of the Owen demonstration might attempt to carry out their original intentions: if they did, they merely rushed on their fate. They might have sagacity enough to perceive that their conspiracy had exploded, and immediately fly to the Confederate army, as they did at a later period. Or they might fall upon a sort of middle course—and by a succession of demonstrations, some of one kind, some of another, but all professing peace, while capable of being suddenly turned to warlike purposes, seek to recover the broken chain of the conspiracy, and take advantage of events. This third course was the one they adopted: but it was too late. Success was no longer possible: the conspirators had been foiled. Wise and daring as they supposed themselves to be, they had been over-matched both in strategy and courage. Every one thoroughly informed of the state of affairs, and competent to form an opinion concerning them; saw in the failure of the Owen demonstration, the failure of the Scott County project in the shape suggested by Governor Magoffin, for the seizure of Kentucky. It had been provided against under its real character;—and that provision—even if its efficacy had been dubious on the day of the military rendezvous in Owen—

became more and more complete, day by day afterward. When the leaders of the meeting, instead of marching a strong force to battle, in concert with the invasions of Polk and Zollicoffer, refreshed it with seditious speeches and bad whisky, and then mysteriously postponed it to meet in Frankfort on the fifth day afterward, (September 10th), and again in Lexington on the fifteenth day afterward, (September 20th); there could remain no doubt that the movement was completely under the control of the strategy adopted against it. It should be added that on the 6th of September—the second day after Bishop Polk's force occupied Western Kentucky, a Federal force, sent over from the camp at Cairo, at the junction of the Ohio and Mississippi, occupied Paducah, in Kentucky at the junction of the Tennessee River with the Ohio, in a position to hold Polk's army in check. They found a small body of rebels already at Paducah, preparing to occupy the place in force.

II.—1. Secret meeting of rebel officers at Lexington, in the interval of the Owen demonstration of the 5th, and the Frankfort demonstration of the 10th of September, 1861.—2. The pretended, and the real character of the Frankfort meeting: Senator Powell's connection with it: The military force at its disposal.—3. The leaders of this demonstration—and their subsequent career: Connection of the United States District Attorney and the Adjutant-General of Kentucky, with the case of one of them.—4. The Lexington demonstration of Secessionists, on the 20th of September, 1861: Triumph of the counter revolution against the conspiracy in the Legislature, and renunciation of further neutrality by the State, in the interval of the rebel demonstrations at Frankfort and at Lexington.—5. The loyal force under Colonel Bramlette, in face of the Lexington rebel demonstration: Complete triumph of the Camp Dick Robinson strategy: Governor Magoffin's idea of a conspiracy, a failure.

1. Immediately following the Owen demonstration, and before the contemplated demonstration at Frankfort, the five intervening days were diligently improved, by the baffled but still resolute conspirators. Among other important proceedings, they held a secret military conference at Lexington, composed of as many of the field and company officers of the State Guard, and other military organizations in their interest, as could be got together. The fruits of this Conference, in the line of policy rendered the more necessary by the recent failure in Owen, were more vigorous attempts to prevent the arming of loyal people and the passage of loyal troops along the rail-

roads, and, if necessary, the seizure or destruction of those roads, in the execution of this object: illustrations of which were afforded in the attempts which we have before explained, made upon the railroads running to Lexington from Cincinnati and from Louisville—and by those, of which we have not had occasion to speak, made by General Buckner on the railroads running from Louisville to Nashville and to Memphis. These preventive measures were only preparatory—to the advance of Zollicoffer from the East upon Lexington, and that of Buckner from the South upon Louisville, while Polk should establish completely the blockade of the Mississippi—menace Missouri and Illinois, and overrun all Western Kentucky: in the mean time the central conspiracy recovering itself, and dealing with the interior portion of the country, the force under Nelson—the Home Guards—and the Legislature.

2. On the 10th of September, 1861, the fifth day after the balk in Owen, and the eight day after the meeting of the Legislature,—the Frankfort demonstration occurred. This was, *professedly*, a mass meeting of the *Peace Party*, at the capital; while this pretext was generally understood by loyal men, to be a cover for revolutionary designs of some sort,—among the rest, probably to overawe the Legislature, and menace the Union party. The leaders of the Secessionists knew it was a party necessity created by the critical state of their affairs, and designed to be used in any way, that circumstances might suggest. It was strikingly illustrative of the state of affairs, and of the minds of men, at that time, that the meeting was held in the Hall of the House of Representatives, by the consent of that body; and that its last act—being met at the time expressly to hear a discourse from Humphrey Marshall, Esq., was to fall into an uncontrollable panic, and disperse under the belief that they were about to be fired on! Two gentlemen on the platform—struggling for precedence in being heard—one suddenly drew out a large meershaum pipe—which being mistaken for a revolver—conscience did the rest. Wild cries of danger, a confused struggle and crash, a vehement and scandalous stampede; and the *Peace* aspect of treason in Kentucky passed away. This meeting, however, had done serious business; for participation in which—along with other things—Lazarus W. Powell, Esq., was afterward put on trial, for

expulsion, in the Senate of the United States. We ought to add that a decided majority of the Senate voted against his expulsion: and, as far as we can judge, the grounds on which they did so were, in the *first* place, Mr. Powell's protestations that all he had done was intended only in a Democratic and not in a disloyal sense; and in the *second* place, his ingenious, and, we must admit, somewhat plausible showing, that his conduct and doctrines had been pretty nearly in accordance with those of the bulk of the Union politicians of the State, up to the decisive election of August 1861; since which time he had, as he asserted, as fully acquiesced in the decision of the people, as they had. We are certainly not in a position to gainsay these things, *absolutely*: as the drift of all we have said sufficiently indicates. Mr. Powell, however, knew very well that there was a party in Kentucky—the *party of the people*—with whose conduct and opinions, any just comparison of his own—ought probably to have given another aspect to his case. It is very easy to make apparent the real composition of this Frankfort meeting; as well as the imposing state of their preparations—*leaving out of the account the Camp Dick Robinson counter revolution*, which had already begun to work itself out,—and the whole extent of which they feared none the less that they did not fully understand it. Zollicoffer occupied the Cumberland Gap, and they had sent him word to advance: Polk occupied Columbus, and their messenger had just about reached his camp: Humphrey Marshall had organized and drilled a force in Owen and the adjoining counties: another force was assembled at Kentontown, in Harrison County: John S. Williams had a force in the north-eastern counties, which was afterward beaten under him by Nelson, and still later by Garfield: there was another at Bloomfield, on the edge of Nelson County: and Buckner with a large force, embracing, as part of it, most of the Kentucky refugee regiments, was in the very act of advancing upon Louisville, after ravaging in part and menacing the whole Southern border between Polk and Zollicoffer.

3. The chairman of the meeting was Richard Hawes, very soon afterward a refugee, and a Quartermaster in the rebel army. Its chief speakers openly advocated armed resistance to the National forces: Wm. Preston, and his nephew by marriage, Robt.

W. Woolley—both refugees immediately afterward—both just before returned from the foreign diplomatic service of the nation—being, perhaps, the fiercest utterers of such rhetoric. The committee appointed to organize and execute the purposes of the meeting—which we suppose every one but Mr. Powell and the majority of the Senate of the United States understood to have been traitorous; consisted of Mr. Hawes and Mr. Preston, just named, together with George W. Johnson, Thomas P. Porter, and General Lucius Desha. Mr. Johnson had just been Governor Magoffin's Ambassador to Governor Harris and President Davis; and was afterward rebel Governor of Kentucky; he has lately died of wounds, received in the battle of Shiloh, while fighting in the Confederate army. Mr. Porter had been a Senator and Acting Lieutenant-Governor of Kentucky, up to the close of the last preceding Legislature; he became a refugee soon after this meeting, for what purpose we forbear to state, as he has recently returned, and been arrested, and will answer to the legal tribunals—*perhaps*. We add that doubt for the reason that appears in the next sentences. General Desha was a member of the Legislature at the time he took part in this Frankfort demonstration. Subsequently he took a prominent part in certain political movements in the county of Harrison, where he resided, and where he had great influence; whose avowed objects were the preservation of local peace, and the mutual protection of the citizens. In the mean time a military force of Secessionists was formed there, and large numbers of the men of that county, went into the different rebel armies—the greater part, perhaps, in organized bodies, and in open day: and after a time, General Desha became a refugee, and was indicted for treason in the Federal court. Toward the close of the last session of the Legislature, he left Bowling Green just before its evacuation, and suddenly appeared in his seat in the House of Representatives at Frankfort, and asked for a committee of investigation into his conduct; which request, after some conversation in the House, he withdrew—and the matter dropped there, so far as the House was concerned; the whole affair having every appearance of being arranged beforehand. His return to his residence in Harrison County, was attended or preceded by a military order from John W. Finnell, Adjutant-General of the militia

of Kentucky, appointed by Governor Magoffin, to Lieutenant-Colonel Landrum, then in command of a Federal force in Harrison County, composed of part of a regiment of Kentucky Volunteers—serving in the Department of General Buell, forbidding him to arrest General Desha; thus a second time, exhibiting the appearance of pre-concert—and this time, as we suppose, without even a color of authority. There remained the indictment for treason; and the only question was whether the United States Marshal, Alexander H. Sneed, Esq., was chargeable for not arresting General Desha—or whether James Harlan, Esq., the United States District Attorney, was chargeable for not having the warrant issued, or for preventing its service; in any of these events, the case thus exhibiting for the third time, all the appearances of being arranged beforehand. We believe the loyal people of Harrison County, and the friends of Mr. Sneed, have received satisfactory assurances and explanations from him that he had done, and was ready to do, his duty in this case: and we are aware that the public impression, and probably the fact is, that Mr. Harlan took the warrant out of the Marshal's hands,—upon his refusal to hold it up. The case, we suppose, is finished *—and the doubt we expressed in regard to the case of Mr. Porter is, therefore, well founded. But if such cases as those of General Desha and Mr. Porter, were not proper ones, for thorough investigation, and the judicial settlement of the rights and duties and liabilities of citizens, in such times as we have passed through, and are still witnessing; it is difficult to imagine what particular

* This *memoir* was first written in the autumn of 1861, and was re-written in the spring of 1862, when the *First Part* of it was prepared for the March number of this Review; and the *Second and Third Parts* of it were revised, when the former was prepared for the June number of it. Now (June 28, 1862) in revising this *Third Part* for the press, for the September number of the Review—instead of altering the text, at this place, in order to make it correspond with some recent events in the case of General Desha—we add, in this note, a statement of facts in that case, as we understand them, of recent occurrence. General Desha, protected by the military interposition of the Adjutant-General of Kentucky, and the failure of the District Attorney of the United States for Kentucky, to have a writ issued and served on him, under the indictment for treason, or misprison of treason—or both—remained in Harrison County undisturbed till about the end of May. Before that period, *the leaves being full grown*, guerilla bands of robbers and murderers began to be actively organized, and renewed activity was shown in sending squads of armed rebels to the Confederate armies.

use there is for civil government. If, however, Adjutant-General Finnell, besides virtually exercising the military patronage of the Governor, may supersede General Buel in his own Department; and District Attorney Harlan is the authority, in the last resort, to determine whether or not indictments for treason shall be tried; the people of Kentucky have certainly much reason to rejoice that the latter is an able lawyer, and to hope that the former will soon be a great General. It is fortunate, also, that both of them belong to the Union party. Strange finale of the great secession demonstration!

4. On the 20th of September, 1861—ten days after the Frankfort demonstration, the one appointed to be held at Lexington occurred. This, like the preceding one, had a character of its own; its avowed object being to exhibit and make manifest the strength of the Secessionists in Central Kentucky. In the interval of the two meetings, events of the greatest importance had occurred; which, on the side of the loyal men of the State, the conduct of the riotous and warlike *peace demonstration* under the eyes of the Legislature, tended to precipitate. At the breaking up of that demonstration, fourteen days had elapsed since the loyal consultation at Camp Dick Robinson; and the situation was rapidly becoming such, that the Legislature must put itself at the head of the counter revolution, which it was no longer able to control either by opinion or by force; or it must array itself against the General Government, against the entire military force that was to be used in repelling the invasion, and what was, perhaps, most serious of all, against the stern loyalty of the real people, who

In connection with this excitement, General Desha was arrested under a military order, emanating from General Duffield, or the Provost Marshal of Louisville; and upon taking the oath of allegiance, and giving heavy bail, was released. After being thus released—and as his friends are supposed to believe—in violation of good faith toward him, he was arrested by the United States Marshal, under the old indictment—and, of course, we suppose, under the supervision of the United States District Attorney. Under this arrest, he was carried to the Federal Court at Frankfort, and his case being continued he was released on bail till the next court in course. All this only makes more obvious what is illustrated in the text, that the ordinary course of public justice was improperly set aside in this case. And who can tell in how many more? And to what injury of individuals—or danger of the public?

would no longer endure the outrage of invasion, the perpetual menace of armed revolt at their doors, and the public and official trifling with the safety and honor of the State, which had distinguished most of its policy during two years. Mr. Powell, in his recent defense in the Senate of the United States, makes it a main point that after the election of August, 1861, by which this Legislature came into power, he had committed no act contrary to the popular will then made manifest against the further maintenance of neutrality: and he makes a further point, that the mass meeting of September 10th, of which he was a member, was not even a *neutrality* meeting so much as a *peace* meeting—and that, at any rates, it was held *before* the Legislature “annulled the neutrality of Kentucky.” Before that date, as he expresses it, “the doctrine of neutrality stood unrepealed on the statute-books in the resolves of the Kentucky Legislature.” Undoubtedly it was far better to act as Mr. Powell declares he did, and obey the public will of the commonwealth lawfully expressed, even if so doing involved the greatest change of conduct; than to persist, contrary to that lawful and righteous decision, in treason, conspiracy, and revolt, even if so persisting involved no change at all. “A few days after that meeting the Legislature of Kentucky got off neutrality”—says Mr. Powell, truly. We have before explained the origin, the nature, and the effects of this doctrine in Kentucky—we now see its end. The Legislature which fell into it, was the Democratic Legislature which came into power in August, 1859: and tending toward loyalty during the two years of its existence, it came so far in that direction, as this doctrine, and having crystalized there, expired by constitutional limitation. The loyal Legislature elected in August, 1861, found that the progress of events had worked the doctrine to its final result, as a doctrine of peace; and all that remained was to arm in defense of the doctrine, or abandon it and arm in support of the nation, or arm in support of the revolt: unless, indeed, the most pusillanimous and destructive of all possible courses had been adopted, by allowing a war in which Kentucky took no part, to be fought out in her bosom. That a loyal Legislature should have hesitated an instant, in a contingency so clear and so impressive, much less that it should have required two weeks of deliberation, under the perilous

and dishonoring circumstances which existed, and which we have already explained, does not appear to us to be creditable, notwithstanding the various ways in which the hesitation has been accounted for. In the end the body did act with decision and vigor: and the people and government of Kentucky repudiated neutrality in one state of case, as distinctly, at least, as they ever approved it in a previous and different state of case. On the 16th of September, the Legislature passed a resolution ordering the armed invaders of the State to quit its borders; which, of course, Governor Magoffin vetoed, as he has done nearly every loyal act and resolution since he came into office; and which the Legislature passed over his veto, on the 20th of September. We need not enter into minute details concerning the various and very important acts and resolutions of this Legislature, about the period we are speaking of. Taken together, they constituted a system, founded on the complete recognition of the true posture of Kentucky, as an integral and loyal portion of the nation; and of her duty and purpose to put forth her whole power in the maintenance of its integrity, its constitution, and its laws—and in defeating and chastising every attempt against it, and against herself.* Provision

* In the act of correcting these pages for publication, we have received, through the Post Office, a letter of three sheets, mailed this month (June) at Gallatin, Tenn., but dated at Carthage, Tenn., Oct. 3, 1861—nearly nine months previous—some extracts from which will show what were the views, intentions, and resources of the Tennessee rebels with regard to Kentucky—and how desperate the attempt to save Kentucky from their grasp, seemed to them to be, at the period of which this *memoir* treats. The letter is from a native of Kentucky—long a citizen of Tennessee—and one of the most distinguished Presbyterian ministers in the South:

"There is but one possible way for Kentucky to escape the most appalling calamity. Let her unite with the States Rights men, and expel the Federal troops. The South will assist you to fortify and protect your northern border. We are ready, and, with the aid of Kentucky, will be able to protect the Ohio river from Wheeling to the Mississippi. This, by the help of God, we will do, even if compelled to fight through Kentucky, and for Kentucky, and against her will, and a portion of her bravest fighting men. But if she could be aroused from her dream of security in the Union, to look her danger in the face, and to contemplate the crime of shedding *innocent* blood, and *at once* to submit to her *destiny*, and make common cause with the South, all would be well in one *vigorous* campaign." * * * * "If the Cabinet at Washington had acted promptly on your suggestion, and sent fifty or sixty thousand men to Cumberland Gap in time, none can tell what the result would

was made for the raising of a powerful armed force, and turning it over to the General Government—the military aid of that Government was asked in defense of the State: the State Guard (Buckner's corps) was ordered to co-operate in driving the invaders from the State, and the people were exhorted to do the work at once: they invited General Robert Anderson to the capital as the guest of the State, and urged him to exercise in the commonwealth, as a Federal General, all the authority proper in his position: and whatever more commended itself to the Legislature, as needful and proper to be done, was done during that session. All tended to identify the State with the great national movement, and to insure triumph to that movement. She opened her heroic bosom to the irresistible tide of war, that sweeping over her it might carry victory into the very heart of the rebel Confederacy.

5. Now it was in the first flow of this new and grand movement of the Legislature, that the day appointed for the secession demonstration at Lexington, of its boasted strength, arrived. It needed but one more application, and that a very simple one, of the strategy agreed on at Camp Dick Robinson twenty-three days before—and which had wrought with such efficacy in all directions in the intervening periods, to make this the last of these dangerous and deceptive demonstrations. General George H. Thomas had just relieved General Nelson in his command. At daylight on the 20th of September, Colonel Bramlette, with his regiment of Kentucky infantry,

"have been. This much is certain, it would have inflicted a deep wound on the Southern cause—even might have checked the revolution, for a time. But the God of Providence blinded their eyes, and confounded their wise men—and it is now too late. All in that quarter is lost to you. The way is closed, and the position occupied by Southern troops." * * * * "If Kentucky had kept her promise of neutrality, and driven from her soil the North, as you are now seeking to do the South, Tennessee would have admired your prudence and courage, and have aided you. But now our people have had the courage and wisdom to take such positions, as self-defense called for. Nor will we yield an inch, till Kentucky expels the Yankees." * * * * "Act upon the impulses of your noble nature. Rebuke the Legislature of Kentucky. Cut loose from the bogus Government at Washington. Let us build up a model Government in the sunny South." * * * * "The only possible way to save your State from the horrors of civil war, is to unite with your true friends and natural allies, *the men of the South*. But whether Kentucky will help or not, we will defend the border line of the slave territory." * * *

was found to have pitched his tents in the suburbs of Lexington, during the previous night. During the day, Colonel Woolford's regiment of Kentucky cavalry came up. Toward evening, a battery of artillery filed through the principal streets of the city, on its way to Bramlette's camp. A body of local Home Guards increased the force to about two full regiments in all. No explanations were asked or offered, on either side: for every one understood that a disloyal demonstration designed expressly as a menace, was appointed for that day and the following day: every one understood that Colonel Bramlette's force was there on that account: every one understood, as Mr. Powell expressed it to the Senate of the United States, that "the Legislature of Kentucky had got off neutrality." To a certain extent, the secession demonstration was permitted to go forward: but it was even more fruitless than the great ovation in Owen on the 5th, or the great Peace Conference at Frankfort on the 10th. The idea of a sudden and triumphant rising in Central Kentucky—of the seizure of the capital and the Legislative bodies—of the rapid and almost unopposed march of three invading armies into the heart of the State—and of a grand *coup de main* by General Bickley and his Knights of the Golden Circle; were no longer suitable to conspirators whose secret plans were seen to be penetrated and counteracted, whose overt acts had most unexpectedly to be performed in presence of an armed force, and whose chief leaders had suddenly concealed themselves, or fled. The inducements to carry the idea of demonstrations any further, were extremely slight. The one of September 20th, 1861, was the last. Three days afterward, at daylight on the 23d, Colonel Vanderveer, in command of the 35th regiment of Ohio infantry, was found in possession of the town of Cynthiana, embracing the railroad and telegraph from Cincinnati to Lexington, and their depots and offices. This was the first of the northern regiments which entered Kentucky: and probably no body of troops ever made an opposition which, as to time, place, occasion, and people, was more unexpected or decisive. It was the first fruits of the *external* policy, so to speak, of the Camp Dick Robinson counter revolution. Afterward a very large force of northern troops came into Kentucky—and a considerable army of native troops was raised in the State: but

we did not propose to carry this narrative further, at present, than to the final overthrow of the conspiracy, to seize the State. This we have now done; having pointed out the exact accomplishment—in all its parts—and the complete success in every direction—of the plan of deliverance agreed on, at the moment when all seemed to be lost. It was simultaneously with this demonstration, that General Buckner advanced from Bowling Green to seize Louisville: and failed, among other causes, in consequence of the rapid and skillful movement of Colonel Rousseau's force, to confront him. It was this double failure on Lexington and Louisville, in chief part, that arrested the movement of smaller bands, organized and waiting to seize a number of towns, and rob, in concert, every exposed bank in the State. The conspiracy was crushed: what remained was war. How great must have been the deliverance, when such an alternative was a blessing!

III.—1. Immediate Effects of the Catastrophe: Delusion and Incapacity of the Rebel Leaders: Their Failure and Flight: Temporary Disorganization of their Party: Condition of Affairs. 2. General Effects of the Suppression of the Conspiracy, and the Triumph of the Counter Revolution: Conduct and Condition of the bulk of the Kentucky Refugees: Influence of the changed position of Kentucky, upon the course of the war. 3. Conclusion of this Memoir: Commencement of the Civil War in Kentucky.

1. The immediate effects of the series of daring movements on both sides, which it has been our object to explain, were of the highest importance. A military rising of the Secessionists in Central Kentucky—attended with neighborhood devastation and butcheries, such as have desolated Missouri—became too perilous to them, to be ventured on; while the discovery of the exact nature of their conspiracy, and the defeat of their attempts as they were successively made, rendered the seizure of the State impossible except after a bloody struggle of that sort. This much they could not help knowing; and if they knew all, they knew that even temporary success in that part of their plan of August 17th, as things stood after the 29th of August, would probably be useless, whether it cost much or little. They had been totally mistaken, in various respects;—and their most prominent men saw, when too late to retrace their false steps, that they would probably be killed, and the flower of their party cut to pieces, if they persisted in their

original designs. Their insight of the case they had to deal with, had not been adequate: the common and fatal defect of all conspirators—manifest in every part of this terrible American rebellion. They did not believe the Home Guards would fire on them. They did not believe the troops of the Northern States would be called in. They did not believe in the determined loyalty of the people. They did not believe that there existed in the ranks of their opponents, sufficient administrative talent to penetrate their designs, and organize such materials as existed, under the actual circumstances, in a manner capable of defeating them. They did not believe that the personal hardihood, or the military capacity, adequate to successful opposition to them, in the apparently helpless condition of their adversaries, could be suddenly produced. Moreover, they miscalculated all their own resources: they miscalculated the moral power of organized society over themselves, and over their followers: they miscalculated the hardihood of their leaders, both political and military, in braving personal exposure and danger, in such a cause. At the first moment of separate, personal, and immediately impending liability, whether as citizens or as soldiers, they began to leave the State; persuading themselves that it was better to organize in Tennessee, and return in force. Buckner, Hanson, Williams, Marshall, and many others high in military position, and we suppose of unquestionable personal courage, were out of the way—in most instances out of the State—at each moment when a fierce movement or a desperate act, without which treason is mere folly, might possibly have wrought wonders, or possibly have led to the gallows. As soon as those implicated became seriously apprehensive that the Scott County conspiracy was no longer a secret, and that other pregnant secrets had been disclosed, and arrests for various offenses and crimes, both civil and military, were being made by the authorities; an immense agitation succeeded to overweening confidence, and showed its pungency by flight. Many hastened to escape who might not have been disturbed—who were not even suspected before their flight; and there is reason to believe that many were induced to fly by false statements confidentially made to them by those of their own party, that they would be arrested—increasing, in this way, the rebel force in arms. In many

cases, circumstances apparently wholly casual as to them, were construed as evidences of immediate peril, and followed by flight. There is, we suppose, no doubt that Major Breckinridge, Colonel Preston, and others of less note, fled from Lexington, on being secretly notified of the advance of Colonel Bramlette's force upon that place, as before narrated. The conspiracy was overthrown: its leaders fled, and the Secession party, at the moment of utmost embarrassment and need, was left without guidance. To march to battle, under such circumstances, would have been an achievement possible only to the best troops in the world, acting under the highest impulses of which human nature is capable. The struggle of parties had been fierce, silent, ceaseless, and deadly, from the 17th of August to the 23d of September. The catastrophe came. Its *immediate* effects was the great deliverance we have explained—in its kind, one of the greatest human society can receive; and the firm establishment of public order and the supremacy of the regular Government in the hands of the existing loyal Legislature; in their kind, blessings without which no others can be conferred by society.

2. The more *general* effects of all these movements, and their catastrophe, were also of the highest importance, not only to Kentucky, but in their bearing on the whole course and issue of the national struggle, and therefore on the destiny of the country. So far as Kentucky was concerned, the character and theater of the impending war were changed. Secessionists, who were resolved on war, had no alternative but to retire to the lines of the invading armies. Multitudes did so. And it is a characteristic feature of the men and the times, that, nearly without exception, such as had wives and children left them to the care of those whose country it was their object to conquer, and to the protection of the Government they took up arms to subvert. Vast numbers of these deserted families were left without any provision for their support; and the broken fortunes of their natural protectors were left to be wound up, and their hopeless insolvency to be borne as a heavy burden by their friends. We have no idea that the *rights* that have any marketable value, belonging to all the Kentucky refugees taken in a mass, would pay ten cents on the dollar of their aggregate liabilities; nor that one in every hundred of

them, after the payment of their just debts, could hold title in his own right to the lowest priced slave on earth. Nevertheless, they might fight the more desperately, just by reason of the desperation of their circumstances; and, therefore, if they were determined to subdue and enjoy Kentucky, or perish in the attempt, as they commonly professed, it was a great gain to the commonwealth, and to all who had any stake in it, that they should be gathered into armies, and be fought at the frontiers. In a still more general point of view, it is easy to see that the events we have disclosed had a great share in pitching the chief scene of conflict at the center of the immense line of battle which traverses the continent, and in converting every victory from a local advantage into a national triumph. Such a succession of victories as Burnside afterward won on the coast of North Carolina, and which appeared to have no serious influence much beyond the sound of his cannon; if won six months earlier in any portion of the Confederate States to which any natural access implicates Kentucky, would have exposed the Mississippi Valley, and by consequence the Confederate States to have been subdued at once. The brief, triumphant, and most fruitful struggle of three months on the Cumberland and the Tennessee, compared with the tedious, dubious, and comparatively barren struggle of nearly the first twelve months on the Potomac, illustrates the great truth that the nation could be saved or lost, only at its heart—points out the strategical importance of Kentucky considered either as a highway or as a field of battle, and makes plain the decisive value of her earnest co-operation. This illustration, whether it be thought just, or otherwise, serves to make obvious the general perils which were escaped, and the general advantages which were secured, by the counter revolution in Kentucky, whose history we have traced. Thenceforward, the part allotted to Kentucky, instead of being a separate and barbarous series of obscure butcheries, became an advanced position on the great field where all was to be won, or lost. She could not expect more than this: she did not ask more. If the nation is saved, her own deliverance is also complete. If the nation perishes, she need hardly care to survive it. While the horrible carnage shall continue, our wretched kindred who still thirst for our blood, know in what part of the great bat-

tle to look for our banner. They saw it at Wild Cat, at Parkton, at Ivy Mountain, at Logan's Field and Mill Springs, at Fort Donelson, at Shiloh! In six months it has been borne in triumph by the side of the still more glorious banner of the nation—over an area five hundred miles square! God send that every wandering child of the State would return to its shadow, and share its glory!*

3. We have now traced this strange and eventful story up to the moment when the civil war broke out in Kentucky, and the Tennessee army under Zollicoffer advancing from the Cumberland Gap into the heart of the State, was repulsed at Wild Cat, near the Rockcastle River. It belongs to the military historian to record all that follows. We trust he may be worthy of so high a task; for he has that to recount at which our posterity will never cease to marvel—and concerning which no free people can ever be indifferent, nor any true statesman willingly ignorant. We have been eye-witness of one of those terrific human volcanoes, which have, at irregular intervals, desolated human society, and threatened the progress of the human race, since its creation. From the beginning our confidence has been great, and has been repeatedly expressed, that the entire nation would survive the terrible shock, and completely triumph over it. The attentive consideration of what we have now written, will probably beget, or confirm, a similar confidence in every candid mind. It is but an episode; but it is one wrought from a central point of unusual importance, and having the widest relations. Moreover, posterity, in order to comprehend fully those more glorious acts and events, concerning which many will write, must understand those earlier, more obscure, and less striking affairs, concerning which it chanced that we were of the small number likely to speak at all, who could do so with a certain confidence, at this time. All we have said concerning public affairs, can be verified by public records. Touching those things that are more private,

* Great events and great changes have occurred during the months that have elapsed from the writing of this paragraph, till its present revision for the press. And in the months that must elapse before it can be issued (September), still greater events may occur. We leave it, very nearly as it was first written, to speak for itself. Much that has since occurred, confirms its scope; and we accept the risk of future confirmation.

we have stated nothing except upon personal knowledge, or upon such evidence as we believed to be true—and upon that belief acted under circumstances of great difficulty. And our conviction is, that though we may have fallen into mistakes, which we shall be glad to correct, there are no important facts stated by us, which will not be perpetually confirmed by time and scrutiny.

ART. II.—*The Unity of the Human Race.*

THE doctrine of the Bible is, that all mankind have descended from a single pair created immediately by God. But this doctrine has been assailed by men of no mean pretensions to learning and science. The grounds of their assaults are the differences of organic structure, including all the varieties of external appearance, the physiological and psychological varieties, and the numerous languages, that obtain among the human family. These organic, physiological, and psychological differences and varieties have been fully considered by Dr. Prichard, in his elaborate work entitled “*The Natural History of Man,*” and shown to be perfectly compatible with unity of species. So minute has the Doctor been in his observation, and so extensive is his induction of facts, that little can be added by way of strengthening his conclusions. An impartial reader of his work must be led to acknowledge that God “hath made of one blood all nations of men, for to dwell on all the face of the earth.”

The objection against the unity of the human family, drawn from the variety of human languages existing in the world, has not, perhaps, from the circumstances of the case, been so fully met as that drawn from the natural history of the various races of mankind; yet enough has been done, by the classification of all the most important languages into distinct families, and by establishing points of connection between these families themselves, to convince any reasonable mind that all the languages of the world have been derived from one common source.

To exhibit as briefly as possible the principles that have guided philologists in their investigations, the results at which they have arrived, and the bearing of these results upon the question of the Unity of the Human Race, is the object of the present article.

Languages are subject to laws like all other manifestations of the human mind. They have their history, which may be traced through their periods of growth and decline. To investigate these laws, "and to trace the history of languages through their various stages, is the main purpose of Comparative Philology. To accomplish this end, we follow language to the earliest times. We view it as in constant and direct connection with the ever-active mind of man; and we find that the plan of making it and the progress in forming it, are not in the hand of man alone, but, like his own fate, subject to the will of the Most High. We consider, moreover, a language not merely as given and ready at a certain time, nor as standing by itself, subject to laws of its own, but we trace all idioms back to the period when their oldest forms are still apparent, and then compare these with one another. For only when we have found these primitive forms, which alone are objects of comparison, and by comparison afford valuable results, a systematic science of language can be said to begin. It will then receive aid from the three branches, which, for such purposes, are indispensable to each other. Lexicography, or the mere knowledge of words; Comparative Grammar, which investigates their structure and inflexions; and a Comparative History of all the various idioms which belong to the same great family."* Thus has a popular writer on Comparative Philology indicated its main purpose, and its method.

The history of Comparative Philology is one of deep interest. In the words of Cardinal Wiseman, "it presents the same features in the moral sciences, which Chemistry does among the natural. While the latter was engaged in a fruitless chase of the philosopher's stone, or of a remedy for every disease, the linguists were occupied in the equally fruitless search after a primary language. In the course of both inquiries many important and unexpected discoveries were doubtless made;

* De Vere's Comparative Philology.

but it was not till a principle of analytical investigation was introduced in both, that the real nature of their objects was ascertained, and results obtained far more valuable than had first caused and encouraged so much toilsome application."

Its history commences with the attempts to arrive at the knowledge of the primitive language. Curiosity, or national vanity, if we may credit the statement of Herodotus, prompted these attempts at a very early period. But in later times it was argued, if it can only be shown that there exists some language, which contains the germ of all the rest, and forms a center whence they all diverge, then the confusion of Babel receives a striking confirmation; for that language must have been, at one time, the common original speech of mankind. For this primitive language a host of claimants arose. The Celtic, Chinese, Dutch, Biscayan, Abyssinian, Syriac, and Hebrew had each their respective advocates.

The prosecution of their claims was conducted on principles, the subversion of which by more rational has raised Comparative Philology to the eminence which it occupies at the present day. The only affinity admitted between languages was that of filiation. Parallel descent from a common origin was hardly ever imagined. As soon as two languages were found to bear a resemblance to each other, it was concluded that one must be the offspring of the other. This erroneous principle led to many errors, as, for example, the derivation of the German from the Persian, and of the Latin from the Greek.

There was another error in prosecuting philological studies. It consisted in conducting researches by imaginary and forced etymologies, instead of an extended comparison of all the members of the same family. This was indeed the natural result of the object proposed—to prove the derivation of all other languages from the one assumed as the primitive. The investigator preferred to find, in his favorite language, a supposed original word, which contained in itself the germ, or meaning of the term examined, rather than to trace its affinities through sister languages, or to derive it from obvious elements in the language to which it belonged. Goropius Becanus, for instance, explains from Dutch the names found in Genesis; and concludes that these names were given in that tongue. It would argue, in his opinion, the most invincible

stubbornness to deny that Adam and Eve spoke the language of Holland, when the name of the first man can be resolved into *Hat* (hate) and *dam*, because he was a dam opposed to the serpent's hatred; and that of the first woman into *E* (oath) and *vat* (receptacle), because she was the receptacle of the oath, or promise of the Redeemer.

This method of guessing at etymologies, as has been already remarked, was the necessary result of the objects pursued. As soon as any one language was assumed as the primary, then such a course was natural and unavoidable. Resemblance of forms was all that was sought for, with little, if any, reference to signification.* Before any advance could be made in Philology it was necessary to gain a more extensive acquaintance with languages than was usually attained, and to adopt a method of investigation very different from the one pursued. Travelers and missionaries were the first who gathered materials which have been constructed into the noble edifice of modern philology. The former, through mere curiosity, brought lists of words from the countries which they visited: the latter, from higher motives, learned the languages of the nations, to which they bore the message of love, and wrote elementary books for their instruction. To mention the individuals, by whose labors these materials have been collected, would be tedious and unnecessary. We will, therefore, proceed to speak of the method of philology, by which is meant the mode of conducting philological investigations.

No words can be more appropriate on this point than those of Cardinal Wiseman, in reference to the immortal Leibnitz, whose comprehensive genius laid the foundation of a scientific study of the languages. "However," says Cardinal W., "he might occasionally indulge in trifling etymologies for a pastime, Leibnitz well saw that to extend the sphere of usefulness which he wished to give this science, a comparison must be instituted between idioms most separated in geographical position. He complains that travelers were not sufficiently diligent in collecting specimens of languages, and his sagacity led

* An Irishman is said to have concluded that his countrymen are of Phœnician origin, from the resemblance of an Irish word, signifying glory, to Cadiz, a city in Spain, founded by the Phœnicians. The Hibernian philologist did not stop to inquire the meaning of Cadiz.

him to suggest that they should be formed upon a uniform list, containing the most elementary and simple objects. He exhorted his friends to collect words into comparative tables, to investigate the Georgian, and to confront the Armenian with the Coptic, and the Albanese with the German and Latin. His attention to these pursuits, and the peculiar sagacity of his mind led him to conjectures, which have been curiously verified by modern research."

Nothing could be of more importance for the obtaining of correct results than a comparison of the most simple and elementary terms of each language, for as it is by these that the objects of nature, the family and social relations, the members of the body, existence, feeling, time, and place are expressed, they must be coeval with language and descend to each succeeding generation. Unusual words, technical terms, or such as are continually arising by the progress of the arts and sciences, may easily be imported from languages belonging to entirely distinct families.

In regard to the method just described philologists are all agreed ; but they are divided in opinion as to whether the lexical, grammatical, or historical connection of languages is the most important point to be considered in their investigations. Out of this difference of opinion have arisen three Schools known as the Lexical, Historical, and Critical. The first "bestows its attention principally upon words and forms." The second "endeavors to show the different use which a language has made, at various times, of certain elements, and, if possible, the very period of transition, when one use has been given up, and another substituted for it. Upon this historical basis it then establishes the analogies of the secondary language with others of the same epoch." The Critical School "attaches much less value to the number of resembling words than to their kind, and makes grammatical analogies and affinities the principal standard by which to judge of the connection between different idioms. Here no claim to historical affinity is admitted, until the whole material and the original texture of a language have been carefully examined, according to distinctly traceable and generally acknowledged rules of analogy. The strictest proof is demanded that resemblances thus discovered are neither merely ideal nor accidental, but

essential; that they are not the result of intrusion from without, but indigenous; and not isolated, but running through the whole idiom." Such, in general terms, according to De Vere, are the distinctive character of these Schools. An exhibition of their differences in detail would be inconsistent with the objects and limits of the present article. We must now touch briefly upon the result of philological researches.

Philologists have divided the languages of the world, so far as they have been investigated, into great families, which present remarkable points of difference. A. W. Von Schlegel and Bopp, two of the most eminent philologists of the present century, have concurred in recognizing three great families, or classes of languages, which they distinguish as follows:

I. Languages with monosyllabic roots, without the capability of contraction, and hence without organism, without grammar. This class comprises Chinese, where all is hitherto bare root, and the grammatical categories, and secondary relations after the main point, can only be discovered from the position of the roots in the sentence.

II. Languages with monosyllabic roots, which are capable of combination, and obtain their organism and grammar nearly in this way alone. The chief principle of the formation of words, in this class, appears to me to lie in the combination of verbal and pronominal roots, which together represent, as it were, body and soul. To this class belongs the Sanscrit family of languages, and, moreover, all other languages, so far as they are not comprehended under I and III, and have maintained themselves in a condition which renders it possible to trace back their forms of words to the simplest elements.

III. Languages with dissyllabic verbal roots, and three necessary consonants as single supporters of the fundamental meaning. This class comprehends merely the Semitic languages, and produces its grammatical forms, not simply by combination, like the second class, but by a mere internal modification of the roots.*

As a complete enumeration of all the members of each class is unnecessary for our present purpose, we will mention only the most important.

* Bopp's Comparative Grammar, vol. I, pp. 102, 108: London, 1845.

The first or monosyllabic class, incapable of grammatical inflection, comprises the Chinese and the languages of South-eastern Asia generally.

That class of languages usually designated the Indo-European, sometimes the Indo-Germanic, consisting of monosyllabic roots capable of inflection, has a great many branches. These are :

1. The Arian family-pair—the Indian and Iranian—comprising the Sanscrit, ancient, later, and modern, the Gipsy, the Persian languages, the Kurdish, the Ossetian, and Armenian.

2. The Graeco-Italic or Latino-Greek family-pair, viz.: the Greek, the languages of Italy, and the Romanic languages derived from the Latin—Italian, Wallachian, Spanish, Portuguese, Provençal, French, and Rhaeto-Romanic.

3. The Lettic family, viz.: the Lithuanian, Old Prussian, and Lettish.

4. The Slavic family, viz.: the Russian, Bulgarian, Illyrian, Lechish, Tshechish, Sorbenwendish, and Polabish.

5. The Gothic, Teutonic or German family, viz.: the Gothic, the Scandinavian languages, the Anglo-Saxon, Frisic, German, and English.

6. The Celtic family, viz.: the Welsh, the Cornish, the Armorican or Bas Breton, the Irish, the Gaelic, and the Manx.

Under the third class, consisting of languages with dissyllabic verbal roots, and three necessary consonants as single supporters of the fundamental meaning, are comprehended the following, usually called the Semitic languages: the Assyrian or Babylonian, the Berber dialects of Africa, the Phœnician, the Hebrew, the Punic, the Chaldaic, the Syriac, the Samaritan, the Arabic, the Aethiopic, and the Maltese.

Some philologists reduce the Indo-European and Semitic languages to one class, under the designation of inflected languages, and introduce another class styled agglutinative, or Nomadic. The languages belonging to this class are superior to the monosyllabic, yet they have not attained to a degree of development equal to that of the inflecting languages. They express the idea itself by a word, the relation by additional syllables or letters which are merely mechanically joined to the

former. This class comprises the languages of the Tataric family, which are distinctly agglutinative; and the Caucasian family, which are not so distinctly but yet essentially of the same rude style of mechanism. To this class belong chiefly the languages of Northern Asia, together with the Finnish, Samoidic, Magyar, and Turkish in Europe. To the same class, also, W. Von Humboldt assigns the American languages. Other philologists, however, are of the opinion that these and the African languages have not yet been classified into any thorough scientific system.

Between the members of each of the respective classes or families described exist such analogies as are possible only on the hypothesis that all the individuals of the same family have been derived from a single source. In the language of Ovid :

"Facies non omnibus una
Nec diversa tamen, qualem decet esse Sororum."

The different classes themselves have been compared with one another and "the nice exactness of their tallies in many parts, the veins of similar appearance, which may be traced from one to the other, show that they have been once connected so as to form a whole; while the boldness and roughness of outline at the points of separation prove that it is no gradual devolution, no silent action, which has divided, but some violent convulsion which has riven them asunder." These words of Cardinal Wiseman are corroborated by the fact that certain languages are found to belong distinctly to no particular class, but to sustain an intermediate relation to two separate classes, thus showing a connection between these classes and rendering it highly probable that they originally formed but one. This fact has been demonstrated with reference to the three general classes into which the principal languages of the world have been divided. Ligaments are found binding them together, so that they form a triplet descended from a common parent.

This result, arrived at by wide and minute philological investigation, coincides with the statement of the Bible that "the whole earth was of one language, and of one speech;" while the boldness and roughness at the points of separation of the

different classes, prove that the separation was made by some such means as is intimated in the sacred volume, that God "confounded their language, that they might not understand one another's speech."

Philology thus becomes a witness to the truth of the Holy Scriptures. Like some other sciences, which, during the incipient stages of their development, were considered antagonistic to Revelation, it has become the handmaid of the Christian religion. Its conclusions have dissipated the error, long so commonly entertained, that languages proceed from one another in a kind of perpendicular line of descent, one disappearing in order to make way for another; and they have established the doctrine that all languages have moved on side by side, from one common source, some developing themselves and attaining to maturity at an earlier, others at a later period, but all pursuing an onward and simultaneous course, and no one of the number proceeding from, or produced by, the other. It must be borne in mind, however, that this is true only of separate and distinct languages, such as the Sanscrit, Latin, Greek, and German, and not of such as are merely corrupt dialects of some parent tongue, or, in other words, the same tongue reappearing in an altered and more barbarous form. Thus, the Italian, French, Spanish and Portuguese are, strictly speaking, so many corrupt dialects of the parent Latin; and yet, at the same time, they may be said to possess an affiliation among themselves. This affiliation between the Romanic languages will serve to explain what is meant by affiliation in the case of the Indo-European tongues. As the former all sprang from one common source, the Latin, and have pursued an onward course, side by side, so the Zand, the Sanscrit, the Latin, the Greek, the German, and others of the same class, have all come from some parent tongue, now lost, or partially existing in the elements common to them all, and have all pursued paths parallel to each other, some of them attaining to an early, others to a late, maturity.

The bearing of these results upon the question of the Unity of the Human Race is at once obvious. No one will deny that nations speaking a common language have descended from a common stock. Unity of language implies unity of origin

among those who use it. This may be considered axiomatic. The very fact that the New Englanders speak the English language is decisive proof that their ancestors came from England. In like manner, the existence of the Spanish in Mexico and South America, apart from all historical testimony, is conclusive evidence that these countries were conquered and settled by emigrants from Spain. All this is so plain that every one yields assent to it. It is not, however, at first sight, so obvious that the Germans and English, the Greeks and Russians, the Welsh and the French, and all those nations, that speak what are called the Indo-European languages, extending from India to the shores of the Atlantic are of the same stock; and yet such is the conclusion that Comparative Philology forces upon us. The languages spoken by these nations are radically the same, and consequently those that speak them must have proceeded from a common source. The same thing is true of the nations that speak the languages belonging to the other two great classes.

Did philological investigations stop here, we would, apart from Revelation, be led to the conclusion that mankind, so far as their languages shed light on the matter, have descended, not from a common stock, but from a plurality of stocks or origins. We would say three at least. But when we take into consideration the points of connection between the three great classes of languages themselves, indicating a common source, we no longer rest satisfied with this conclusion. Unity of language implies unity of origin: hence all those nations that use the languages belonging to the three great classes described, must have had a common origin. This is the final decision to which Philology brings us.

The languages of the aboriginal Americans and those of Africa, have not been sufficiently investigated to warrant any positive opinion in regard to the relation that they sustain to the other great families. In eighty-three American languages examined by Messrs. Barton and Vater, one hundred and seventy words were found, the roots of which appeared to be the same; and of these one hundred and seventy words three-fifths belonged to the Tataric family.

“The South African idioms constitute a particular family

of languages, and afford an instance of a peculiar, and in some respects singular development of human speech. They are; however, not without external relations, though it is difficult to say what place will ultimately be assigned to them among the different groups of languages. In what relation they and the languages of Africa in general stand to the Semitic or Syro-Arabian family is, as M. Von Ewald has observed, a problem not yet solved. Some words have been recognized in the Suahelic similar to Semitic words, but it is possible that these may have been introduced by Arabian, or even by old Phœnician traders on the eastern coast. In one respect these languages coincide remarkably with the Coptic. I allude to the law by which both prefix all modifying particles and the whole apparatus of small and abbreviative words which answer the end of inflexions, while other languages, either in part or universally suffix them." *

What future investigations, as Dr. P. observes, may discover in regard to the relations of the American and African languages to the other languages of the world, we can not divine. Time, the great teacher, will disclose. Past researches have led us to hope that such a connection may be established as to prove that human speech is a unit—that all the languages of the world have descended from one primitive language, no longer existing except in the elements common to all. Such a result would form a strong philological proof of the Unity of the Human Race, which, added to the many other proofs drawn from tradition, history, anatomy, physiology, and psychology, would leave the matter without a doubt. Already has Philology proved to be of one brotherhood nations dissimilar in features and color, and the most remote from one another in geographical position. It has demonstrated that the German nations and the Hindoos are of the same stock—that the Magyars of Hungary are closely allied to the Turks and Tartars; and by reason of the points of union existing between the great families of languages themselves, it proves a common relationship among all the diversified nations that use them. In this way, as already stated, Comparative Philology becomes the handmaid of our holy religion; for the

* Prichard's *Natural History of Man*, p. 652: London, 1848.

intelligibility of the Christian system rests upon the doctrine of a primitive pair from whom all mankind have descended. This doctrine Philology, so far as its investigations have been carried, helps to confirm. When its labors, in its ethnological department, are complete, may its last generalization be, "God hath made of one blood all nations of men for to dwell on all the face of the earth."

ART. IV.—*Journalism.*

If it be the destiny of a great people, upon new shores, in a new world, to build there a great State, let it not be surprising that such a State should have its peculiarities. In fifty centuries of the world's history, the exact counterpart of the former order of things, has not been realized in any that was new, among any of the races of people that have ever lived, in whatever part of the globe. New languages have arisen, new customs have come into vogue, new forms both of social and of political life have been assumed, and these changes have taken place in immediate connection with the decay and the rise of empires. Plants reproduce their like, and all animals their kind, possessing the same instincts; but intelligent man an intelligence, many-sided, ever-active, and ever-expanding, suited to this wonderful world, in which an infinite God displays the boundless resources of an infinite and inexhaustible intelligence. Restless in its career, it is like the stream that, tiring of the old and sluggish courses, quickens its activity, as well as refreshes its energy, by overcoming impeding obstacles, and continually wearing to itself newer channels for its ever-onward currents.

All things derive an efficacy, and receive a fertilizing influence, from the virgin soil in which they are placed; so that there is an exuberance of life and of fruitfulness, that has nothing at all to do with climate, or locality, or people, or their institutions, as of necessity, but is due especially to the new-

ness and richness of the land. A people at once transferred to such a country, will spring to sudden wealth, and to great prosperity. Nor will it hinder, that they are ever so poor, upon their entering upon their lands, or have to pass through ever so great trials in the securing of them ; the resources to which they have attained will at once make them to be rich. In the instance of the American nation, this wealth has gone on, extending as well as increasing, and that to an almost incredible degree, because, as there were literally almost boundless fields to be occupied, so none did need to remain without for want of country to enter upon.

The development and the resources of this land, on so great a scale, and of so unique a character, have drawn the eyes of the nations to them ; so that what would otherwise have been an unspeakable evil, that is, an uninhabited country of boundless extent, becomes, on the contrary, a source of immeasurable and immeasurably increasing wealth, because that there is no limit to the extent to which all people that are from all the nations do seek to occupy it, and that, from the main that bears the commerce of Europe on the east, to the main that is laden with the spices of the Indies on the west.

The effete monarchies of the old world were prolonging a wearied existence, by subtracting for their sustenance what remaining vitality there was, that was left to their cumbrous and antiquated organisms. Their support was not from the inherent energy and vivifying power of their systems, or their masterly conduct of them, but from the sinews and substance of the land. Wherever there was manifestation of life, there was taxation. It became as if the rule was, that the governed lived for the governors—not the government for those ruled. And the question came up and was settled, under what form of impost can the nation, governed as it is, best stand up and hold on its way—not, what is for the good of the nation, and, how can we best dispense with taxes. Resistance was vain. Years and centuries of conflict had rolled by, and there was no relief. The people were sunken in sullen silence, and were quietly submitting to their burdens, when the new order of things in the new world arose. The exodus that has since followed, is the most remarkable that has been known in ancient or modern times.

The movement thus under way, was accelerated by causes operating with the intensity of double forces: those which were from the repulsions of the old world, and those which were from the attractions of the new. It was speedily rendered purer, also, by the ordeal to which, of inevitable tendency, it had finally to be, as it was eventually subjected. With the perils of the wilderness a conflict might be disheartening; and with the treacheries of a savage foe, there might be cause of dismay; but when it became imperative to battle with the greatest powers of earth, it was glory, if they could but camp on the field (as did our fathers in the Revolution), though they had even barely life remaining in them, and though they had been stripped of everything they possessed.

The character of this movement had in it two striking peculiarities; the one internal to itself and of its essential nature: the other outward and incidental, and therefore simply cotemporaneous; but both of the greatest and most indispensable importance.

The first of these was that it was a movement, not of a race or of a nation, as of France in contradistinction to England, or the Netherlands in contradistinction to the Danes, not a movement of any of the nationalities as such, but a movement of principle, in which all distinctions of nationalities were confounded, and against which, because of its reflex influence upon them all, and upon their forms of oppression of every sort, they subsequently combined in a secret but unhallowed "Holy Alliance." That the movement was of the nature of principle, is as palpable as that the movement was made; and that it was not the characteristic of a race, is manifest from there being no single race to which it had been confined, or which as a race, had made such a movement. The old law of human progress, by bringing together "Parthians, and Medes, and Elamites, and the dwellers in Mesopotamia, and in Judea, and Cappadocia, in Pontus, and Asia, Phrygia, and Pamphylia, in Egypt, and in the parts of Libya about Cyrene, and strangers of Rome, Jews and proselytes, Cretes and Arabians," has been observed in our land; and the old law of diffusion that was established, in making these the agents for the spread of the principles espoused, is the law whose operations have been felt in respect to our government by each and every

one, separately and collectively, of the despotisms of Europe. In truth, as far as the divine plan has been revealed, and to the extent that the whole history of the past would illustrate, a principle has never been committed to a race, except in view of its preservation: and when its dissemination has been determined upon, there was a preparation as of all races, that they might be conjoined in the enterprise. And somehow such was the inward life of the principle, in the regard that concerns ourselves, and such was its focal relation to the very being of our government, that without any form according to which it is declared, and without any explanation being possible to be given as to where or how it came so to be, and with an earnest and solemn protest from our inmost heart that it should ever be otherwise, our land has come to be distinguished, above every other respect whatever, as the "asylum for the oppressed of ALL NATIONS." Certain it is, that in analogy with this, for the period that the government has existed, none was ever more widely known, or exerted a larger influence, or as to its order and institutions, was more extensively or more profoundly studied.

The second of these peculiarities, namely: that which was from without, and so by coincidence connected with this movement, consists in that the movement took place at the juncture of time when the great protestant principle of accountability, every one for himself, to "the Judge of quick and dead," had received a successful enlargement in Europe. It was the operation of this principle, and its acknowledgment among the nations, that was to be the hope of mankind. The substitution of *government*, and by governments, to accomplish the purposes, legitimately to be fulfilled alone by this principle, was among the most striking indications ever given, on so grand a scale, of the insufficiency of human wisdom. The protestant principle, placed the word of God in the hands of every man. It recognized the conscience as having peace, only and alone, as the acts and the life were approved by Him, who searches, as with a lighted candle, INTO the most secret chambers of the soul. It prepared man, in the very highest sense, to be a subject of government; rendering a government possible in such manner as a government could not possibly be without it, for that it accomplished for government and for man,

that which is inseparable in its connection with the highest forms of government, and yet that which no mere government in and of itself alone could accomplish. It came from above, and therefore was not of a substance with them, and it did not spring from the earth, and therefore there could be no requirements, as of necessity, for it to contend against them.

We have adverted to these facts in the history of the past, that we might give them their proper place, as among the things on which the results of these our times, and in this our country, were conditioned. The beholder, who, attaining to some crowning elevation, shall descry, not towns and villages merely, but the wealth, and the resources, and the illimitable prospects of a great people, and shall return, confounding the glory with the possessor, is guilty of a fallacy that is as unphilosophic as it is bigoted and ill-conceived. But the possessor, who is so far forgetful of himself as to confound the operations of God's providential government, with his own feeble doings, and who says in his heart, "Is not this great Babylon, that I have built for the house of the kingdom, by the might of *my* power, and for *the honor* of my majesty?" is guilty, to say nothing of wickedness, of a vanity and a folly, that in all ages have been the precursors of destruction.

One of the great distinctions that early obtained, between our own country and those of Europe, was in respect of the influence of the press. An immediate cause for this was the exemption of paper from the manifold disabilities of an oppressive system of taxation. Undoubtedly there was a vitality in the popular mind of Europe (or that which is nearest of kin to it), which could be made to yield something in support of the morbid organism which the nation upheld. Of all objects of taxation, one would suppose that those which respected the wants of the mind, so intimately related as they are to the necessities of our spiritual well-being, would be the last to be fallen upon. But such are the inconsistencies of human kind. Not in Europe, only, but in our day, and in our own country, there are those who stand by the fountains of knowledge, and who say, not a drop, only at a cost which shall pay for it, with a margin to fill a purpose that is separate besides. It may be, some soul, languishing beside this stream, with one ray of light, might be directed to the cross. Is it the response, we

must have the profit? In the old countries, where these systems are those which are exclusively prevalent, the greatness of the burden is seen from the magnitude of their operations. That instructive and highly useful work, the Penny Cyclopædia, for instance, was subjected to a cost of the enormous sum of \$82,500, in the way of a duty to the government of three cents a pound on the paper alone; and then began the publisher's expenses proper: his pay to the paper dealer, the printer, the binder, the shopman, and at the end of all, he received the remunerative profits, that excited to the undertaking, and which provided for him a livelihood. What a tax on knowledge! Could Aladdin's lamp be conceived to work more wonderful changes, than the suspension of the adage, *obsta principiis* (resist the beginnings), applied to the workings of the press? And yet this is but one form of taxation, and upon one article, and which, together with the remainder of its kind, is over and above all those enormous amounts, which a government of incredible expenditures, must raise besides, by diversified means, to meet its unceasing demands.*

It is not so much, however, by a comparison of the systems of the two countries, that we can appreciate their effects, as by bringing into contrast, the circumstances that reveal the conditions of the nationalities themselves. The wars of the United States have been in a fair degree proportionate to those of other foreign powers. Considering the need of capital, in a country where capital has not yet had time to accumulate, into which but little capital has as yet been brought, and where all increase of improvement is itself an expenditure, or a needed investment of capital, the United States could ill have afforded to incur the immense costs of such wars. But whether under such circumstances, we view the country or the government, they must either of them appear exceedingly desirable to those concerned in them. Such are the resources of the country, that its enormous indebtedness, as repeatedly as it occurs, is all cancelled; and such is the mildness of the government that no government tax is directed against the people, and more and better than this, the thousand and one aggravations of an espionage over every individual and over every interest, as of

* See, in brief, Enc. Britannica, article Taxation.

a down-trodden and an oppressed community, are so completely avoided as to be wholly unknown.

Possessing such advantages as these, and with all the peculiarities of such surroundings, for us to call the press an institution of man, or its use, as among ourselves, anything else than of the orderings of an all-wise and most gracious Providence, seems to us to be little else than a species of profanity itself. For take all that is directly to be ascribed to the invention of man, as auxiliary to its power, and what is it, in comparison with that munificence of economical arrangement, which the good providence of God did have in preparation for it? Which, therefore, is not of the invention of man, and with which that invention had nothing whatever to do, as in the way of procuring it. So far, indeed, is it from this, that the perfection of the press, as to its management, and the results, is with those over whom we have the advantage; but *the sphere* of its operations is with us, on whom God has conferred the economy to that end. There is a sense, therefore, in which we may no more arrogate to ourselves the benefits of the press, as being of our providing, than we may claim to ourselves the lead mines, or the coal deposits, or the salt springs which God has constituted in nature, as he has constituted man with society, and with government, and with all other interests in which man is concerned, conferring on him their good.

From the consideration of these views, we are led, in connection, to observe that the great characteristic of the press, as conducted by us, is not intelligence, but cheapness. And its great quality to us, and as in our hands, is that God has given to us so mild a government, and so easy circumstances, and such unrestrained privileges, that the press has become to us as the simplest piece of mechanism, to be used or abused for every purpose, and unto every end, that the thoughts of men, good or bad, may lead them to devise.

As in the physical world, there are the upper, and middle, and at length the terrestrial regions, where, as in the first, amid the amber fields of space, above where play the forked lightnings, or reverberate the wheels of mighty thunders, circling its way in the azure deep, the eagle bird of heaven, builds its nest on topmost peak, and dwells apart in space

sublime, or, as in the second, those higher orders of the inferior creation have their abode, which are great in prowess, or swift on wing, or subtle in device, or, as in the last, where be frogs and lizards, and all manner of buzzing insects, and of creeping things; so in the world, the *greater* world of mind, there be those to whom the press is but the machine to convey the electric spark from above. To them it feeds a heavenly fire. Them it elevates to thrones of glory. Them it inspires with noble deeds, and them incites to exalted virtues. In their hands, as an instrument, it is like the bursting cloud, whose showers are blessings to the fields on which they fall. Others there are with whom the press is but a means, genteelly, acutely, wittily, from a heavenly or from a mercenary spirit it may be, to accomplish whatever purpose God of his grace may prompt them to seek out, or the Evil one, in his vile machinations, may insidiously lead them to pursue. If good, it is clothed in philosophy *so called*, in sentiment, in wit, in speech of reason perchance, or in any and in all of these in various and promiscuous proportions, but least of all is it based on the sublime testimony of the INCORRUPTIBLE WORD. There are others, and they of the third class (how large it is, we shall not delay to describe), in whose hand, and to whose purposes the press, as an instrument, is but as the muck rake, which Bunyan, when a pilgrim, descried—a dream that, but reality this. In its use they may noise and buzz, may slime in their native dust, and hide from the light of day, but whatever may be the varieties of their modes of pursuit, or of the ends sought, it is a succinct description, they are of the earth, earthy.

How large a field have we spread out before us, in the history of the operations of the press! Not the press, even, as it embraces all that in any way is issued from it, but simply as confined to that what is serial; or even that part of the serial that, more distinctively, is classed under the head of Journalism: a topic for consideration, great and important, and in this single department of it, worthy of attention beyond what it has received.

There is no history, however, that is deserving of the name, which is not obtained, first of all, simply from a record of fact. And as the lover of that which is true in nature, returns from

his walks, with one specimen and another, seen by him to be beautiful, because so wonderfully touched in this and in that manner, by the finger of the Almighty, so we, simple students of Nature, in that which respects man, rejoicing in the providence of God, tell only what he has ruled and over-ruled, in orderings that are ALWAYS mysterious, because always involving a wisdom that is greater than we have capability to comprehend. It is not ours to make the facts, but only to discover and relate: and to this end, out of many, but as appropriate to the character of this Review, we present the following. The details, it will be observed, are made minute, and justly so, as affording an apt illustration of the all-comprehensive character of our subject.

The "town" of Lyme, in the county of New London, and in the State of Connecticut, is about ten miles long, by eight wide. The limits in one direction, the historian tells us, were matter of controversy with a town that adjoined; and the dispute was ended by being referred to contestants; with whom (there being two on either side), the victorious party should represent, also, a victorious town. The pugilists from Lyme bore off the palm, and the boundary ever after extended accordingly. Another event happened within its limits, and connects with this history. Elias Smith was born there. His life may not have elicited the attention of our readers, and yet circumstances connected with it, forbid that it should be passed over:

1. OF THE FAMILY. "My father's name was *Stephen Smith*. My mother's name before she was married, was *Irene Ransom*. They were both born in Lyme. My father's family were originally from England; my mother's, I have been told, were from Wales. My mother was a second wife, and was 13 years younger than my father. She was 17 years and 6 months old when she was married, and 19 years old the month I was born, being her first child."—*Life*, p. 13.

2. DISPOSITION IN CHILDHOOD. "The spring before I was 3 years old, my father moved into a new house which he had built; this is still in my memory, from a particular circumstance. A little girl in the neighbourhood, 5 years old, was at play with me, and some others a few rods from the house; while at play, she wanted a case knife I called mine, which I refused to give her. Soon after my refusal, she with a stick dug a large hole in the ground; I asked her what she

"dug the hole for; she said, to plant my knife; adding, that if I planted it, the knife would come up and be more. This pleased me much, as I had seen beans grow, and expected that in the course of a few weeks, the knives would hang down under the leaves as thick as bean-pods. She planted the knife with my consent; telling me that it would come up in a short time. Believing what she said, I waited patiently for my knife to grow, but waited in vain, and at last dug after it, thinking it better to have the old one than to wait so long for new ones. Not finding it, I told her the knife was not there. She told me it had fallen down through the ground into the water, and was gone. I cried aloud at my loss, and determined never to plant a knife again."—Life, p. 15.

"The next thing retained in my memory, is a circumstance which took place the summer following, when four years old. One evening, as I stood by my father, who sat in the door, there came a bird, called (in Connecticut) *Whip-poor-will* (or *Whip-'o-will*), and lighted near us. Being pleased with the bird, I thought nothing more was needful but to reach out my hand, and to have him at once in my possession. As I reached out my hand moderately, to take him, he flew a few feet, and stood still; this encouraged me to hope he would soon be mine. When I came near him, he flew farther than before, and as he flew farther, my desire to obtain him increased; after treating me in this manner repeatedly, he flew far from me, and rising into the air sung such a song as taught me his liberty, and my folly in attempting to make him a captive. By this time I had run several rods from the house, and found myself near a grove, in the dark, far from my father, in danger, as I apprehended, and to heighten my trouble, disappointed of that which I had in vain run for. My trouble and disappointment caused me to cry aloud, and return to my father, who said I had learnt never to run after a bird that could fly, with hope of catching him, because I wished to be gratified with him at the expense of his liberty."—Life, p. 17.

3. YOUTHFUL CHARACTER. "In the spring of 1862, my father sold what property he had in Lyme. * * * * * Sometime in the month of August in that year (having purchased 'land in the south part of Woodstock, Vt. '), we commenced the journey (to that place) of 180 miles, which we performed in 13 days. * * * * * The Monday after our arrival, I sat out from where we put up, with my father, mother, brothers, and sisters, and several of the neighbors, with our goods, to go to the house we were in future to make the place of our abode. We had about 2 miles to go; the first mile we went without much difficulty; this brought us to the foot of an hill which we were to ascend to get to the house. A considerable part of this mile,

"a cart had never been. It took us till sometime in the afternoon, to cut away the logs and stumps so that the team could pass along. After many sweats and hard pulls, my father pointed us to the house, about forty rods ahead, the sight of which struck a damp on my spirits, as it appeared to me only an abode of wretchedness. After going to it, and taking a general view of the house and land around, before the team came up, I determined within myself to return to Connecticut; thinking it better to be there to dig clams for my living, than to be in such a place. I was disappointed, grieved, vexed, and mad, to think of living in such a place. Though I was some over thirteen years I cried; part of the time because I was disappointed, and sometimes for madness. With this fixed determination to return, I went down to the team, and passed by the team down the steep and dismal hill as fast as possible. My father, observing my rapid course, called after me, asking me where I was going; and commanded me to return to him. I feared to disobey him and returned. He asked me where I was going; my reply was, to *Connecticut*. He ordered me to return. This order I obeyed, though with great reluctance, as it appeared to me better to die, than to be confined to such a place."—Life, pp. 34-36.

4. THE SCHOOL-MASTER ABROAD.—"Soon after my return (then in my eighteenth year), James Cottle, Esq., who had been a peculiar friend to me, proposed to me to take a school one month, as they wished the school to continue longer than their teacher could attend. The thing was proposed to my father; whose only objection was, that I had no learning. My friend Cottle told him I could teach the children A, B, C, and ab, and that was the chief the children needed to be taught; however, I was determined to do the best in my power, knowing an angel could do no better. Without any doubt, my appearance as a school-master was rather awkward, for I could write but poorly, and did not understand the rules of reading; and, to save my life, could enumerate only three figures. My wages was four dollars for the month, to be paid in wheat, at five shillings per bushel, and boarded at the expense of the district. * * * * * One or two weeks of the time I boarded with my friend Cottle, who was considered a man of good learning; he taught me how to enumerate, and told me every third figure was hundreds; this looked plain, and I considered it an acquirement, not to be parted with on any account."—Life, pp. 89-91.

5. If, in relating the following incident, we appear to attach importance to it, the reader will remember that we do no more than does the person, of whom it is the subject. Of it he avers his confident belief, p. 60, that he "then experienced the

washing of regeneration, and the renewing of the Holy Ghost." It is everywhere regarded as a cardinal fact; and in the oft repeated allusions to it, is variously described as "conversion," p. 97—a "change," p. 84—his "first relief," p. 70—his "distress washed away," p. 70—or that event, in view of which his belief was, that he "had passed from death to life," p. 70.

"Not long after these things passed through my mind," he says, "I went into the woods one morning after a stick of timber; after taking it on my shoulder to bring it to the house, as I walked along on a large log that lay above the snow, my foot slipped and I fell partly under the log, the timber fell one end on the log and the other on the snow, and held me, so that I found it difficult, at first, to rise from the situation I was then in. While in this situation, a light appeared to shine from heaven, not only into my head, but into my heart. This was something very strange to me, and what I had never experienced before. My mind seemed to rise in that light to the throne of God and the Lamb, and while thus gloriously led, what appeared to my understanding was expressed in Rev. xiv: 1: 'And I looked, and lo, a Lamb stood on the Mount Zion, and with him an hundred and forty and four thousand—having his Father's name,' etc. The Lamb once slain appeared to my understanding, and while viewing him, I felt such love to him as I never felt to anything earthly. My mind was calm and at peace with God, through the Lamb of God that taketh away the sin of the world. The view of the Lamb on Mount Zion gave me joy unspeakable and full of glory. It is not possible for me to tell how long I remained in that situation, as everything earthly was gone from me for some time. After admiring the glory of the Lamb for some time, I began to think of the situation my body was in, and rose up to return home. Looking around me, every object was changed, and a bright glory appeared on everything around me. All things praised God with me. As I went toward the house, this thought came into my mind, 'Why do I feel so different from what I did a short time past; I am unspeakably happy, and shall never see trouble again.' As I walked along, these lines came into my mind, and appeared peculiarly pleasing:

"Come we who love the Lord,—And let our joys be known,
 "Join in a song with sweet accord,—And thus surround the throne;
 "Let sorrows of the mind,—Be banish'd from the place;
 "Religion never was design'd—To make our pleasures less."

"I sung the words in a tune called Little Marlborough, and sung them with such pleasure as was never known by me before."—Life, pp. 58-60.

Remarkable ecstasies like this, seeming to be connected, at the time, with no particular views of one's own character, and state, and prospects, or of God's mercy and grace in Christ, but being simply because of some wonderful manifestation, supposed to be outward to the person experiencing the hallucination, are frequently made mention of in biographies and other books of a religious nature. Dr. John P. Campbell makes citation of an instance, which is even more noticeable than the one just related, because, not only a still greater hallucination, and therefore, showing its undoubted possibility; but connected with a high degree of gifts and attainments, and so proving that it is a liability of the mind, and not a mere consequence of ignorance, or any such incidental cause.

Edward Lord Herbert, Baron of Cherbury, one among the most eminent of the deistical writers of a former age, prepared a work, *de Veritate*, the first edition of which was printed in 1624. Respecting this publication, we have this remarkable but undisputed statement, that:

"As the frame of his whole book was so different from what had been written heretofore on this subject, and he apprehended he should meet with much opposition, he did consider, whether it were not better for him for a while to suppress it.

"Being thus doubtful, in my chamber, one fair day in the summer, my casement being open toward the South, the sun shining clear, and no wind stirring, I took my book *de Veritate* in my hands, and, kneeling on my knees, devoutly said these words: *O thou eternal God, author of this light which now shines upon me, and giver of all inward illuminations: I do beseech thee, of thine infinite goodness, to pardon a greater request than a sinner ought to make: I am not satisfied enough, whether I shall publish this book: if it be for thy glory, I beseech thee give me some sign from heaven; if not, I shall suppress it.* I had no sooner spoken these words, but a loud though yet gentle noise, came forth from the heavens (for it was like nothing on earth), which did so cheer and comfort me, that I took my petition as granted, and that I had the sign I demanded; whereupon also I resolved to print my book. This, how strange soever it may seem, I protest before the eternal God, is true; neither am I any superstitiously deceived herein; since I did not only clearly hear the noise, but in the serenest sky that I ever saw, being without all cloud, did, to my thinking, see the place from whence it came."

The particular circumstance alluded to, it will be observed, is here also described in Lord Herbert's own words.* The reader may, for himself, refer to the whole statement, as found, with accompanying reflections, in Leland's *View of the Deistical Writings*, London, 1837, p. 19.

6. The peculiarities with Mr. Smith were very remarkable, and as his case comes directly in our way for consideration, we deem it altogether proper for us to bestow upon it some further attention.

(1). There seems to have been a ground for these peculiarities, in his physical constitution. Of a weakness in this respect we have undoubted testimony, in what he says of himself in his fifteenth year: "Making shoes was such a confinement to me, that I was † *obliged* to quit it without becoming master of the trade," p. 42. Again, "After entering my 18th year," he says, "by overdoing, I had an uncommon faintness at my stomach, caused partly by hard work, and partly by reading and *thinking so intensely* upon what I had read, in order to retain it in my memory. * * * * * My father thought *reading* hurt me more than hard work," pp. 88, 89. "In the spring, the same complaint returned upon me again, that I had the year before, which was caused by too much singing, reading, and *intense thinking* upon what I had read," p. 91. The phrase "intense thinking," is to be understood as expressive, not of concentration of mind (especially with one whose mind had never received discipline), but of the feebleness of the body, so little able to bear up the power of thought. To the business of teaching, there was such an objection, because of "the confinement" attending it, p. 135, that, p. 265, he determined never again to be engaged in it, "unless there was *no other way left*" for him "to make a living." In his twentieth year, one day's "overdoing" again, brought on a "violent pain" in his side, p. 118, and compelled a suspension, for a period, of his movements. From a former attack, which we have already mentioned, he recovered only after "a change of climate," and seeking "the salt water," p. 89. Apprehensions

* See "Life of Edward Lord Herbert, of Cherbury." Lon. 1826, pp. 302-306.

† In making quotations from the Life, we shall occasionally italicize a word or sentence, so as to give distinctness to expressions, and make more obvious the purpose for which we cite it.

of "a decline," p. 185, constrained him again, in his twenty-second year, to try "the sea air," a "change of climate," etc. And, at a very much later period, we find the "choice" "to live near the sea," p. 245, a ruling motive in determining the course he should pursue.

(2). There are indications, also, of a singularly morbid trait in his mental constitution. This was manifested early. "I felt," he says, "an aversion to company; and *many times* when young people came to my father's house, I would retire to the barn, and *stay there in the cold*, rather than be with them. One reason of this was, I concluded that I had not common sense, or not sense like other young people, and that by keeping from them, they would not know how great a fool I was," p. 86. Such a morbid feeling seems to be evidenced in the inference he drew from what his father told him one day, that is, suggesting to him "to give up the idea of trying to help him," as "he did not think" he "should be able to do any more work that summer," p. 101. "I could not tell," he says, "what he meant, but rather concluded he thought I might not live long."

(8.) It would have been strange if these constitutional peculiarities existed, and yet they did not show their influence in connection with the religious character. This they constantly do throughout, but at sometimes much more clearly than at others. "Sometimes," he says, "while walking through the fields alone, and meditating on *the glory* to come, my desire was to be gone from earth, to be with Christ, which is far better. Many times in that month, did I wish it to be my lot to leave all below," p. 74. In other instances, his feelings partook of an exactly opposite character. "*Several times*," he says, "after the people" (holding a "congregational meeting" in his school-room), "were gone from the school-house, there was a strong temptation in my mind to get under the school-house and *die there*. This was the state of my mind through the winter, and *there was no one that knew* the unhappy state of my mind," p. 142. "My mind was so distressed *oftentimes*, that I *could not* work, and sometimes had no appetite for my food. Many times I arose before day, and went into the woods, and there remained the greatest part of the day without any food. My time," he continues, "was

spent in prayer, reading the Bible, and meditating on what it contained." But were these exercises consistent with what immediately follows? "Sometimes I wished a Bible had never been put into my hands; sometimes I felt a strong temptation to throw my Bible away and *drown myself*, or *starve in the woods*. My parents," he adds (such was the reality of his malady), "were frequently alarmed about me, **FEARING WHAT MIGHT HAPPEN**, and frequently called after me when in the wilderness, and though I heard, *yet I gave them no answer*,"* pp. 142, 143. These things took place after the period of (what he regarded) his conversion. That it was a constitutional affection alone, and not caused by any apostasy that brought his conscience into bondage, is proven from what he says, p. 84, that he had *not* gone into "sinful courses."

(4.) Besides what we have been considering, there were peculiar phenomena attending his mental operations. There were impressions *somehow* produced upon his mind, in regard to which he had a "fixed" persuasion, that it would be with him, as, according to them, he was led to expect. For instance, "one thing," he says, "my mind *was fixed upon*, which was never to try to preach, unless I had *an evidence* that the God of heaven called me to the work," p. 102. Again, "Two things *I was determined upon*; one was, never to speak in public, without *an evidence* of being called of God to the work," p. 133. From which it is manifest that there was to be something that he would call "an evidence," that must precede his ever being a preacher. These impressions were sometimes more nearly of the character of manifestations, like to that at the time of his supposed conversion. They were frequent, though with various degrees of distinctness. "On a certain day," for instance, he says, "being alone, and meditating on my situation, there came a voice, as from heaven, to my understanding, which said: '*Give an account of thy stewardship; for thou mayest be no longer steward.*' This came with power to my heart, and I said, if this takes place, I am forever undone,"

* On pages 184, 185, this "state of my mind," and "trouble of mind," in which he was "afraid," as to his religious state, is immediately connected with his being brought "very low," and compelled to seek "the sea air," a "change of climate," etc.

p. 294. Again, he says: "While meditating upon these doctrines, and my own situation, and saying, what shall I do? there was a gentle whisper to my understanding in these words: '*Drop them both and search the Scriptures.*' This command was immediately consented to; and *instantly my mind was freed* from the entanglement before experienced; and *immediately I sung*. 'Our soul is escaped as a bird out of the snare of the fowler, the snare is broken, and we are escaped, our help is in the name of the Lord.' *From that moment*, my mind was delivered from *Calvinism, Universalism, and Deism*," pp. 292, 298. That it was the supernatural manifestation that wrought these convictions, is evident, not only from the statement itself, but from a declaration he elsewhere makes. In this last, there is explicit mention of the manner, as he supposes, of his illumination. "In the night it was made manifest to me, I believe, BY THE SPIRIT OF TRUTH, that God would work in Portsmouth, and that I should see a glorious reformation." With what power this hallucination, that he was in direct communication with God, operated upon his mind, or rather, as he says, p. 59, and p. 294, his "heart," may be seen from the description he gives of the then state of his feelings. "I had such a sense of the situation of the people, and the ministers who cried peace, when there was no peace, that *I could scarce refrain from going through the streets in the night*, to warn the people to flee from the wrath to come. From that time, it was *fixed in my mind*, that God would pour out his spirit before many months," p. 304. A remarkable instance of this special apprehension of things, such as is dependent upon divine communication, is referred to as having been had at a much earlier period, and has this additional characteristic, that it partakes more nearly of the nature of prophetic vision. "When in my twenty-fourth year, I believed there *would be* a people, bearing a name distinct from all the denominations then in this country." Such a specific *belief*, with an uncultivated mind, at least, could hardly be grounded upon anything short of a *revelation*; and its having the effect to produce some such conviction as this, is doubtless the cause of its being made known. That there was a knowledge, in some sort, distinct from our ordinary intelligence, apparently connected with the matter, would seem to be clear from what he immediately

adds: "But what they would be called, I then could not tell," p. 298. The uncertainty applied, not to the fact, but to the name. If it were not so, then there is nothing in the statement.

(5). Dreams are an almost unfailing accompaniment of certain forms of mental disease. Mr. Smith's use of them was various. Sometimes they had respect to his character, as connected with his state and hopes; sometimes to his course in life, and sometimes to the subject-matter of his belief. In one dream, an angel says: "I am sent to try you, and the other two young men" (who were of his religious acquaintances), "that you may know what your situation is," p. 75. This dream was attended with a remarkable bodily affection. "I awoke," he says, "and was in the same situation that I dreamed of being in. My face was bathed in tears, and my pillow was wet with my weeping." "I felt a calmness of mind, and every circumstance of my dream appeared solemn to me. It was not long after this that my dream began to be fulfilled," pp. 76, 77. In another instance, having determined to preach on Gen. xxviii: 12, an angel, the night previous, conversing with him, inquires, "How wide do you think that ladder is?" To his reply, that "He did not know;" the angel answered, "It is as wide as the world." "The next day, in the pulpit, I told the people of Jacob's dream, and my own, and was happy in having an whole Saviour to preach to every creature," pp. 216, 217. In a third, he makes use of a dream, vulgarly to bring down his displeasure upon a Baptist minister, who had refused to him the use of his meeting-house. "When I awoke," he says, "the application of my dream was easy. And from that day to this, I have considered Caleb Green where he can do no more than *kick*, and say, 'you shall not preach,'" pp. 355-357. Such was his reliance upon dreams, that not only his own, but those of others, in any way coming to his knowledge, were quoted and made use of. "A religious woman in Vermont," in her dream, saw stars moving, and an angel appeared, and explained to her the meaning. Mr. Smith relates the story, and says: "This I tell as a dream, and as it was told me by a person who had it from the one who had the dream, as near as my memory serves." He then declares his sentiments in regard to dreams. "Whenever I see the truth

of a dream, I am bound to believe it;" and then his conviction in regard to this by the "woman in Vermont," viz.: "The truth of this dream I have seen and do see," pp. 380-382. Dreams have ever been exceedingly captivating to enthusiasts; having this immense advantage, that if anything was seen to be true in a dream, it was by the Spirit of God: whereas, if proven by men, it rested only upon human testimony: but subject also to this disadvantage, that by means of them, the will of God is only known, according as "memory serves;" wherein is also an unfortunate liability.

6. THE CALL.—It may be inquired, did Mr. Smith receive the call to preach? (See p. 421). At first he was encouraged to believe from "*the singular freedom*," p. 162, he enjoyed in speaking, "that the Lord had called" him "to bear witness to the truth." But the impossibility, as he viewed it, for one of his "natural, spiritual, and acquired abilities, to be called to such an important work," p. 163, caused him to be so depressed, that he soon entirely relinquished it. "Three weeks from the time," he did so, p. 168, he had a dream, in which a man came riding and leading a horse, with many other particulars. "I dreamed," he says, "that these things greatly affected me, and that while endeavoring to preach, the power of God was manifested, and myself and the assembly were convinced that the Lord had called me to preach in Bradford," p. 169. The dream, in all its particulars, was literally fulfilled; even to the resistance, which the subject of it interposed, at every step. The topic of the discourse he delivered, was in Heb. xiii: 2; "*Be not forgetful to entertain strangers.*" Respecting it, he says: "My mind was uncommonly enlarged, to my own astonishment, and of many who heard. There was such a flowing river, that I continued two hours in speaking, and my speech dropped upon them, and they waited for it, as for the rain. I was convinced, then, that nothing but the power of the Spirit of God could enable me to speak in such a manner. * * * * * The assembly in general, were to appearance moved, as the trees are moved by the wind. * * * * * The enlargement of mind, freedom of thought, ease in communicating, and power of truth, which was then felt by me and many others, served at that time to remove all my doubts respecting being

called of God to preach the Gospel of Christ," pp. 173-175. All this, however, is the display of a but slightly inferior quality of that same element, of which fanatics make their boast, and which the Shaker connects with his history in such words as the following: "The remarkable revival which happened about that time, in the province of Dauphny and Vivarais, in France, excited great attention. The subjects of this work were wrought upon in a very extraordinary manner, both in body and mind; nor could the violent agitations of their bodies, nor the powerful operations of their spirits, which appeared in the flaming and irresistible energy of their testimony, be imputed to anything short of the *mighty power of God*; with which they were EVIDENTLY INSPIRED." The writer continues: "Persons of both sexes and all ages, were the subjects of these *divine inspirations*. Men, women, and even little children, were wrought upon in a manner which struck the spectators with wonder and astonishment, and their powerful admonitions and prophetic warnings 'were heard and received with reverence and awe.'"—*Millenial Church*, p. 8.

To this purpose of God, eventually to call Mr. Smith to be a preacher of the Gospel, there are dark and mysterious allusions, again and again, in the Life. "You do not know what he may be," p. 49, is the remonstrance of his *uncle* with his father, interceding that he might be permitted to learn Grammar. Some members of the *Baptist Church* thought he would be so called, p. 98. Next, my father told me "it appeared to *him* that I had some other business to do besides laboring with my hands," p. 101. "At other times," again, *he* says, I thought "some other business was laid out for me, in the world, especially when so many frequently told me they expected one day to see me a preacher of the Gospel," p. 101, 102. He thinks whether it might not be his "duty;" and as it would be "a less cross to speak among strangers," gets a school (to favor that end), away from home, p. 102. He there speaks in "meeting," p. 123, reads printed sermons, and speaks again "once or twice in a private meeting," pp. 134, 135. He now finds that his attention is so occupied with reading, that he "could not work," p. 135, that is, could take no interest in his work. He speaks of the "constant labor in" his "mind. as to speaking in public," that "*could not be removed*," and

says, "there was no person on earth that knew the labors of my mind at that time," p. 135. It is not to be understood that Mr. Smith was intending to thrust himself into this work. On the contrary, he "frequently wondered why others should think" him "possessed of a public gift," p. 135. *He* "was much against ever being a preacher," p. 136. "My mind was continually distressed on account of preaching the Gospel to others," he says, but immediately adds, "it often was surprising that such a subject should trouble me, when, in my own view, I was destitute of every qualification for such a work," p. 136. "Many of the church" argued with him, "frequently," and in reply to his pleas, quoted against him Moses and Jeremiah. "When I told them of my ignorance, weakness, foolishness, and that for many years I had thought myself a fool, and that I never could talk as others could, they would bring me the words of Paul: 1 Cor. i: 27, 28, 'But God hath chosen the foolish (his own italicising) things of the world,'" and so on, citing the whole passage. "I considered myself destitute of every qualification needful for such an important and glorious work," p. 98. "There was no righteous thing which my mind was so opposed to, as this," "preaching the Gospel to others," "and it was my determination never to submit to it, if it *could be avoided* righteously," p. 132. Two things, by Jonathan Edwards, we are strikingly reminded of, in this connection. 1. "A person," he says, "may be over full of his own experiences," under which head he cites 2 Pet. ii: 17—which, if we will remember how Mr. Smith's views of being called, at length became settled, has a wonderful force of significance in its manner of expression. "'These are clouds without water' (see Jude 12), '*carried with a tempest.*'"—Treatise Concerning Religious Affections, p. 45. 2. The reason of the former, viz.: "that it is the nature of false religion to affect show and observation;" which he accompanies with this citation from Mr. Shepard, that "a man will sometimes covertly commend himself (and *myself* ever comes in) and tells you a long story. * * * * * Why the secret meaning is, *I pray admire me.* Hence complaints of wants and weaknesses; *pray think what a broken-hearted Christian I am.*" Same work, p. 45. But why, it may be asked, should an expectant of a call to public life, decry his own qualifications, and even protest his willing-

ness to undertake its services? Manifestly for the reason, that if he is called of God, the more ignorant and disqualified he is, the more it is attested, that his preaching is by a mighty power; and the more unwilling he is, of himself, to undertake the work, the more evident it is that he is the Lord's messenger. Whatever shall suspend the conscious relation of the person concerned, to human agencies of any sort, in that degree prepares the way to ascribe the excellency of that which he says and does, and the authority of it, to a supernatural cause. Elder Grow would not permit the evidence that was from this supernatural source, to be interfered with by books, that were of human invention. "There," said he, showing to Mr. Smith a volume entitled "Skeletons of Sermons," "There is the book they gave me when *men* undertook to make a minister of me," p. 138. How far removed from Elder Grow's view, is any thing that is contained in the extract which follows? And at what point will we *begin* to distinguish between them?

"Those among us who followed the light of God (that was), ministered in that revival, and (who) were not held in bondage by the traditions of men, or the *comments of human wisdom*, received from time to time renewed and increasing *light from God*, opening their understanding to understand the Scriptures on one subject or another."—*Manifesto*, by Dunlevy, p. 437.

What operation of the Spirit in man, that was ever contemplated by the Shaker, was more miraculous than that which they must have had in view, who, on hearing Mr. Smith, appropriated to him the language used respecting our blessed Lord, "Whence hath this man these things, having never known letters?" p. 161, and p. 162; applied and applicable to Him alone, upon whom the Spirit was poured out without measure? And what less than this *miraculous gift* manifested in him, could have led to this appropriation, since by it they were "fully convinced," p. 163, of his being called of God?

The first distinct view we have of the traits of intellectual character belonging to Mr. Smith, is from an important observation of Elder Leland, after hearing him preach. "You must have a system of doctrine," he said, "*you have none now*. You will find the necessity of being doctrinated," p. 180. But Mr. Smith's mind was not fitted to follow logical processes, so as

to be benefitted by a system. "At first," he says, "I had no idea of systems of doctrine, as they are called." Nor had he at the last. "Osterwald's Theology" was (not studied and comprehended) but "*committed to memory*," by him: just as some students repeat from memory the proposition in Euclid, because, in no other way could they ever recite it. Of Elder Leland, he says, "I looked, to myself, when he was preaching, as the ten spies did, when they stood before the sons of Anack; like grasshoppers. His preaching preached away my knowledge, voice, and all," p. 180. Again, "In conversation at Elder Leland's house, some things were conversed upon, which they called DOCTRINAL POINTS; but as they were beyond my *comprehension*, I retained but little of what was said," p. 145. The sphere of *mind* does not seem to be the one to which he was adapted; and, therefore, when what Mr. Leland observed to him, was "attended to afterward," it was, he says, "*with many grievous consequences*," p. 181. How *could* that be? And yet, if we remember, that after the period of time, which is fixed upon by Mr. Smith, as that in which he was "born of the Spirit," p. 121, he makes this declaration—"I thought a real Christian *felt as holy as an angel*, and that he" (the Christian) "*felt nothing in himself wrong, or unlike God*," p. 71, the mind that can reconcile so great a "*change*," with being left in such *utter darkness of view*, as this, can take no ground, at which we need at all to express surprise.

A reference to the characteristics of Mr. Smith's moral sense, must be equally unsatisfactory. He had resisted all movings and inclinations to preach, until he should receive an extraordinary proof that he was called of God. Such reluctance to assuming the duties would intimate, an endeavor, as he says, in performing them, to put his "trust in the Lord, and preach the preaching he bid" him, p. 197. Observe, now, what follows in regard to this same matter. "I had for many years held with Dr. Baldwin, but by reading the articles of the Church in Woburn, I found it stated 'that the death of Christ was special and particular, that is, for the elect only;' and finding it so there, concluded to *preach according to the articles*," p. 285. Were this the utterance of one, whose judgment we did not know to be enlightened in this respect, the statement would not appear so decisive. Again, "I ever

preached a free Gospel to all, * * * * * while my Calvinism, for ballast, preserved my reputation among *the Calvinists*, who considered me sound in their faith," p. 242. Again: "I considered myself almost alone in the world; though *the Baptists thought* I belonged to their faith and order," p. 321. Again: "This year I became acquainted with the Free-Will Baptists. * * * * * But for one man I should have become a member with them, so far as to be held in fellowship as a fellow-laborer," p. 354. At the time of this unsuccessful effort, and while yet acknowledging the also great misapprehension under which the Baptists labored respecting his real position, he had already reached the following "determination," viz.: "*as soon as things were ripe, to declare myself free, and separate from the Baptist denomination, and all other sectarians on earth,*" p. 321. The same anomalous position was occupied by "Elder Abner Jones," of Vermont, who, Mr. Smith says, "was the first free man" he "had ever seen," p. 321. "He was received among the Free-Will Baptists, and ordained by them; though he told them from the first he was not a Free-Will Baptist, but a Christian," p. 321. Notwithstanding this declaration, whatever influence he exerted, was in consequence of his known public relation. "He was considered a *Free-Willer*," p. 324. If there can be no plea for these false positions among the *teachers of religion*, as "*fellow*"-laborers, there can be less for the use that was attempted to be made of the advantage afforded by these positions. What was called "The Christian Conference," composed of a number of preachers (who are named), was assembled with this "design:" "to leave behind everything in name, doctrine, or practice, not found in the New Testament." "Whither they thought at first this would carry them," says Mr. Smith, "I can not tell. I conclude they did not." "I was confident at first, if we *attended to our proposition*, it would end in a final separation from the Baptist denomination." "When *they saw* where it would end, the greater part went back, and apologized for their conduct, and remain with the Baptists to this day," p. 301. The same remark applies to the design, in adopting the articles, by the Christian Conference that was held in Stratham. Mr. Smith says, "This was a bold and important step *at that time*, for by these articles we condemned

all others. *The next step* was to disown *these*, and hear Christ in all things," p. 309. In like manner, as to these articles, which were drawn up by Mr. Smith: they were "articles of faith and church building, which we then thought necessary to keep a church together, in addition to '*the perfect law of liberty*,'" p. 309. Here, then, were so many operations of the rule of expediency; not only in a way in which no principle was involved, but in a way contrary to principle. A *perfect law of liberty* was *added to*, and thought *necessary* to be added to, and that necessity was for so important an end as *the keeping of the church together*, and this deliberately in a Christian Conference—holding, that such *addition* was wrong. In one adhering to "the perfect law of liberty," a more complete denial both of that "law," and of its perfection, could not well be conceived. Such inconsistencies, not only did violence to the moral sense, but made more apparent than before was manifest, the contariety of sentiment thus attempted to be reconciled, and so caused a failure in the very ends for which the expedients had been adopted. Elder Jones, for instance, held to "the perfect law of liberty." In his view the articles "were needless and *hurtful*," p. 322. In consequence, although almost the only free man there was, he refused to "join" *the Christian Conference*. On the other hand, what pleased him, namely the declaring of the articles "useless" (in 1805), was the means of fraying away all, or nearly all, of the other members: inso-much that Mr. Smith, in 1807, thinks it proper to note that about this time the Christian Conference "disappeared," p. 378.

It is, perhaps, a frequent mistake to suppose that a want of intelligence shows itself, in most important degree, in the inaccurate use of words, and in ungrammatical phrases. On the contrary, our every-day observation will prove to us, that where there is strong, good sense, and the proper capacity of understanding, these blemishes are passed over, and are no hinderance, either to good companionship, or to deserved influence. Were we to single out for remark such expressions of Mr. Smith as "an whole" (p. 217), "gave an evidence" (p. 247), "preach with them" (p. 265), "they had an Hopkinsonian preacher" (p. 373), "priscimmon-tree" (p. 393), "dis-asteemed" (p. 371), we should feel that we were trifling, not with that in which he was to *blame*, but with what was his

misfortune, in not having enjoyed suitable early opportunities. The real calamity of ignorance in the uncultivated, is in the thousand and one foolish notions, and injurious prejudices, which are engendered in the mind, of the mere humors that are within itself. These are the things which are hurtful; which, working and festering in the mind, diffuse through it their poisonous element; and for which, as they are undiscerned, so no remedy can be provided. We have already alluded to the existence of feelings in Mr. Smith, of long standing, and known only to himself. But that did not make them inoperative. *They* fixed opinions, determined character, and established practices, with an absoluteness of power, *that despised all authority, and refused all investigation.* Meeting with a clergyman, who crossed from the opposite side of a river, to where he was waiting, he says: "As he came out of the boat, he looked earnestly at me, and said, 'Sir, I thought whether you were not a clergyman; I beg leave to ask.' My *only* reply was, No. I crossed the river, pleased to have no more to do with a clergyman, besides saying, *no.*" (The italicising of this word is his own.) The only reason suggested for this conduct was, the "abomination" in which clergymen at that time were held, p. 186. Again: he prayed "at the Baptist meeting-house," after Elder Leland "had done preaching: which was the first time," he says, "I ever prayed in a meeting-house. My mind was greatly embarrassed, as a meeting-house, then, was to me a very different place from what it is now," p. 145. Having to preach at Lee, he says: "What gave me the most unpleasant sensation, was to see an old man come into the pulpit, with a large white wig upon his head. His presence made me tremble, as I *had ever thought* that ministers with white wigs were knowing men," p. 197. This gives a view of ignorance, that makes it pitiable; it requires, however, but a slight change in this same ignorance, to give it a very different appearance. In another place, a story is told of a negro, who professed to his master, his belief in what is meant to be a representation of Calvinistic doctrine. It is made to appear absurd; and the master to illustrate its being so, tied him "fast" to a tree, and "began to whip him severely for not" eating food that was beyond his reach; requiring him, at the same time, to give up such a religion. "The negro cried out,

'Master, I no believe such religion any more.' He then let him go, having convinced him of the *wickedness* of such doctrine, by the example of food he could not reach, and the solid arguments of the cowskin,"* p. 212. A belief that is not comprehended by an ignorant man, may be regarded by him as absurd, and, therefore, *wicked*; and to the person holding it, he may rightly reply with a harsh "no," or apply "the solid arguments of the cowskin." In flame these prejudices to a still higher degree, and it is equally the disposition to use the rack, or the sword, or the stake.

With the ignorant man, the supposed absurdity of an opinion, is almost inevitably transferred, and made the absurdity of the person holding it. Whatever even incidentally *attaches* to the person, receives also a portion of the stigma, which is regarded as resting upon himself. His college education, his notes or written sermons, his titles and style, all the little economy of arrangements which attach to the performance of his public duties, his dress, his cane, the whole become a part of a system of "*wickedness*," which the person with whom they connect, is engaged in promoting and building up in the world. Hence, returning to the case before us, the clearness with which Mr. Smith reaches the conviction, respecting the clergy, "that they are in general ignorant of the things of the spirit of God," p. 164. Their ways were wrong, and, of course, they must be. Hence, also, when he himself had conformed to prevailing customs, it was wicked, and made him liable to punishment. In that respect, he describes his own course, as a "return to Babylon, and *partaking of her plagues*," p. 280.

It may have often appeared a surprising circumstance, that an illiterate man, without real piety, and without reasonable prospect of success, should array himself against undoubted talent, and superior opportunities for knowledge that have been carefully improved, and these supported, as the very corner-stone of the social fabric, by the intelligence, and virtue, and influence that are in society. The secret is easy of apprehension. One particular of it can be

* In the reference made to this matter in the index, it is designated "The Calvinistic negro whipped out of Calvinism."

given in a few words: "Everything that is highly esteemed among men," is "abominable in the sight of God."* The peculiarities in "the Kingdom of God," are in its nature and principles. The enthusiast, refusing to consider these, looks only to their outward form and manifestation. Only those forms, however, are wholly right, which arise from a *perfect conception* of the nature of Christianity. And as this conception, in this degree of it, is not attainable by humanity, the Scriptures do little more than inculcate principles, leaving to them to develop their several appropriate forms, according to their true genius, and the measure of intelligence with which they are apprehended. Knowledge and grace are made inseparable. (It is the *rational* soul that is to be sanctified.) On any other principle, the practice of religion would be the observance of "the form," without the knowledge, and "without the power." In discarding this intelligence, the enthusiast wholly removes himself from a true apprehension of religion. He sees the manifestations of Christianity in prevailing forms, but they are to him without authority, and therefore he makes war upon them as unscriptural. His Scripture is the letter. *Præterea nihil*. In this view of the case, nothing could be more natural than for Mr. Smith to speak against the Catechism. "It was in this meeting that I first, in a gentle manner, spake against the Catechism, as an invention of men,"† p. 298; that is, something additional to the mere words of Scripture. Now it is not at all singular that this same Mr. Smith, who so diligently eschewed the inventions of men, should insert passages in his book, designed "particularly," "for the instruction of * * * * * young preachers," p. 141, for the absurdities of ignorance can have no end.

* "If you wish to know what denomination I belong to, I tell you, as a professor of religion, I am a *Christian*; as a preacher, a minister of Christ; calling no man father or master; holding as abominable in the sight of God, everything highly esteemed among men; such as Calvinism, Arminianism, Free-Willism, Universalism, reverend, parsons, chaplains, doctors of divinity, clergy, bands, surplices, notes, creeds, covenants, platforms," etc., p. 342.

† "A numerous host of dreaming saints succeed,
Of the true old enthusiastic bread,
'Gainst form and order they their power employ,
Nothing to build and all things to destroy.

—Dryden: *Absalom and Achitophel*, Part 1.

Envy, and hatred, and revenge, are natural to man. It is only in the experience of a true work of grace, and in the proportion of that experience, that their power is broken. A spurious religionism leaves the nature still under their control. Impelled by their instincts, the enthusiast imagines all visible agencies to be but instruments of his displeasure. He may not himself persecute, but he sometimes has exceedingly clear discoveries of a *Providence* which visits judgments upon his opposers. Of this, the *Life*, by Mr. Smith, furnishes several illustrations: "I saw," he says, "the woman fleeing from the house she had the summer before refused me a lodging in for one night. The house was entirely consumed, with *much property*" (so great was the judgment), "it contained." p. 312. Again: "Awful judgments were sent on several of those who opposed me, and the work of God. Several were taken out of the world in a sudden and awful manner," p. 817. "*From that evening* the glory departed from the First Baptist Church in Boston, and has never returned. For many years it was rare that they ever had a peaceable Church meeting, * * * * nor did they *ever after* prosper as before," p. 336. Speaking of a certain elder among the Free-Will Baptists, he says: "His opposition" to my being received into that denomination, "lessened his influence among his brethren, and he has been losing ground *from that day*," p. 354. The writings of the Shakers contain similar statements. "But *judgments* appeared evidently to follow all the most active and violent of these persecutors. * * * * Some came to sudden and untimely deaths, others became insolvent and left the country to avoid their creditors."—*Millennial Church*, p. 28.

From judgments that *did* follow his opposers, the enthusiast readily passes to the discovery of judgments that *would* follow, and thence the prediction of them. Mr. Smith says: "At the time Elder Jones went to Boston, my mind was much exercised upon the conduct of the Baptists in different parts of the country, and especially the Baptist ministers in Boston. The 18th of July, 1803, while Elder Jones was there, I was meditating upon what is said in 1 Peter, iv: 17, 'For the times is come that judgment must begin at the house of God.' My conclusion was, that judgment meant *punishment* inflicted on professors of religion for leaving their first love and con-

forming to the world in their *manner of worship and appearance*," p. 325.

Fanaticism is not that which may be conceived of as of certain form, or definite mould, so that, from associations of the past, we may know assuredly what it will be in the future; but is *of all things* most pliable, conforming with fidelity to existing order, and adapting itself with subtlety to a present mental type. The press not devoted to fanatical ends! The press an element of power, because a means of diffusing knowledge, and not suborned to the purposes of fanaticism! We mistake in the apprehension. It is not that which is external to man that needs to be perfected, but that which is internal. There can be no improvements in the agencies of society, which shall make them to be, not liable to fanatical perversion. More, there are no agencies that *are not* so perverted. Still farther, it is *the angel of light* whose form Satan most aspires to assume.

"Though people had frequently requested me to write," Mr. Smith says, "my determination was" (and he had, it seems, definitely determined the matter) "never to publish any book, till over thirty years old." He waited till he was "thirty-three years, and two months old," p. 305. He "published," as Mr. Benedict (quoted by Mr. Smith, p. 399), says, "a multitude of books." In preparing these works, he says: "Many times I wrote till toward day, and commonly slept about six out of twenty-four hours," p. 349. What relevancy there was in the purpose of Mr. Smith, thus to employ himself, his own account of the matter will best enable us to judge. "At the time this book was written" (the first printed), "it was not in my power to prepare it for the press. I could not tell where to place the capital letters nor the points. This Mr. Pierce did, and by seeing him do it, I soon learnt so much as to prepare my books, so that people could find my meaning, by reading the book after it was printed," p. 308. If Mr. Smith had ever attained to literary qualifications for book-making, what he here relates respecting himself, would not have been to his dispraise. But as, with Elder Grow, he reprobated *men-made* ministers, p. 138, and a college education, p. 306, his statement of capability for the work, as above given, must be taken as remaining literally true.

As to the measure of intelligence that may be expected to be exhibited in his books, the reader may form a judgment from the character of a statement made by him on so important an occasion as that of his finally withdrawing from the Baptist Church. It speaks of the manner of his withdrawing, and why he withdrew in that manner; so that what he relates, he must have supposed to be correct. I "concluded the time had come for me to declare myself not of that order of people, but free from all sectarians on earth. The conduct of Martin Luther taught me a good lesson. Pope Leo X. told him, if he did not renounce his errors, and return to the Church by such a day, he should be excommunicated. The day before this Luther *erected a scaffold in Rome*, and in presence of thousands, declared that he then publicly withdrew from the Church of Rome, and was no longer a member of that community. This prevented *his ever being excommunicated*," p. 340.

The objects had in view by his books, are well stated by Mr. Benedict, to be "to defend his opinions, or rather to oppose those of all others," p. 399. "I am determined," he says, "through the Lord's help, *to oppose every thing which I believe is wrong*, and to contend for what I believe is right," p. 341. As might be expected, such a course brought him into the greatest difficulties. His first publication was on the "One Baptism," which, he says, "made no small stir among the sectarians," p. 308. Another, and the first written, but whose publication was delayed, was "The Clergyman's Looking-glass," which, he says, "by many was considered almost blasphemy," p. 318. One was "A Review of the Methodist Discipline." One, "A short Sermon to the Calvinistic Baptists in Massachusetts." One was "The Clergyman's Looking-glass, No. 4;" this, he says, "the Baptists were pleased with, as it described their baptism, and they had not then wholly separated me from their company," p. 346. One was "The History of Anti-Christ;" this, he says, "sorely grieved the friends of *law religion*, and those who were attached to an *anti-republican government*," p. 318.

Mr. Smith's preaching came to partake of the same character with his writings. "All these things," he says, "and preaching contrary to the popular doctrines of the day, exposing the fashionable prayer-books published by

the clergy in Portsmouth and around, led many to say, as of Lot, 'This one fellow came in to sojourn among us, and he must needs be judge,' p. 318. He was, however, not only not appalled by the opposition which he encountered, but makes merry over it, as something much to his liking. Dr. Shepard "was greatly agitated to find a man had told the world that the Baptists were unscriptural in *seven things*! (His own italicizing.) He came on to Northwood, and appeared almost distracted," p. 344. "Once they took the nuts off that held up the thorough braces of my carriage. Once they cut one of them almost off, intending to let me down; and once they took off my carriage wheel in the night, and hung it up on the mast-head of a vessel. My friends took it down the next day, and though it had been *hung* (his own italicizing), it went very well the next day," p. 375. Sometimes, as one in the midst of a grand drama, he looks on with the same interest when it is himself who performs, as though the performance was by others. As thus: "When I came to contrast man-made ministers with the ministers of Christ as *wolves* in the midst of sheep, instead of sheep in the midst of wolves, and shew that they were as wise as *doves*, and harmless as *serpents*, it made a cracking among the wooden fences," p. 383. In the same manner, also, "hooting, firing guns," "throwing potatoes," upsetting "the place where" the preachers "stood to preach, while they were in it," p. 385, and numberless other such things, are parts of a grand scenic representation, which he describes with a relish, and enjoys with zest. He does not, it is true, throw up his hat, in his escapes, for it is a religious enthusiasm which bears him along; and, therefore, it is the "good hand of God," p. 385, that is upon him, so that "not an hair of" his "head" falls "to the ground through the malice of" his "enemies," p. 318.

On a precisely similar principle, even ministers who opposed, were made "great" by their opposing. "These great ministers;"—some said, "Smith held damnable doctrines. One of them said he did not suppose Smith ever believed the Bible." One of them "said, I was *then* under admonition," p. 371. This was the very fuel of fanaticism, and was just as much lived on, whether only imagined or really true.

Meanwhile new books appearing, caused trouble in new

directions. One of these was "Five Sermons," which "proved" "that, at the last judgment, the wicked would be punished with everlasting destruction, which would be their end," p. 348. "My first preaching and writing," he says, "disturbed the clergy and the wicked; the next disturbed the Baptists; and I was about certain, if this was known, it would disturb my brethren with whom I was connected," p. 348. This was in 1804. Early in 1806, he takes this survey of matters: "At this time, *almost all the Baptist ministers* had left me, or were disaffected at the *new doctrine* I had preached, as they called it. *Elder Jones* was some hurt respecting the end of the wicked, and the *Conference* I concluded to attend no more, as they seemed in general inclined to continue Baptists," p. 358.

Two considerations influenced Mr. Smith, in the midst of discouragements that to most men would have appeared insupportable. Of the first of these we have already spoken, namely, the fact of the existence of a multitude of things, among ministers and professing Christians, which, *in so many words*, were not found in the Bible, and the belief that for want of this literal designation all these things were *topically* unscriptural. The rule had great sweep of force. It, Mr. Smith believed, made the Church to be the mystical Babylon; and thus furnished, as he imagined, an abundant reason for all that was said and done in regard to himself and his books. It compelled, also, the making known the destruction of the wicked, notwithstanding whoever might be alienated by it. "I kept it back," he says, "as long as duty would suffer me." The second consideration was the implicit confidence Mr. Smith had, that he knew unmistakeably what was the will of God. This was by means of "manifestations" which he had. Some such resource as this, seemed to be necessary, in order to compensate for the dispensing in so large a degree with the Scriptures: that is, with all excepting only the *literal word*. In thus divorcing the imagination, by which he was swayed, from the reason, he was of necessity given over to the dominion of impulses, and subject to be directed, alone, by the wildest enthusiasm. "I told him," he says, replying to an opposer, "*my belief was* that the Lord had called me to preach the Gospel in Portsmouth; that my work was not done, and that I should not go for him, nor all the devils in hell, nor opposers

on earth," p. 329. It was an impression that he had indications of the divine will, in regard to writing and printing, that was the beginning of all that he ever did in that way. "In the summer of 1802," he says, "*new and strange* things were made manifest to my understanding. For many years I had thought much upon the doctrines and conduct of the State clergy, but the whole was a mystery to me. One day in the month of August, as I sat in my hired house, in Epping, meditating upon the opposition the clergy in Portsmouth and other places made to my preaching the doctrine of the New Testament, a thought passed through my mind, that the clergy in general were settled upon a plan exactly opposite to the New Testament. This led me to compare their doctrine, laws, conduct, manner of preaching, titles, and manner of being supported, with the New Testament: by which I found, they were, as to their plan, what the New Testament calls *anti-christ*. Here I first began to write," p. 305. He *believed* that these supernatural influences, as he supposed them, upon his mind, were immediate means of success in preaching. "Sometime in April, on Sunday morning, I felt a strange operation on my mind, which was unaccountable to me. * * * * * Uncommonly solemn, * * * * * I went to the court-house at the usual hour. A large number of people had collected, and appeared very solemn. After sitting awhile on the judge's seat, the situation of the people came on my mind, so that I could say with the prophet, 'I am pressed as a cart with sheaves.' At first I wept, then sobbed, and at last cried aloud, being unable to refrain. I remained in that situation about half an hour; and, at the same time, almost the whole assembly, old and young, were in tears, and some cried out, being unable to conceal their distress. As soon as my mind was enough composed to speak, I told the people their dangerous situation was the cause of my trouble. * * * * * I have ever believed that this operation was *by the spirit of God*," p. 315.

By means, also, of these divine communications, as he regarded them, impressions as to God's character were conveyed, not mediately but immediately, to his apprehension. "One day, while walking through a piece of ground where the trees stood thick on each side of the road, my mind was

remarkably solemn, while viewing the works of God around me. Amidst this solemnity, this thought came into my mind. O, that I could see God's justice, as I have often heard Christians say they have seen it! In an instant* it appeared to me that a light from heaven shone around me, and that justice was manifested to my understanding. * * * * * O, what glory appeared in justice!" p. 81.

The doctrine respecting the Holy Spirit which is involved in all these citations, is fundamental in any system to which it stands related. With Mr. Smith it was the same as with enthusiasts in general, who all concur, not excepting even the Shakers,† in an operation of the Spirit, both mediate and immediate; but who so believe in these as to entirely obliterate the distinctive views of the evangelical denominations. They, further, so elevate into importance, as we have already seen, such things as impressions, suggestions, manifestations, and other like exercises, in which neither the mediate nor the immediate operations of the Spirit are really concerned, as virtually to supplant all reliance upon any true work of the Spirit whatever.‡ Even the use which they make of the Scriptures, is most frequently by way of accommodation, and

* Jonathan Edwards makes citation of a striking passage from "the famous Mr. Perkins," respecting "melancholic passions arising only from mere imaginations, strongly conceived in the brain; which, he says, usually come on a sudden, like lightning into a house."—*On the Affections*, p. 63.

† "Shakers believe in the illuminations or inspirations of the Spirit in the present day, as far as may be necessary, whether mediate or immediate, to build up the Church of Christ, and to promote the Gospel in the world, and to understand the Scriptures sufficiently for their proper use."—*Manifesta*, p. 462.

‡ We attended a meeting, not long since, in which one present described a scene as follows: On going out on to a porch, one night, he was struck with the appearance of an unusual brightness concentrated on the spot where he stood. On raising his eyes, he discovered that the stars were all looking down right on that spot. He changed his position to the other end of the porch, and it was the same there. He then went to the opposite side, and it was the same there. The impression upon his mind was very solemn; so that he felt to put his shoes from off his feet, for that the place where he stood was holy ground. The greatest objection to this was that the speaker was impressed by it with a particular belief. Mohammed thought he saw the moon cut in two. (The fifty-fourth chapter of the Alkoran is entitled "The moon split in two.") Mr. Smith thought he had manifestations. The speaker, on this occasion, thought the stars were all looking down where he stood. It was as easy to think so in either one of the cases as in the others.

not for the very meaning of the words cited: and the value of even *such* citation, in numerous instances, will be found to be not so much in any words that are employed, as in some peculiarity of manner, according to which they are brought to the mind. For instance: "From the time Mr. Stone came into the house, until I consented to go with him, this place of Scripture pressed hard upon me, *as though whispered to me by a kind friend*: Acts x: 20, 'Go with them, doubting nothing: for I have sent them,'" p. 171.

The followers of Mohammed boast, among other things, of his humility. This jewel among the graces is too bright an ornament not to be emulated. Enthusiasts are never proud. The representation of them is always the reverse. "At that time," Mr. Smith says, "the Baptist ministers were poor, and made a mean appearance in the world. * * * * * Mr. Peak was low in the world, and in his own esteem, and the Lord looked to him then. He was a tailor, and followed the business when at home. He had an old horse, poor and lame, which he thought unfit to ride to Chester. * * * * * He told me, that if it would not mortify my pride too much, *I* might ride his old lame horse to Chester." And Mr. Smith had *so much* of the grace of humility, that he "accepted." "We were both poorly dressed, and felt our dependence." p. 144.

Mr. Benedict relates that "the Free-Will brethren, finding him" (Mr. Smith) "expert at brow-beating Calvinism, were ambitious of placing him among the champions of their cause," p. 899. A similar feeling, at a subsequent period, seems to have taken hold of some Methodist "brethren." Sentiments more diametrically opposed to the understood views of the Methodist Church than some of those held by Mr. Smith, could not, perhaps, well be found. His notion of the Holy Spirit was, that it was "the spirit or *influence* of the eternal God," p. 24. He is asked, "Do you believe in the Trinity?" and his answer is, "No, sir; for the word is not in the Bible, *nor the doctrine*. The whole Bible declares 'One God,' and his *person* one." "Do you hold to the fall of man?" "No, sir; because it is not mentioned in the Bible; but is the doctrine of the Catechism," p. 322. And yet the Methodist "brethren," upon meeting with *The Dagon of Cal-*

vinism,* attributed to Mr. Smith,† concluded it would be well for "their cause" to promote its circulation. An edition was even printed, through their agency, in Cincinnati.‡ The fact that this last bore on its title page, "Printed for the Author," without any notice of a former edition, gave rise to a grave misapprehension. The reprint of a scurrilous pamphlet might be regarded as an abortive attempt to introduce pollution from abroad; but the existence of such a fountain in the community itself, would be wisely regarded as a very different matter, and one that needed attention. "Printed for the Author." Who, in that community, could have those views of Calvinism? What could have so inflamed the mind of any of the Methodist "brethren," as to lead them to regard Calvinists of any sort, in such a light as here set forth? Who can be the instigator of strife, such as this must tend to stir up between sister denominations?

The publication of *The Dagon of Calvinism*, in the West, had the same effect to produce discord and tumult there, that we have discovered Mr. Smith's writing and preaching to have had in the East. Coming within the sphere of the labors of the late Rev. Dr. J. L. Wilson, it was regarded by him as an assault upon opinions which he represented, and made by persons of whom better things were to be expected. Unfortu-

* "THE DAGON OF CALVINISM, or the MOLOCH OF DECREES; A POEM IN THREE CANTOS. To which is annexed a Song of Reason. BY THE SAME. 'They lavish gold out of the bag, and weigh silver in the balance, and hire a smith. The smith with the tongs both worketh in the coals and fashioneth it with hammers, and worketh it with the strength of his arms.'—ISAIAH. PRINTED FOR THE AUTHOR." 24mo., 47 pp.

† "From the positive testimony of several gentlemen from New England, now resident in Cincinnati, we learn that *Dagon* was written and first published by a Mr. Smith, of Connecticut, a man who never belonged to the M. E. Church."—*Burke's M. E. Church Vindicated*, p. 81.

‡ "Near the close of the Annual Conference of the M. E. Church, held in Cincinnati, three young men, members of that Church, viz.: Messrs. Stillwell, Cartwright, and Griffin, did, in a clandestine manner, procure the reprinting, or printing, by J. W. Browne & Co., at the office of Liberty Hall, in Cincinnati, of an anonymous pamphlet, styled the *Dagon of Calvinism, or the Moloch of Decrees, etc.* These officious men, who were all traveling preachers, and were prohibited by rule from printing any thing good or bad, without the consent of the Conference, did nevertheless, in direct violation of that rule, procure the reprinting of a low and pitiful pamphlet styled *The Dagon of Calvinism*."—*Burke's M. E. Church Vindicated*, p. 80.

nately the source from which it emanated wholly misled him as to its authorship, and the exceedingly evasive character of the title-page, left him without any clue by which he could be undeceived.

In this dilemma, the applications which he made for information as to the author, receiving no respectful attention, he came out in a pamphlet entitled *Episcopal Methodism, or Dagonism Exhibited*.^{*} In this, he wrote with the sharpness of one attacked by professed friends, and with the earnestness of one aroused by the consciousness of wrongs that had been inflicted. *The Methodist Episcopal Church, * * * * * Vindicated, by the Rev. William Burke, 'Assistant Preacher, Cincinnati Circuit,'*† was in reply to *Dagonism Exhibited*. Much of the acrimony of these two pamphlets, and most of the matter in them, would have been saved had there been, at the first, a prompt and frank disclosure of the source of the publication entitled *Dagon*,[‡] etc., in answer to the reasonable and repeated demands made for information in that particular. As it was, it was left to an earnest and animated discussion, such as drew the attention of the whole community, to compel the unwilling discovery, and reveal the complicity of parties secretly engaged in the transaction.

Some of the tenets held by Mr. Burke, and advanced by him in his pamphlet, were made the subjects of a just review, in two consecutive numbers of the *Evangelical Record*, for 1812, published in Lexington, Kentucky.

In the year 1822, Mr. John Broadfoot Smith, who had previously prepared some "rhymes," at this time made publication of them,† occasioned by the fact that "some sneaking creature, whose guilty conscience prevents his appearance, (had) again introduced the impious *Dagon*," p. iii. "About nine or ten years since," he says, "at the conclusion of a Methodist Conference, when that

Contemptible, detestable,
Abominable, diabolical,
And infernal thing,

^{*} Cincinnati, 1811, 12mo., 84 pp.

† Cincinnati, 1812, 12mo., 94 pp.

‡ "A few imperfect rhymes on the Sovereignty of Jehovah, * * * * * Likewise a rod for Dagonites," etc., etc.—Cincinnati, 1822, 12mo., 56 pp.

entitled *The Dagon of Calvinism, etc.*, crawled into the town, I was shocked at its horrible appearance and malignant impiety; and when I saw the equivocation and duplicity of many of the Methodist society, and beheld their

Sarcastic jeers,
Exulting airs,
And taunting sneers,

it led me to examine the infallible records of truth," p. ii, with what results, the pamphlet at this time published, will more particularly set forth, and to which we must refer those curious of further information.

One further topic demands our notice. In the year 1807, "Isaac Willer, Esq., who was then a member of Congress, proposed to me (Mr. Smith) to conduct a religious newspaper, that should give a description of that religious liberty that is in harmony with civil liberty," p. 374. Plans were suggested, which, however, Mr. Smith declined, "and soon after, issued proposals for printing the '*Herald of Gospel Liberty*,' and published the first number in September 1, 1808," p. 374.

Of his editorial labors, we have scarcely any knowledge, Mr. Smith making but two or three further allusions to them and his paper, in his whole biography. "In February, 1812, I began to write my New Testament Dictionary. * * * * * In March I had only fifty pages written. About this time my printers began upon it, and I wrote for them constantly for about five months. * * * * * I wrote and published the *Herald* at the same time," p. 394.

Again: "From January to June (1815) I was constantly employed in writing my paper, settling my accounts, writing some of my Life, Travels, etc., and preaching the Gospel of the Kingdom," p. 401.

The only remaining reference to this matter, is on page 383. "On the first day of September, 1808, the first number of the *Herald* was published in Portsmouth, N. H., which, perhaps, was the first religious newspaper ever published." PERHAPS! Save that word! Mr. Willis is more positive than that. Seriously, however, we have not approached the subject of 'the first religious newspaper,' from a stand point favorable to the present consideration of that question

ART. IV.—STUDIES ON THE BIBLE, No. II. *Israel in Egypt.**

THE portion of time proceeding from the call of Abraham to the passage of the Hebrews over the Jordan, is known in biblical history as the Age of Sojourn. Its subordinate divisions are the period of the pilgrimage running from the call of Abraham to the migration of Jacob and his family to Egypt; the Egyptian period extending to the Exodus; and the period of the wandering, terminating with the close of the age. The first of these periods is characterized by the nomadic life of the pilgrim patriarchs and the giving of the covenants; the second, by the expansion of the chosen seed into a nation, its bondage, and its preparation for final colonization in Palestine; and the third, by the giving of the law and the error in the wilderness. The present study will be devoted to the second of these periods; during which the chosen seed passed through its transition state, from the condition of a single family of shepherds feeding their flocks in Canaan by the sufferance of its inhabitants, to the condition of a great nation taking permanent possession of the land by force of arms.

I. The duration of the sojourn in Egypt has not been determined. The chronologers, who reject the testimony of the Bible as decisive of such questions, have, as might be expected, gone wild in their conjectures. Bunsen, for example, as if charmed with the magnificent ages in the Egyptian chronology, estimates the period at fourteen hundred and twenty-seven years. Now, do those who have attempted to solve the problem by the data contained in the Word of God, agree in their conclusions? The older interpreters, with great unanimity, both Jewish with Josephus, and Christian with Augustine, fixed the period at two hundred and fifteen years. Many of the latest authorities, among whom are Kurtz, and,

* HELPS TO THE STUDY.—Kurtz's *Old Covenant*, vol. II, pp. 183–198, 380–429. Macdonald's *Pentateuch*, vol. I, p. 85; vol. II, p. 279, seq. Rosenmüller in *Penta. Hengstenberg's Egypt and the Books of Moses*. Osburn's *Egypt*. Rawlinson's *Hist. Evid.*, p. 287.

apparently, Mr. George Rawlinson, extend the computation to four hundred and thirty years. The case, therefore, ought to be fairly stated.

The shorter chronology rests, in the first place, upon the statement of Paul, in Gal. iii: 17; which is to the effect, that the law was delivered four hundred and thirty years after the covenant. Assuming as the starting point, the call of Abraham when the covenant began to be revealed, and disregarding the few months, by which the giving of the law was separated from the Exodus, the computation will be as follows: From the call to the birth of Isaac was twenty-five years; Gen. xii: 4; xxi: 5; thence to the birth of Jacob, sixty years; Gen. xxv: 26; thence to the descent into Egypt, one hundred and thirty years; Gen. xlvii: 9; in the aggregate two hundred and fifteen years, leaving two hundred and fifteen years for the Egyptian period. Again, in Gen. xv: 16, there is the promise of the return of the chosen seed to Palestine, in the fourth generation. According to what was at that time the term of human life, the fourth generation would reach forward about two hundred years; and, in Exodus, vi: 16-20, the four generations in question are registered in this order: Levi, Kohath, Amram, Moses. This estimate is still further confirmed by Exodus, ii: 1; vi: 20, and Numb. xxvi: 59, showing that Jochebed, the daughter of Levi, was the mother of Moses. Now, on the hypothesis that the duration of the sojourn in Egypt was four hundred and thirty years, Jochebed must have been two hundred and fifty-six years old at the birth of Moses. For, according to the received chronology, Levi was forty-three when he came into Egypt, where he lived ninety-four years. Exodus, vi: 16. The age of Moses at the Exodus, was eighty; and even if Jochebed was born during the last year of Levi's life, two hundred and fifty-six years are required to make up the full period of four hundred and thirty years, the whole burden of which must be cast upon Jochebed before she became the mother of Moses. Thus far all seems plain.

But on the other hand, those who adopt the longer chronology, rely upon Exodus, xii: 40: "Now the sojourning of the children of Israel who dwelt in Egypt, was four hundred and thirty years." It is said that the phrase, "the children

of Israel," can not include the persons of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob. To this it is answered, that the phrase is used in the Scriptures, as a general term, for the whole of the chosen seed from the beginning. This being so, the passage, as it stands in the English version, simply states the Hebrews who dwelt in Egypt, passed four hundred and thirty years as sojourners, that is to say, partly in Canaan, partly in Egypt. But it is urged that, by the construction of the Hebrew text, "which" [Heb. *asher*], refers to "sojourning" as its antecedent. To this the reply may still be, that the mind of the writer was fixed upon the long exclusion of the chosen seed from the promised land, rather than upon that portion of the expatriation that was passed in Egypt. This solution is found in Josephus, and was adopted by the Septuagint and Samaritan translators, and by the Targum of Jonathan, in all which the reading is, "The sojourning of the children of Israel, which they passed in the land of Egypt, and in the land of Canaan, was four hundred and thirty years." Josephus, also, and a very early copy of the Septuagint insert, "and their fathers," after "Israel." These glosses, although without authority as emendations of the sacred text, show what interpretation was put upon it by some of the earliest biblical scholars.

The statement in Gen. xv: 13, is also supposed to be in conflict with the shorter chronology. But the Hebrew accents, which are of equal authority with the vowel points, appear to throw the middle clause of the verse into a parenthesis, thus: "Know of a surety that thy seed shall be a stranger in a land that is not their's (and shall serve them and they shall afflict them), four hundred years." This punctuation allows us to refer the body of the verse to the whole period during which the chosen people were dwelling as strangers, both in Canaan and in Egypt; and the parenthetical clause to their affliction in Egypt. The same method is applicable to the language of Stephen, in Acts, vii: 6-7, which is, indeed, quoted with slight verbal changes from the Septuagint of Gen. xv: 13. To this it should be added, that the use of the number four hundred, instead of four hundred and thirty years in both these places, is to be referred to the habit, among all writers, of employing round numbers.

The shorter computation is more seriously embarrassed by

Numb. iii: 27, 28. At the Exodus, the descendants of Kohath were divided into four branches, of whom Amram was one. These branches contained in the aggregate, 8,600 males, from a month old and upwards. Of these a fourth part, or thereabout, say 2,150, would be the descendants of Amram. Now, was this Amram the father of Moses? The alternatives are, first, while Amram's three brothers had together 8,594 male descendants, Amram himself had only six—that is to say, Moses, his two sons, Aaron and his two sons; or, secondly, if Amram had his proportion of offspring, and Moses was his own son, then Moses had more than two thousand brothers and nephews; or, thirdly, the father of Moses was an Amram of a subsequent generation. If the last explanation be adopted, the conclusion is, that several links are omitted in the genealogical register of Exodus, vi: 16–20; and that a much longer period than two hundred and fifteen years is to be assigned to the sojourn in Egypt. This is a very imposing statement; and the present condition of biblical science does not, perhaps, furnish a complete solution of the difficulty. But it is to be observed that the prediction of the Almighty to Abraham in Gen. xv: 16, is explicit to the effect that only four generations should dwell in Egypt. Still further, Moses and Aaron held relations so peculiar to the Theocracy, that it may have pleased God to limit Amram's male line of that generation to Moses, Aaron, and their sons. Or, lastly, in the rapid increase of the Hebrews, the collateral kindred of Moses, when he was eighty years old, may have reached a number quite extraordinary, and in other circumstances quite incredible.

Finally, the bearings of Exodus, xii: 37, on the question must be investigated. It appears that, at the Exodus, there were 600,000 Hebrew men capable of bearing arms, representing a population of more than 2,000,000, all springing from the family which went into Egypt with Jacob; a rate of increase, it is urged, that is wholly incredible in the space of two hundred and fifteen years. To this the reply is, first, God made special promise to Abraham of the immeasurable augmentation of his posterity: "I will make of thee a great nation." Gen. xii: 2. "I will make thy seed as the dust of the earth." Gen. xiii: 16. "I will multiply thy seed as the

stars of heaven, and as the sand which is upon the sea shore." Gen. xxii: 17. These promises, it is fair to presume, began to be fulfilled in Egypt. Next, their actual multiplication was so extraordinary that the historian employs five synonyms, arranged in a climax, to describe the phenomenon. "The children of Israel were fruitful, and increased abundantly, and multiplied, and waxed exceeding mighty; and the land was filled with them." Exodus, i: 7. The Egyptians, also, were alarmed at their swelling numbers, and resorted to a system of wholesale infanticide to keep down the population. This numerical increase must, no doubt, be referred to the special providence of God, making good his special promise. Beyond this explanation it is not needful to go. It is not necessary to resort to the fable of some of the Rabbins, according to which the Hebrew women ordinarily produced three or four children at a birth; nor to the idea of any strictly miraculous interference with the ordinary course of nature. For the "seventy souls" who came into Egypt with Jacob were, with only two exceptions, males; of whom, as is commonly estimated, not less than fifty-one were married men. Jacob and his sons, moreover, took with them their households. Gen. xlv: 18. As to the number of these we may form some conjecture from the fact, that Abraham had three hundred and eighteen "trained servants born in his own house" capable of bearing arms, representing more than a thousand persons; Gen. xiv: 14; and from the fact that Jacob met Esau with an army of retainers so great that he divided them into two "bands" or armies. Kurtz estimates the number of servants, who went with the family to Egypt, at "several thousand." These were all circumcised, Gen. xvii: 12, and so were Israelites; in the nomadic state, the distinction between master and servant is too slightly marked to prevent intermarriage, as is indicated in the relations of Jacob to his wives' maid-servants; and the antipathy between the Israelites and the Egyptians forbade coalescence between those two stocks, and compelled the former to contract marriage with their servants. These circumstances lead to the conclusion that the whole of the people who went into Egypt with Jacob, became the progenitors of the future race. Estimating their number at one thousand, and sup-

posing the population to double once in nineteen years, at the end of two hundred and fifteen years, it would exceed two and a half millions; or, beginning with two thousand, and doubling every twenty-one years, the result would be the same. The population of the United States has doubled, since 1790, once in every twenty-three years. The proper allowance is to be made for the element of foreign immigration in the increase of our own population. But on the other hand, allowance is to be made also by way of effect, for the productiveness of both men and animals in Egypt. Thus Pliny: "*In Ægypto septenos uno refero simul gigni; auctor est Trogus.*" Similar statements by Aristotle and Columela may be found in Kurtz's Old Covenant, vol. II, p. 150. After making all proper deductions from these extravagant estimates, still the extraordinary fecundity of the human species in Egypt may be rationally inferred from them. But apart from this, if the special providence of God bringing to pass his special promises be considered, the phenomenon, although unusual, is fully explained without resorting either to the supposition of a miracle in the case, or as an alternative, to a period of four hundred and thirty years. In the present state of the inquiry, the biblical student will not, perhaps, abandon the traditional opinion, in favor of the shorter computation; but recognizing the difficulties of the subject, he will reserve his final judgment until the discovery of new evidence. In the meantime, there is great satisfaction in the conclusion that the solution of the problem, either way, can not affect any material statement of fact in the record, or even disturb the general outline of the history.

II. The form of the record, as well as the chronology, has been often discussed by the historical critics. Taking advantage of the acknowledged brevity with which the Sojourn in Egypt is described, some of them have complained of what they call the "immense gaps" between Genesis and Exodus; and have inferred, therefrom, that the Pentateuch is a collection of fragments and traditions rather than a coherent narrative, and that the author was either ignorant of what took place through a period of two hundred years, or if informed himself, was an unscrupulous and incompetent historian. But, the truth is, that the narrative, though brief, is, for

all the purposes of the history, complete. Four chapters in Genesis are occupied with seventy-one years of the period down to the death of Joseph. Thence to the birth of Moses, was sixty-four years, according to the shorter chronology; and a brief and graphic summary of what took place during that time appears in the first chapter of Exodus. The four succeeding chapters bring down the narrative through the remaining eighty years. There are no "immense gaps" in the record.

The truth further is, that the plan of the history did not admit of detailed and minute narrative of the period. The people were in a transition state from the condition of the patriarchs feeding their flocks in Canaan, to the conquest of the land by the forces under Joshua. Egypt was, so to speak, the hidden womb in which the embryo nation was matured for its birth at the Exodus, its organization as a state and a church, under a written constitution and ritual, at Sinai, and the attainment of the final condition of nationality, in the acquisition of Palestine. Very few incidents occurred to relieve the monotony of a career which was simply one of expansion in numbers, wealth, and physical power. No new promise, or covenant, or theophany, or Messianic prophecy, or revelation of any kind, was disclosed from the death of Jacob to the appearance of the burning bush to Moses; an interval of about two hundred years. The record was, therefore, necessarily brief.

The truth still further is, that, so far as Moses wrote his history for the use of his contemporaries, they needed no minute information as to the course of events in Egypt. They were themselves part and parcel of those events. What they needed to know was the previous history of the family; how their father Abraham got into Canaan, under what divine vocation, and in execution of what divine purpose; what holy covenants God had made with their fathers; with what magnificent theophanies he had revealed his glory to their senses, and with what gracious promises he had revealed his love to their faith. They wanted, also, a full explanation of the strange sign which they bore in their flesh, its origin, the covenant which it sealed, together with its conditions and stipulations. They needed to be told how they were brought

into Egypt and into bondage, what was the prospect of deliverance, what was the nature of their title to Canaan, and what power supreme over Egypt and Canaan, and over the dividing wilderness, was pledged to plant them in the promised land. All this information was far more important to them than any description of their hard and bitter bondage in Egypt, and this Moses imparted to them in the book of Genesis, and that, too, with a minute and laborious accuracy, which is said to be after the manner of a gossiping old chronicler, by the shallow critics who complain of his brevity in the pages now under consideration.

The truth further yet is, that so far as Moses wrote for the later ages, this record, compendious as it is, furnishes ample information in regard to the leading events of the period. The remarkable increase of the Hebrew population; the change which occurred in the policy of the Pharisees toward them, together with its causes and results; the exact relations of the Hebrews to the dominant race and to each other; their moral and religious condition; the stern discipline by which they were educated for the future; the means by which their amalgamation with the Egyptians, or, as an alternative, their extermination was prevented; the preparation made for the Exodus; all these essential and controlling facts are clearly stated. What further was requisite to a complete history of the times?

The truth, finally, is, that these critics overlook the primal laws of historical composition. History does not deal with the element of time alone, and that after the method of an almanac, giving to every month an equal page, but it deals with events in time, and using the cunning hand of the master, it projects upon the forefront of the canvass the salient features of the landscape, and dwarfs into the background, or hides in shadows, the subordinate details. Are these critics ignorant, or do they suppose their readers to be ignorant of the first principles in the science of history, its laws of perspective proportion and symmetry; how imperatively it demands a definite end and purpose, and how rigorously it exacts an adherence to that purpose? When will they learn that the historical Scriptures are, in the inmost sense of the term, historical compositions?

III. Two hundred years before Jacob's family went into Egypt, God revealed to Abraham his determination to bring about that event as a necessary part of the divine plan. The course of Providence, by which the purpose was accomplished, is in every way remarkable. It can be distinctly traced from Isaac's blessing on Jacob through a long series of incidents: even the wrath of Esau, the flight of Jacob to Padanaram, his double marriage, his partiality for his second wife, his excessive fondness for her son Joseph, the jealousy of the brothers, Joseph's dreams and his arrogance in telling them, the sale of the boy to the Ishmaelites and by them to Potiphar, his temptation and imprisonment, the dreams of the butler and baker, and of Pharaoh, and his interpretation of them all, his release from prison and elevation to power, the famine in Canaan, and the journeys of Jacob's sons to buy corn in Egypt, terminating, at last, in the migration thither of the family. The most minute of these events was in its place decisive, and the most casual of them necessary to the issue. Although seemingly remote and unrelated, they all stood in an unbroken sequence; they were linked in together, they formed a chain of concealed but indissoluble continuity.

Nor are the events as such set forth alone in the record; the many persons in many lands, who were concerned in them, are made known. Isaac, Rebekah, Esau, Jacob in Southern Palestine; Laban, Leah, Rachel in Mesopotamia; Reuben, Judah, the Midianitish merchants in Dothan; the butler and baker, Potiphar and his wife, with Pharaoh in Egypt, each wove his own separate thread into the tangled maze and stepped aside, knowing nothing of the rare and luminous device that was gradually unfolding the divine ideal on the hidden side of the tapestry. Each of these, also, had his personal motive or passion—Rebekah her maternal pride, Esau his revenge, Jacob his partiality for Rachel and Joseph, the brothers their jealousy, Reuben his lingering kindness, Judah his moderation, the Midianites their love of gain, Potiphar's wife her unlawful desire, Pharaoh his superstition, Jacob's sons their hunger, and Jacob his love for his long-lost Joseph. All these conflicting passions, good and bad, in all these men and women, Israelites, Midianites, Egyptians, in all these countries, through so many years, wrought

unconsciously together unto one definite end, the foregone and preordained purpose of God.

On the part of man was the absolute freedom of his will, choosing and refusing, doing and not doing, in every instance, according to his own good pleasure. On the part of God was His Providence, accomplishing his own absolute decrees; prompting all that was good, overruling all that was evil, and adjusting both to the general plan, suffering no link in the chain to be lost, allowing neither haste or delay, binding together events as remote as the sale of a mess of pottage and the sale of a man by his brothers, or as the dreams of a lad in Canaan, and the dreams of the king and of his servants in Egypt, and at last bringing to pass every word that he had spoken. Apart from the value of this record, as a development of the plan and promise of salvation, it is invaluable as a practical exemplification of the supreme dominion of God and the freedom of the creature.

IV. The record, although brief, leaves the reader in no doubt as to the providential purposes of the sojourn in Egypt. One of these purposes was the preservation of the chosen seed from extinction by a gradual coalescence with the heathen. From the very beginning Abraham was alive to the danger, and adopted effectual measures to prevent the marriage of his son with a daughter of the Canaanites. Gen. xxiv: 2-6. In her turn, Rebekah frankly declared that she was weary of her life, because of the daughters of Heth, and both she and Isaac warned him of the snares that were laid for him, and sent him to Padanaram to get a wife from among his kindred there. Gen. xxvii: 46; xxviii: 1, 2. This tendency developed itself in the next generation, for some of the sons of Jacob contracted these dangerous alliances. Simeon married "a Canaanitish woman." Gen. xli: 10. Judah also separated himself from his family and married a daughter of the land. His first-born son followed his example, in marrying Tamar; and one of the many disastrous results of this marriage was an incestuous connection between Judah and Tamar; the whole narrative setting forth, in the clearest manner, the necessity of preventing the family from being contaminated and finally swallowed up by the heathen population. Gen. xxxviii. The expedient which God adopted was a tem-

porary expatriation of the chosen seed from the promised land.

The suitableness of Egypt, as a refuge from these dangers, will be recognized when it is remembered that there was no ordinary possibility of intermarriage between the Hebrews and the Egyptians. The antipathy of the latter toward the former was not only intense, but it took a form which sets aside one of the prime conditions of the marriage relation, a common table for the husband and wife. "The Egyptians might not eat bread with the Hebrews, for that is an abomination unto the Egyptians." Gen. xliii: 32. The ground of this antipathy is not distinctly made known in the record. Some critics have referred it to the general aversion of the Egyptians toward all foreigners, others to the different customs of these two parties in the preparation and use of food. It is almost certain, however, that this repugnance was directly connected with the occupation of the Hebrews; for in Gen. xlv: 34, it is stated that "every shepherd is an abomination to the Egyptians." Perhaps, as some have suggested, the Egyptians being addicted to agriculture and the arts, had conceived a disgust for the coarser habits of the nomadic races; or, as others have conjectured, the inroads which the country had suffered from the Bedouin robbers of the adjacent deserts, had established in the public mind an aversion toward "every shepherd;" or, as others still suppose, the Hebrews slew and ate animals held sacred among the Egyptians. In addition to this, the worship of the Hebrews, according to Exodus viii: 26, was peculiarly offensive to the Egyptians, whether on account of the kind of animals slain in sacrifice, or of some other ceremony in the Hebrew ritual can not now be determined. From these various circumstances however, they may be explained, it is clear that the barrier to any wide system of intermarriage was impassible. Indeed not more than two or three instances are on record, in which the barrier was broken through. Joseph, who was naturalized and took an Egyptian name, and was exalted to power, received from Pharaoh the daughter of a priest. Gen. xli: 45. The case mentioned in 1 Chron. iv: 18, is not explained; unless the Hebrew name, which the Egyptian princess took, Bithjah, indicates that she was a proselyte. The instance in Lev. xxiv: 10, was, perhaps,

a case of concupinage. The divine plan in the removal of the family to Egypt, was, therefore, fully accomplished, so far forth as the preservation of the Hebrew stock in its purity entered into that plan.

The second providential purpose in this emigration, contemplated a change in the habits of the people from a nomadic to a settled mode of life. From what is said of Isaac, in Gen. xx: 6-12, it is probable that the pilgrim fathers occasionally tilled the soil; but for the most part they were shepherds, without fixed possessions, dwelling in movable tents, and leading their flocks throughout the whole land, from the wells of Beersheba to the slopes of Hermon. But the very basis and substance of their future social polity, was to be agriculture, and a stringent agrarian law was to be enforced, securing to every household, forever, an inalienable landed estate. Moreover, it was appointed to the descendants of these wandering shepherds to build cities and palaces, and a temple for Jehovah, all of them fenced about with walls and towers; to construct streets and roads, conduits, fountains and sewers, prisons and tombs, instruments of music, chariots of war, and all the other appliances of an exalted civilization. Still further, they became skilled in the elegant arts. The generation that went out of Egypt set up in the wilderness a tabernacle for Jehovah; its curtains of blue, and purple, and scarlet, and fine twined linen, embroidered with cherubim; its furniture adorned with gold, beaten out into crowns, and knops, and almond blossoms; the holy garments of its priests—robe, embroidered coat, mitre, ephod, with the curious girdle thereof, woven for glory and for beauty; onyx stones set in gold, and bearing the names of the tribes; the breast-plate of twelve gems in their golden inclosings, the diamond, the ruby, and other jewels rare, graven with the names of the children of Israel, twelve, like the engraving of the signet; its holy oil and incense, compounded of costly spicery, a perfume, a confection after the art of the apothecary, tempered together pure and holy—the whole made after the pattern of heavenly things, and forming a Sanctuary, and a Ministry, and a Worship, not unworthy the Sacred Presence. Exodus, xxviii and xxx. Now, this radical and thorough transformation of the simple nomad into the husbandman, vine-dresser, architect,

engineer, artist, and jeweler, could scarcely have been wrought in Canaan. No event in the career of the oriental races has been more unfrequent. Indeed, has it ever taken place except by means of colonization.

This transformation was easily effected in Egypt. The province of Goshen, which was assigned to the chosen family, rested toward the West on the Tanitic or Pelusiac arm of the Nile, a region of unsurpassed and inexhaustible fertility, and toward the East, on the confines of the Arabian Desert, a region adapted to pasturage. Here the children of Israel, while they were few in numbers, were able to combine the cultivation of the soil with their more familiar occupation; as their numbers increased, agriculture would naturally supplant the raising of cattle, and the desired change in their habits of life be gradually established. That such was the result appears from the record. Toward the close of the period, they became skilled in agriculture; Deut. xi: 10; in fishing and gardening; Num. xi: 5; xx: 5; and had abandoned tent-life and dwelt in houses framed with door-posts. Exodus, xii: 4, 7. They were employed, also, in building cities for Pharoh, and by that means, as well as by erecting houses for their own families, they acquired a practical acquaintance with all the arts involved in domestic and public architecture. As their population increased, and as the demands of the Egyptians on their services became more exacting, multitudes were "intermingled with the Egyptians in their cities, and even in their houses." For at the close of the sojourn, they sprinkled blood on the door-posts of their houses to distinguish between themselves and the Egyptians; Exodus, xii: 13; and the women borrowed jewels of their neighbors and of those that lived in their houses. Exodus, iii: 22. They were, by this means, brought into the closest contact with Egyptian art of all kinds, such as weaving and embroidering, the working of gold and silver, and the polishing and engraving of precious stones. It is expressly stated, for example, in 1 Chron. iv: 14, 21, 23, that some of the tribe of Judah were craftsmen, linen-weavers, and potters. Egypt became, on a large scale, a school of agriculture, and the arts for the Hebrews, and, although the discipline was severe, the education was thorough.

A third providential purpose in the sojourn in Egypt, was "to impose proper conditions on the expansion of the family into a nation." The complicated problem to be solved was, how to conduct the critical process of developing the twelve patriarchs into a great people, in such manner as to secure their organic unity as one nation, and their organic diversity as tribes and families, how to resist the tendency to barbarism which besets all nomadic races, and how to preserve them uncontaminated by the heathenism of the land. It is difficult to see how this problem could have been solved upon the people if they had remained in Canaan, and so perfectly solved as to prepare them for the peculiar position to which God had assigned them. For, in the first place, their coherence as a single people, which was indispensable to their destiny, would have been liable to dissolution from two causes. Their nomadic pursuits would inevitably scatter them over the whole land and the neighboring countries in search of pasture-grounds; and dissensions among themselves, like that which had separated the herdsmen of Abraham and Lot, and like that which had destroyed the peace of Jacob's family, might be expected to spring up. The effect of these two sources of alienation would be to divide them into separate, perhaps, hostile clans, destroying utterly the unity of the race. Next, their relations to the native tribes were exceedingly critical. The increasing numbers of the Hebrews would awaken the jealousy, and their accumulating wealth would stimulate the ruling passion for plunder of these tribes. Meanwhile, hostilities between the parties would be engendered by accident or by malice and revenge. A serious controversy had already arisen between the servants of Isaac and the Philistines, respecting the wells in Gerar. Gen. xxvi. The abduction of Dinah, Jacob's daughter, by the heathen prince of Shechem, and the treacherous and cowardly slaughter of a whole city, by which her brothers avenged the honor of the family, awakened in Jacob the most serious apprehension lest he and his whole house should be slain. Gen. xxxiv. In addition to occasions like these, for forays and bloody encounters, was the material circumstance that the Hebrews were appointed of God, not only to supplant, but, for their hideous iniquities, to destroy the Canaanites. When this fact came

to the knowledge of these people, they would wage a war of extermination upon the Hebrews, through every succeeding generation, until one of the parties was extirpated, root and branch. Even if the Hebrews had prevailed in the desperate struggle, they would have emerged from it with the wily and treacherous habits of the Bedouin—more Ishmealites than Israelites. Lastly, they were to be the recipients of new and surprising revelations from God, and were to establish ordinances of worship wholly unknown before. The subsequent history shows this to have been a process of extraordinary difficulty, even under the most favorable circumstances. The obstacles would have been insuperable in Canaan, and this, by a double tendency, the disposition of the Hebrews to adopt the religious usages of the heathen, and the reciprocal disposition of the heathen to adopt the religious usages of the Hebrews. The idolatry of Israel in Egypt and in the wilderness, and even in the promised land, supplies an example of the former tendency, and the conduct of the Shechemites, a whole city of whom submitted to the act of circumcision, furnishes an example of the latter. Gen. xxxiv. To maintain the unity of the people, to restrain them from degenerating into barbarism, and to guard the purity of their religion, it was indispensable that the family be removed, for a period, from Canaan.

Two of the three conditions of the problem were met by the sojourn in Egypt. The Hebrews were settled in one compact body in Goshen; they were separated from the Egyptians by the prejudices of race; they were completely secluded from all other peoples; their pursuits, their traditions, the oppressions they endured, and their hopes for the future, perpetually reminded them that they were one in origin, in position, and destiny. It was in Egypt that the sense of national unity became fixed in the Hebrew mind, which has been so intense and inextinguishable through the ages. Nor did any danger from border wars, leading to blood-thirst and barbarism beset their condition in Goshen. They were in subjugation under oppression and cruel bondage; and a spirit not of ferocity, but of servility and cowardice, leading to imbecility, was likely to be, and in fact was, engendered. Provision for the cure of this evil, however, was found in

the discipline of the wilderness. The third condition of the problem, the preparation, namely, of the people to receive the Mosaic Institutes, was also reserved in the divine plan, for the period of the wandering; it can not, therefore, be discussed in this place.

Lastly, it was the purpose of God to plant his visible kingdom for a season in the heart of a great pagan empire. The idea of missions to the heathen, as it enters into the constitution of the Christian Church, was foreign to the genius of Judaism. That form of religion admitted of only one sanctuary, and one high-priest, and a ritual, and a calendar for the people of a single narrow territory. Jerusalem was the place where men ought to worship. Neither priest or prophet was ever commissioned, and by the intimate nature of the system was not allowed to establish the ordinances of religion in any other land. Instead of that, God was pleased, once near the beginning and once toward the end of the old covenant, to send his visible kingdom, as a whole, into the bosom, first, of Egypt, then of Babylon; each being the proudest and most godless world-empire of its day. There he made known his name and supremacy as Jehovah by the judgments which he executed; fulfilling, in a way most wonderful, the words which he spake first to Moses, then by Ezekiel. To Moses he said: "The Egyptians shall know that I am the Lord when I stretch forth mine hand upon Egypt." Exodus, vii: 5. By Ezekiel he said: "I will set my glory among the heathen, and all the heathen shall see my judgment that I have executed, and my hand that I have laid upon them." Ezek. xxxix: 21. Compare Lev. xxvi: 45; Ps. xevi: 3; Ezek. xx: 9.

V. The religious condition of the covenant-people in Egypt is the topic next in order. The whole case may be stated in a few words. The church, toward the close of the period, had become well nigh apostate. Three apostacies from God had already marked the career of humanity; one embracing the entire race in the persons of our first parents; the others all but total in the days of Noah and of Abraham. Now, we are brought face to face with still another; one, more deplorable than the preceding, because occurring among a chosen people, who were also in a covenant, the Abrahamic, which was itself a manifestation of the covenant of grace.

The fact of this apostacy is made clear by the record. They worshiped the gods of Egypt; descending even to the disgusting goat-worship of the land. "Put away," said the dying Joshua, "the gods which your fathers worshiped on the other side of the flood and in Egypt." Josh. xxiv: 14. Said the Lord to Moses, "They shall no more offer their sacrifices unto devils (lit. *shaggy ones, he-goats*), after whom they have gone a whoring." Lev. xvii: 7. Compare Ezek. xxiii: 3; Acts, vii: 39, 40. They set up the calf, the idol peculiar to Egypt at Sinai, and idolatry was, for a thousand years, the inveterate crime of the people. It did not finally disappear until the captivity; when, by a singular course of Providence, they were cured in pagan Babylon of a leprosy contracted in pagan Egypt. In the meantime, the ordinance of worship had probably gone into disuse. When Moses demanded of Pharaoh permission for the Hebrews to go to the wilderness for the purpose of public worship, he said: "We shall sacrifice the abomination of the Egyptians to the Lord our God: lo, shall we sacrifice the abomination of the Egyptians before their eyes, and will they not stone us?" Exodus, viii: 26. This statement concludes to the entire suspension of sacrifice in Egypt, at least, as a public ordinance. Nor is it probable that the task-masters allowed the Hebrews to rest from labor on the Sabbath; and the form of expression in Exodus, xvi: 22, 23, indicates the renewal of an appointment which had fallen into neglect. The apostacy, therefore, became desperate. That it was wide-spread, also, appears from the repeated murmuring and insurrections of the masses of the people in the wilderness; and more decisively from the judgment of God, by force of which, every grown man who came out of Egypt, two only excepted, fell in the wilderness.

Yet in the midst of this degeneracy, there was a certain number who served the Lord. Paul puts the parents of Moses, and then Moses himself in the catalogue of those who were memorable for their faith. Heb. xi: 23-25. There were midwives, too, in Egypt, who "feared God, and did not as the king commanded them." Exodus, i: 17. Besides these individual cases of piety, there are in the record, two indications of something resembling a religious consciousness in the body

of the people. One is to be recognized in the proper names in use among them, to which the syllable *El*, the Hebrew term for God, was prefixed or suffixed: as Elzaphan, Eleazar, Jemuel, Uzziel, etc. Exodus vi; Num. iii. The other appears in the scrupulous observance of the sacrament of circumcision. In Josh. v: 5, it is stated that all who came out of Egypt were circumcised. How far these circumstances are to be referred to a lingering spirit of piety, acknowledging Jehovah as their God, and their own covenant relation to him, and how far they are to be resolved into attachment for traditional ideas and forms, can not be determined. But the true heirs of the promise were not quite extinct. The church invisible was yet with the church visible. There was an Israel according to the spirit, as well as the Israel after the flesh; or, to borrow a fine expression, there was "an election within an election."

VI. The existing state of things was in some sense prophetic of an approaching interposition of Providence, introducing a new development in the history of the church. It is in bondage to the heathen, and worse than that, it has partaken of their foul iniquities. True, it is almost apostate, but the only true worshipers of God, on earth, are in its bosom; these he will not forsake. The people, though degenerate, compose the only visible kingdom of God on earth; this he will not abandon. They are his people by covenant with Abraham; he will not be unmindful of his covenant. And, finally, his word is pledged to their deliverance. To Abraham he said, "That nation whom they shall serve will I judge: and afterward shall they come out with great substance," Gen. xv: 14, and to Jacob, "I will go down with thee into Egypt, and I will also surely bring thee up again." Gen. xlvi: 4. The case, as made, demands the interposition of Jehovah, else his word, and his covenant, and his oath will fail, and the plan of redemption, which is inextricably woven into the career of the Hebrews, will be defeated. The *dignus vindice nodus* is in hand. The time has come for God to make bare his arm and bring deliverance.

The nature of this deliverance is also foreshown in the spiritual condition of Israel. The church must be withdrawn from Egypt, else it will become wholly idolatrous. The divine purposes concerning it can never be accomplished in that dark

land. It must be taken up and planted in a new region, where the knowledge of the true God may be revealed within it, and where all the institutes of a true religion may be established. The vine must be brought out of Egypt. Out of Egypt God must call his son. Not only this, but an internal spiritual work of renewal must be wrought within the church. Of what avail were it to take up an idolatrous and degraded race, like these Hebrew bondsmen, and plant them in Canaan? There are idolaters enough there already. Why add two millions to their number? That were not to fulfill but to defeat the divine purpose. They must be won from their idolatry; they must be taught to fear the Lord; a new heart and a new spirit must be given to them. A two-fold deliverance was therefore indispensable; on the one part external from bondage in Egypt, and on the other spiritual from their own corrupt and evil natures. In short, there must be at once a national exodus, and a national regeneration. These are the two luminous points in the history of the departure from Egypt, and the forty years wandering. And these furnish a sufficient answer to the suggestion that the sojourn in Egypt was a failure, inasmuch as the people became idolatrous in that land, for the Egyptian period was one of national expansion, coherence, and secular education, while their spiritual training was reserved for the discipline of the wilderness; for the scenes of Sinai, Hazeroth, Kadesh, and Moab.

The basis, the rule, and end of all these proceedings are, also, clearly set forth in the record. The basis was the grace of God. If the inquiry be raised, why did not God cast off this rebellious people, the reply must resolve it all into the distinguishing grace of God, first choosing, then redeeming from bondage, then planting in Canaan this particular stock of the human race. The same grace, meanwhile, by an election within an election, secured the salvation of such among them as were ordained unto eternal life. The rule of the deliverance was the covenant made four hundred and thirty years before with Abraham. This remarkable instrument is steadily brought forward in the history as its controlling and determining element. When God heard the groaning of the children of Israel, he "remembered his covenant with Abraham, with Isaac, and with Jacob." Exodus ii: 24. "I have established

my covenant with them to give them the land of Canaan."
 * * * * * "I have remembered my covenant." * *
 * * * "I will bring you unto the land concerning which
 I did swear to give it to Abraham, to Isaac, and to Jacob."
 Exodus vi: 3-8. Compare Exodus iii: 15; Deut. ix: 4-6; Ps.
 cv: 8, 42; cvi: 45. It is impossible to comprehend the course
 of these events, except by observing how thoroughly they were
 controlled by the stipulations of the covenant. That is the
 primal organic law of the history, shaping and ruling the
 entire future of the chosen seed.

The end of this deliverance was the glory of God in the
 salvation of the race. It must be constantly borne in mind
 that the final course of God's dealings with Israel, was not to
 set up a great and opulent nation, nor was it even the spiritual
 welfare of the Hebrews only, but the salvation of the Gentiles
 as well. The Jews were the vehicles as well as the recipients
 of God's grace, and the dispensation to which they were
 the human parties, was simply preparatory to that which is
 now passing through its glorious career. The sojourn in
 Egypt was introductory to the conquest and settlement of
 Canaan, and that again to the era of David; but that golden
 age of Judaism, and every preceding period, and all the events
 which distinguished every succeeding stage in the progress of
 affairs was intended to exalt the name of God among the
 heathen, and to prepare the way for the coming of Christ.
 Ezek. xx: 6-26.

VII. Toward the close of the sojourn in Egypt, the provi-
 dential plans for the Exodus approached maturity. When
 the family went into Egypt it was with the expectation, on
 their part, of remaining there no longer than the continuance
 of the famine. Gen. xlvii: 4. Before the death of Ephraim
 some of his sons attempted to anticipate God's appointed
 time, and to take possession of Southern Palestine, but were
 defeated with heavy losses. Certain of the descendants of
 Judah, also, made themselves masters of a portion of Moab.
 Such, at least, is the current interpretation of 1 Chron. vii:
 20-24, and iv: 22. These premature movements were fruitless.
 But as the set time approached, the signs of preparation make
 their appearance in the history. It shows, first, by way of
 objective preparation, that the population had swelled to num-

bers sufficient to encounter the perils of the wilderness, and to gain, by an easy victory, the conquest of Canaan. Their organization by tribes and by families was complete, and the office of the ruling elder had been established. Exodus iii: 16. The chosen seed were also for the most part in a single, compact body, isolated both socially and locally from the Egyptians, and dwelling along the edge of the wilderness, through which their journey was to be laid. They were, therefore, ready to set off at a day's notice.

Next, by way of subjective preparation, all their traditions, religious and national, pointed to Canaan as their future home. The gift which God had made to Abraham of Palestine as the sure and everlasting possession of his posterity; the promise that the fourth generation should actually enter upon the inheritance; the oath which Jacob, when dying, had exacted from Joseph, respecting his burial in Hebron; the funeral caravan of the family across the desert, fulfilling the terms of the oath; the commandment which Joseph himself gave concerning his bones, and the presence among them of the coffin which contained his remains, embalmed and waiting for the Exodus, were circumstances the memory of which had neither passed away nor lost its power. Indeed, every male person among them of eight days old and upward, bore in his flesh the sign of the covenant between God and themselves, conveying to them the land of Canaan as an everlasting possession. So far as the religious consciousness existed in the bosom of that degenerate race, these traditions established within them both the assurance of escape from Egypt, and a longing for the promised rest. And even where true faith was extinct, a vague hope of emancipation from slavery was doubtless kept alive.

But, thirdly, something more potent than traditional ideas was needed to loosen the Hebrews from their attachment to Egypt. The problem of an emigration, such as was contemplated in the plan of Providence for this people, has been solved but once in the history of the world, and that instance is in this record. Colonies innumerable have been planted by adventurers like the Phenicians, by unhappy survivors of a ruined country, like the Trojans, by exiles for conscience sake, like our own pilgrim fathers, by fugitives from justice, by

refugees from oppression, by trading companies, by gold hunters and land hunters. Indeed, the race has spread over the earth, from its original center in Asia, by a series of successive migrations. These, however, have been offshoots simply from their native stocks, a few departing from the many. But when, before or since the days of Moses, has an entire nation, counted by millions, with the whole multitude of their helpless ones, by reason of infancy, old age and infirmity, been taken up in a body and transplanted to a new and distant region? When has a whole people voluntarily quitted a country like Egypt, at that time the garden and granary of the world, unrivaled then for its beautiful and rainless sky, its perpetual verdure, the inexhaustible wealth of its soil, and the luxuriousness of its climate? And when did such a nation willingly abandon a region like the delta of the Nile, and boldly strike out into a region like the desert of Arabia? The experience of the American Colonization Society shows how difficult it is to persuade even an enslaved race to leave the soil on which they were born, for the land of their ancestors. And the murmurings of Israel in the wilderness, at Moses, for bringing them away from Egypt, and their attempt to return, show how strong were their attachments to that land. Exodus xvi: 3; Num. xi: 5; xiv: 4. But the problem of their departure was solved by the rod of oppression. So soon as the Hebrews had become numerous and powerful, "there arose up a new king over Egypt which knew not Joseph." Exodus i: 8. Whether a young king in the royal line, or a new native dynasty, or a foreign usurper succeeded to the throne, can not, perhaps, be determined, nor is it material. His accession introduced a change of policy toward the Hebrews. The Egyptians reduced them to slavery, set over them taskmasters, made them serve with rigor, and, indeed, embittered their lives with hard and cruel bondage. The king, also, issued a brutal edict, commanding all their male children to be put to death as soon as they were born. The tyrant died, and the Hebrews looked for better times. But when they found that his death brought them no relief, they sighed and groaned, and cried out in utter despair under their intolerable sufferings. Exodus ii: 23. It was by these afflictions that their attachment to Egypt was dissolved. It was a gradual

process, running through nearly a hundred years, but it was effectual.

Finally, during the last eighty years of the period, God was preparing the instrument for the deliverance of the people. Moses was born of the stock of Israel in the darkest hour of oppression, and so was brought under the law of sympathy with those whom he was appointed to redeem, according to the profound principle involved in the incarnation of the Son of God. Heb. ii: 11-18. He was rescued by divine interposition from the sentence of instant death under which he came into the world, and so was marked out for some extraordinary career. In his infancy he was nursed by his Hebrew mother, from whom he imbibed reverence for God and love for his kindred. In youth and early manhood he received the education of a prince at the court of Pharoh, and so "became learned in all the wisdom of the Egyptians." At the age of forty, the consciousness of his destiny impelled him to an heroic but precipitate attempt to avenge the wrongs of his nation, whereby he became suddenly severed from the court, identified with the afflicted people of God, and separated to his life-work. Forty years long was he in the wilderness. There by isolation from enemies, from kindred, and from all the world; by meditation, by prayer, by many sharp trials, and, toward the end, by theophanic revelations, his too hasty and eager temper was formed into the gravity and self-control and repose befitting the highest commission ever granted to mortal man. The names which he gave to the children that were born to him in the wilderness, reveal both the nature and the fruits of the divine discipline. He called his first son Gershom, for he said: "I have been a stranger in a strange land"—the cry of a lonely exile from his kindred. Exodus ii: 22. But this despondency in due time gave place to a holier affection. He named his second son Eliezer; "for the God of my fathers," said he, "was mine help and delivered me from the sword of Pharoh;" the aspiration of faith recognizing God's goodness and indicating a spirit chastened and tempered at last to the work set before him. Exodus xviii: 4. The forty years in Egypt—the school of human wisdom, and the forty years in the wilderness—the school of divine wisdom, although in these outward conditions, thoroughly opposite to

each other, wrought together upon him by the law of higher unity, and fashioned the man for his mission.

VIII. During a residence in Egypt, extended through more than two centuries, Israel was brought into the closest relations with the language, geography, manners, and customs of the country. The student will, therefore, naturally expect to find in the Pentateuch unequivocal traces of these particulars. Indeed their absence would, according to the accepted canons of historical criticism, be a defect in the record fatal to its authenticity. Hengstenberg and Osburn have devoted each a separate treatise to the subject, in which they have instituted a rigid comparison between the sacred text and the discoveries of the best Egyptologists. The results of their inquiries are entirely satisfactory. It is impossible, in any condensed statement, to do justice to researches which deal with multiplied and minute details. But as indicating the general nature of the argument, it may be said, first, that the linguistic accuracy of the Pentateuch appears in the use of proper names peculiar to the Coptic or old Egyptian vocabulary: as Pharich, Potiphar, Asenath, and Zaphnath-Paaneah, the name given by the king to Joseph. The etymology of Moses, also, is thus given by Josephus: "The Egyptians call water *mo*, and those that are rescued from the water *uses*." Gesenius, the distinguished oriental scholar, has also detected, among the common names of the sacred text, a certain number of Coptic words.

Next, the geographical accuracy of the inspired writer appears in the names and sites of towns: as Zoan, Migdol, Pithom, Ramases, and On; also in his incidental allusions to the river Nile, to the bulrushes and flags growing at its brink; Exodus ii: 3; to its fertile meadows and wheat lands; and to the "streams, and rivers, and ponds, and pools of water" supplied from its abounding channels; Exodus vii: 19; to the wealth of the fisheries of Egypt, and to its productions in barley, flax, wheat, leeks, onions, melons, figs, grapes, and pomegranates.

Not less precise is the narrative in its allusions to the usages of Egypt. The autocracy of the king, the position of the priesthood, the art of magic and the influence of its adepts, the vast public works, the employment of foreigners and slaves in their construction, the system of task-masters, the prepara-

tion of sun-dried bricks by the use of straw, are instances in point. The Egyptians abhorred all shepherds; they habitually suspected foreigners to be spies; their women were dissolute, and yet were not locked up or guarded after the manner of many oriental peoples; they divined by the use of cups; Gen. xliv: 5; they sat rather than reclined at the table; Gen. xliii: 33; in years of plenty they stored up grain against years of scarcity; they used chariots and horses of war; all these usages were according both to the Scriptures and the best archæologists established in Egypt. The sacred writer is no less exact in his allusions to the curious art of embalming the bodies of the dead; to the importation of spices used in the art; Gen. xxxvii: 25; to the time, forty days, required for the process; to the period, seventy days, assigned to the solemn mourning for persons of rank, and to the extravagant lamentations of the survivors. The minute fact is stated that Joseph applied through others, not in person, to the king for leave to bring Jacob in Hebron, the explanation of which is that, according to the manner of the Hebrews, the mourner allowed his beard and hair to grow, but, according to the usage of the court, the subject might not come unshaven into the royal presence. Gen. xli: 14; 1: 45. Even in the dream of the chief butler, the vine with its clusters; in the dream of the chief baker, the three wicker baskets of bakemeats borne upon the head; and in the dream of the king, the lean and fat kine and the thin and full rows of wheat, are all true to Egyptian occupations and habits of thought. Indeed so accurate is the Bible in all its allusions to the antiquities of Egypt, that the most searching and rigorous modern criticism has not been able to detect a single blunder on its pages. The more immense and thorough the knowledge of the past becomes, the more completely does it confirm the infallible truth of the historical statements and allusions of the Pentateuch.

IX. The connection between the Pentateuch and the written history of Egypt ought not to be wholly neglected in this study. Manetho is supposed to have been a distinguished priest at Heliopolis, and to have compiled a history of Egypt from the archives of the temple about the year 260 B. C. The work itself is lost, but some remains of it have been preserved by Josephus. One of these fragments contains a statement to the

effect that an ancient king of Egypt gathered out of the whole land 800,000 leprous persons and set them to work in the quarries east of the Nile, where they occupied an old city. They chose a leader named *Osarsiph*, formerly a priest of Heliopolis. [Qu. *Joseph?* Gen. xli: 45.] Under his rule they ceased to worship the gods, used sacred animals for food, and adopted many other customs repugnant to those of Egypt. They were joined by 2,000 shepherds from Jerusalem, deposed the lawful king and took possession of the whole land, which they held thirteen years, when they were driven out of the country as far as the frontiers of Syria. Their leader, *Osarsiph*, was afterward called *Moses*. Manetho professes to have derived this information, not from the public archives, but from tradition. It doubtless refers to the Hebrews, although it confounds the persons of Joseph and Moses; and if Manetho be worthy of credit, the tradition is an important part of Egypt's testimony to the truth of the Bible.

According to another extract from the same historian, a certain people from the east, of ignoble origin, invaded Egypt, settled in the eastern portion of the kingdom, became numerous and powerful, subdued the whole land, burned the cities, treated its inhabitants with great barbarity, expelled the royal family, and appointed one of their own number king. These people were called *Hyksos*, or shepherd-kings. At the end of five hundred and eleven years, the Egyptians rallied their forces and waged war upon the usurpers. The *Hyksos* were defeated, and were allowed to capitulate on condition of their quitting the country. Accordingly 240,000 of them, including their families, marched through the wilderness to Judea, where they built a city called Hierosolima. This tradition has received various interpretations. Josephus identifies the *Hyksos* with the lepers of the former fragment, and both with the Israelites.

It is, however, the current opinion of modern historical critics that the *Hyksos* were not Israelites, but a nation of Arabs, or shepherds from the east, of the Shemitic stock. But among these critics the relation of the *Hyksos* to the Hebrews is in dispute. Lipsius assigns both their arrival and expulsion to a period anterior to Abraham. But if, as is supposed, the antipathy of the Egyptians toward "all shepherds" grew out

of their hatred for the Hyksos, how will Lipsius explain the courtesy and kindness of Phariorh to Abraham and Joseph?

Saalschiitz supposes that the Hyksos invaded Egypt after the death of Joseph; that the "new king who knew not Joseph" was the first of their dynasty, and that the Phariorh who perished in the Red Sea was the last of the line. But this theory does not appear to be tenable.

The view advocated by Berthau, Knobel, and Kurtz, and generally adopted, is that the shepherd-kings were of the stock from which the Israelites descended, and were in possession of Egypt when Abraham first went to Canaan. It was but natural that they should treat their remote kinsman, the patriarch, with respect, on his visit to Egypt. But they gradually became assimilated to Egyptian ideas and customs, so that in the days of Joseph they were so far Egyptians as to refuse to eat with shepherds; and yet so far shepherds themselves as to own cattle, and to extend a welcome to Joseph and the shepherd family of Jacob. The Hyksos were expelled, and the new king who knew not Joseph was the first of the restored native dynasty. He and his successors allowed the Hebrews to remain, and reduced them to slavery, but always suspected them of being friendly to the Hyksos and disposed to favor their return to power in Egypt. And, finally, Manetho confounded the Hyksos and the Hebrews in his narrative of their migration to Canaan. Such is the common explanation.

Hengstenberg, however, attaches no value whatever to these fragments. He denies that Manetho was a priest at Heliopolis, or that he compiled his history from the archives of the temple. He supposes him to have lived in the time of the Roman Emperors, and suspects him to have been an "intentional falsifier" and a "professional wind-bag," perverting and garbling the narrative in the Pentateuch in order to flatter the national vanity of the Egyptians. Hengstenberg is not likely to be sustained in this judgment; and Manetho is likely to be still classed with Heroditus and Berossus, historians whose testimony, when thoroughly winnowed and sifted, yields a certain amount of truth. But the precise value of these fragments, and their relations to each other, to the lost history which they have survived, to the tangled web of Egyptian chronology, and to the sacred records, are not perhaps determinable. Nor is it

important to the student of the Bible that they should be determined. Manetho explains nothing in the sacred text which is not as well explained without him. His testimony can not confirm the Pentateuch. He occupies an humbler attitude. He waits to be himself explained and confirmed by the infallible word.

ART. V.—*The Holy Spirit and the Church.*

As we are living under the special reign and “more glorious ministration of the Spirit,” the subject to which we invite attention in this discussion is of the very utmost practical importance. Every other ministration was, in fact, but preparatory and introductory to this one. The dispensation which immediately preceded it is termed *το καταργουμενον*, *that which is counterworked and abolished*, while this one is *το μενον*, *to continue*, for all time, places, and people.

The ministration of the Spirit is to be permanent and universal—world-wide. The Church has been fully endowed, by her dying and risen Lord, with all the gifts and graces of the Holy Spirit, a royal legacy, “*THE gift of God.*” Christ told his weeping disciples that it was expedient for them that he should go away in order that the Comforter might come and abide with them always, and be everywhere present with them, as his substitute and vicegerent. The Holy Spirit is in the room and stead of Christ “until he shall come the second time without sin unto salvation.” It becomes, then, a matter of the very last importance to understand precisely the relation which the Spirit sustains to the Church, and the Church to the Spirit.

Holding in her hands the great commission to evangelize all the nations of the earth, the Church has the guarantee that her resources are equal to the mighty task in the assurance: “Lo, I am with you always, even to the end of the world.”

What the Church now needs, in order that the kingdom and dominion of the whole earth may be given her, is to know how

to put herself in full possession, and then to give a practical development, of all the resources left at her command. When she once becomes perfectly "filled with the Spirit," "a spirit of love, power, and a sound mind," "filled with all the fullness of God and strengthened according to the riches of his glory, by might, by his Spirit in the inner man," then nothing shall be impossible to her faith.

That we may understand aright the present posture of the Church, and especially in her relation to the Spirit, we propose briefly to consider the other ministrations through which she has already passed.

I. THE THEOCRACY.

The first of these we term the Theocracy—the reign or government of Jehovah. During the first ages of the world, the human race seems to have had no knowledge of God. They had sunken into the profoundest abyss of atheism. They must be taught the very first lesson of theology—that there is a God—theism. To this end God must reveal himself, which he did in terrible signs and wonders. He manifested forth his being, power, and glory. The voice of his thunder was in the heavens, and his lightnings lightened the world. He made the earth to shake and tremble. He spoke to the nations of the earth in an audible voice, saying: "Be still and know that I, Jehovah, am God alone." He loosened the fountains of the great deep, and sent his flood upon the earth, and swept away its wickedness as with the besom of destruction. He sent forth his fire from heaven, and consumed their cities, until he made the world stand in awe of him, and acknowledge the being of God.

His next object was to make a revelation of his *Nature*—what kind of a being he was—that he was a *holy God*. Hence "he revealed himself in flaming fire," the chosen symbol of his purity. He appeared upon Sinai, in the presence of his people, amid thunders and lightnings, a thick cloud, and the voice of the trumpet exceeding loud, so that all the people in the camp trembled. And Moses brought forth all the people out of the camp to meet with God, and Mount Sinai was altogether on a smoke, because the Lord descended upon it in fire, and the smoke thereof ascended as the smoke of a furnace, and

the whole mount quaked greatly. And when the voice of the trumpet sounded long, and waxed louder and louder, Moses spake, and God answered him by a voice, and the Lord came down upon Mount Sinai, on the top of the mount." Ex. xix: 16-25; comp. Heb. xii: 18-21. The angel of the Lord appeared to Moses in a flame of fire in a bush. He continually stood before the people of Israel in a pillar of fire, his Shekinah remained ever in the tabernacle. The same truth was perpetually enforced by the sacrifice of clean beasts, burnt upon the altar, and in all their "divers baptisms," etc.

But the third and last truth to be developed during this administration, had reference to the *relation* which this thrice holy God sustained toward his people. He was (1) *God*, (2) a *holy* God, (3) *their* God. He caused himself to be proclaimed as he passed before them in such awful majesty and glory, "the Lord, the Lord God, merciful and gracious, forgiving iniquities, transgressions, and sins." He was their father, and friend, and deliverer.

We may remark, in passing, that whenever Jehovah endeavored to impress the human mind with any great truth concerning himself, that would be the point against which Satan would array all his strength. For instance, God told Adam not to eat the forbidden fruit, that if he did he "should die." Satan told him it would make him "as wise as the gods." When God taught *theism*, the devil taught *atheism*. And when the conviction became overwhelming that there is a God—that none but a "fool" would deny it—instantly the father of lies would give the pendulum of the mind a swing to the opposite extreme of *polytheism* that everything was God! and sent man thus deceived to do reverence to stocks and stones, to leeks and onions.

Or if God tried to teach man that he was a pure and holy God, Satan persuaded them that he was like unto corruptible things—to four-footed beasts and creeping things.

When God would be their king, Satan would put it into their hearts to renounce allegiance to him, and choose one from among themselves, and finally succeeded in turning away their minds from the service of the only living and true God to worship the idol gods of the heathen.

II. THE SECOND OR MEDIATORIAL DISPENSATION.

The first great fact concerning the being, nature, and relation of God being established, and also the correlative fact of man's sinfulness, instantly the question arises, "How shall man be just with God." God's people were now prepared for a new and glorious development of divine truth. 1. There is one God. 2. "*There is one mediator between God and man.*"

One dispensation gradually prepares the way for the one that is to follow. This truth, long foreshadowed by types and ceremonies, at length breaks forth in all its glory, in the incarnation, life, and death of the great Messiah. "Immanuel," "God manifest in the flesh," the incomprehensible Jehovah brought down to our senses and our sympathies; the word made flesh that we might behold his glory and handle that word of life. Until now, the Church had remained comparatively ignorant of the ground of her acceptance and the strength of her devotions. "Hitherto ye have asked nothing in my name."

Christ sets forth the doctrines of the atonement. Justification by faith, through his blood, by which the law is magnified, sin expiated, and the sinner saved. His mediatorial kingdom more perfectly organized; his apostles commissioned; the gracious influences of the Holy Spirit secured; his work on earth finished, it is expedient for him to ascend on high, to occupy his mediatorial throne in the heavens. And as the great High Priest passes into the heavens, the Comforter descends upon earth and ushers in the last and "more glorious ministration of the Spirit." Now error assumes a new form. The devil being foiled and beaten from his old position, now assumes the very ground against which he has all along so earnestly contended. He admits that there is *one God*, but denies that there are *two*; or what he would persuade us is the same thing—two persons in the Godhead. His main effort is now to discredit the divinity of Christ, and hence Unitarianism, Arianism, Socinianism, etc.

III. THE MINISTRATION OF THE SPIRIT.

The Church now passes under her final and more glorious ministration. "It is expedient for you that I go away, for if

I go not away the Comforter will not come; but if I go away I will send him unto you, and he shall abide with you forever, and reprove the world of sin, of righteousness, and of judgment," etc.

The ministrations of the Messiah were limited both as to time and place. They were confined to one nation, while that of the Spirit should include the whole world.

Christ being man as well as God, could not continue here always, by reason of death, but the Spirit would abide always. Christ could not be personally present in every assembly of his worshiping saints, but the Spirit would be present "wherever two or three were gathered together in his name."

These were the advantages to result from this change from Christ's personal ministration, limited both as to time and place, to the ministration of the Holy Ghost, which, besides being permanent, would be spiritual and universal. His special reign was inaugurated on the day of Pentecost. It will continue to increase in power and in great glory until the knowledge of the Lord shall cover the whole earth, when the latter-day glory shall be ushered in with meridian splendor; a dispensation no longer clouded with types and shadows, nor to be signalized by the shedding of the blood of the great sacrifice, but a reign of universal peace and love, a day of the mighty power of God, witnessing the outpouring of the vials, the opening of the seals, and the sounding of the trumpets, the final and complete triumphs of the Gospel, when every knee shall bow to Jesus, and the cry come forth from God out of heaven, "the kingdoms of this world are become the kingdoms of our Lord Jesus Christ."

This epoch will be marked by the overthrow of all the anti-Christian powers, the Beast and False Prophet. It shall continue until every bright prophecy is fulfilled, until the whole creation that groans and travails in pain together until now receives its baptism of fire, and shall come forth from its flames a new heavens and a new earth, wherein dwelleth righteousness, and Christ himself shall be a second time revealed from heaven, with all his holy angels, in flaming fire, taking vengeance on them that know not God, and obey not his Gospel. This spiritual reign shall continue until the last enemy be destroyed, swallowed up in victory, and the curse of sin effaced

from our fair heritage, and Christ and his risen saints reign in visible glory upon the earth.

This will be the consummation of all things, the fulfillment of the whole Gospel economy of salvation. This being true, the Church ought and must be brought to understand the teachings of the Scriptures concerning the personal reign and influence of the Spirit. It is against this very point that Satan is now arraying his whole strength. He is now drawing off his forces from all other points of attack, and concentrating them here. Everywhere, all over the earth, is heard the hum of busy preparation. All the powers of earth and hell are being consolidated into one mighty army, and are girding themselves for the last great battle. Mighty issues are at stake. But the issue is not that of Theism against Atheism, nor is it Unitarianism against the Deity of Christ, but it is against the personal reign and influence of the Holy Spirit in the hearts of men.

As the Church is now under the special control of the third person in the Trinity, the gift of the Father, and the vicerent of the Son, who will not cease to reign until he brings the whole world unto the feet of the Messiah, as might be expected, and what is now true in fact, the grand heresy of our day has embodied itself in a denial of the work of the Spirit, the unpardonable sin of the age. The Holy Spirit is here "*anti*," in the place or room of Christ—to do his work more thoroughly and perfectly than he could, if here in person.

Now whatever comes in between Christ and his Church, superseding his Spirit in dispensing salvation to men, is "*Anti-Christ*" in the place of Christ, and therefore against Christ. But this opposition is not open, but insidious. The Devil grows wiser by experience, and improves upon his own policies. He now comes "as an angel of light." He comes in the garb, and in the name, and as an advocate of Christianity.

The most cursory observation will show any one what is the prevailing form of error of this day. What, for instance, is the Church of Rome, "who opposeth and exalteth himself above all that is called God, or that is worshiped; so that he, as God, sitteth in the temple of God, showing himself that he is God?" 2 Thes. 2: 4. Holding "the keys," he claims to open and shut the kingdom of heaven at will.

And how much better is the Puseyism and High-Churchism of England, or the Rationalism of Germany, or the Parkerism and Campbellism of this country? In all these prevailing forms of error the work of the Holy Spirit is almost entirely ignored, or cramped and tied down to a mere frame-work of ceremonies.

Besides the heresy of this day takes care to embody itself into an *organized* form of concentrated strength. And what renders it so much more dangerous and difficult to combat, is the fact that it no longer takes an open field, nor fights under its own colors, but dresses up its soldiery in canonical robes, and sends them forth in the regimental uniform of "the only true Church." Pretending to the utmost sanctity and zeal for God, they seem to excel all others in devotion to Christ, choosing for themselves a monopoly of devout titles, as "Most Holy Catholic," "Christian," etc. Like the Jews and Romans, under pretense of honoring Christ, they do put a crown upon his head, but it proves to be a crown of thorns, and upon his body a purple robe; but the more effectually to mock him, a scepter in his hand—but, lo! it is a broken reed. Having blindfolded him, they buffet and spit upon him, then crucify him, and bury his body under a rubbish of good works, done without the aid and grace of the Holy Spirit, which are indeed good for nothing. Their salutation to the Church is like that of Joab to his brother Amasa, when he took him by the beard and said, "Art thou in health, my brother? and then kissed him," that he might more effectually conceal the stab that shed out his bowels upon the earth.

No, the opposition and despite done the Spirit of God in this day does not come directly from the world, but from those who profess to be the special defenders of the faith. Satan's policy now is not to oppose, but *pervert* the truth. He does not try to prevent men from being religious, but takes care to supply them with a false religion—one that will satisfy the accusations and demands of the conscience, without mortifying the corrupt desires of the heart. This he does by making religion a mere outward matter, the more of which one has the more certain is he of damnation—a religion in which bigotry will supply the place of piety, and a splendid ritual be a substitute for true spirituality. There is a marked tendency in our age to exalt the Church, with all her imposing rites and costly ceremonies,

into the place of the Spirit. And hence this great ado about baptismal regeneration, apostolical succession, free will, penance, holy water, priestly absolution, transubstantiation, and the like.

Such is the posture of things in our day. The Church has manfully fought its way up to this point. She has struggled on through Atheism, Pantheism, Polytheism, Deism, through Arianism, Socinianism, Unitarianism. She has evolved the sublime doctrines of Theism—the being, nature, and relations of God Jehovah to his people. She has solved the great problem of man's salvation through a Mediator—that all things in heaven and upon earth were created by and for the Messiah, in subserviency to the interests of the Church.

In the meantime she has been taught herself, and is now teaching the world, that she has achieved none of these things by her own power. It was not by (her) might, nor power, "but by the Spirit of God" dwelling in her. She has at length come up to this point; she feels her entire *dependence upon the Spirit of God*, without whom she "can do nothing."

Now there is but one more truth for her to realize, and practically to develop—the most important and momentous practical truth that she has ever been brought to consider, viz.: that it is her duty and privilege to enjoy the *abiding fellowship*, and to feel the *mighty, the almighty indwelling power of the Holy Ghost*! It remains for her "to be filled with all the fullness of God, and to be strengthened according to the riches of his glory, by might, by his Spirit in the inner man, that Christ may dwell in our hearts by faith, being rooted and grounded in love, who is able to do exceeding abundantly above all we can ask or think."

For the Church to feel her *dependence* of the Spirit is one thing, but to realize his *presence and power and life* in herself, is quite a different thing. A sick man may know that his life depends upon a certain medicine, but this will not save him; he must take the medicine, and experience its saving virtues within him.

There never was a more important truth for the Church to consider than this. She has at length gotten to the very point to which God has all along been bringing her. She has but one more step to take—one more truth to realize. If she has

a proper sense of her intrinsic weakness, she has as yet no just conception of the supernatural strength with which she is really endowed—the omnipotent energies of the eternal Spirit of God. “When I am weak, then am I strong,” said the Apostle; weak in self, strong in God. The gifts and graces of the Spirit are all given to the Church, all that is wonderful and transforming in power, all that is ineffable in grace, infinite in wisdom, and omnipotent in love, are all lodged with the Church, as a rich and lasting legacy. Her resources are infinite, unlimited, omnipotent. They can never be circumscribed or repressed, except by the Church herself, in her own ignorance and inaptitude. The Spirit that dwells in her is the same that brooded over the face of the deep, bringing order out of chaos, light out of darkness, that garnished the face of the heavens, “that made dry bones to rejoice,” and who will at the last day raise the sleeping dust, and array it in forms of beauty and life. The Church has not yet begun to awake to the sense of the solemnity of her mission, nor the sublimity of her destiny, nor to the adequacy of her resources; and, least of all, has she a practical knowledge as to how to apply them.

A mere earnest of that power was given her on the day of Pentecost. When the Apostles preached, “they were filled with the Holy Ghost.” Three thousand were converted in one day. Paul “preached in the demonstration of the Holy Ghost, and *with power*.” This was not the demonstration of zeal, or learning, or philosophy, or eloquence, but “of *the Spirit*.” They all preached with the Holy Ghost sent down from heaven. It was not the *miraculous* power of the Holy Spirit that converted men in their day, but it was by those saving virtues of that Spirit which are, and ever will be, reserved for the use and benefit of his Church. There is no limit or restriction put upon these divine influences in our day. The promise of the Spirit is left us. It is as much our duty to be “filled with the Spirit” as it was that of the Apostles. There is no promise in the Bible more frequently, freely and fully made, than that of the Spirit. God declares he is more ready to give than we are to ask or receive it.

Now let us suppose that every minister and layman were filled with the Spirit, how long would it be ere the world would be

converted to God? Pentecostal seasons would be witnessed by every rolling sun.

Do not say that this is an impracticable thing. Let each Christian seek to be filled with the Spirit, and then the work is done! When each one is filled, then are all filled with "the spirit of love and power, and of a sound mind." No one need to wait for another. If each one was just as eager to be filled with the Spirit, and would labor as earnestly as does the miser for gold, or the man of ambition for the honors of this world, lo! suddenly the whole Church would find herself immediately inspired and imbued with power from on high. We are commanded "to covet earnestly the best gifts of the Spirit:" such as "faith, hope, and charity," which ever "abide" with the Church. And if there be anything on earth worthy of our most earnest seeking, surely this is that thing; whether we consider our duty, or our pleasure, our usefulness, or happiness; and a most solemn thought it is, that in the last day we must account to God for all that lost good we might have accomplished had we been "filled with the Spirit."

But if these things be so, it may be asked, how comes it that the world has not been converted long ago?

We reply, in the first place, that the Church has been hitherto ignorant of the nature and extent of her resources. We might ask, why was not the commerce of the world transported by steam in the days of Noah? The latent power of steam has always resided in water. We make steam to draw, electricity to talk, and the sun to paint. Why did not our fathers? Possibly there are still occult powers in nature, only awaiting deeper research on our part, that are to work still more wonderful results upon the destinies of the world. But as yet we are ignorant of them. So has it been all along with respect to the Church. God has long since placed at her command the moral power, the leverage and fulcrum, by which she may lift the world; but she knew not the facts, or if she did, she lacked the principles by which they are to be applied. Nor is she yet weaned from all human dependencies. She knows neither her own innate weaknesses, nor where lie the hidings of her power; that the omnipotence of God lies concealed amid her dormant and reserved energies. With Christ's strength nothing is impossible to her faith. She can "do all

things." "If ye abide in me, and my words abide in you, ye shall ask what ye will, and it shall be done unto you." Nay, Christ expected his disciples to do even greater wonders than those he wrought, because, said he, "I go to my Father," and because his Spirit would, in consequence, come upon them and us.

Secondly. Supposing the Church does know and believe the foregoing facts as a theory, as yet she is not in a proper condition to give to them a practical development. She has "put off her coat" since the day of Pentecost, and knoweth not how to put it on again. Having dallied so long with sin, she has fallen asleep in the lap of worldliness, until the "seven locks of her head have been shorn." In vain she tries to shake off the fetters from her limbs. Her magic power is gone. She "wist not that the Spirit of God has departed from her." But the Philistines have come upon her, "put out her eyes, and bound her with fetters of brass, and made her to grind in their prison-house," through the long dark ages. The strength she now puts forth is a blind, human strength. But in due time God will gird her with his own Almighty power, and then she will lay hold of the pillars of Dagon's temple, and drag it in the dust.

God's purpose is to make known his manifold wisdom and saving power, "by means of the Church;" Eph. iii: 10; to convert men "by the foolishness of preaching." The operation of God in the salvation of men is a co-operation; the Church working out as God works in. The necessity for this is *in the Church itself*. She must be taken into vital union with Christ, inspired by his Spirit, and quickened by his life, that her own talents may be increased by becoming a co-worker with God. The inspiration which he affords is not intended to supersede the use of her own faculties, but to quicken them into a new life and activity. It is but the "putting out her talents to usury."

Every member of the body or faculty of the mind is increased by exercise, and extirpated by disuse. The teacher may try to communicate knowledge to the pupil, but unless the pupil will call into exercise the mercurial powers of his own mind, his faculties will never grow. They may be overlaid and entombed in the knowledge of other men. His mind may become a lumber-room of facts, but can not thus be educated.

Hence, there must be a co-operation between the mind of the teacher and the taught.

So there must of necessity be a combination of the divine and human forces in the great work of evangelizing the world; God working in, man working out; the vine giving life, the branch bearing the fruit. Seemingly, God might have dispensed with the agency of the Church, by writing his Word across the face of the sky; or by sending his angels through the midst of the heavens, having the everlasting Gospel to preach to men, and so left the Church with nothing to do but to fold up her talent in a napkin.

But no, the doctrine of divine influence, so far from superseding the use of the means of grace, necessitates them, and affords them the only ground or hope of success. Those Apostles who were the most deeply "moved by the Holy Ghost," were the most diligent in the use of their own powers, and entertained the most profound respect for divine ordinances.

It is manifestly the purpose of the divine mind to convert the world through human instrumentality, "by means of the Church." And of necessity there must be a place of meeting, a point of contact between the divine and human forces, in carrying on the work of redemption in the world. And that point must be in the faithful and persevering use of the means of the divine appointment. Else why did God appoint them at all, unless he intended that they should serve as a connecting link between himself and the Church, uniting the divine and human agencies? Like the wire, they connect the two poles of the battery; take them away and the circuit is broken. The magnetic influences of the divine Spirit will flow to his Church, and through it, in saving a lost world, only through his own ordinances, properly administered. "How, then, shall they call on him in whom they have not believed? and how shall they believe in him of whom they have not heard? and how shall they hear without a preacher?" Rom. x: 14. "I will be inquired of by the house of Israel, to do this thing for them."

But it by no means follows that the connection between the influences of the Spirit and the means of grace is absolute. These means may be, and often are, improperly employed.

The Church may rest *in them*, instead of looking *through them*. The sacraments may be received without repentance and faith. We may "ask amiss." Perverted, they become "a savor of death unto death;" not because there is any defect in the means themselves, and least of all, because the Holy Spirit has sovereignly deserted them. In that event, they would cease to be the ordinances of God.

The truth of God, as contained in his word and ordinances, is the shrine of the divine influence, and not the hearts of believers, except so far as his word abides in them. John xv. The Holy Spirit never is withdrawn from his Word, nor from his Church, except as the Church withdraws herself from him, by neglecting or perverting his ordinances. "Lo, I am with you always."

If there be any cessation of the divine work at all, it is the fault of the Church—the negative pole of the battery.

The God of nature and of grace is the same God. The perfect analogy between the natural and spiritual kingdoms enabled Christ to speak always in parables. We feel warranted in saying that, as God has deposited certain physical influences in the kingdom of nature, so, in like manner, has he deposited certain spiritual influences with his Church, or in his spiritual kingdom. He allows us to avail ourselves of these influences, to lay them all under contribution to our necessities. And these influences are so definitely and permanently located, that we may know where to find them, and by what combinations to elicit them.

He does not, in either kingdom, change his laws fitfully, leaving man every year to renew his experiments, feeling blindly after God if haply he may find him. The whole economy, both of nature and grace, is settled fast in all the fixedness of an unchangeable law.

Now such is the order of things in the natural world, that to obtain the necessities of life, there must be a combination and co-operation of both the divine and human forces; man must plant that God may give the increase. But in using the means, in order to insure the increase, we must use them properly: according to law. There may be vitality in the seed, fertility in the soil, germinating power in the rain and sunshine, but the seed may be sown on a rock, or by the way-

side, or among thorns, or cast into the fire, what then? There is no harvest. But is it because God has withdrawn his presence from the physical world? All the elements of a harvest were there, but failed to be developed for the want of a proper combination.

So the Church may employ the means of grace with great assiduity, as did the Pharisees, or Israelites, in the days of Isaiah (chaps. i: 1-18, and lviii: 2-8), and yet fail of the grace of God. The fault was not in the good seed; it fell on a rock.

The Church, in her attempts to do good to others, too often fails. She labors with but one oar, and wields that with only a human arm. She may be rent with strife, or incased in pride and worldliness. God's Spirit will no more co-operate with such a Church than steam will exert its power through frozen valves and icy cylinders. God does not withdraw his physical influence from the natural world, or alter any one of its laws, in order to compensate for our ignorance of, or disregard for, them. Who believes that the loadstone has lost its power to attract, because it has no influence over wood, or that powder is no longer explosive, because one fails "to spring a magazine with a match of icicles?"

So "the law of faith," by which all spiritual influences are regulated, is just as certainly and definitely fixed as are "the sweet influences which bind the Pleiades," and control the motions of the physical universe. The magnetic influence of the Spirit, like electricity, has its chosen mediums, that, like perfect conductors, transmit his graces to the hearts of men. He will never despise nor desert them. He has deposited them where they may at all times be found. His relation to the Church and the means of grace is forever fixed, and is as unalterable as his own eternal throne. It is God's Spirit that worketh all in all, yet always in accordance to "the law of the Spirit of life."

The Church herself must be pre-eminently holy if she would be filled with all the fullness of God, or exert, like salt, a saving influence upon the world. She is like the moon, herself an opaque body, and shines, if at all, in a borrowed light. To do this she must arise, full orb'd, above the earth, into that high and holy elevation where she may bathe herself in the light of the Sun of Righteousness, now no longer visible to the eyes

of the men of this world, and thus throw back his borrowed splendors upon this dark earth. "Ye are the light of the world." "Ye are my witnesses."

The Church, filled with the Spirit, is in the stead of Christ, a living, practical embodiment of his life, convincing the world of the reality and power of godliness, by an argument that the most ignorant can understand, and the most learned can neither gainsay nor resist.

But the Church, like the moon, may get down upon a level with the earth, and in a direct line between it and the sun, and throw the shadow of her dark disc over our already benighted world, covering it with a double mantle of darkness, verifying the words of the Saviour: "If the light that is in thee be darkness, how great is that darkness!"

We come now to consider more closely the union of the Holy Spirit and the Church, or how it is that believers are under divine influence, and yet retain their own freedom of will.

The Christian life is a new life—a divine life. "You hath he made alive." Eph. ii: 1. "I am crucified with Christ: nevertheless, I live; yet not I, but Christ liveth in me: and the life I now live in the flesh, I live by the faith of the Son of God," etc. Gal. ii: 20. I live, yet not I. It is not I that live, and yet I do live. A blessed mystery, a sweet and heavenly paradox! Dead, yet alive; alive, yet dead! Dead to the former life, alive to a sense of the former death. The corn has fallen into the earth and died, but lo! a new life springs out of its death, containing the germ of a reproduction, "the power of an endless life;" fit type of the new, divine life of him that is crucified but still lives. The life which he henceforth lives is not a self-originated life. Before conversion we live, but are dead; after conversion we are dead, while we truly live. The former state is a living death, because a dying life; the latter a living life, because we live in him who is the Life of our life.

The branch might say to the vine, "I live and bear fruit; see the rich cluster of grapes which I have produced. I live, yet not I. It is my life, and yet not my life. Severed from thee I wither and die, and am fit only to be burned, and yet the fruit is mine. I bear it, yet not alone and of myself—not by my own, self-originated efforts and struggles for the dew, and rain, and sunshine. I simply abide in the vine. Thy life

is my life. We are two, but one; one, but two; distinct, but united; united, but separate and distinct—one life is common to us both." Fittest type of the life of Christ in the souls of his people. It is Christ's life in us; it is our life in Christ; he the vine, and we the branches—a divine life. It is also a human life. The two forces, the divine and the human vitally blending in the Christian life, and yet the one does in no way trench upon the sphere of the other.

The operations of the Spirit are so perfectly in a line with the laws of our own spirits, that he does not "destroy free agency, nor offer the slightest violence to the will of the creature, nor disturb the contingency of second causes." Divine influence does not come in such a way as to supersede the use of our own faculties. Nor does it "work them as steam does the valves, and cranks, and wheels of an engine." The Holy Spirit *helps* our infirmities. Galvanism poured along the line of the muscles does not destroy them, nor supersede the use of them, but imparts a new power and vitality to them. So the influence of the Spirit does not destroy our freedom, but enlarges it. "Whom he makes free, are free indeed." They do not unmake our humanity, but repair and restore it. They are necessary to bring man back to his normal state. When God first created man he breathed his own life into him, and man became a "living soul." So far was this from destroying his manhood, it was essential to it. It was necessary to make him a perfect man. It elevated him in the scale of humanity to be thus divinely inspired. When he sinned he died; lost the divine life. In his conversion it is restored, "being born again of God." This does not make him less a man, a human being, by being restored to what he was in the beginning; having his dead soul quickened by the Spirit of God, and with the power of an endless life, and having his soul purged from the foul demoniacal spirit that is in him.

We have the finest illustration of the union of the human and divine natures in the person of our great prototype, Jesus Christ. He was both God and man, being the son of both, having two natures in one person, and being perfect in both. "He is the great fundamental, external element of Christianity between God and man; and in him perfect and complete divinity, and perfect and complete humanity, each in its integrity,

meet and blend in one person. The divinity does not exclude anything corporeal, and make the life of Christ a continued theophany: that is Doceticism. It does not crowd out the rational human soul: that is Appollinarianism. The divinity and the humanity, though side by side, and joined by contact, are not separate and independent: that is Nestorianism. The divinity does not absorb the humanity, so that the two, though distinct and separate in origin, are in manifestation confounded, having but one nature as well as one person: this is Eustychianism, or the Monophysite doctrine. Neither does the humanity expel the divinity and leave Christ a mere man, however miraculously endowed: this is Socinianism. Nor does it, in any way, emphasize itself at the expense of the divinity, producing a doctrine lying anywhere between the wide extremes of the highest Unitarianism and the lowest Rationalism. All these errors, one after another, has the Church thrown off as unscriptural and unsound, as it has steadily but slowly gravitated through the conflicts of opinion toward the true doctrine, under the influence of the Spirit who has promised to guide unto the whole circle of Gospel truth; and it rests in the position that both natures interpenetrate and co-operate, each in its integrity, in a living personal union. The divinity and the humanity are fused into one person, not one nature, in such a way that, without substantial change in either, of any kind, of addition or abatement, the divinity is divinity still; the humanity, humanity still."*

How two natures blend harmoniously in one person, each distinct and perfect, "yet making one," we may not be able to explain or understand, nor is this necessary to our faith. Man is himself a "compound being," made up of matter and mind, having a soul and a spirit, yet he is but one. So the Spirit of the living God may penetrate our spirits, as the light does the diamond, without overriding our faculties or impairing the perfect freedom of our powers. That subtle influence called gravitation, penetrates every particle of matter, goes even down to the very center of the earth, and flings abroad his sweet influences among the heavenly orbs, and yet does not "destroy the law" of nature "but establishes it."

* See Biblical Repository, vol. XVI, p. 500.

There is in our natures a centrifugal power, whose tendency is to drive us away from God. The Holy Spirit is the only centripetal force, restoring by his potent influences the wandering and the lost, and adjusting all things to their proper spheres, and causing them to move onward in all their order, beauty, and harmony.

The union of the divine life with our life, does not impair our humanity but restores and elevates it; so that the life of Christ in us is emphatically our life, and our life becomes a divine life. It is human, yet divine; divine, yet human: a life in the flesh, but not of it. The more perfect it becomes in its divinity, the more perfect in its humanity. Christ, our Head, was the most perfect human being that ever lived, because perfect in his divine nature; so the more of his Spirit we possess the more does it intensify our individuality. "He turneth the hearts of men as the rivers of water are turned." Water may be turned out of its old into a new channel, and be water still, obeying every law of its nature, though induced to run freely in an opposite direction. The oil on Aaron's head ran down over his whole body. So our Living Head was largely anointed with the unction of the Holy Ghost, which anointing flows over the whole body, imparting grace and life eternal to every member of his mystical body. "If any man have not the Spirit of Christ, he is none of his." Rom. viii: 9.

These two elements, the human and the divine, enter into all parts of divine worship. The Church itself is partly human, partly divine. It is the body of Christ; his Spirit is its life. Without the human element there would be no body, and without the divine no life. There are those who think to serve God standing without the pale of the visible Church; but if all would act upon the same principle, the Church would cease to exist, and piety, for the want of an organization, would soon disappear from the world. This would be the result from setting aside the human element.

Others run to the opposite extreme and ignore the divine element. Like Ishmael, they mock at and deride the doctrine of divine influences. They exalt the Church into the place of Christ, and make salvation the reward of human merit. "What God hath joined let no man put asunder."

If the two elements be not conjoined, it is no true Church

at all. If Christ be not in it, and if it be not in Christ, it is a mere human association. Or, take away the human element, and nothing is left "but a mere phantom without any concrete form." Each Church, so far as it is inspired by the Holy Spirit, is divinely authenticated, be the form what it may. The true essence of a Church is not in its form but in its life. The high churchman makes salvation depend upon the Church. That is to exalt the human element unduly, putting the Church before Christ instead of Christ before the Church. "This is to make the Church the way to Christ, instead of making Christ the way to the Church."

But take away entirely the human element, and you annihilate the Church, and break up the divine plan. There is no salvation by the Church, there would be none without it. There would be no fruit without the vine, there would be none without the branch. We may swing the pendulum to either extreme, but truth lies in the middle. The Church is God's divine organization in the which man becomes a co-worker with God. This is what Calvin meant—"There is no other way of entrance into life unless conceived by her (the Church), born of her, nourished at her breasts, continually preserved by her care and government, till divested of this mortal flesh, and we become like angels."

In giving us the Scriptures, God affords us another illustration of his purpose not to disregard the law of divine and human co-operation. "Holy men of God spake as they were moved by the Holy Ghost." 2 Peter i: 21. "The revelation of Jesus Christ, which God gave unto him, to show unto him things that must shortly come to pass; and he sent and signified it by his angel unto his servant John." Rev. i: 1. Here the two agencies meet, yet each distinct and neither trenching upon the sphere of the other. Christ is the medium, who is God speaking in man, as man for man, to man, by man. The two natures coexisting, coalescing, coacting, but perfect in their individuality as in their unity, "so that it is God who speaks to us, but it is also man; it is man, but also God."

The same thing is true with respect to prayer and praise. Prayer is the offering up of the desires of *our* hearts to God, the Father, who is the hearer of prayer, through the Son, who

is the medium of prayer, in the Holy Spirit, who is the intercessor or helper in prayer. "If ye abide in me, and my words abide in you, ye shall ask what ye will," etc. But we must ask in faith, which is human in its exercise but divine in its origin, being of the operation of God. "Likewise also the Spirit helpeth our infirmities." Still the prayer is human, perfectly so, and even more so than if we had no divine help, for the object of the divine aid is to bring out the human element in our devotions. Prayer without the Spirit is no more than "vain repetitions." It is defective in both matter and manner; "for we know not what we should pray for as we ought," etc. The Father will not hear those prayers that are not "offered up through the Son and by the Eternal Spirit."

He that would preach the Word with success must preach it, "not with enticing words of man's wisdom, but in the demonstration of the Spirit and with power, that the faith of those who hear it may stand not in the wisdom of men, but in the power of God." 1 Cor. ii: 4.

In giving to us the spirit of adoption, the Spirit beareth witness *with our spirit*. We have first, and directly, the testimony of our own spirits; secondly, and indirectly, the testimony of the divine Spirit, just as the branch immediately bears the fruit, which is mediately produced by the vine. So the sacraments contain both the human and divine elements in them. As human, they are but a sign; as divine, seals of the covenant of grace. Baptism is a sign of the work of the Spirit; "of the washing of regeneration and renewing of the Holy Ghost." Viewed simply in its human or manward relations, "it is nothing" more than a sign, token, symbol. Like that circumcision which is outward in the flesh, merely human, or rather carnal, "it is nothing," the mere "letter that killeth." But added to the divine it becomes life, a sacramental, sealing, saving ordinance, ingrafting us into Christ.

In like manner, the bread and wine in the Eucharist, taken in their human relations only, are but symbols of the broken body and shed blood of Christ. But put in also the divine element, and there is Christ really, not personally, in the sense of transubstantiation, spiritually, graciously, sacramentally, and savingly present. "The words that I speak unto you, they are spirit and they are life." "The cup of

blessing which we bless, is it not the communion (*κοινωνία*—*participation*) of the blood of Christ?" etc. 1 Cor. x: 16. If filled with the Spirit, "when we eat the bread and drink the wine," then that which was symbolized becomes actualized. It both illustrates and ratifies the compact, and verifies the profound words of Christ, "this is my body, this is my blood." Calvin says: "I grant that the breaking of the bread is symbolical, and not the substance itself. Yet this being admitted, from the exhibition of the symbol we may justly infer the exhibition of the substance; for unless any one would call God a deceiver, he can never presume to affirm that God sets before us an empty sign. Therefore, if by the breaking of the bread the Lord truly represents the participation of his body, it ought not to be doubted that he truly presents and communicates it. And it must always be a rule with believers, whenever they see the signs instituted by the Lord, to assume and persuade themselves that they are also accompanied with the truth of the thing signified. For to what end would the Lord deliver into our hands the symbol of his body, except to assure us of a real participation of it? If it be true that a visible sign is given to us, to seal the donation of the invisible substance, we ought to entertain a confident assurance that in receiving the symbol of his body we, at the same time, receive the body itself."

Finally, in the training of our households we must not overlook the necessity of the union and co-operation of the divine and human agencies. Parents of themselves can operate upon the minds of their children only by the uncertain influences of education and example. If they would train them up in the way they should go, it must be *in the nurture and admonition of the Lord*. Coming into this wicked world with evil natures, and surrounded by unholy influences, how are they to be trained for heaven without God's help? One would suppose that the very instincts of the parental heart would lead him to go to God with his child, and enter, at once, into a solemn covenant with him, by offering up his child to him in holy baptism.

The virtue of this ordinance, with respect to the child, does not reside in the element used, nor in the manipulations of the officiating priest, nor yet in the faith of the parent pre-

senting his child, though these are all necessary to the rite, but in the co-operation of the Holy Spirit, who alone hath power to save. As there is room "in the nurture of the Lord," a provision in the economy of grace for "little children," we greatly sin, both in overlooking the fact, or in expecting success in the training of our households, while we ignore either the human or the divine element necessary thereunto.

Remarks.—(1.) If we trace up all religious heresies to the original source, we will invariably find them to begin right here, by ignoring either the human or divine agency in the salvation of men, or in destroying the relation or proportion between them. The Pelagian, the Socinian, and the Arminian exalt the human. The advocates of transubstantiation rush into one extreme, and make the bread and wine the real body and blood of Christ, and the receiving of it into their literal bodies the condition of salvation—making us Cannibals rather than Christians. Again, the pendulum of the mind takes a backward swing, and lands us into the equally absurd error of baptismal regeneration—"the Gospel in the water"—as if the grace of God resided in the running brook or stagnant pool. Others go into the opposite extreme of fatalism, setting aside all human instrumentalities. We must not separate what God hath joined together, nor join together what the Lord has separated.

(2.) What an unspeakable honor hath God put upon our nature in that he offers to bring it into a holy conjunction with his own nature! to endow it with his own almighty power and life, and adorn and beautify it with his own excellency and glory! Truly "it doth not appear what we shall be, but when we see him as he is, we shall be like him—we shall awake in his likeness."

The Church is permitted to be a copartner and a co-worker with him in the salvation of a ruined world. He has determined to show forth his manifold wisdom and that sublime mystery hid in God from the foundation of the world, by means of his Church. The whole economy of nature and grace—including heaven and earth, angels and men, principalities and powers—is conducted in subserviency to the interests of the Church. "Christ is head over all things to his Church." Christ has taken his Church into an eternal union

with himself. Christ became man, thus "humanizing the divine, that he might deify the human." What a sublime destiny awaits the believer! It behooved Christ to be made like unto his brethren as they are, and they shall be made like unto him as he was. Their nature, transformed and glorified, has he not left in the grave, but carried it up with him into the highest heavens, sitting, as a Lamb newly slain, in the midst of the throne. He and you are to be forever identified in all "the full glories of the Lamb." Redemption is to be the wonder of heaven, and you the wonder of redemption! At once the inheritors and glory of the mediatorial kingdom! "When he shall come to be glorified in all them that believe in that day." By the wonderful grace of God ye have been changed from rebels to servants, from servants to subjects, from subjects to sons, from sons to heirs, from heirs to kings and priests, from kings and priests to saints, from saints to angels; and finally, to be so transformed until the Most High God will break in upon your astonished beings with the surprising announcement, "ye are gods!"

(3.) It is the duty of every Christian to be filled with the Spirit, and so filled that every faculty of his mind, and every emotion of his heart shall be quickened into life, and made to burn and glow with a seraph's love, until every look of the eye, and every utterance of the tongue, and every gesture of the hand, and every expression of the countenance—nay, our whole being, body, mind, and spirit, shall become tremulous under the pressure of his inward but mighty power.

The Holy Spirit, to this end, has been given to the Church entire, in his wisdom, power, love, and grace; infinite, unlimited, omnipotent, never to be withdrawn, or diminished. His influences, on account of the ignorance and inaptitude of the Church, are permitted, in a great measure, to lie dormant. But, blessed be God, the Church is beginning to wake up to the magnitude of her mission, the dignity of her vocation, and to the adequacy of her resources! Let her learn one lesson more—how to apply and wield these resources, by making them her own.

The Holy Spirit is beginning to vindicate his claims, and also to awaken a sense of individual responsibility in the hearts of private Christians. Look at the results of these daily

prayer meetings; and all springing from the self-denying labors of one humble Christian! It is the Spirit of God that we want. And when he shall come upon the Church as he did upon Samson, then she will shake off her fetters of sloth and inactivity, like threads of tow touched by the fire. "One can chase a thousand, and two put ten thousand to flight." In obedience to the higher calling of God, Elisha left his plow in the field and went forth clothed with a double portion of the Spirit of his Master. Peter, who trembled before a maid, and denied his Lord with oaths and cursings, when the Holy Ghost came upon him could preach this same Jesus to an infuriated mob, charging his murder home upon their consciences. Paul could "go bound in the spirit to Jerusalem, knowing only that bonds and imprisonments awaited him." Timid females would not accept deliverance from a martyr's death. Martyrs could wash their hands in the flame, their seraphic spirits singing God's praise as they leaped from their crisped bodies into the chariots of Israel.

The Holy Spirit can make the weakest among us to be as Samson; the most timid to become as valiant as David; and those who go halting, to tread down the lion and the dragon; and they who hang down their heads, to soar like the young eagle in the heavens.

Oh! there is an omnipotence in the faith, and prayers, and labors of God's feeble ones. But this is not the result of a mere theoretical, orthodox dependence upon the Spirit, but a real, vital indwelling *fellowship* of the Spirit, resulting in an outward practical "demonstration of the Spirit and of power." Let every Christian man and woman pray for the indwelling of the Holy Spirit, and give God no rest until filled with all the fullness of his grace. If our whole body be full of light, (the result of singleness of heart), then will our light shine, because we ourselves have become luminous. Then will our piety be not a theory, but a reality; not a form, but a power; not a creed, but a life. Then will Christianity be seen in its beauty, as well as power. It will both win and conquer. "Then will the Church arise and shine, her light being come and the glory of God being risen upon her." "And it shall come to pass afterward, that I will pour out my Spirit upon all flesh; and your sons and your daughters shall prophesy, your

old men shall dream dreams, your young men shall see visions: And also upon the servants and upon the handmaids in those days will I pour out my Spirit. And I will show wonders in the heavens and in the earth, blood, and fire, and pillars of smoke. The sun shall be turned into darkness, and the moon into blood, before the great and terrible day of the Lord. And it shall come to pass, that whosoever shall call on the name of the Lord shall be saved." Joel, 2: 28-32.



ART. VI.—*Israel and Sinai.*

Journal Asiatique: Tom. XVII. Février, Mars, 1861.

Biblical Researches in Palestine: By E. ROBINSON, vol. I, ed. II.

History of the Old Covenant: By J. H. KURTZ, D. D., vol. III, English Translation.

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Sinai and Palestine: By A. P. STANLEY, D. D.

Commentaire Géographique sur l'Exode et les Nombres: Par Comte LEON DE LABORDE.

Briefe aus Ägypten und der Halbinsel des Sinai: Von R. LEPSIUS.

THE straits to which infidelity is reduced, in attempting to invalidate the authority of Holy Scripture, exhibit either depravity or lack of sense. For seeming incongruities in particulars of the Sacred Word, are heralded as conclusive evidence against its general accuracy; and though the cumulative and constantly increasing proof of fidelity be such as no other history can boast, yet a shadow is thrown across the Divine Word, because some things, as yet, can not be fully explained. Of this disposition to unfair dealing, we have had numerous examples relative to the Exodus from Egypt. It has been stated that the number given is too great to accord with the conditions of the case; and, therefore, some error, proving the fallibility of the Bible, lurks in the record. From this the inference is, that the whole narration is untrustworthy, and the Scriptures must be rejected as a rule of faith. But, should some future historian discover that the forces raised by

the Federal Government were estimated too high, during the present contest, it would not, therefore, follow that no campaigns were fought, nor victories won over treason. Neither does it follow, even on the admission of apparent difficulties in the history of the Exodus, that the main features of the narrative are unworthy of belief, or our grounds of confidence in the whole shaken.

We propose to examine, by the aid of the most recent researches, the narrative in relation to the sojourn of Israel in the Peninsula of Sinai, touching, at the same time, on such collateral matters as may be necessary to the better elucidation of the whole subject.

1. The number of Israel at the time of the Exodus.

Every classical, and especially, oriental scholar has been struck with the uncertainty of all systems of notation, before the introduction, by the Arabians, of the Indian numerical character. For the designation being by letters used arbitrarily, or by words where the misplacement of a single character would make an essential difference, while no means existed frequently by which such misplacement could be detected and rectified, the consequence was that errors crept in despite the closest vigilance. Especially is this the case in notation by Hebrew letters, because so many of them are somewhat alike, even when printed with great accuracy, and still more easily confounded when written imperfectly with a pen.

M. Quatremere, the profound French Orientalist, expresses his notions of this difficulty in the following words:

Journal Asiatique, Tom. XVII. Fevrier, Mars, 1861, p. 120. Les noms de nombre ont pu, en particulier, subir quelques changements, quelques altérations. On peut croire que dans l'origine on les indiquait figurément par les lettres numérales, et que, dans plus d'un endroit, une lettre a pu facilement se substituer à une autre lettre. Le texte de la Bible semble indiquer quelques fautes de ce genre. Au 1^{er} livre de Samuel, ch. vi: v. 19, dans le récit du retour de l'arche d'alliance, on lit: "Dieu frappa, parmi les habitants de Bet-Schemesch, soixante et dix hommes, cinquante mille hommes." : שְׁכַעִים אִישׁ חֲמִשִּׁים אֶלֶף אִישׁ. Mais on peut croire qu'il faut lire בְּחֲמִשִּׁים et traduire: "Dieu frappa soixante et dix hommes sur les cinquante mille (qui se trouvaient présents)." .

But while it may be possible that such mistakes do occur in enumeration, and sometimes we seem compelled to admit them in other places, there is no necessity for the admission in regard to the number of the Israelites, as has been done by some commentators. In Exodus xii: 37, we have a statement of the number which departed from Rameses, and much stress has been laid on the interpretation of this passage. A departure has been made from the ordinary rendering, by which the supposed difficulty respecting the great multitude of Israel may be relieved. The Hebrew idiom in loc. cit. admits the following rendering: "And the children of Israel journeyed from Rameses to Succoth, about six hundred thousand on foot, the strong; besides little ones." The translation of **הַגִּבֹּרִים** by "the strong," is unusual, as the ideas attributed to it generally are, "warrior," "the male sex," and "mortal." But, at the same time, "to be strong" is the original meaning both of the root **גָּבַר** and its cognates, while the words in Hebrew for "warrior," "vir," etc., are derived from the theme, because the leading quality constituting them what they are is the proper signification of their primitive. Besides, it is further contended, in support of this interpretation, that, unless we render as above, in verse 37, we have no enumeration of women, of old men beyond military age, or of boys still too young (all of which might well be included under those "on foot, the strong"—those able to walk); for **וְהַטֹּף** is applied to "little ones," boys and girls, while yet children, and so it seems to be understood by interpreters in this place, the English, Luther's, etc.

M. Quatremere speaks as follows on this subject:—*Journal Asiatique*, No. 66, pp. 124–5. D'abord le nombre de six cent mille hommes, indiqué par le livre de l'Exode, ne peut produire une somme de trois millions. Moïse dit que les Israélites étaient six cent mille, sans compter les enfants **לְבָר מִטָּף**. On voit que, dans le calcul susdit, se trouvent compris les hommes, les femmes, les jeunes gens, les vieillards; qu'il faut seulement y ajouter la masse des enfants; ce qui, comme on le voit, change beaucoup les résultats admis par un calcul qui n'est par complètement rigoureux.

On this view we can reduce the number of Israel greatly, for instead of three millions, which is the sum at the ordi-

nary allowance of one man fit to bear arms for every five of population, we have to add only one-third to six hundred thousand, as near the proportion of children yet of a tender age, making eight hundred thousand as the sum total of Israel proper. But M. Quatremere appears to have overlooked the enumeration in Num. i: 46, and xxvi: 51, which has been almost universally understood to refer to men fit to bear arms. It is true that לִבְיָטָן can, without violence to the idiom, be translated "going on the march;" but certainly the usual meaning of לִבְיָטָן when referring to man, is an army or military expedition. However, the two leading difficulties which these interpretations are intended to obviate, vanish when carefully examined. The first is the oft-repeated one, that it is inconceivable and quite contrary to the ordinary law of increase, that Israel could, in the time of the sojourn in Egypt—that is, about two hundred and ten years—have increased from seventy-five to three million souls. This objection has caused much needless perplexity to biblical interpreters, and has usually been answered by reference to a miraculous fecundity which thwarted the malice of the Egyptians; or to that which is generally manifest in an oppressed people. But, on the contrary, the laws of population testify most directly to an increase equal to that required; and it is passing strange that the prating of infidels has not been silenced by an appeal to those laws, which they claim, forbid such a multiplication as the Bible sets forth. Euler (vid. *Encyc. Amer. Art. Population*), than whom there is no better authority on this matter, says, that under the most favorable circumstances the population of a country will double every twelve years. Now Israel, according to the narrative, did increase rapidly despite the efforts of the Egyptians to the contrary. So that if we take Euler's formula as a basis, we have the following calculation: The original number was seventy-five, the time two hundred and ten years, which, divided by twelve, the time required to double a population, we have seventeen and a fraction. Raising seventy-five to the seventeenth power by arithmetical progression, we get fourteen millions, seven hundred and forty-five thousand, six hundred—a number many times larger than required.

Again: Let us take the following formulæ, which embrace

the elements of a certain calculation. Let the marriageable age of both sexes be placed at twenty-one years, which, divided into two hundred and ten, gives ten as the number of terms in a geometrical series. Let the number of children in each family be five (a low estimate for that time), which represents the ratio of increase. If we then take from seventy-five twenty persons as being too old, and thirty as too young to be reckoned in this calculation, we have twenty-four persons, or twelve couples, of a proper age to have children. Then by raising the ratio five to a power one less than the number of terms $10-1=9$; then multiplying by the first term twelve, and dividing by seven, the number of generations—allowing thirty years to each, which is a very liberal admission considering the longevity at that time, we have a result of three millions, three hundred and forty-eight thousand, two hundred. So we see the difficulties arising from the supposed too great increase, all vanish before an appeal to the laws regulating population.

The other objection is the sojourn of so many persons, with their flocks, and the mixed multitude of strangers (of which see hereafter), in the pent-up valleys and deserts of rocky and mountainous Sinai. This objection has been strongly urged by Count Léon de Laborde, in his *Commentaire Géographique sur l'Exode et les Nombres*, who maintains that sufficient room could not be found for such a multitude, with their flocks, in this peninsula, whose surface is covered with precipitous mountains, immense granite rocks, with only a few narrow wadys interspersed, and no plains fit for encampments. But it can be proved that the objection itself has no real foundation; for there is room enough in the valleys of Sinai, as will be shown in the proper place, for the encampment of the multitude at its highest received enumeration.

It must, however, be kept in mind that added to the Israelites, how many soever they might be, there was עַם properly "a mixed multitude," a collection of strangers, of different nationalities, who accompanied them on their departure. Doubtless, these formed an immense number; for such an event as the Exodus would be the occasion for a general collection of the rabble, runaway slaves, prisoners of war, and discontented persons of every class, who sought this opportunity to escape, or were allured by the novelty of the circumstance.

How long such a collection would remain with Israel, we have no means of judging from the narrative; but it is not likely they could be induced to submit to the restraints of the Israelitish people, or that they would be willing to endure the hardships of a long sojourn in such a desert locality as Sinai. The probability is, that they scattered soon after crossing the Red Sea, leaving comparatively few for the journey besides the descendants of Jacob.

Still another difficulty is found by some in the multitude of animals which went along. We learn that the flocks and herds were very numerous; and several circumstances corroborating the statement, show that this was the fact. For the Hebrews were, from the beginning, herdsmen and shepherds; and as this was their chosen occupation, it is likely that nearly all the wealth they were permitted to possess, was of this kind. And as they spoiled the Egyptians, making their own departure the signal for stripping their oppressors, the probability is, they drove off with them all the cattle and flocks they desired. But it must be remembered that their flocks and herds were their chief, if not exclusive, means of support at first after leaving Egypt, and these would be diminished constantly until few or none were left. This appears to have been the case from the lack of animal food which caused the yearning after the flesh-pots of Egypt. But if it be said, that when Israel came to the Jordan, they had numerous possessions of flocks, it does not follow that these were the products of the same they took from Egypt; for they passed through a nomadic country after leaving Sinai, and habitually plundered their enemies; so that the diminished stock would be replenished. Thus, from a natural view, this apparently insurmountable difficulty likewise disappears.

II. *Israel crossing the Red Sea.*

There are two places in the Red Sea which have been maintained as the points of passage of Israel. These are the southern one, from the mouth of the Wady Tawarick to the Wells of Moses; and the northern one opposite Suez. The sea at the former place is twelve miles in width, and quite deep; at the latter it is shallow, and varies from one to three miles wide. The sea was divided by the agency of natural causes working to a supernatural degree; for we learn that a

strong east wind blew and caused the sea to go back. Travelers tell that a north-east wind is common there; and this operating with the ebb tide would drive the waters from the shallows opposite Suez, while in the deeper portions higher up they would still remain as a wall above. The removal of the waters, and the passage of the Israelites, must have taken place before three o'clock, a. m.; for, as the Egyptians essayed to cross, the Lord caused the waters to return in their strength; and by morning light the transit of the chosen people was complete, as they looked back upon the destruction of their enemies. This march could be made at the narrower place reasonably enough in the time specified, and the agencies employed also produce the opening in the sea; while the miraculous interposition was just as clear in the peculiar adaptation of natural causes, as though it had been manifested by what was altogether supernatural. While, however, there is nothing in the wider and deeper place rendering it out of the question for a passage to be opened by divine power—since nothing is impossible with God—still we can not conceive that the Israelites at their smallest computed number, together with the mixed multitude, impeded as they were in their march with their wives, their little ones, and their numerous flocks, could make the transit of twelve miles in the time specified. For the wind and tide must needs, as natural causes, operate several hours before dry land would appear in the bottom of the sea; then the transit must be made before three o'clock, a. m., allowing too short a time for the passage of such a caravan.

After the passage at Suez, the course of the host would be in a south-east direction; but after the lapse of so many ages it is difficult, perhaps impossible, to designate the precise track. Besides, while it is contrary to reason to suppose, as some have done, that the people spread out in every direction while passing through the Sinaitic peninsula, still it is not necessary to maintain that they all went immediately together, or that they encamped in one body at the stations mentioned. There were probably the camps of Moses and the elders; while the people were spread out in the adjacent valleys, as they could find water and pasturage, though still pursuing the same course, and within a moderate distance from head-quarters. After journeying south-east until they arrived at or near the southern point of

the promontory, they took a northerly direction toward Mount Sinai or Horeb, at which place they made their long delay for the reception of the Law, and the establishment of the ritual worship.

III. *General Survey of the Sinaitic Promontory.*

It is proper to dwell a little on the general character of the southern portion of the peninsula, for this will enable us to understand the sacred narrative better. To the traveler of the present day, if we divest this region of its sacred associations, there are few localities to be found more uninviting; for there is either sandy desert or precipitous mountain crag throughout the entire surface, relieved only here and there by a deep narrow valley winding between the frowning rocks. Water is very scarce, and of the few springs affording a supply, several are brackish and unfit for drinking. In the valleys there are winter torrents which rush down from the mountains during the rainy season, and wash deep gullies; but most of them are dry as the desert in summer. The universal name for these channels is *Wady*, which signifies the bed of a torrent or rivulet, whether containing a perennial stream or not. These wadys possess nearly all the vegetation found in the peninsula, though some of them are dry too much of the year to sustain verdure. Sometimes a spring bursts from the rocks and forms a sufficient stream to run some distance above ground, and afterward its course may be traced by the verdure nourished by the subterranean moisture.

The greater portion, however, of the country is covered with precipitous mountains, composed of sandstone and red granite, the latter predominating. The mountain peaks are from five thousand to eight thousand feet high above the level of the sea, and they generally rise with uncommon abruptness. In addition to these, there are immense masses of rugged rocks scattered in wild profusion. These rocks and mountain peaks are blackened by the fierce rays of the sun; and, unlike those in Europe and America, are wholly destitute of plants, giving the country a remarkably gloomy and frowning appearance, which the stunted palms and scattered oasis of vegetation around the springs do little to relieve. Few animals, and fewer birds are seen; so that, added to the bleak desolation of the scenery, there is also an almost entire destitution of life and motion.

Thus, together with the wild grandeur of the scene, a solemn silence reigns on all sides, filling the traveler with mute astonishment.

Such is the general character of the whole district, and what has been said generally of all, applies still more to the particular Sinaitic range. This cluster of mountains is about three miles long, extending north-north-west and south-south-east, and is from three-quarters to one mile wide. On the north, it is bounded by the Wadies Er Rahah and Es Sheykh. The former of these extends in a north-westerly direction, forming a plain nearly two miles in length by more than one-half in breadth, and the Wady Es Sheykh is an extension of this toward the north-east. On the east of the Horeb or Sinai group is the narrow Wady Ed Dier, some twenty-five paces broad; and on the west the Wady El Leja, still more narrow, being merely the bed of a winter torrent. On the south-east of this range there is the Wady Sebayah; and on the south this extends and rises into a gravelly plain, the plain of Sebayah, and which gradually ascends from the foot of Gebel Musa or Moses' Mountain like an amphitheatre, giving an extensive open space in front of the whole southern base of the Sinaitic group. The Gebel Musa forms the southern extremity of the range, and the Ras Sassafeh the northern.

Here it is proper to state, that there has been a constant vascillation in the use of the names Horeb and Sinai. At one time the former is employed as the designation for the whole range, and the latter to denote the particular southern peak; while, again, Sinai refers to the whole group, and Horeb only to the Ras Sassafeh. "The names Horeb and Sinai are used interchangeably in the Pentateuch to denote the mountain on which the Law was given; and this circumstance has naturally occasioned difficulty to commentators." Robinson, *Res.*, p. 120. "On looking at the subject during our stay at the convent, I was led to regard Horeb as the general name, and Sinai as the particular one. Two circumstances seem to favor this conclusion. One is, that before and during the march of the Israelites from Egypt to the place where the Law was given, the latter is called only Horeb, just as the Arabs now speak of going from Cairo to Gebel et Tur; while during the sojourn of the Hebrews before the mountain, it is spoken of (with one

exception) only as Sinai; and after their departure, it is again referred to exclusively as Horeb. The other and main fact is, that while the Israelites were encamped at Rephidim, Moses was commanded to go on with the elders before the people and smite the rock in Horeb, in order to obtain water for the camp. The necessary inference is, that some part of Horeb was near to Rephidim; while Sinai was yet a day's march distant." *Ibid.* The same view respecting the use of Horeb as the general, and Sinai as the specific one, is adopted by Hengstenberg: *Authentie des Pent.*, II, p. 396, quoted by Robinson.

This group of mountains, as we have seen, is surrounded on all sides by valleys, and at the northern base by one of sufficient magnitude for a large encampment. On the eastern and western bases, the valleys are so narrow that they are merely sufficient for passages, but not for striking tents; while the plain at the south seems unfit, from its arid and gravelly nature, for an encampment with flocks. Here, around the base of Horeb, we have a spot which is secluded from the whole world, a kind of natural sanctuary where God might meet with his people undisturbed by aught from without. The solemn grandeur of the scene, with the lofty mountains rising precipitously on all sides, the deep stillness which habitually reigns in these secluded passes, were well adapted to inspire the people with awe. Here Moses had attended the school where God was instructor, and in communion with his Great Master had received that training which fitted him to be a leader of the chosen people. And now, in this temple not made with hands where God dwelt, his servant was to speak all the words of the Law in the audience of the great congregation.

IV. *The precise locality where Moses received the Law.*

Let us next inquire where is the particular spot on which Jehovah descended amid thunders, lightnings, and smoke, to declare his will to man. Three points have been selected, and their claims advocated by distinguished scholars and travelers. These are Serbal, not belonging to the Sinaitic range, and situated south-west of it, whose claims are urged by the great Egyptologist, Lepsius; Horeb, or Ras Sassafeh, which is claimed by Robinson as the locality, and advocated by many ingenious arguments; and Gebel Musa, supported by tradition, both

ancient and modern, and with convincing arguments maintained by Ritter, whose judgment on all points of geography, to which he gave special attention, is well nigh infallible. Dismissing the claims of Serbal for the present, as they are urged by what seem strained or perverted arguments, I will consider now the two latter. Robinson, who examined many of the localities of Sinai with great care, and who brought to his examination an amount of biblical and critical knowledge uncommonly great, is clearly of the opinion that Ras Sassafeh or Horeb is the mount of the Law. As he approached through the plain on the north, he saw the majestic mountain rising in grandeur with an almost perpendicular front; while at its foot lay the plain of the valley running north-north-west and north-east. "As we advanced, the valley still opened wider and wider with a gentle ascent, and became full of shrubs and tufts of herbs, shut in on each side by lofty granite ridges, with rugged, shattered peaks a thousand feet high, while the face of Horeb rose directly before us. Both my companion and myself involuntarily exclaimed: 'Here is room enough for a large encampment!' Reaching the top of the ascent or water-shed, a fine broad plain lay before us, sloping down gently toward the south-south-east, inclosed by rugged and venerable mountains of dark granite, stern, naked, splintered peaks and ridges, of indescribable grandeur; and terminated at the distance of more than a mile by the bold and awful front of Horeb, rising perpendicularly, in frowning majesty, from twelve to fifteen hundred feet in height. * * * * * As we crossed the plain, our feelings were strongly affected, at finding here so unexpectedly, a spot so entirely adapted to the scriptural account of the giving of the Law. No traveler has described this plain, nor even mentioned it, except in a slight and general manner; probably because the most have reached the convent (St. Catherine) by another route without passing over it; and perhaps, too, because neither the highest point of Sinai, now called Gebel Musa, nor the still loftier summit of St. Catherine, is visible from any part of it." Robinson, *Res.*, pp. 89, 90. But there is a difficulty in reconciling this with the narrative of Scripture, for it is said "Moses brought forth the people out of the camp to meet with God, and they stood at the nether part of the mount." Now, if the camp was at the north of the mountain, the only locality

in this neighborhood adapted for an encampment, and Horeb was the peak, the people would be immediately in front of it, in full view of the mount from every part of their camp; and hence no need of leading them out. Nor, again, on this supposition would it be possible, without removing their camps, to be afar off, and especially out of sight and hearing of the terrible manifestations of God's presence.

But let us consider the claims of Gebel Musa. It rises perpendicularly from the plain or wady about two thousand feet, so that a person standing at the foot could distinctly see another at the top; and so abrupt is it that the people could justly be said to "stand under the mountain." Deut. iv: 11. And this characteristic makes it answer well to the description, "the mount that could be touched;" and shows the necessity of setting bounds around its base, so that the people could not break through and touch it. Again: it is the highest peak of this range, higher than Ras Sassafeh by nearly five hundred feet, and it is said, repeatedly, that God descended on the *top* of Sinai. From its base rises a gravelly hill of gentle ascent, forming such an inclined plain that those farthest off could see as well as those near the foot of the mountain; and the dimensions of this shelving plain are sufficient to accommodate all the people with standing room, even at their largest enumeration. Ritter, *Erdkunde*, Band xiv, s. 590, says: "It is not a fact that the only large plain, adapted for the encampment of a tribe, lies at the northern cliff of the Horeb; but there is an equally large one immediately adjoining the southern cliff of the Sinai, from which there is a direct road to the Wady Sheykh, through the broad, capacious Wady Sebayeh; and from this large, southern plain of Sebayeh, the peak of the lofty Sinai of tradition, which rises like a pyramid to the north, would be just as visible to a whole tribe as the Ras Sassafeh, which is supported by no ancient tradition whatever. * * * * It (the plain of Sebayeh) is large enough to contain an immense crowd of people; it lies at the foot of Sinai, which rises in front of it, and towers above it like a great monolithic granite wall, to the height of two thousand feet; and the buildings at the top—the mosque, the Christian chapel, and even the stone of Moses—are clearly discernible by any one looking up from below. There is not a single spot in the whole peninsula in which the topographical

data (given in the Bible) can all be found united more perfectly than they are here." Now let us see how these data meet the conditions required by the narrative. Ex. xix: 17: "Moses brought forth the people out of the camp," say in the valley north of the mountain range through the valley Ed Deir, which is wide enough for the six hundred thousand (which are frequently put for all the people, as in Ex. xxxviii: 26, Num. xxvi: 51) to pass in less than half a day, and the distance to the foot of Gebel Musa not requiring more than an hour to travel. And when the people perceived the thunderings and lightnings, and stood afar off, to be removed from the terrible apparition, this would be accomplished by the return to their camp through the pass at the eastern slope of the mountain by which they came. The abruptness of the mountain would enable all, even those standing under it, to see that which was taking place at the top; and renders plain the necessity, as before stated, of setting bounds around its base to prevent any one from touching it. So this locality appears to meet, with the utmost precision, all the requirements of the case, and to do no violence to any statement of Holy Writ. It is, moreover, corroborated by the constant and unvarying tradition of thirty centuries; and, in fact, seems never to have been called in question until very recently. It, therefore, seems to rest on sufficient proof to be received with entire confidence.

V. *Serbal and Serbalitic, or Sinaitic Inscriptions.*

The notion that Serbal was the scene of the giving of the Law, seems to me to rest on a totally insufficient foundation, although Lepsius has labored hard and perseveringly to maintain this point. The objections to this view are as follows: There is no plain in the vicinity of this mountain of any considerable size, as is attested by all travelers without exception. The valleys in the vicinity are very narrow and irregular, and there is no approach to the mountain except by one pent-up gorge, the Wady Aleyat. And while the peak is visible at a great distance, yet it can not be seen, except from the gorge above named, from any place in the vicinity; nor can its foot be approached or touched from any other place, because of lofty ledges of rocks surrounding its base. These circumstances are all incompatible with the application of Scripture narrative to this locality; for there must be some place, at no

great distance from the mount, where the people could encamp, which is not the case here. There must also be a space near the foot where the people could approach and stand while witnessing the heralds of Jehovah's coming, which is wanting. Again: if there is no place where the people could approach the foot of the mount, there would be no use in setting bounds to prevent their touching it; and as to the narrow gorge spoken of, the elders would, doubtless, be there in front of the people, so that this would be guarded. But still further: in Exodus iii: 1, Moses is said to have kept the sheep of Jethro, priest of Midian, and to have led them to the back side of the desert, to the mount of God, even to Horeb. Now Horeb and Sinai are in the land of Midian, and, therefore, we see the propriety of Moses taking the sheep of his father-in-law, the priest of Midian, to a place within the jurisdiction of the Midianites. But Serbal was in the country of the Amalekites, the enemies of Midian, and these hostile people would not have permitted Moses to pasture his flocks on their grounds.

Again: Mount Serbal was the seat of the Sabeian worship of the stars, the great center of idolatry to which all the neighboring tribes resorted. But, as the object of Jehovah was to retain his people separate from the heathen and uncontaminated with their idolatrous worship, it is little likely that Moses, by divine direction, would lead them to the great center of heathenism, celebrated for ages before as the place of abominable idolatries; for the Israelites, already prone to idolatry, if brought to the chief temple of star-worship, would undoubtedly be ensnared by, and unite this with that of the true God. So that this reason of the prior sacredness of the place as a center of heathen worship, which influences Lepsius to think Serbal the locality where the law was given, has precisely the opposite tendency with nearly all reflecting minds, and appears to me to be fatal to his position, if nothing else militated against it. In the case of Sinai, however, we have just the opposite reason. No heathen worship had been connected with it. Its valleys were no thoroughfare for heathen pilgrims as those of Serbal had been; but it was shut out from the world on all sides by lofty mountains, as a kind of secret recess wherein God could meet with his people alone, with nothing

in the surroundings to distract their attention, or lead their minds from the true worship.

The so-called Sinaitic Inscriptions, more properly the Serbalitic, have been adduced in favor of Serbal as being the mount of God. These are found in great abundance about this mountain, and in all the west and north-west approaches, especially in the Wady Mukkateb or *written valley*, north-west of Serbal. These are not found at all on the peaks of Horeb or Sinai, nor to the eastward of them, but appear to belong exclusively to Serbal, or to the route taken by pilgrims from Suez to this mountain. The name Serbal is from the Arabic word *Sereb* and the Phœnician *Baal*, which signify the *Palm-grove of Baal*, from a group of palm trees at the foot of the mount, and from the worship of Baal the sun-god. There are five principal summits of the mountain, which appear to have been dedicated each to one of the five planets as then known. Karl Ritter says on this matter: "The fine, bold, rugged, hardly accessible rocky peaks, which crown the summit in so royal a form, seem better fitted for the five pyramidal thrones of the five great planets, than for the seat of the one God; for the other two of the seven planetary deities, the sun and moon, had undoubtedly their own special sanctuaries in the Serbal itself and the immediate neighborhood." *Erdkunde*, Band xiv.

From the latest investigations made by Professor Tuch, of Leipzig (in the *Zeitschrift des Morgenländischen Gesellsch.*, p. 136), these inscriptions seem to have been made in part by an ancient Arabic tribe, the Tawarah, who inhabited the western part of the peninsula and around the northern shore of the isthmus of Suez; but there is also reason to believe that pilgrims came from Egypt, and that there are traces of this star-worship in that country: for all these inscriptions are accompanied by what seemed to many travelers crosses, and therefore led them to think that they were of Christian origin, but which, as is now admitted, is not the case. A passage in Amos v: 26, throws much light on this subject: "Ye have borne the tent of your king, and the chime of your idols, and the star of your gods, which ye made for yourselves." The word כִּיָּץ in the Syriac signifies the planet Saturn, and the Arabic equivalent, *kaiwanun*, has the same meaning. This planet represents the

devil, or the malignant spiritual power, which was constantly sought to be propitiated by the heathen of the districts around the gulf of Suez. The original of the word כוכב, signifying star, seems to be found in the Ethiopic, showing a connection in its employment between the idolatry of the Israelites and that of the Egyptians. The inference from this passage in Amos is, that the former had, during their march toward Sinai, part of the way by the common route taken by the heathen pilgrims from Suez, engaged in the star-worship, which had its chief center at Serbal. These Serbalitic inscriptions, as deciphered by Beer and Tuch, are merely the records of the names of such pilgrims as have visited these localities, accompanied by a short salutation, and preceded or succeeded by a +, or character such as has been adopted from the Arabic Astrology to designate a planet. That this is not the Christian cross is plain, because the inscriptions invariably record the names of heathen, none of them, save such as are unquestionably of a late date, being exceptions. So that instead of referring this to the cross of the Christian pilgrim, which can not be without distortion, the above offers a natural explanation according to the facts of the case.

VI. *Sustenance of the Israelites in the Desert.*

It is not proposed to account by natural means how so large a company was sustained for the length of time they remained in the vicinity of Sinai. For the miraculous preservation is accepted as an undoubted fact, and we can easily see reasons why such a barren locality was chosen, since it would teach the Israelites dependence on God, and through this bring them near to Him. But there are some matters connected with their subsistence which it is well to refer to. The Israelites undoubtedly had immense flocks and herds when they left Egypt; but unless the Sinaitic peninsula was immeasurably more fertile then than now, or they too sustained by miraculous power, of which we have no account, they could not have survived long. It is true that they might have been scattered far and wide through the narrow valleys, as some suppose, and there have obtained a scanty support; but it is not likely that they would have felt safe in separating far, if that could be in the bounds of the whole peninsula, in the face of hostile nations. Nor was this consistent with their unity as a people,

which was necessary to their instruction in the Law. Nor would it permit the subsequent services of the tabernacle, or the order of the encampments, that they should be greatly scattered. Again: It is not likely, as before stated, that they had numerous flocks remaining when they so greatly desired the flesh-pots of Egypt, and to meet this desire the quails were sent. For had they possessed the very kind of animals which supply the food they desired, why should that earnest longing have been manifested? It is probable, then, that they had either lost their flocks by starvation, or had consumed them for food—probably both causes operated—very soon after leaving Egypt. That their flocks and herds were comparatively few may be inferred from the smallness of their offerings, Numbers vii. 87–88; for the sanctification of the tabernacle, in comparison with those offered when Solomon dedicated the temple. 1 Kings, viii. 63.

An attempt has been made to identify the manna wherewith Israel was fed, with the modern gum of commerce, produced from the shrub *Tamarix Gallica mannifera*. This gum exudes from the branches and twigs of the tree in consequence of the puncture of an insect, the *Coccus manniparus*, and becomes inspissated, hanging in small semi-transparent globules. But it is impossible for this to be the same, whether we hold to the rationalistic or miraculous view. For, admitting it to be the same, the amount furnished is wholly inadequate, since not more than 600 pounds is produced in a year in the whole peninsula; while the shrubs in the camp only, must have afforded at least 3,000,000 pounds per day to feed the people, at their ordinary enumeration. Hence the natural explanation is reduced to an absurdity, and miraculous power must be resorted to for aid. But, again: the character of the modern manna does not agree with that described in the Exodus; for it is found in small drops or globules, and only under, or upon, the shrubs from which it exudes. But the manna of Scripture was “found upon the face of the desert; the people gathered it, ground it in mills and beat it in a mortar, or cooked it in pans, and made cakes of it”—all which is impossible with the modern article; for it is a gum and would neither admit of grinding in mills or pounding in mortars. Nor would it bake into cakes, for heat instead of hardening, renders it liquid.

But still further: the true manna, if kept over night, decomposed, stank, and bred worms; while this may be kept for years without any perceptible change. Schubert (in his *Reise*, I, 345, quoted by Kurtz), says on the general subject: "If this insect-manna formed the entire nourishment of the hosts of Israel in the desert, they were greatly to be pitied. It contains absolutely none of those substances which are indispensably necessary for the daily nourishment and support of the animal frame, and in which worms of decomposition could be generated. * * * * I agree, therefore, with K. von Raumer, in the opinion that the angels' food, the manna from heaven, was not the same as the manna produced by lice and chafers."

It is true that many persons have maintained the identity, and that it may be adduced as an evidence that the modern manna, properly so called, is not found outside the peninsula. But this does not by any means prove their identity; for many localities bear specific productions, and the natural manna of Sinai doubtless took its name from the supposed resemblance to the supernatural bread from heaven. Nor does it settle the question that Josephus espouses its identity; for there was none of the true manna when he lived; since the little pot of manna had long ago disappeared, together with the holy of holies of the first temple. And, in conclusion, all must admit that it gives a degrading conception to the many references to the bread from heaven, which on the supposition of the identity would not be true, if we think of it merely as a gum flowing from a shrub in consequence of the puncture of an insect, and destroys the parallel so often instituted by our Lord between his body given as the bread for the soul of the believer, while passing through the wilderness of life, and the bread which God sent down from above to nourish Israel during the journey in the Desert.

ART. VII.—*Imputation and Original Sin.*

PART III.—(Continued.)

(TESTIMONIES CONTINUED.)

XXXV. JOHN FORBES, *Professor of Theology, in Aberdeen*, 1598—1648.

We have sufficiently referred to this learned and holy man in No. XXIX, in connection with Vossius. In his *Theologia Moralis*, lib. 10, cap. 6, sect. 9, he thus refers to the principle on which antecedent imputation is based:

“For as it is impossible that God should be the author of sin, so, also, it is impossible that he did create or should have created man in the beginning, possessed of a fleshy concupiscence contrary to reason. * * * * * For such concupiscence is morally evil of itself, and naturally hateful to God; and, therefore, as he is the revenger (ultor) of it he can not be its author. Man is the cause of the whole of this evil to himself, by the voluntary transgression of the Divine precept.”

XXXVI. J. CLOPPENBURG, *Professor at Franeker*, 1597—1652.

In his *Altera Tomus*, pp. 150, 151, he says:

“In the ancient covenant of works before the fall, the first man (being conjoined with Eve and they being made one flesh) was bound not only for himself, but for all his natural posterity, as the root of the human race propagated from these two. This appears from the calamitous result, because our first parents have not only themselves fallen, but so as that they have drawn with them the ruin of the whole human race.”
 “There is, therefore, plainly, according to the mind of the Apostle, a two-fold original sin in all the natural descendants of Adam. 1. The first sin of man imputed. 2. Then that hereditary spiritual poverty, by which all who are propagated from Adam are spiritually dead in sins.”

XXXVII. J. MESTREZATIUS, 1592—1657.

This great and good man has ever ranked among the first theologians of the Reformed Church of France. His family were of Verona, in Italy, and were very eminent; and on account of their religion, emigrated to Geneva, where he was born. When but eighteen years of age he was offered a Professorship of Philosophy, but declined to accept it. He studied

at Saumur, and then settled as pastor of the church in Paris, where he served them faithfully during forty-two years, and died in charge. He was moderator of the Second Synod of Charenton (1631), which directed Placeus to accept the chair of Theology at Saumur, in view of the full restoration of the Seminary there. Mestrezatius had a nephew, who was likewise celebrated, but who should not be confounded with him. In his treatise on communion with Christ, he says:

"The righteousness of God could not impute to us the sin of Adam, unless we had been in Adam (Justitia Dei non potuisset nobis imputare peccatum Adami nisi in Adamo fuisset), and as if in his loins, that is, by considering him as the head of his posterity."

And in a work against Millitiere (who was condemned by the Synod of Charenton, 1645), he says:

"A certain corruption of Adam (corruptio quaedam Adami), passes into us really, and inheres in us; but I say that the act of the imputation of his disobedience precedes, AND THAT, THEREFORE, CORRUPTION IS TRANSMITTED INTO US BY GENERATION, BECAUSE WE HAVE SINNED IN ADAM AS IN OUR HEAD." See also the extracts by Dr. Hodge, P. E. I, p. 208.

As we are now among the continental cotemporaries of the Westminster divines, it may be well here to notice also their testimony on the subject.*

XXXVIII. A. BURGESS, *one of the leading members of the Assembly.*

In his "Original Sin," he says:

* Did not our limits forbid, it would give us great pleasure here to quote from the following named divines, all of whom wrote before the middle of this century. They express their views of the doctrine precisely as Wendeline, Mestrezatius, and most of the forementioned writers have done, as our readers may see by referring to the citations from them by Rivetus, translated and published in *Princeton Essays*, I, p. 201-214. They are the following: S. Fabritius, J. Wollebius, J. C. Occitanus, J. Chenet, J. Dartesius, A. Collignon, P. Ferrius, G. S. Prisius, J. Junius, J. Lorentius, J. C. Emdan, and J. Strackius. *Their united testimony is, that the doctrine of Original Sin should not be explicated on the ground of imputation, to the exclusion of our own demerit or depravity.* They attempt no solution of the question as to the ground on which Adam and his descendants are one; but, with the Apostle, assert the fact and there leave it. Adam sinned, and we sinned in Adam, and therefore God now treats us as sinful and corrupt. This is their doctrine.

"By Adam we have imputed sin with the guilt of it, and inherent sin the effect of it." "The Apostle distinguisheth *Adam's imputed sin* and *inherent sin*, as two sins. *By imputed sin we are said to sin in him actually, as it were, because his will was our will* (jure representationis), *but by inherent sin we are made sinners by intrinsical pollution*," pp. 32, 35.

XXXIX. T. GOODWIN.

He was another leading member, President of Magdalen College, and called, by Dr. Owen, "*my very learned colleague, a very eminent man*." He says:

"So, then, in this first man, the whole nature of man being repositied as a common receptacle or cistern of it, from whence it was to flow to others; therefore, what befalls this nature in him by any action of his, that nature is so to be propagated from him? God's ordinance, in the law of nature, being, that all should be made of *one blood*, which could not have been said of any other man than of him. If he stood and obeyed, then the image of holiness had been conveyed as it was at first created. If he fell by sin, then, seeing that he should thereby corrupt that nature, and that that corruption of nature was also to be his sin in relation to, and as the consequent of, that act of sin that caused it; therefore, if the law of nature were ever fulfilled so as to convey his own image as sinful (suppose he should sin), so as it should be reckoned sin in his children, as it was in himself, *this could not take place, but they must be guilty of that act that caused it, so far as it cast* it, as well as himself*." Works, vol. III.

XL. JOHN LIGHTFOOT, another member.

"The fall of *Adam* was the death of himself, the death of us, and the death of Christ."—*Miscellanies*, chap. 47.

XLI. S. RUTHERFORD, another member, Professor at St. Andrews.

"The guilt of sin, and sin itself, are not one and the same thing, but far different things. That I may prove the point let the terms be considered. There be two things in sin very considerable. 1. *The blot*, defilement, and blackness of sin, which I conceive is nothing but the absence and privation of that moral rectitude, etc. 2. *There is THE GUILT of sin, that is somewhat which issueth from this blot and blackness of sin, according to which the person is liable and obnoxious to eternal punishment*."—*Trial and Triumph of Faith*.

* A misprint for *caused*.

We return to the Continental divines.

XLII. ANDREAS RIVETUS, *Professor at Leyden, 1572—1651, and moderator of the Second National Synod of Vitre, in 1617.*

In his *Summae Controv. Tract. IV: Quæst. 2*, p. 156, after refuting the Popish objection against the imputation of Christ's righteousness, on the ground that he is to restore what we have lost in Adam, Rivetus, in sec. 18, thus proceeds:

"Perhaps it might be more to the purpose to consider *what others object from Paul* (Rom. v: 17, 18), *that we are rendered righteous in Christ as we are rendered sinners in Adam. But in Adam we have become sinners, not only by imputation, but also inherently, therefore we thus become righteous in Christ. But I reply*, that it is not true that we have both in Christ, and by Christ. For we become righteous by the imputation of his righteousness, and every day we are rendered just in ourselves (in nobis justi reddimus), both in habit and in holy actions, proceeding from the renewal of the Spirit. The first we possess perfectly, the second incipiently, but we look for its completion at the end of our present life. But if our adversaries would acquiesce in this comparison (between Adam and Christ), as they propound it, they would necessarily lapse into an admission of the imputation of the righteousness of Christ, which they so strenuously reject and regard as absurd. For Bellarmine (De Amiss, Grat. et Statu Peccati, lib. 5, cap. 17), in reference to the actual sin of Adam, speaks as follows: '*The actual sin of Adam is communicated to us by generation, in that mode in which it is possible for that which hath passed to be communicated, to wit: by imputation (nimirum per imputationem). For it is imputed to all who descend from Adam.*'* Why, therefore, can not the righteousness of Christ be imputed to us, or be communicated by imputation? Yet, there is nothing in this argument which forbids that we acknowledge the necessity of inherent qualities. For it can only be proved that we have righteousness in Christ, as we have unrighteousness in Adam. *But there is a comparison of the causes, and not of the mode, in which the thing is communicated to us. For the sin of Adam is communicated to us by generation, but the righteousness of Christ by imputation. Therefore the Apostle does not compare the modes in which righteousness is received, but the causes, effects, and subjects of each. The cause of salvation is the obedience of the second Adam, as the cause of condem-*

* In this quotation, as given in my edition, of Rivetus, the word *transit* is erroneously printed for *transit*, which Bellarmine wrote. We, therefore, translate it accordingly.

nation was the disobedience of the first. *The effects are, that the one constitutes us unrighteous and the other righteous.* (Id enim probari tandum potest, nos in Christo justitiam habere, quemadmodum in Adamo injustitiam. *Erit autem comparatio causarum, NON MODI QUO NOBIS RES COMMUNICATUR. NAM PECCATUM ADAMI NOBIS COMMUNICATUR PER GENERATIONEM, JUSTITIA AUTEM CHRISTI PER IMPUTATIONEM. Itaque non comparat Apostolus modos quibus justitia recipitur, sed causas, effectus, et subjecta utriusque.* Causa salutis est obedientia secundi Adami, ut causa condemnationis fuit inobedientia primi. *Effecta sunt, quod una nos injustos constituit altera justos).* The subjects are, many rendered just by the one, unjust by the other. Therefore, Bishop Bitontinus, explaining these words of the same chapter, 'but not as the offense, so also the gift,' thus concludes from the whole of the preceding similitude: 'The similitude is as to the point between the two, but not as to the mode' (*quoad rem inter hæc, sed non quoad modum*). Since this is so it puts an end to the argument of our adversaries, because they can not well argue from the thing to the mode of the thing (*à re ad modum rei*)."

This one testimony, all things being considered, sweeps away every prop by which Dr. Hodge has endeavored to sustain his position, that antecedent imputation, as taught by himself, has ever been the approved doctrine of the Reformed or Calvinistic Church. Our readers must, therefore, indulge us with a few remarks upon it, that we may point out its direct bearing upon the question.

We first solicit attention to Dr. Hodge's statement of the matter. The following is from *Princeton Essays*, vol. I, p. 178:

"*This analogy is asserted by almost every old Calvinist that ever wrote. 'We are constituted sinners in Adam, in the same way that we are constituted righteous in Christ; but in Christ we are constituted righteous by imputation of righteousness; therefore we are made sinners in Adam by the imputation of his sin. Otherwise the comparison fails.'*—Turretin. '*We are accounted righteous through Christ, in the same manner that we are accounted guilty through Adam.'*—Tuckney. '*As we are made guilty of Adam's sin, which is not inherent in us, but only imputed to us; so are we made righteous by the righteousness of Christ, which is not, inherent in us, but only imputed to us.'*—Owen. *We might go on for a month making such quotations. Nothing can be plainer than that these men considered these cases as perfectly parallel as to the point in hand, viz.: the nature of imputation.*"

Then in the *Princeton Review*, for 1860, p. 388, he asserts

most gratuitously that the Lutheran and Reformed Churches receive his view of antecedent imputation; and with equal inaccuracy he repeats it on p. 339, with the following baseless assertion respecting the early Calvinistic view: "The fact that men are born under condemnation was sometimes specially referred to the imputation of Adam's sin as something out of themselves; at others, to the corruption of nature derived from him. *What finally modified and harmonized these representations was the acknowledged analogy between our relation to Adam and our relation to Christ. It was soon seen that what the Bible plainly teaches, viz.: that the ground of our justification is nothing subjective, nothing done by us or wrought in us, but the righteousness of Christ as something out of ourselves, could not be held fast in its integrity without admitting that the primary ground of the condemnation of the race was in like manner something neither done by us nor infused into us, but the sin of Adam as out of ourselves, and imputed to us on the ground of the union, representative and natural, between him and his posterity.*"* This he repeats substantially on p. 340, and on p. 341, employs the following extraordinary language: "The main point in the analogy between Christ and Adam, as presented in the theology of the Protestant Church, and as exhibited by the Apostle is, that as in the case of Christ, his righteousness as something neither done by us nor wrought in us, is the judicial ground of our justification, with which inward holiness is connected as an invariable consequence; so in the case of Adam, his offense as something out of ourselves, a *peccatum alienum*, is the judicial ground of the condemnation of the race, of which condemnation, spiritual death, or inward corruption, is the expression and the consequence. It is this principle WHICH IS FUNDAMENTAL TO THE PROTESTANT THEOLOGY, and to the evangelical system, in the form in which it is presented in the Bible, which is strenuously denied by Dr. Baird, and also by the advocates of the doctrine of mediate imputation." And finally, on pages 368, 763, 764, he reasserts the same idea in a style equally remarkable, thus indorsing at the present time, and reiterating all his earlier representations in the Princeton Essays, respecting that doc-

* We have already adverted to this extraordinary language on a preceding page.

trine. See also pp. 373, 374, and *Princeton Essays*, I, pp. 171-174, 176, 177.

Now, in the very face of these most confident and pointed asseverations, we directly affirm that the representations which they set forth, in relation to the point of inquiry before us, are wholly unsustained by the facts in the case; and our readers shall judge for themselves in view of those facts. We maintain, therefore, that the assertion made and so often repeated by Dr. Hodge respecting the aforesaid Pauline analogy, between the imputation of sin and righteousness, and the recognition and adoption of it by the Calvinistic Church, was never held by that Church as he holds it: and that the opposite view as presented by Rivetus, in the forecited passage from his works, and in which he refutes the very view insisted on by Dr. Hodge; has ever been the view of the Reformed Church, and that that Church has ever held (except where Supralapsarian principles bore sway) that Rom. v: 12-21, teaches simply the fact of the headship both of Adam and of Christ; and that death came by the one, and life by the other; and, moreover, that they never denied or asserted that anything is therein taught as to any mode of transfer in respect to sin. Adam sinned; we, as the guilt was common, participated therein, and consequently partake in his guilt, corruption, and punishment. Christ obeyed; and his obedience is imputed to us for justification. This is their doctrine.

Before we proceed to the facts, and to remark on the testimony of Rivetus, we must again hear Dr. Hodge, who, in the *Princeton Review* for 1860, pp. 344, 345, thus comes into direct collision with Rivetus himself, whom, in P. E., I, p. 196, he denominates "the greatest theologian of the age." Rivetus, in speaking of the analogy in Rom. v: 12-21, expressly asserts that "there is a comparison of the causes, and not of the mode" in which sin and righteousness are communicated to us; while Dr. Hodge says "the design of the Apostle is to illustrate the mode or way in which the righteousness of Christ avails to our justification;" and then still further on, "*It is to illustrate this great fundamental doctrine of his gospel that he refers to the parallel case of Adam, and shows that antecedently to any act of our own, before any corruption of nature the sentence of condemnation passed upon all men for the offense of one.*

To deny this, and to assert that our own subjective character is the ground of the sentence, is not only to deny the very thing which the Apostle asserts, but to overturn his whole argument. It is to take sides with the Jews against the Apostle." And then a little further on, he says: "The Leyden Professors, in their recommendation of the work which their colleague Rivetus had written against Placæus, declare the doctrine in question to be a *dogma contrarium communi omnium fermè Christianorum consensui*, and pronounce the doctrine of immediate imputation (that is, that doctrine as Dr. Hodge holds it, for such alone can be the meaning of his language here), to be a *dogma verè Catholicum*." Our readers will note here, that though Dr. Hodge differs with Rivetus, *toto cælo*, on the point before us, he, here and elsewhere, cites him in support of his own views! There is, however, a thought in this connection which would bear to be enlarged upon, but our space forbids. It is this: our edition of Rivetus, from which the citation above given from him was made, was issued in 1644, and, of course, after the controversy with Placæus had begun. His views on the point here before us, are the very reverse of those of Dr. Hodge (in support of which he has adduced Turretin and Tuckney), as the extract itself shows. If, therefore, Dr. Hodge's views are right, those of Rivetus are wrong. And yet, as is evident, from Princeton Essays, I, pp. 147, 196-217, Dr. Hodge adduces Rivetus and his testimonies, to prove that his own views of imputation are correct! Which, if true, Rivetus must have set out by this labored treatise to prove that a view of imputation directly opposite to his own, is the true view, and, of course, that he himself was a heretic! a subverter of the Gospel, etc., Dr. Hodge being judge. But the whole representation of Dr. Hodge on this subject is built upon his own rash and utterly unfounded assertion that the work which Rivetus wrote against Placæus, and which was so highly extolled by the Leyden divines, was written after Placæus had sought (as Dr. Hodge avers), to evade the sentence of the Synod by making the distinction between mediate and immediate imputation; whereas, the facts are as follows: This work of Rivetus was written in 1644-1645, while the work of Placæus, in which he makes the distinction, was not issued till 1655, ten years later, and four years after the death of Rivetus; Placæus having been, in the meantime, and by appoint-

ment of the same Synod, assisting to complete the great work of Chamier in answer to Bellarmine. So far, therefore, is it from being true that Rivetus wrote in reply to the work or distinction of Placeus, or in defense of the dogma of antecedent imputation! By such inconsiderate representations, Dr. Hodge has, in instances almost innumerable, raised false issues, misrepresented the facts concerned, and greatly perplexed the whole subject under discussion. We shall patiently await his solution of these extraordinary proceedings.

As to Rivetus, the praise bestowed upon him by Dr. Hodge, though indiscriminating and based upon an obviously imperfect acquaintance with the facts, may be, in the main, deserved; for if not "the greatest controvertist of the age," which produced Daniel Chamier, and James Usher, and Molinæus, and Scioppius, and F. Spanheim, and Selden, there certainly were not many who were his superiors. His colleagues in the University were Walæus and the elder Polyander, Spanheim, and Frigland—men not a little distinguished in their day; and they unite in highly extolling both him and his writings, in which applause both Turretin and De Moor join most heartily. He was, moreover, an intimate friend of the great Molinæus, whose writings (and especially his *Anatome Arminianismi*) he styles "*eruditissimæ et acutissimæ lucubrationes*;" and whose value in defense of the truth appears by their success in silencing the cavils of its enemies. Few, indeed, who encountered Rivetus in dispute, ever had anything to boast of as the result. The controversial renown of Grotius withered and died in his iron grasp; and his reply to the boasted *Catechism of Controversies*, and *Veronian Method*, put the finishing stroke to the long-existing controversy between the Jesuits and Protestants on the Continent. This work proved to be, to their theology, what the *Letters of Pascal* were to their ethics, and they paid it the respect of long-continued silence.

As to the forecited testimony of this eminent man, with which the views and statements of Dr. Hodge are so directly in conflict, we shall now proceed to consider its bearing on the subject under discussion. And, in the first place, our readers will be pleased to observe that the views therein expressed, in respect to the parable between Adam and Christ, and which are the direct reverse of the views asserted by Dr. Hodge, and

which he claims to be "fundamental to Protestant theology," were not adopted by Rivetus in a moment of excitement during controversy, but were the deliberately-formed and settled convictions of his life. This is shown by the fact that at the end of the chapter which contains the section which we have quoted, he adds an extensive *appendix* containing a defense of the arguments of Calvin from Rom. v: 12-21, etc., against Bellarmine, and against his assertions, that the sin of Adam descended by imputation, as expressed in the quotation given above. This *appendix* is simply a tractate, which Rivetus had written a number of years before, and which he now adds, as sustaining by a more extensive line of argument, the views advanced by him in the chapter itself, and because Calvin had asserted the same views with himself respecting the analogy between Adam and Christ (as advanced by Paul in Rom. v:), and which Bellarmine had attempted to refute; and the views of Calvin thereupon, being the accredited views of the Reformed Church, he appends to the chapter this specific defense of them. Such is the character of this appendix. And let our readers note that in this appendix, sec. 31, pp. 164, 165, he reiterates precisely the sentiments on this subject which are expressed by him in the extract above given, and adds that it is by virtue of *our natural union with Adam* that his sin becomes ours by the just imputation of God. These views he affirms to be the views of Calvin; and now in his seventy-third year, and up to the very time of preparing the work against Placæus, he republishes them as his own views, and the accredited views of the Calvinistic Church. His collected works, as we have said, were issued in 1644, and in 1645 he issued the aforesaid book against Placæus, containing the testimonies of the Reformed Church on Imputation and Original Sin; which work Dr. Hodge, Dr. Thornwell,* and others, would have us believe was written to establish that "*fundamental principle of Protestant theology*," asserted by Bellarmine, but which was denied by Rivetus, and Calvin, and the whole Reformed Church.

That the views of Rivetus above given respecting the analogy of Paul and the *modus* of the transmission of sin, and not the views asserted by Dr. Hodge, were the views of the Reformed Church, may be clearly seen by the testimonies

* See Southern Presbyterian Review for 1860, pp. 198, 199.

adduced in this essay. Let our readers advert particularly to the citations from the French Confession, and to the articles of the Synod of Dort, and to all the other testimonies (except some of the Supralapsarian divines), where the matter is specifically referred to. For instance, to those of P. Martyr, Calvin, Hyperius, Bullinger, Chemnitz, Sohnnius, Danæus, Chamier, Paræus, Piscator, B. Turretin, Tilenus, Mestrezatius, Molinæus, Walæus (a colleague of Rivetus), Drelincourt, Essenius, Vitranga, and Lampé. They had no conception that the dogma of antecedent imputation, as presented and insisted on by Dr. Hodge, ever had been or ever could be, an integral part of Calvinistic theology.*

And then further: as respects the Pauline *analogy* between Adam and Christ, of which Dr. Hodge affirms that, in the sense in which he has presented it, it "*is asserted by almost every old Calvinist that ever wrote,*" and that he "*might go on for a month making quotations,*" to prove what he here says. We request our readers to note that the dogma was not only not received by the Protestant Church, but was pointedly denied by not only the Infralapsarian divines, but even by many Supralapsarians themselves. We have seen how Rivetus and Chamier regard it. CALVIN treats it in the same manner, on Rom. v: 17 (a part of which we have already quoted). See also URSINUS, pp. 68, 69. BEZA expressly reiterates the same view in his notes on Rom. v: 14, 15: "*Duos enim Adamos facit Paulus, quorum prior fuit posterioris typus; typus, inquam,*

* As to the mere question whether the *mode* is referred to Rom. v: 12-19, our readers will perceive that, in *this connection*, it is purely historical; that is, do the Reformed divines sustain the statement of Dr. Hodge? The foregoing references, and which are but a portion of what we can adduce, show that they do not, and that they never did. And yet, so far as the question is one of theology and exegesis, we are willing, *for the sake of the argument*, to admit the assumption of Dr. Hodge and the Supralapsarians in the matter, and to concede that the *mode* is referred to. In the first section of this third part of our discussion, we have briefly adverted to this fact in remarking upon a quotation from Dr. Hodge, in which he makes inward holiness the *consequence* of justification, and did not our limits forbid, we should follow it out more fully here. But the case stands thus: that while the assumption on which Dr. Hodge rests his argument is historically false, the argument itself, if admitted to be sound, destroys his doctrine. So that were the victory which he so strongly claims on the historical basis admitted, and the field given up, he would find occasion to say, with the king of Epirus, after the Romans had abandoned the field: "Another such victory and we are undone."

non quia ad imitandum propositus sit uterque, sed propter vim utriusque similem; in illo, perniciem in posteros propagandi, in hoc, suos justificandi. "In hoc versu (15), confertur Adamus cum Christo, et illius offensa cum istius obedientia, ut quæ sit vis utriusque sese in suos derivandi intelligatur. In v. 16, vis utriusque, *id est, lapsus Adami* PROPAGATI PER NATURAM, ET CHRISTI OBEDIENTIÆ PER GRATIAM IMPUTATÆ, COMPARATUR. In v. 17, fines istorum inter se conferuntur. In v. 18, tres istæ collationes unâ connectuntur, quarum basis ac communis ratio v. 19, explicatur." Beza and all these distinguished men admitted the imputation of Adam's sin, but utterly denied, with Rivetus, the point in Dr. Hodge's *analogy* which he claims to be fundamental in Protestant theology. PAREUS affirms the same view. In Romans v: 12, he says: "Nisi etiam (apostolus) diceret, in Adamo omnes naturaliter corruptos, et reos esse, quomodo in Christo omnibus remedium culpæ et reatus ostenderet, quod faciet versu 18, 19. MANIFESTUM est igitur, apostolum, ista ratione inserta, cur omnes moriantur, quia omnes peccaverunt, peccatum originis evidenter adstruere in omnibus hominibus, Christo solo excepto, quippe ex Adamo non naturaliter prognato; quodque sit verè peccatum, quia omnes verè peccaverunt in Adamo." The same is repeated on v. 18, and on v. 19 he says: "Verbo *κατεσθῆσαν ἁμαρτολοι* vim inobedientiæ exauget, quod non modò reatu, sed et pravitate omnes inquinari: nec modò naturaliter prave, sed et habitualiter peccatores fecerit. Dixerat in Adamo semel omnes peccasse v. 12, et hinc omnes reos factos, v. 15, 16. Nunc addit, etiam PECCATORES CONSTITUTOS, HOC EST, NON SOLUM NATURA POLLUTOS, SED ET TOTO VITÆ HABITU VITIATOS, UT NIHIL NISI PECCARE VALEANT. Plus igitur hic dicit, quam ver. 12. *In quo omnes peccaverunt.*" PISCATOR is equally explicit: "PLENA autem COMPARATIO SIC HABET. Quemadmodum per Adamum peccatum introiit in omnes homines, et per peccatum mors, eò quòd in Adamo omnes peccarunt: sic per Christum justitia introiit in omnes credentes, et per justitiam vita: eò quòd in Christo omnes credentes pro peccatis satisfecerunt."

The very learned L. DE DIEU (1590–1642) expresses the same view: "Confert (in v. 15) cum peccato hominis gratiam Dei, etc. Deinde, effectus etiam peccati Adami æ gratiæ Christi confert: quòd inde mors, hinc salus, ad illos manaverit," etc. HYPERIUS also, on v. 12, "Si autem Antithetorum habere vol-

unus rationem, sic perfici sententia potest: *Quemadmodum per unum hominem Adamum peccatum in mundum introiit, et per peccatum mors, et sic in omnes homines mors pervasit, quatenus omnes peccavimus: ita per unum hominem Christum justitia in mundum allata est, ac per justitiam vita, et sic ad omnes homines vita pervenit, quatenus omnes credidimus.*" TILLENUS reiterates the same: "Igitur ipsa generatio, et *σπερματισμός*, modus est, quo in homines promanat hoc malum; qui et uno hoc modo ab Adamo pendent." Syntag. Theol., Part. I, loc. 56, thes. 81. GOMAR too sustains precisely the same view. In his analytical explication of Romans (Opp. I, p. 405), he presents a clear analysis of Rom. v: 12, etc., and speaking of the similitude and dissimilitude in the analogy between Adam and Christ he says: "Prior comparatio continetur, v. 12, 13, 14, similitudo autem si rem intereamur, consistit in natura effectis duobus." Then, after illustrating this, he thus concludes: "Adamus peccati et mortis, in hominibus fons est: Christus verò justitiæ et vitæ author. *Adamus peccatum suum omnibus et solis natis suis, vi naturæ; Christus verò justitiam suam et vitam omnibus et solis renatis suis communicat.*" He gives not the slightest intimation of Dr. Hodge's *fundamental* and *harmonizing* principle of Calvinistic theology. And in his vol. II, pp. 44-46, he institutes in 58 theses, a discussion *De Adami primi et secundi collatione*; throughout which he presents the same exposition as the aforesaid of Rivetus (see particularly Thes. 41-57), and says nothing of the *imputation* of Adam's guilt, but maintains that his posterity are guilty for having sinned in him. If Dr. Hodge's fundamental principle could be found insisted on as essential to the Reformed theology, we might well expect to find it here. But this is not all, for in Princeton Essays, I, p. 178, in a passage which we have quoted above, he cites the authority of TURRETTIN in support of this exposition of the analogy drawn by the Apostle between Adam and Christ; and, on p. 181, he moreover represents him as quoting from Bellarmine the passage *which Rivetus, in the aforesaid quotation, cites and refutes*, and as conceding that it contains "a full admission of the doctrine of imputation;" but by turning to the place in Turretin, we find the representation wholly unauthorized. The passage may be found in vol. II, pp. 572-573, (Loc. 16, Quæst. III, Sect. 15), and instead of

approving the sentiment of Bellarmine, he merely introduces it with the remark, "Deinde ipse Bellarminus contrarium testatur." And, after citing it, with another passage from the same work, he adds the following words, which are in perfect accordance with the aforesaid exposition of Rivetus, and directly at war with the representation of Dr. Hodge: "Nec si injusti et rei constituimur per peccatum ab Adamo propagatum, statim justificari debemus per justitiam inhærentem nobis per regenerationem à Christo communicatam, QUIA DIVERSISSIMA EST UTRIVSQUE RATIO. ET PAULUS HIC COLLATIONEM INSTITUIT INTER ADAMUM PRIMUM ET SECUNDUM IN RE, SED NON IN MODO REI."* See also pp. 566, 567.

We confess that we are surprised at the representation of facts thus made by Dr. Hodge; and the worst of it is, that this representation is often made and insisted on. For instance, in Princeton Essays, I, pp. 166, 177, he utters the averment, which we request our readers to compare with the foregoing citations, that Turretin and others (that is, the Reformed divines) "*uniformly maintain that we are constituted sinners in Adam (eodem modo, eodem ratione), in the same manner that we are constituted righteous in Christ;*" and to sustain this, he quotes from Turretin a passage which is in perfect agreement with that just cited from vol. II, pp. 572, 573, and in which he pointedly denies it. We shall leave Dr. Hodge to explain his intention in this extraordinary procedure. We are at an utter loss to account for it.

Thus, then, it appears that not the slightest ground can be pleaded in support of the representations made by Dr. Hodge

* Let our readers compare this citation from Turretin with the following passage from Dr. Hodge (P. E., I, p. 181), in which he professes to give the meaning of Turretin therein, and if they know of a more remarkable instance of unmitigated perversion of a plain matter of important fact, they know of that of which we confess ourselves ignorant. The following are his words: "To this passage from the Catholic Cardinal, Turretin subjoins the remark that it can not be inferred from the fact that we are also rendered sinners and liable to condemnation by the corrupt nature which we inherit from Adam. We are also justified by our inherent righteousness, communicated by Christ in regeneration; *because the Apostle did not mean to teach that the cases are parallel throughout, THOUGH THEY ARE SO FAR AS IMPUTATION IS CONCERNED.*" Turretin, so far from saying that *ratio est eadem*, says that it is *diversissima*, and that there is no *collatio in modo rei*. And yet, in direct contradiction to this, Dr. Hodge represents him as here saying that *eadem est ratio*.

respecting the view entertained by the Reformed divines of the analogy between Adam and Christ, which he has so constantly pleaded in support of his doctrine of antecedent imputation. They not only never entertained his view, but, on the contrary, pointedly reject and refute it. But we must draw these remarks to a close, though before doing so we shall request the attention of our readers to a matter or two connected with the subject, which still calls for notice.

Dr. Hodge is perpetually repeating, in all his lucubrations on imputation and original sin (as may be seen by the passages above referred to and many others), that the views of the earlier Calvinists were very much confused on these subjects until they hit upon and adopted *the idea which he entertains and insists upon*, respecting the Pauline similitude or analogy between Adam and Christ; and as precisely expressing his own view he quotes the forecited passage from Bellarmine, the great Papal theologian, in which he assails the doctrine taught by Calvin. Rivetus, as above shown, refutes this view and defends Calvin; and the Reformed divines sustain him in doing so. But Dr. Hodge finds the passage to contain "a full admission of the doctrine of imputation," as held by himself. It presents the exact idea as entertained by him, of the *point* in the analogy between Adam and Christ, and gives the *true idea* of the *mode* of communicating both sin and righteousness; a principle *fundamental* to Protestantism, and the *harmonizing* principle of Calvinistic theology. Bellarmine asserted it in his attempted refutation of the Reformed theology, and the Church continued to repudiate and refute it for a century or two; but has, at length, through Dr. Hodge, harmonized her theology by adopting it. If all this be so, then surely our progress is only lately begun, and we may adopt as our appropriate motto,

Per varios casus, per tot discrimina rerum,
Tendimus in Latium; sedes ubi fata quietas
Ostendunt illic fas regna resurgere Romæ.

Then further: since Dr. Hodge asserts so emphatically that the recognition of the point referred to, as the point in the analogy instituted by Paul in Rom. v, became the harmonizing principle of Protestant theology, the question is an interesting one *whose theology did it harmonize?* Not that of the Infra-

lapsarians, as is above shown, for they always rejected it. But it did become the "harmonizing" and "fundamental" principle of the Supralapsarians. A single instance will evince this.* Polanus, the great Supralapsarian theologian of Basel, and who published his *Syntagma* (pp. 2260, in quarto) in 1609, asserts most pointedly the very view of Dr. Hodge on this subject. And on page 518, in defending his view, he speaks as follows: "Quin ipsemet *Bellarminus*, tom. III, de Amissione gratiæ lib. 5, c. 17, id fateri cogitur, quum ait. Solus ipse (Adamus) actuali voluntate illud (peccatum primum) commisit; nobis verò communicatur per generationem eo modo," etc.; thus making the same quotation which Rivetus makes, and acknowledging, as Dr. Hodge does, *that it expresses the true view.*† Thus the Supralapsarians, from the first, receive and acknowledge it as a fundamental principle, and the Infralapsarians reject and refute it. It is fundamental, therefore, only to the Supralapsarian theology, and not to the Reformed or Calvinistic. And we are quite willing that the Supralapsarians should retain it if they see proper to do so, but let them not insist that we too must either receive it, or forfeit our claim to Calvinistic soundness of doctrine. And it is worthy of note in the same connection, that De Moor (III, p. 260) refers to this very treatise of Bellarmine, lib. 5, to evince that he, along with Pighius and Catharinus, teach that "*totam Peccati Originalis naturam solâ imputatione primi Peccati definiebant, nullam inhærente corruptionem agnoscentes,*" and he adds, "*Rectius hæc duo junguntur a Tridentinis, Sess. V. Decr. I.*"

But we think it high time that there should be no more of such proceedings in our midst, and that the Church should be permitted to retain peaceable possession of her own acknowledged doctrine in its purity and simplicity and integrity, and without being longer troubled by persistent efforts to engraft upon that doctrine the pernicious and long-since exploded errors of the Supralapsarian school. It is not now true, and never has been true, and never can be true, that the Popish

* Our readers may find a similar instance also in the citation above given (No. 25) from the Supralapsarian Lubbertus.

† "Turretin quotes him (Bellarmine) as stating the doctrine of the imputation of Adam's sin, to his entire satisfaction." *Princeton Essays*, I, p. 193.

Cardinal Bellarmine has, in his antithesis or analogy, suggested, as Dr. Hodge asserts (see Princeton Essays, I, p. 181, and Princeton Review for 1860, pp. 339-341), the true ground on which Calvinistic theology is to be understood and explained, and by which it has become harmonized; or that the principle he thus inculcates ever has been or ever can be a fundamental principle of that theology. It belongs to Ockham and his followers, from whom Bellarmine and Pighius, and a few Protestant Supralapsarian divines have adopted it; but, true to herself and to the Divine Word, the Calvinistic Church has, as a body, ever rejected it. Let her do so still. Nor let any portion of her sons in this day lay the flattering unction to their soul, that they have, by embracing a pestiferous error which she has ever repudiated, acquired a soundness of doctrine above their brethren.

XLIII. MARROW OF MODERN DIVINITY.

This remarkable book was first published in 1645-1648. The edition issued by our Board of Publication is decidedly the best ever published. We present the subjoined passage, which, though it serves the purpose for which we cite it, evinces that Mr. Fisher's mind was somewhat perplexed by the speculations of the Supralapsarians of his time. For he confounds the two ideas, which certainly are very different, to wit: *a surety paying a debt for us*, and *we paying a debt in our surety*; an error which has been followed out to its legitimate consequences, so as to be made to countenance the antinomian notion of eternal justification. And it is certainly absurd to say that *we obeyed in Christ*, in the same sense and manner in which *we sinned and disobeyed in Adam*. For in what sense can it be even imagined that a fallen, corrupt, and rebellious creature should, while in a state of impenitence and rebellion, perform obedience in Christ? and so secure his own renewal and salvation in another with whom he could have, while in this state of sin, no possible sympathy. It is, therefore, the *obedience of Christ* (and not *our obedience in Christ*), that results in the formation of our new nature, whereby alone any true obedience is practicable. Eternal life is the *gift of God*; and in no sense has it been wrought out *by us*, either in our surety or otherwise; but it has been wrought out *by our surety for us*,

and is thus the gift of God to us; while, on the contrary, death is the *wages*, the actual *desert* of sin; and in no sense, therefore, is it the *gift* of God, either by antecedent imputation or otherwise. We, by our own intrinsic demerit, deserve the *first*; the *second*, we never can in any sense be said to *deserve*; and if God, in his infinite mercy, shall bring us to glory, we shall never cease to sing, "Not unto us, but to Thee be the glory; for *thou hast redeemed us*."

The following passage is from pp. 106–108 of the edition above referred to:

"But yet for the further proof and confirmation of this point, we are to consider that, as Jesus Christ, the second Adam, entered into the same covenant that the first Adam did; so by him was done whatever the first Adam had undone. So the case stands thus—that as whatsoever the first Adam did, or befel him, was reckoned as done by all mankind, and to have befallen them, even so, whatsoever Christ did, or befel him, is to be reckoned as to have been done by all believers, and to have befallen them. So that as sin cometh from Adam alone to all mankind, *as he in whom all have sinned*; so from Jesus Christ alone cometh righteousness unto all that are in him, *as he in whom THEY all have satisfied the justice of God*; for as being in Adam, and one with him, all did, in him and with him, transgress the commandment of God; even so in respect of faith, whereby believers are engrafted into Christ, and spiritually made one with him, *they did all, in him and with him, satisfy the justice of God* in his death and sufferings. And whosoever reckons thus, reckons according to the Scripture; for in Rom. v, 12, all are said to have sinned in Adam's sin; in whom all have sinned, says the text, namely in Adam, as in a public person; all men's acts were included in his, because their persons were included in his."

The foregoing exception to this incautious phraseology, is not intended to undervalue the excellent work from which it is taken, for all our ministers should possess that work. But as the passage contains a very clear statement of a commonly-received fallacy in relation to our subject, and also evinces the inevitable consequences resulting from all attempts to confound the personal *sin of Adam*, with *our sin in Adam*, it is deserving of very serious consideration in this connection.

XLIV. P. MOLINÆUS, PROFESSOR AT SEDAN.

We have already referred to Molinæus. He was born in October, 1568, and studied both in Paris and England with

great success. Grotius was subsequently one of his pupils. He finally settled as pastor of the Church in Paris. In 1619, the Curators of Leyden University invited both him and Rivetus to the Professorships of Theology in that institution. Rivetus accepted the overture, but Molinæus declined. He and Rivetus had been chosen as deputies to attend the Synod of Dort, but after they had started on their journey thither the King of France refused to allow them to proceed. He, moreover, having become exasperated against Molinæus for writing to James I, to aid the Elector of Palatine, and to use his influence on behalf of the Protestant Church in France, Molinæus could not return to Paris, but was soon after called to the University of Sedan (over which little principality the Duke of Bouillon was sovereign), where he continued till his death in 1658, aged 90 years. In the beginning of the year 1618, he sent to the press his *Anatomy of Arminianism*, but in consequence of a decree of the Provincial Synod of Charenton it was not published until the conclusion of the sessions of the Synod of Dort, to which he had transmitted it, as he was not allowed to proceed thither.

The dispute between him and Tilenus (in the settlement of which James I took so much interest) was simply in relation to the effects of the *hypostatical union*, and no otherwise affected any point of Calvinistic theology. The treatises of Molinæus number seventy-five. And Twisse, though so utterly opposed to him in his views of the doctrine respecting *the will of God*, refers to him in the following beautiful and magnanimous style: "I do admire him upon the Eucharist and on Purgatory. He hath my heart when I read his consolations to his brethren of the Church of France, as also in treating of the love of God. I would willingly learn French to understand him only, and have a long time desired, and still do get anything he hath written." I omitted to state that Molinæus was moderator of the National Synod of Ales (1620), which adopted into the Confession of Faith of the French Churches, the Articles of the Synod of Dort, with its "Rejection of Errors," which proceeding greatly exasperated the French monarch. In relation to the subject before us, Molinæus employs the following language:

"In this argument (Rom. v: 12-19), the declaration of the Apostle is most express, where he says: *By one man*, etc. Yea, infants he subjects in a peculiar manner to this necessity, saying, 'death reigned over those who had not sinned after the similitude of Adam's transgression,' that is, who had not sinned actually, but only originally. AND LEST ANY SHOULD REFER THIS TO IMPUTATION ALONE, he, in the seventh chapter, confesses his own proclivity to sinning. 'We,' says he, '*sinned in Adam, and in him willed this depravation.*'" "NOR, INDEED, WOULD GOD IMPUTE THE SIN OF ADAM TO HIS POSTERITY, UNLESS THEY HAD IN THEMSELVES SOMETHING WHICH WAS TRULY OF THE NATURE OF SIN, AND UNLESS THEY WERE EVIL BY NATURE."

Nothing could be more utterly subversive of the doctrine of antecedent imputation, than this language. And can Dr. Hodge really believe that Rivetus (from whom he himself has cited the same passage, but disfigured by a mistranslation) could have adduced this testimony of Molinæus, to say nothing of the multitude of similar ones which he has cited, to prove that he held the doctrine of antecedent imputation? Why could not such instances have suggested to Dr. Hodge, the only obvious conclusion, that the *design* of Rivetus in adducing these testimonies, must, in the necessity of the case, have differed *toto cælo* from his own design in adducing them? And, therefore, that he has misapprehended the design of Rivetus, and utterly misapplied his argument. And, then, further, in our first Essay, pp. 409-411, we have quoted from Molinæus' *Anatomy of Arminianism*, on the subject of Reprobation and the Will of God, and have mentioned how highly he was esteemed by the Synod of Dort (who had at that time this very treatise of his before them, printed, though not published), on account of his writings. And we have now cited his statement on Imputation and Original Sin; and in which statement he speaks of the doctrine of antecedent imputation (that is, of imputation alone without regard to subjective desert), just as he has spoken on the subject of Reprobation in the citations aforesaid. Now it will be borne in mind (as we have stated in No. XLII, of these testimonies), that this very *Anatomy of Arminianism* is spoken of in the highest terms by Rivetus, whom Dr. Hodge represents as denying and refuting the very doctrine which it asserts; and, moreover, while Rivetus himself has made the foregoing quotation from

Molinæus, in order to show what were really the views of imputation, as entertained by the Reformed Church. Rivetus cites him as saying, that "assuredly God would not impute the sin of Adam to his posterity, unless they had in themselves something which was truly of the nature of sin, and unless they were evil by nature;" and this very view Dr. Hodge has again and again repudiated, and denounced as Placæanism, while Rivetus quotes the passage to prove that the doctrine of the Reformed Church was directly opposed to Placæanism.

XLV. A. WALÆUS (*Antoine de Wael*), 1573—1639.

In our first Essay, p. 416, we have referred to this justly celebrated Leyden divine. Rivetus, J. Polyander, Thysius, and Jac. Triglandius, were colleagues of his in that University. *He drew up the canons of the Synod of Dort*, and soon after the conclusion of its sessions became Professor of Theology in Leyden. We shall cite his testimony to show what he understood to be the doctrine of the Reformed Church respecting imputation and original sin; and, perhaps, it would not be a very unfair inference to conclude that he probably knew what was contained in the canons of the Dordrecht Synod.

He was born in Ghent, and studied under Junius and Gomar; and while he was yet a student, the States of Zealand learning that their younger students at the University were becoming demoralized, appointed him to oversee them, and commanded that they should be guided in their studies by his direction. The piety of Walæus, though most firm and decided, was pre-eminently of a lovely type, and he possessed the missionary spirit in a very remarkable degree for the time in which he lived. His interest was much awakened on behalf of India, then so recently opened to extensive intercourse with Europe, and he established a seminary for the purpose of preparing youth to go thither as missionaries. He never sought the favor of the great, except so far as to secure some desirable benefits for the Church of God; and if, during his intercourse with such, anything were said prejudicial to religion, he never hesitated to rebuke it promptly.

In his reply to the attack of Corvinus (a celebrated Arminian Theologue), upon the Anatomy of Arminianism of Molinæus,

he thus most decidedly expresses his views on the subject before us: .

"Nor yet do we so judge, as you appear to think, that the guilt of the first sin, and the guilt of the sin inhering in his posterity, are different kinds of desert or guilt which may be mutually divided from each other, as the guilt of two depraved actions may be divided; but we affirm that the two are connected and beget a common guilt (*sed dicimus hæc duo esse connexa, et communem reatum gignere*), which obligates the sinner to one and the same punishment, because the guilt of the first sin to condemnation (and as the Apostle speaks, Rom. v: 16, *χρῖμα εἰς καταχρῖμα*), CAN NOT BE IMPUTED TO POSTERITY UNLESS THAT VITIOSITY OF INHERENT SIN INTERVENE (*non potest posteris imputari nisi mediante illâ peccati inhærentis vitiositate*): SEEING THE JUSTICE OF GOD WILL NOT PERMIT THAT THE FIRST SIN SHOULD BE IMPUTED TO CONDEMNATION TO A POSTERITY HAVING NO SIN IN THEMSELVES." "The Scriptures testify, also, that corporeal death is the fruit of original sin, not only *mediately from imputation*, which we do not deny, but also *immediately from the internal contagion of sin, which you deny*."

We have already referred to Dr. Hodge's attempt to prove antecedent imputation by quoting an expression from the Leyden divines, and have shown its unfairness and want of accuracy. Our readers can now decide that matter for themselves, by comparing the representation of Dr. Hodge, with the aforesaid testimonies of Rivetus, Molinæus, and Walæus.

XLVI. ARCHBISHOP USHER, 1580—1655.

Few men, more richly endowed with both natural and spiritual gifts, have ever adorned the Church of the Living God in this world. In his "*Sum and Substance of the Christian Religion*," London, 1702 (a work collected from his writings, but of which he decidedly expressed his approval: a work, too, of singular merit, but now most unaccountably neglected), he says:

"Our first parents were by God's appointment to *stand or fall* in that trial, not as singular persons only, but also as the head and root of all mankind, representing the persons of all that should descend from them by natural generation. And, therefore, for the understanding of the *ground of our participation with Adam's fall*, two things must be considered. First, that *Adam* was not a private man in this business, but

sustained the person of all mankind, as he who had received strength for himself and all his posterity, and so lost the same for all. For Adam received the promise of life for himself and us, with this condition, if he had stood; but seeing he stood not, he lost the promise of life both from himself and from us. And as his felicity should have been ours, if he had stood in it, so was his transgression and misery ours. So that, as in the second covenant, the righteousness of the second Adam (Christ Jesus the Mediator) is reckoned to those that are begotten of him by spiritual regeneration (even those that believe on his name), although they never did it; so in the covenant the sin of the first Adam (who herein sustained a common person) is reckoned to all the posterity that descend from him by carnal generation, because they were in him, and of him, and one with him. Rom. v: 15-19. Secondly, that we all who are descended from Adam by natural generation, *were in his loins, and a part of him when he fell, and so by the law of propagation and generation sinned in him, and in him deserved eternal condemnation therefrom.* * * * * * *Then it appeareth, that by propagation from our last parents we are become partakers of the transgression of our first parents.* Even so; and for the same transgression of our first parents, by the most righteous judgment of God, we are conceived in sin, and born in iniquity, and unto misery. Ps. li: 5," pp. 125, 126.

XLVII. J. HOORNBECK, *Professor at Utrecht and Leyden,*
1617—1666.

This is another great and venerable name in the Church of God. He was born at Haerlem, and studied at Utrecht and Leyden; and in 1644 became Professor of Theology in the former University, and ten years later in the latter. He was a very earnest and successful minister of the Word, and also in training youth for the ministry, and his *Ratio Concionandi* has great merit. He never deviated from the most rigid orthodoxy. In his *Confut.*, Socin., lib. iii: cap. 3, he says:

"You ask whence is the sin which is within us? the response is ready—from that first *common sin* of Adam, imputed to all men from Adam. To understand this it is proper to know what person or condition Adam sustained, and how, in him, the whole nature of man should have been considered as so accounted, represented, and confederated, that what he thus far had been, possessed, or did, *should be reckoned as belonging to all men, and therefore to the whole of human nature in him.*
* * * * * He stood as the root, origin, *head*, beginning of all

our nature; and this, indeed, with a two-fold title, *the natural head*, from whom the whole of our nature was to be disseminated, and *the moral head* by whose obedience or disobedience, our whole nature must either stand or fall. From the first headship it comes to pass that we are men; from the second that we are either good or evil."

XLVIII. C. DRELLINCOURT, *Pastor at Paris*, 1595—1669.

"As the sin of Adam is imputed to us because we all sinned in Adam, so in like manner the righteousness of Christ is imputed to us, since in the person of Christ, our head, we have fulfilled all righteousness." (On Rom. v: 19.)

In the conclusion of this passage, we have the same incautious phraseology referred to in No. XLIII above.

XLIX. J. COCCEIUS, *Professor at Franeker*, 1603—1669.

We cite this divine, the companion of Maccovius and Szydlowski, to show the influence of the Supralapsarian scheme in modifying the views of the Reformed theology. Cocceius says:

"To impute, in the style of Scripture, is to judge that he has done a thing, who has not done it; not to impute is to judge that he has not done a thing, who has done it. To impute is either to condemn or absolve many individuals by one sentence, on account of the conjunction." (Sum. Theol., cap. 30; see also his Lexicon, sub voce *אָשָׁם*.)

Dr. Thornwell, after quoting the above, says:

"This is exactly our doctrine, the doctrine of the Westminster Standards, and of the whole Reformed Church."

Dr. T. can speak for himself in the matter. But while we may assent to the entire truth of the first clause of this sentence, we pronounce all the rest of it unfounded. (See Southern Presbyterian Review, for April, 1860, page 201.) And yet, if we are able to understand language, Dr. Thornwell has repudiated this very idea of Cocceius, and in the same connection, for he says:

"We also agree with Dr. Baird, that the imputation of guilt is simply the declaration of the fact. To condemn a man is to find or pronounce him guilty, and not to make him so. It is a verdict upon the case as it is,

and introduces no new element. But the question arises, upon what ground is a man pronounced deserving of punishment? * * * * * All that we maintain is, that a sin may be ours, really and truly ours, and therefore chargeable upon us, when we have not, in our own proper persons, committed it; when we have, in fact, sustained no causal relation to it whatever. This is the point upon which we differ," etc.

"They (Dr. Baird's authorities) only prove that guilt is inseparable from crime; no one denies that. They prove, further, that a man can not be punished for a crime which is in no sense his own; no one denies that." (Ibid, pp. 188, 200.)

L. AND. ESSENIUS, *Professor at Utrecht, 1618—1672.*

Essenius, the associate of Hoornbeck, and subsequently of Leusden, possessed a very lovely and highly evangelical character. Among other works of approved merit, he, in 1649, published the *Triumphus Crucis, sive Fides Catholica*, and in 1659 his *Systema Theologicum*, in two volumes, which he afterward abridged. The abridgment passed through several editions. We quote from the second, issued in 1682:

"The effects of the first sin came alike upon our first parents, and were: 1. The loss of original righteousness, and the deformity contrary thereto, etc. 2. Guilt before God (*Reatus coram Deo*). 3. Terror of conscience," etc.

"Original and actual sin, arising from this first sin, follows. Original sin is the fault from that first fall, making guilty, and miserably staining the whole nature of the human race as it was reckoned in Adam. (*Originale est culpa ex primo illo lapsu universam Generis humani naturam, prout ea in Adamo censica, ream faciens, atque inficiens miserrime.*) Rom. v: 12, Eph. ii: 3. (He quotes these texts.) It is either imputed or inherent. Imputed is the fruit itself of the first sin (*Fructus ille primi peccati*), by which it, according to the constitution of the legal covenant, is esteemed natural; so that it truly involves that whole nature in the same guilt with our first parents."

"They are implicated in the same guilt, who do not, like Adam, sin in *propria persona*; but only in their head (in *capite illo*), as the faithful are justified in Christ, whose type he was."

"The proximate effect of this imputed sin (*peccati*), is the guilt (*reatus*) of all the Adamic race: that is, of all who were federally reckoned in him. Whence follow the more remote effects, calamities, pains, miseries," etc.

"Original sin inherent, is a habitual congenital vitiosity, arising from

that first sin, through which our nature is rendered wholly inapt to all spiritual saving good, and prone to the opposite evils."—Cap. X, sec. 24–29.

LI. S. MARESIUS, *Professor of Groningen and Leyden*,
1599—1678.

Maresius, or Des-Marets, ranked among the very ablest divines of his age. He studied theology under Gomar at Saumur, for three years, and completed his course of study at Geneva. In his *Enodatio Gravissimarum Quæstionum*, etc., Tract. 5 (De Peccato Originis), he speaks as follows :

"Since the guilt of Adam and his posterity is a common guilt, it is not foreign from the mercy of God that he should have remitted it to Adam and to many others ; or from his justice, that to many others to whom God was not bound to remit it, it should be imputed for punishment."

"The place in Ezekiel (ch. xviii : 20) here objected, *should be understood of the iniquity of a personal parent, and of a son who is free from all blame. But this in no sense forbids that the common and natural iniquity of the first man should be justly imputed for actual punishment to all his posterity who have sinned in him*, and who, besides the blame (noxa) contracted in him, are by generation inhesively and subjectively corrupted, guilty, and sinful."

"And properly there was a tything of Levi in the loins of Abraham, although he did not yet exist by act and personally, as the apostolical expression proves ; and properly we have all sinned in Adam, in whom we existed seminally. Nor does the ὥς ἔπος εἰπεῖν (ut ita loquar) indicate that Paul spoke figuratively and tropically ; but that he wished by one word, subtle and new, to remove the whole difficulty."

"Wrongfully are these two things set in contrast, *to sin against express law and against the law of nature* ; for in whatever way one sins actually, he sins after the similitude of Adam's transgression, *who violated both*. Then I grant that in neither way infants are able to sin actually and personally ; *but they violated in Adam originally each law, the positive and natural.*"

"None can be treated as sinners by a God of equity, who have neither personal nor actual sin ; unless some sin has by right (jure) been imputed to them."

LII. LUD. LE BLANC, *of Sedan*, 1614—1675.

"But that it may be more distinctly understood how Christ takes away the sins of men (referring to John i : 29), let it be observed that

there are two things in sin : one is a certain depravity and filthiness, which spots and defiles the sinner, and renders him odious to God, and opposed to reason and the Divine law. *The other is an obligation and appointment to the punishment which Divine justice exacts, and the law threatens.* Each is taken away by the grace of Christ."

Then, after enlarging upon these points, he adds :

"From all of which it truly and evidently appears that sin in the believer is taken away by the grace of Christ, not only as to guilt or obligation to punishment, but also as to the stain and depravity itself which defile the soul." (*Theses Theolog.*, pp. 279-281.)

LIII. JOHN CHARNOCK, 1628—1680

The rank held by this great Puritan divine, is sufficiently known. Dr. Hodge justly reckons him with the old Calvinists, and often quotes him as a Calvinistic authority ; and our Board of Publication have issued some of the best of his works. In his work on the Attributes (Discourse 10), he thus exposes the Supralapsarian sophism which confounds the power with the justice of God—the principle underlying the doctrine of antecedent imputation :

"Power does not always suppose an object, but constitutes an object. It supposes an object in the act of preservation, but it makes an object in the act of creation ; but mercy supposes an object miserable, yet does not make it so. *Justice supposes an object criminal, but does not constitute it so ;* mercy supposes him miserable to relieve him ; *justice supposes him criminal to punish him ;* but power supposes not a thing in real existence, but as possible ; or, rather, it is from power that anything has a possibility, if there be no repugnancy in the nature of the thing."

"*A creature, as a creature, is neither the object of mercy nor justice, nor of rewarding goodness ; a creature, as innocent, is the object of rewarding goodness ; a creature, as miserable, is an object of compassionate mercy ; a creature, as criminal, is the object of revenging justice ; but all of them the objects of power, in conjunction with those attributes of goodness, mercy, and justice, to which they belong.* * * * * * It is power that frames a creature in a capacity of nature for mercy or justice, *though it does not give an immediate qualification for the exercise of either.* Power makes man a rational creature, and so confers upon him a nature mutable, which may be miserable by its own fault, and punishable by God's justice ; or pitiable by God's compassion, and retrievable by God's

mercy; but it does not make him sinful, whereby he becomes miserable and punishable."

"God can not pollute any undefiled creature by virtue of that sovereign power which he has to do what he will with it, because such an act would be contrary to the foundation and right of his dominion," etc.

(To be continued.)

ERRATA.

THE reader will please correct the following errata in our article on Imputation, in the June Number:

On page 248, line 18 from bottom, read *Sohnnius* for *Sohnius*.

P. 248, l. 7 from bottom, read *I.* for *F.*

P. 249, last word of second paragraph, for *facimus* read *facinus*.

P. 250, l. 20, for *Loco IX.* 2. 9. read *Loco IX.* Q. 9.

P. 250, l. 24, for *where* read *when*.

P. 251, last line, omit the first *the*.

P. 252, l. 21. for *ἡμαςτον* read *ἡμαρτον*.

P. 252, l. 8 from bottom, for *παραπτώματος* read *παραπτώματος*.

P. 253, l. 18 for *Romans ii* read *Romans v*.

P. 253, l. 24, after *will*, for . read :; and after 28, insert *and*.

P. 255, l. 10, for *obedience* read *disobedience*.

P. 258, l. 11 from bottom, for *Zancheus* read *Zanchius*.

P. 268, l. 10, for *Grin-* read *Gry-*.

P. 269, note, l. 8, after *nature* omit . and insert ,

P. 269, note, l. 9, for *αἰσχρὸν* read *αἰσχροῦ*.

P. 271, l. 18, for *Arnyzald* read *Amyrald*.

P. 272, l. 16, for *κατάκριμα* read *κατάκριμα*.

P. 273, l. 4 from bottom, for *Sanmur* read *Sommur*.

P. 274, l. 1, for 1569 read 1549.


P. 274, l. 25, for "*Observations*" read "*Observationes*."

P. 274, l. 81, omit the quotation marks after *defection*.

P. 277, l. 9, for *Mss.* read *Ms.*

P. 280, l. 9 from bottom, for *labors* read *labor*.





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ART. I.—*Imputation and Original Sin.*

PART III.—(Continued.)

(TESTIMONIES CONTINUED.)

LIV. Dr. JOHN OWEN, 1616—1683.

In his "Display of Arminianism," this noble old standard-bearer of God's sacramental host, whose views Dr. Hodge has so often misapprehended and misapplied, speaks as follows:

Original sin "is an inherent sin and pollution of nature, having a proper guilt of its own, making us responsible to the wrath of God, and not a bare imputation of another's fault to us, his posterity, which, because it would reflect upon us all with a charge of native imbecility and insufficiency to do good, is by these self-idolizers quite exploded. The opposition which is made between the righteousness of Christ and the sin of Adam, Rom. v, which is the proper seat of the doctrine, sheweth that there is in our nature an inbred sinful corruption; for the sin of Adam holds such relation unto sinners, proceeding from him by natural propagation, as the righteousness of Christ doth unto them who are born again of him by spiritual regeneration; but we are truly, intrinsically, and inherently sanctified by the spirit and grace of Christ; and, therefore, there is no reason why, being so often in this chapter called sinners, because of this original sin, we should cast it off as if we were concerned only by an external denomination, for the right institution of the comparison and its analogy quite overthrows the solitary imputation."

* * * * * "It is not a bare imputation of another's fault, but an

intrinsic adjacent corruption of our nature itself, that we call by this name of original sin." "The Arminians deny all such imputation, as too heavy a charge for the pure, unblamable condition wherein they are brought into this world; *they deny, I say, that they are guilty of Adam's sin, as sinning in him, or that his sin is any way imputed to us.*" "*In respect to our wills, we are not thus innocent neither, for we all sinned in Adam, as the apostle affirmeth.*"

Then referring to the Arminian notion of the imputation of Adam's sin, he adds:

"Now be this punishment what it will, never so small, *yet if we have no demerit of our own, nor interest in Adam's sin,* it is such an act of injustice as we must reject from the Most Holy, with a God forbid! Far be it from the Judge of all the world to punish the righteous with the ungodly: *if God should impute the sin of Adam unto us, and thereon pronounce us obnoxious to the curse derived by it; if we have a pure, sinless, unspotted nature, even this could scarce be reconciled with that rule of his proceeding in justice with the sons of men, 'the soul that sinneth shall die,' which clearly granteth an immunity to all not tainted with sin.* Sin and punishment, though they are sometimes separated by his mercy, pardoning the one, and so not inflicting the other, yet never by his justice inflicting the latter when the former is not: SIN IMPUTED BY ITSELF ALONE, WITHOUT AN INHERENT GUILT, WAS NEVER PUNISHED IN ANY BUT CHRIST."

LV. FRANCIS TURRETTIN, of Geneva, 1623—1687.

This illustrious theologian, to whom we have already so often referred, and whom Dr. Hodge (*Essays and Reviews*, 366–67) strangely informs us was the cotemporary of Beza (who died eighteen years before he was born), in early youth commenced his studies at Saumur, while Placæus was Professor, and then went to complete his course at Montauban, where Garrisoli was Professor. Montauban was a rival institution, and no faculty in any institution in France stood so high in public favor as that of Saumur. Richlieu and Mazarin were powerfully impressed with the great abilities and learning of Amyrald, and had a high personal esteem for him. It was perhaps expecting too much from fallen humanity, that Garrisoli, though a good and great man, should not be influenced by such considerations. And when the opportunity arose (as it did

when Placæus was accused of erroneous views on the subject before us), he embraced it, and wrote a bulky prosy volume against him. It was under such influences that the still youthful Turretin completed his theological course; and the hold which Garriolius still retained upon him may be seen by his occasional references to his writings, which are but seldom quoted elsewhere. Garriolius was Moderator of the Synod which condemned Placæus, 1644-1645.

Turretin is frequently inconsistent with himself, as for example, when he treats of the Divine agency in the production of sin; or of the Will and Justice of God; or of imputation, as above shown. In the following paragraphs, however, he sustains the position which we, with Stapfer, and all the Reformed Church, maintain respecting the explication of the doctrine of original sin, from the two-fold stand-point of depravity and imputation, and does not make the one causal of the other, as Dr. Hodge does:

"The question is not whether the sin of Adam is said to be imputed to us, but whether the actual sin of Adam is by itself so imputed to all, that, *on account of it*, all are reckoned guilty, and either given over to punishment, or at least are esteemed deserving of punishment."

"Imputation is either of something foreign to us, or of that which is our own. *Sometimes that is imputed to us which is personally ours*, in which sense God imputes to sinners their transgressions, whom he punishes on account of their own crimes; and in a good sense it is said that the zeal of Phineas was imputed to him for righteousness. Ps. cvi: 31. *Sometimes that is imputed which is without us, and not performed by us, as the righteousness of Christ is said to be imputed to us, and our sins to him*, although he has no sin in himself and we no righteousness in ourselves. But *here* we are speaking of this latter imputation, not of the former: and the question relates to a sin committed by Adam, not by us.

"But when the sin of another is said to be imputed to any one, it is not to be understood of a sin which simply and in every way may be foreign, but that it by some reason pertains to him to whom it is said to be imputed; if not properly, singly, and personally, yet commonly on account of a communion which unites him with the proper author of it (at *communiter* propter communionem quæ illi intercedit cum proprio ejus auctore). For it is not possible that the imputation of another's sin should be made to any one, unless on some ground of a special oneness with him by conjunction. That communion also may be three-fold: 1. *Natural*, as between a father and his children. 2. *Moral* and *political*, as between

a king and his subjects; 3. *Voluntary*, as between friends, and between the guilty and his substitute (sponsorem). And hence appears the basis of the two-fold imputation between Christ and us, by which our sins are imputed to him, and on the contrary, his righteousness is imputed to us. 2 Cor. v: 21. We speak not here of this last communion, in which we admit that previous consent is necessary, but only of the two former, in which it is not necessary in order that the imputation may be just: As he who may sustain the punishment of another's sin may either then assent thereto, or may have assented previously. For Adam is joined with us by this double bond: 1. *Natural*, seeing that he is the father and we his children; 2. *Political* and *forensic*, seeing that he was the prince and representative of the whole human race. The basis of imputation, therefore, is not only the *natural* communion, which connects us with Adam, otherwise all his sins might be imputed to us; but it is emphatically a *moral* and *federal*, by which it came to pass that God established a covenant with him as with our head. Whence Adam in that sin stood not as a private person, but as a public and representative person, who, in that action, represented all his posterity, and for that cause his demerit pertains to all."

"The question, then, returns to these terms: Whether the sin of Adam,—not any one, but the first; not the habitual, but the actual,—is imputed to all his posterity naturally descending from him, with an imputation, not mediate and consequent, but immediate and antecedent. They with whom we here contend either deny absolute imputation, or admit only the mediate. BUT WE, WITH THE ORTHODOX, AFFIRM BOTH, and that imputation should be admitted, and that it is immediate and antecedent."

And then in his *De Satisfactione*, Parte I., sect. 33, and after quoting Rom. v: 12, he adds:

"For from this it appears that the sin of Adam was not peculiar to himself, BUT COMMON to the whole nature (sed toti naturæ commune), since on account of it punishment has passed to all."

Turretin, therefore, explicates the doctrine of original sin from the stand-point of both imputed and inherent guilt; or on the ground of both immediate and mediate imputation. If the foregoing language does not convey this idea, it conveys no idea. On what principle, therefore, is it that Dr. Hodge represents him as constantly teaching that imputation is immediate or antecedent alone?

LVI. J. G. BAJERUS, *Professor at Jena, and cotemporary with Turretin.*

This writer has ever been of high repute, not only in the Lutheran, but in the Reformed Church, both as a critic and a theologian. In his *Compend. Theol. Positivæ*, Part II. Cap. ii, Sect. 15, he says:

“Original sin may be described as the want of original righteousness, propagated through the fall of Adam, to all men by carnal generation, deeply corrupting the nature of man itself and all the faculties of the soul, rendering them inapt to the pursuit of spiritual good, prone to evil, and subjecting mankind to Divine anger and eternal death, unless saved therefrom by the remission of sin on account of the merit of Christ, apprehended by faith.”

LVII. H. WITSIUS, *Professor at Francke, Utrecht, and Leyden.*
1636—1708.

Referring to Rom. v : 12—19, he says :

“To illustrate the apostle’s meaning, we must observe these things :
1. It is very clear to any not under the power of prejudice, that when the apostle affirms that all *have sinned*, he speaks of an act of sinning, or of an actual sin, the very term, *to sin*, denoting an action. It is one thing to sin, another to be sinful, if I may so speak. 2. When he affirms *all* to have sinned, he, under that universality, likewise includes those who have no actual, proper and personal sin, and who, as he himself says, ‘*have not sinned after the similitude of Adam’s transgression.*’ v. 14. Consequently, these are also guilty of some actual sin, as appears from their death ; but that, not being their own *proper and personal sin*, must be the sin of Adam, imputed to them by the just judgment of God. 3. By these words, *ἐφ’ ὃ πάντες ἥμαρτον* for that all have sinned, he gives the reason why he had asserted that, by the sin of one man death passed upon all. This, says he, ought not to astonish us, for all have sinned.”

“It can not be explained consistent with Divine justice, how, without a crime, death should have passed upon Adam’s posterity. Prosper reasoned solidly and elegantly against *Collator*, Chap. 20 : ‘Unless, perhaps, it can be said, that the punishment and not the guilt passed on the posterity of Adam ; but to say this is in every respect false. For it is too impious to judge so of the justice of God ; as if he would, contrary to his own law, condemn the innocent with the guilty. The guilt, therefore,

is evident where the punishment is so ; and a partaking in punishment shows a partaking in guilt ; that human misery is not the appointment of the Creator, but the retribution of the judge.' If, therefore, through Adam all are obnoxious to punishment, all too must have sinned in Adam."—*Economy*, etc., B. I, Chap. 8, Sect. 31 and 34.

LVIII. P. JURIEU, *Professor at Sedan*, 1637—1713.

In his "*De Ineunda Pace*," etc., Cap. xiv. Sect. 5, he says :

"Adam being corrupted, procreated children like himself, begotten after his own image, evil, corrupt, subjects of Divine wrath, prone to all evil, and on that account justly damnable, nor from that native blot has any ever been delivered except by Christ."

LIX. CAMPEGIUS VITRINGA, 1659—1722. *

In his *Doct. Relig. Christianæ, per Aphorismos*, etc., Cap. xi, Sect. 3-8, he thus speaks :

"But this sin, with its effects, by a judicial sentence from the righteous law of God the Rector, passes to all the posterity of Adam, as many as are born from him by virtue of that command, *increase and multiply*. This is called *original sin*. Rom. v : 12 ; 1 Cor. xv : 21, 22.

"God, even as the Rector of the universe, established this law, that man, in whatever condition he might be brought, should procreate children after his own image, that is, like himself, and a sinner ; also an offspring polluted by the same habitual vices whereby he had become defiled, and therefore lying under the same guilt with himself, and bringing forth also the same evidences (argumenta) of a common guilt,—death and the preludes of death, the labors and sorrows of this life ; to the extent that unless grace and repentance should intervene, they should be alienated forever from a happy communion with God. Gen. v : 3, Rom. v : 12.

"In which appointment (constitutio) of God there is nothing wrong, because by the law of nature and according to its order, the matter can not be otherwise than that like produces like ; and moreover, because it would be unseemly in God to grant a holy seed to a sinner not seeking such a seed, or to have the seed of the sinner accepted, while he rejects the sinner himself.

* It may be in place here to remark that the *De Natura Peccati*, so often and so injuriously attributed to this eminent man, was written by his son, who bore the same name ; was his theological colleague in the University, and died in less than a year after him.

"According to this law of nature, therefore, it comes to pass that our first parents produced children after their own likeness; that is, slaves, not of reason but of lust, carnal, and savoring of carnal things; their countenance deprived of the beauty of God's image, aliens from virtue and prone to vice and vanity, haughty and puffed up with an absurd and inordinate love of self; and therefore unworthy to live in the communion and friendship of God; which corruption, ruling through all the faculties of man, and greatly displaying itself in vicious and inordinate affections, is commonly called *original sin inherent*. That same sin, or same habitual vitiosity (*quod idem peccatum, que eadem vitiositas habitualis*), draws with it the guilt not only of the evils of this life and of temporal death, but also of eternal death, unless the grace of God prevent; which guilt, whether it may depend from the first sin of Adam *mediately or immediately*, is *disputed in the schools more subtilely than usefully, since the same thing may be asserted and maintained on both sides against the Pelagians*.* This much is certain, that the judgment of God has here intervened; and that therefore this consequence of the sin of our first parents in their posterity, may, in this sense, be called *original sin imputed*." Gen. iii: 15-17.

LX. F. A. LAMPÉ, *Professor in Utrecht*, 1688—1729.

In his remarkably exhaustive commentary on John, Tom. 1, p. 572, this great divine, pronounced by Stapfer the "*ingens ecclesiae nostrae decus*," thus speaks (in explanation of John iii: 6):

"In respect to the quality having this carnal origin, he now pronounces that it is *flesh*: that is, that it also had been corrupted by sin and bound to the same carnal law, and therefore lying also under its guilt. The former follows from the law of our birth fixed by the Creator, by which every thing produces that which is like itself (the Divine judgment intervening), by which both the guilt and stain *are derived from Adam to his posterity*. For instance, as man consists of two parts, body and soul, he owes the former to his parents as the means, and the latter to God producing it immediately. The body corrupted by inordinate and perverse emotions through sin (*corpus per peccatum motibus inordinatis ac perversis corruptum*), can not, in the nature of the case produce otherwise than that which has the like inordinate emotions.

* Both the mediate and immediate imputation as *then* discussed in the schools may be learned from the statements of Weissmann, in No. 61 *infra*. The scheme of immediate or antecedent imputation had not then attained to the fullness of its present perfection, though the principle underlying it has ever been the same.

In the body is the soul, which being produced by the will of God, is so connected with it from the first moment of its existence, that it is now held captive by these emotions; which we suppose to be a just procedure on the part of God by virtue of the covenant agreement with the first man."

If anything could be doubtful in these clear expressions of Lampé, the doubt will be removed by referring to his *Gulden Kleinod der Lehre der Wahrheit*, p. 57 (Stapfer iv, 565, 566, quotes the original German in full), where in the form of question and answer he thus speaks:

"In how many ways can Original Sin be defined? *Ans.* In two ways: either as *imputed* (*zurechnet*), whereby the guilt of Adam has descended to his posterity; or as *inherent* (*ankleband*), whereby they become partakers of his corruption (*wodurch sie seiner Verdorbenheit sind theilhaftig worden*). *Quest.* What thinkest thou of this distinction? *Ans.* That Christian theologians from the very beginning have not agreed respecting it, and that therefore we should bear with one another in charity on the subject; especially since these controversies are so subtle that it requires that the mind should be thoroughly disciplined in order to make a decision, etc. *Quest.* But what, then, deserves herein to be taken particularly into consideration? *Ans.* That we can make a difference between original sin imputed and original sin inherent; *though in their essence they are united, and are not to be separated* (*aber dass sie indessen in der sache selbst unzertrennlich vereinigt sind*). There could be no inherent original sin if there were no imputed sin; for God would not have permitted the descendants of Adam to be born in sin if his guilt (*schuld*) had not passed over to them. *But on the other side the inherent corruption had to be conjoined to the imputed, that every mouth might be stopped, and all flesh be made guilty before God. And by such an association* (*or joining together, verknüpfung*), *we shall avoid the forenamed difficulty; and the comparison of the first with the second Adam will be clearly apparent."*

LXI. DR. T. RIDGELEY, of London, 1667—1734.

We quote from the edition of his Divinity by Carter and Brothers, New York, 1855. In vol. I, pp. 413, 414, he says:

"That we may account for the matter in the most unexceptionable way, and in one which does not in the least infer God to be the author of sin, or overthrow the doctrine of the imputation of Adam's sin to his

posterity, we must consider men's propensity of nature or the inclination of their souls to sin, as a *corrupt habit*, and consequently as *what is not infused by God*. Hence, though the soul in its first creation is guilty, that is, liable to suffer the punishment due to it for Adam's sin imputed, yet it does not come defiled out of the hands of God; or, as one well expresses it, '*We are not to think that God put original sin into men's souls, for how should he punish those souls which he himself had corrupted?*' He adds, that '*it is a great wickedness to believe that God put into the soul an inclination to sin; though it is true God creates the souls of men destitute of heavenly gifts, and supernatural light, and that justly, because Adam lost those gifts for himself and his posterity.*'"

(Dr. R. cites these passages from the *Anatome Arminianismi* of Molinæus, Cap. 10, Sect. 3, 15, 17, and quotes Turretin as teaching that though the soul is created spotless, yet as a punishment of Adam's sin it is destitute of original righteousness. Loc. IX, Quæst. 12, Sect. 8, 9, and then adds:)

"Now, if it be inquired how this corrupt habit or inclination to sin is contracted, we reply that the corruption of nature necessarily ensues on the privation of original righteousness. Some have illustrated this by an apt similitude, taken from the traveler's wandering out of his way, or taking a wrong path, in consequence of the darkness of the night. Here his want of light is the occasion, though not properly the cause of his wandering. So, as the consequence of man's being destitute of original righteousness, or of those habits of supernatural grace which are implanted in regeneration, his actions, as soon as he is capable of doing good or evil, must contain nothing less than a sin of commission, or a defect of, and disinclination to what is good. By this means the soul becomes defiled or inclined to sin. We suppose that it is indisposed to what is good, and that this arises from its being destitute of supernatural grace which is lost by Adam's fall."

LXII. C. E. WEISEMANN, *Professor at Tuebingen*, †1747.

As a matter of some interest we may in the present connection refer to the words of this learned and pious church historian; from whose *Hist. Eccles. Sac.* XVII, see a long quotation in De Moor, III, 282, 283, respecting Placæus. The doctrine of immediate imputation in the form taught by Heidegger, was extensively received in his day, though he can not subscribe to it without modification: and in his *Instit. Theol. Exegetico-Dogmaticæ*, loc. VII, he thus expresses his views:

"We have said decidedly, also, that in a certain sense the first sin was imputed to posterity, and to the whole human race, *but by an imputation rather mediate than immediate* (sed imputatio magis mediata, quam immediata). We do not say, that the sin or moral corruption was propagated to the posterity of Adam *only* by way of natural and physical generation, *but we also acknowledge that this sin existing by nature in all men, as in the children of sinners, brings them under the judgment of God, and excludes them from communion with God and his grace, so long as they remain such.* And this is what theologians are accustomed to call *mediate* imputation, since IMMEDIATE IMPUTATION GOES BEFORE IN RESPECT TO SIN, or propagating, or being propagated; *and is the imputation of the personal act itself of the sin of our first parents in this sense* (et sit imputatio ipsius actus personalis peccati Protoplastorum eo sensu): *that because Adam represented the whole human race, all men WERE MADE GUILTY of his actual sin, not otherwise, than if they had sinned in propria persona.* This is that *immediate* imputation, which produced so much controversy in the Reformed Churches, by occasion of the sharp opposition which Joshua Placcæus, a theologian of Saumur, made to this form of teaching; and strenuously defended his views against the prolix objections of Antony Garriolius.

"We say still further, that that which we call original sin is not a *mere calamity* or infirmity like the physical or civil; for example, as is the case in hereditary diseases, or in the forfeiture of the honors and dignities of parents (who are convicted for a civil offense), by their children; *but that it is truly such a state or condition as is judicially subjected to the Divine anger, and which subjects man to spiritual evils, although he had not contracted it by his own sins.* This part of the thesis is a stone of offense, and the particular stumbling-block of those who ferociously assail the doctrine of original sin in the common theology. Or if they should admit somewhat of this guilt, as sometimes the manifest truth extorts the like from them, they yet quickly stop up both ears *as soon as they hear that this moral vice of man is to be called sin, obnoxious to the Divine anger and to spiritual deprivations.* Curcellæus says summarily, in his fashion, 'There is nothing in us, when we are born, truly and properly called sin, for which God is angry, and purposes to inflict any punishment,' Opp. p. 136. But we establish our thesis by these and other arguments. 1. Because the condition is such that he who continues therein can not enter the kingdom of heaven, John iii. 2. Because by nature both Jews and Gentiles, converted and unconverted, are children of wrath, Eph. ii. 3. Because Divine judgment and condemnation afflict this evil inheritance received from Adam, Rom. v. 4. Because all the saints, in other respects studiously abstaining from voluntary sin, earnestly deprecate the evils of this root (radix) and

condition before the Lord. See the *examples of Job and David*. 5. Because the root of all sins can not itself be innocent before God," etc

"To conclude; that which pertains to things alleged as similar, concerning the participation of physical disease, and civil ignominy, and poverty, those things thus far differ from our fall (*casu*). One is able to remain morally good and innocent, whom these physical and civil evils overtakes. *But man, in this fallen condition, is esteemed MORALLY CORRUPT; in the style of Scripture, a sinner, nor can goodness and moral innocence, or spiritual, at the same time remain in him.*"

The attempt of this learned divine thus to place the *natural* relation of Adam to his posterity before the *federal* relation, is, as we have already shown, merely a reiteration of the erroneous views of Placæus. We have therefore presented his views thus fully in order that the whole subject may be clearly before the minds of our readers. The view which he opposed, and which was an advance upon the views of Heidegger, and which may be found asserted both in Marck and in De Moor, *was, not that the posterity of Adam were really implicated in his guilt by participation* (which is the Calvinistic doctrine), *but that they were made guilty of that sin by an immediate imputation of it, which depended upon the will of God alone.* This is the Supralapsarian view, which Dr. Hodge has perfected by taking another step, making the imputation of Adam's sin alone *causal of the moral corruption of his posterity.* Our next witness is

LXIII. JAMES HERVEY, 1713—1758.

In his *Theron and Aspasia* (published in 1755), which has been ever since its first appearance so great a favorite with our own, as with all evangelical churches, the pious author speaks as follows in relation to the subject before us:

"These are the words of the Ninth Article: '*Original sin is the fault and corruption of every man that naturally is engendered of the offspring of Adam.*' It is the *fault*, says the pious Bishop Beveridge, and therefore we are guilty of it. It is the *corruption*, also, and therefore we are defiled with it. Our Homilies have recourse to no such palliations, and qualifying interpretations, as my *Theron's* Expositor uses. One of them affirms point-blank that '*in Adam all men sinned universally.*'"
* * * * * "For my own part, I must confess that, if the transmission

of original depravity be granted, I know not how the imputation of Adam's destructive apostasy can be denied. *If we had no concern in the one, how could we be justly punished with the other?*"

LXIV. J. F. STAPFER, *Professor at Zurich*, 1708—1775.

"The whole human race is to be considered as a single moral person, (cui unica aliqua Persona moralis,) which person in Adam its head (*not a natural head only, but also a federal head*) entered into covenant with God: and yielded consent, therefore, in all those things which Adam as a public person did and stipulated for himself and for all his posterity. But where there is consent, there also liberty and will have place; and where these are, there also the transgression of the law is sin. If man is born corrupt, and is such from the first moment of his existence, he also sins freely (sponte). But while he is a voluntary transgressor of the law, he consents also to that corruption, and therefore that also is his sin."

Then, to the objection that the sin of Adam can not be ours, simply because imputed, unless we would be willing to say that God by imputation makes them sinners whom he does not find such, Stapfer replies:

"This objection likewise may be answered from the previous reply; for, provided that this whole moral person Adam, with the whole human race, or the entire body and mass, in a moral estimation and by consent should commit the same sin, as well in number as in form, it would follow that the sin should also be imputed to the whole mass; and that, therefore, God imputing this sin finds already the whole moral person a sinner, *and does not only make him such.* (Neque demum eam talem facit.) And since corruption having entered by the sin of Adam could not but pervade the whole mass through natural generation, God regarding the whole human race as only a single body, and representing for itself all in a single act, could not otherwise represent the whole human race to himself than as also corrupt; and, therefore, finding man already corrupted, he imputes the sin both as to its first origin and progress."*

* We have rarely met with a more flagrant instance of what appears to be deliberate and intentional misrepresentation, than that which occurs respecting Stapfer in *Princeton Essays*, I, p. 148-149. The whole representation of his "*apologizing* for his statements," etc., is deceptive and unfounded, as our readers may see from the passage itself, the whole of which we have presented in our *Essay I*. The effort by such means to blast the reputation of this admirable theologian merely because he rejects the Supralapsarian figment of antecedent

LXV. D. WYTTEBACH, *Professor at Marburg*, †1779.

Tholuck, in his History of Rationalism, speaks of this writer (father of the philologist of the same name) as "a rigidly orthodox and Calvinistic theologian." In his *Compend. Theol. Dogmaticæ et Moralis*, Cap. 7, Sect. 326 seq., he thus speaks:

"Because Adam in the covenant of works acted in the name of his posterity, it follows also that when he transgressed the covenant he transgressed it also in the name of his posterity. As to the consequence, therefore, it is the same thing as if his posterity themselves should break the covenant, and sin. Because if it is the same, and if any one should properly and physically complete something, even if he himself commenced it not, and that by virtue of his completing it, it becomes morally his own; it must follow that the transgression of the covenant has become morally the transgression of all Adam's posterity.

"If, therefore, it is the same thing as to consequence (that is, as respects either the reward or punishment of the action), and if he who did the deed should have the action *imputed* to him (which is, to be pronounced the author of the deed, at least actually and morally where the consequence is concerned), it must, therefore, follow that that sin of Adam can be imputed to his posterity. Rom. v: 19.

"But that all the posterity of Adam are born destitute of the gifts of the Divine image, and can not be born otherwise (*nec aliter possint nasci*), is evident; because from a bepoisoned root and stem nothing out a poisoned growth can proceed, especially where the evil receives strength by advancing, as where increase is found by propagation, etc. Ps. li: 17; Job xiv: 4; John iii. 6. And hence this very destitution of the Divine image is inseparably accompanied by an inclination to evil. * * * * * This very inclination to evil, because it is transferred (*transfunditur*) from the root with our birth (*à stirpe cum nativitate*), comes not only extrinsically, nor is it contracted through inclination and example, but is inwardly concealed, implanted, and begotten together with our nature itself.

"The privation of the Divine image, and also the contrary propensity to evil, begotten within us, and through birth propagated to all men, is called *original corruption, original sin*."

imputation, is simply an outrage. Stapfer, as our readers can now see for themselves, expresses precisely the views of the Reformed Church on Original Sin; his only fault being that, like Edwards, he endeavors to sustain that view by an appeal to his philosophy.

LXVI. JOHN WITHERSPOON, *President of Nassau Hall,*
1722-1794.

We have already, in our first Essay, pp. 425-427, referred to the views of this great divine. As true a Presbyterian and Calvinist as his great ancestor, John Knox himself, no man ever had a more just or more intelligent appreciation of the doctrines of our Church than he, or less of a disposition to compromise any portion of them whatever. What his views were, respecting the subjective desert of any and of every creature, against whom the justice of God utters the voice of condemnation, can be learned from the citations from his writings referred to above. And having surveyed in all its logical, doctrinal and practical bearings the theme now before us, he, referring directly to the doctrine of the imputation of Christ's righteousness as the sole foundation of our justification, says:

"The intelligent reader will probably perceive that I have expressed the above doctrine in such general terms, as not distinctly to take a part in the differences that are to be found among some authors, as to the way of explaining it, and particularly as to the nature of faith. *The reason of my doing so is, that I would willingly rather reconcile than widen these differences; and because it is my firm persuasion, that however some think it justest, or wisest, or safest, to express themselves one way, and some another, yet all who have a deep and real conviction, that they are by nature in a lost state, and under the wrath of God, and that there is no salvation in any other but in Christ, are, if they understood one another at bottom, or at least in all things any way material, entirely of the same opinion.* Accordingly the reader will, I hope, find that the reasoning in the following pages may easily be applied by them all without exception." *Tract on Justification, p. 32, note.*

In the first part of this third Essay, we have adverted sufficiently to the testimony of eminent theologians who were the cotemporaries of Dr. Witherspoon, and who have flourished subsequently. And if our readers will turn back and refer again to the testimony there adduced from Dr. DICK, Dr. HILL, and the great and venerable Dr. CHALMERS, the entire coincidence of their testimony with that of the great body of the Reformed Church on this subject, will be perceived. We conclude this catalogue of great and venerable names with that of the late

LXVII. ARCHIBALD ALEXANDER, *Professor in Princeton Seminary.*

In his "*Treatise on Justification*," issued by our Board of Publication, this venerated teacher speaks as follows respecting the leading principle which underlies the Supralapsarian scheme; and so far is he from admitting the principle so strenuously contended for by Dr. Hodge, that God may of his mere will constitute his creatures either guilty or innocent, that he says:

"If we were innocent, then might we willingly and boldly appear in the presence of our Judge; for no one of his creatures need ever fear that he will treat them with injustice. But if we are all transgressors, the more holy God is, the more reason have we to expect punishment." "As justification is the sentence of a judge *declaring the true condition of a person, in relation to the law*, it becomes necessary to inquire, what law it is which is the rule of judgment in pronouncing a creature just; or in condemning him for want of obedience," * * * * *. "So, when God pronounces sentence upon any one, it will be strictly according to his own righteous law." * * * * *. "God, who can not lie, never can pronounce him to be free from guilt and liable to no charge who has, in a single instance disobeyed. Man fell under the curse by one transgression," * * * * *. "All theories which suppose that grace is exercised at the expense of justice, or that in order to the manifestation of grace, law and justice must be suspended, labor under a radical mistake in theology, which can not but introduce darkness and perplexity into their whole system. Indeed if law and justice could have been set aside or suspended, there had been no occasion for the plan of redemption. The only reason why sinners could not be saved was, that the law and justice of God stood in the way."

We here conclude our catalogue of testimonies. It is neither as full nor as complete as I should probably have had it, had not access to my library been greatly interrupted, during its preparation, by the war which has been so fearfully raging in Kentucky: still it is sufficient to settle the question, for the decision of which these testimonies have been adduced. Yet it has not been my aim or wish (as our readers may see) to select witnesses to establish a point; but to present the testimony of the Church of God on the subject just as it exists, and with whatever variations it may contain. For in no other way can the subject be intelligently understood. A large por-

tion of the testimonies, moreover, as given in the work of Rivetus, are cited by Dr. Hodge in the Princeton Essays; and we have frequently cited the same, either more or less fully, as the case seemed to require (as a reference to Dr. Hodge's Essay will show), and we have likewise frequently not only followed the translations which he has given, but have adopted his quotations. We have already remarked, moreover, that the design of Rivetus in adducing this testimony, and the design of Dr. Hodge in making his selection therefrom, are altogether different. Rivetus, as the title of his treatise indicates,* merely aimed to show that the decree of the Synod of Charenton, respecting the imputation of Adam's sin to all his posterity, was in perfect accordance with the recognized teaching of the Reformed Church: while Dr. Hodge has fallen into the unaccountable misapprehension of supposing that Rivetus cited them in support of the dogma of *antecedent* imputation, in the sense in which Dr. Hodge himself entertains that doctrine; but which, as we have seen, Rivetus never did entertain; while, on the contrary, as has been shown, many of the citations themselves evince that such a design could never have entered the mind of Rivetus, unless it could be supposed that he seriously set out to establish the truth of a theory by testimony which pronounced the theory to be false; and not only this, but which would consequently prove that he himself was in error. Of course, this is inadmissible; though Dr. Hodge's use of him can not be justified except on the assumption that this must have been his intention.

It is really surprising that Dr. Hodge could have fallen into this error. He is well acquainted with the work of De Moor (the *Comment. Perpet. in Marckii Compendium*), and that writer expressly says: "*πρῶτον ψεῦδος suum Placæus sæpe prodit, negatur Fædus Operum cum Adamo initum.*" Vol. III, p. 264. And on p. 281, he quotes Jæguerus with approbation, as saying that Placæus taught that "*Peccatum Originale TANTUM IN HABITUALI, subjectivâ et inhærente corruptione consistere; quæ ad singulos per generationem ordinarium propagetur; IMPUTATIONEM FIGMENTUM, ESSE,*" etc. If all this be so, *then these are the views which the Synod condemned*; and it was to sustain this

*The title is given in De Moor, III, 271, and in Princeton Essays, I, 195.

sentence that Rivetus wrote his book. Hence, in refuting those views, he could adduce the testimony of the whole Reformed Church; for all alike, Supralapsarian and Infralapsarian, united in their condemnation. And with all their differences of views, therefore, those witnesses answered the purpose of Rivetus; while the vast majority of them testify directly against Dr. Hodge; and against the distinction which he, in common with Placæus, has adopted; and against his idea of antecedent imputation, as appears not only from the foregoing catalogue, but also from the number of others given in the Princeton Essays, and to which we have referred in a note at the end of citation No. XXXVII above. He adduces them against those who rigidly hold, and ever have held, the federal headship of Adam, and so departs from the design of Rivetus; and, therefore, they not only do not yield him support, but they can be turned directly against him. And we may also add that even De Moor, with all his Supralapsarian proclivities (inherited from his teacher Marck), sustains the representation which they make respecting the transmission of corruption, that it is by generation, and in consequence of a participation therein, on account of which the sin of Adam and also our own sin in Adam, are imputed to us all. What, then, becomes of the reiterated asseveration of Dr. Hodge, that the constant statement of the Reformed Church on this subject is that corruption is propagated *neque per corpus, neque per animam, sed per culpam*? We request that he produce his authority for the statement, for we take direct issue with him here, and deny *in toto* the accuracy of the averment. De Moor himself, in Cap. xv., Sect. 33, wherein he specifically treats of the "*Modus quo corruptio naturalis propagatur*" (see p. 287), makes no mention of any such canon; but goes on to say: "In genere tutò affirmare licet, quod corruptio propagatur per generationem naturalem: ita a. præit Scriptura, Job xiv: 4, Ps. li: 7, Job iii: 6, quæ loca," etc. And even the celebrated J. H. HEIDEGGER, of Zurich (1633—1698), though a strong assertor of that phase of immediate imputation against which Placæus had written, could not abandon this same idea. In his *Corpus Theol.*, Loco X., after mentioning that Hunnius (the Lutheran divine, who had flourished a century before), had suggested, though in a different sense, the distinction made by Placæus,

goes on to say: "But the true imputation of the Adamic sin does not *follow*, but *precedes* inherent corruption as the meritorious cause of it (*tanquam causa hujus meritoria*). *For the first sin is not imputed to us because we are born corrupt, but we are born corrupt because the first sin is imputed to us for corruption and condemnation.*" This is very plain, and from the stand-point assumed by Dr. Hodge, that the phrase "*the first sin*," as thus employed, is *Adam's personal sin alone*, and in no sense ours, except by a figure of speech or a mere legal fiction, the inference is unavoidable: that divines, who thus employ this language, sustain the doctrine of immediate imputation. But if, on the contrary, they employ the phrase "first sin" to mean, not Adam's personal sin alone, but *our sin*, as the apostle expresses it: that is, *our sin* in and fall with Adam in that first transgression, their authority can not, without great and manifest injustice, be pleaded in support of the *antecedent* imputation of Dr. Hodge. We are born corrupt, says Heidegger (and his brethren who take his ground), because *the first sin* is imputed to us. But what *first sin*? is the question. Let us hear his answer, for he gives it in the same passage, which continues thus: "FOR IMPUTATION CONSISTS IN THIS: *That God has adjudged sinning Adam AND HIS POSTERITY AS BEING IMPLICATED IN THE SAME SIN, to be unworthy of the Divine image, but rather (worthy) of the whole punishment by which he punished sinning Adam, and therefore to be punished with spiritual death.*" (The whole passage is cited by De Moor, III, 277-278.) Here, then, we have the *highest type of immediate imputation* ever held by the advocates of the *Formula Consensus of Helvetia*, so often referred to by Dr. Hodge, as settling the whole question. Among the great and noble body of divines who either framed or supported it, there is not one of mightier intellect or more deeply learned than Heidegger: nor one whose name is to this hour dearer to the Church of Switzerland. In this language of his, we have presented and asserted the highest type of immediate imputation ever entertained in the Reformed Church, by men who were not open and avowed Supralapsarians; and so far from finding in their teaching the least vestige of Dr. Hodge's theory of *antecedent* imputation, the very definition of imputation itself, as given by the strongest advocates of the school which Dr. Hodge emphatically claims as support-

ing his views, makes, in direct antagonism to his view, the imputation to be a *judgment pronounced upon the facts as they are, and not a judgment which produces the facts*, as Dr. Hodge maintains. Hence, the sin of Adam, and his posterity's implication or participation therein, constituting "*the first sin*," are imputed for punishment, and moral, spiritual, and eternal death. It is hardly necessary to adduce any other statement from Heidegger, in further explanation of his views: yet the following may be added from his Dissert. I. De Concord. Protest., Sect. 51: "*Omnis perditionis causa vel culpa, non in Deo, sed in hominibus ipsis quærenda sit.*" "*The cause of blame of perdition in every case is to be sought, not in God, but in men themselves:*" precisely the sentiment reiterated by our own illustrious Witherspoon. See our first Essay, p. 426.

So far as relates to the main point of the discussion, therefore, our readers can see from the foregoing summary, that the Reformed divines, almost without exception, explicate the doctrine of original sin just as Stapfer avers that they do; that is, from the stand-point of both imputed and inherent guilt: or, in other words, both *mediately* and *immediately*, and from both the natural and federal headship of Adam; and that in not a single instance, save among the Supralapsarians, do they attempt, as Dr. Hodge does, to explicate it solely on the ground of imputation; that is, making the imputed guilt of *Adam's sin alone* causal of the inherent moral corruption of his posterity. They held that his sin and fall were also our sin and fall; and that God, therefore, finding us subjectively guilty, treats us as having sinned and fallen in our first parents. *Such is their view. Dr. Hodge denounces it as Placæan, and professes to reject it utterly. We, on the contrary, receive it as the truth of God.* Let the Church herself decide, therefore, which doctrine is the fair exponent of the faith attested by the long line of her gifted sons, and sealed by her faithful martyrs' blood. The question, as stated by Princeton, is very far from being one of trivial import. Dr. Hodge announces it to be fundamental; and in his mode of discussing it has, by virtue of his commanding position, more than once imperilled the peace and harmony of the Church.

If we may adopt the language above quoted from Doctor Witherspoon, "we would willingly rather reconcile than

widen the differences" already existing in the family of Christ on this subject: though fealty to the Great Head of the Church is not compatible with an unwillingness to speak the truth in love in any case where the interests of his truth and the welfare of his kingdom are imperilled by the insidious approaches of error, whether made from the high or from the low places in Israel. Bellarmine somewhere cites from Hilary the expression that *Bellum hæreticorum pax est Ecclesiæ*. But we should remember that the converse, too, is true: *Bellum Ecclesiæ pax est Hæreticorum*. The responsibility in this case, however, must rest with those who persist in the effort to establish a test of Calvinistic soundness, which, though never recognized save by a small and erroneous fraction of the Church, has always been repudiated by the Church herself in her councils, as well as by the great mass of her leading divines. We say, therefore, emphatically, that Dr. Hodge has not a particle of right to insist on making his views of the topic under discussion the touchstone of Calvinistic soundness in doctrine. He may entertain for himself his own views on this subject if he chooses to do so, and he will not be molested by his brethren. But let this suffice. For if he shall still persist in the effort to fasten the charge of heresy upon them because of their refusal to accept his views, and if he shall do this either by reiterating his former assertions in the matter, or even by unfair attempts to evade the manifest issues involved, we say it with the kindest feelings of personal regard for one from whose labors we have derived many and great advantages, that Dr. Hodge may reasonably expect the charge to recoil upon himself with a force which he will be scarcely able to withstand. In regard to this utterly baseless accusation of error and heresy, and of departing from recognized truth, and what not, we have borne fully as much as we intend to bear, unless better reasons can be offered to sustain the accusation than Dr. Hodge has yet alleged.

Turretin, as is abundantly manifest from the references which we have made to his works throughout this discussion, is not a safe guide in theology on any doctrine upon which the Supralapsarian scheme comes into collision with the recognized theology of the Calvinistic Church: and the propriety of placing his works (even though among the proudest monuments of theological literature) into the hands of those who are but

beginning the study of theology, may be reasonably questioned. His rejection of the Supralapsarian scheme (to which we have referred already), though formal and real, so far as he knew his own heart, was yet not thorough and fundamental, as may be seen by a careful analysis by his discussions on absolute Reprobation, the introduction of sin into the world, and other points of antagonism between the two systems. Hence, his perpetual vacillation in relation to the subject of this present discussion. It was mainly a technical repudiation of the system *as such*, while his sympathies are mostly with Beza and the school of theology founded by him in Geneva after the death of Calvin. And, in fact, the intelligent reader may easily perceive, from the preceding testimonies themselves, how the Supralapsarian element, when once recognized and formally inaugurated in a theological school, has descended, more or less extensively, from Professor to Professor, imparting either a faint tinge, or a dye of deeper hue, to their theological system. In Geneva, for example, where, during the forty-one years subsequent to Calvin's death, Beza lived and taught, and where his influence bore undisputed sway, nearly every leading divine, though evidently struggling against the pestiferous error, is found to be more or less entangled in its coils, even down to Pictet († 1724). And so, too, with regard to the school at Franeker, where the scheme was inaugurated under Maccovius and his coadjutors, we find it appearing every now and then, even down to the time of Witsius, and later. At Heidelberg, under Ursinus and Zanchius, it started into life with considerable vigor, which remained to it until the lamented Sohnnius dealt his mighty stroke upon it; after which the little vitality which survived was crushed out by the iron grasp of the Synod of Dort. At Basel, under Polanus (an ardent disciple of Zanchius), and at Leyden and Saumur, under Gomar, it flourished but a brief season, for the Dordrecht decisions nipped its buds of promise like the untimely frost; and after a long struggle with disappointment, Gomar died, apparently heart-broken, at Groningen. Neither his imperial intellect, nor his prodigious and unsurpassed learning could rescue him from neglect and obscurity.

We must not, however, omit to refer here to a method of argumentation pursued by all the modern advocates of ante-

cedent imputation, without exception; and which, though designed to sustain a very modified form of that doctrine, if compared with the views of Dr. Hodge, he has adopted; but which, from its glaring unfairness, deserves not so much a refutation as a censure. An instance of it may be cited from De Moor, III, 203 (copied by him, without acknowledgment, from Turretin, Loco. IX, Quæst. X, Sect. 3), in which he says:

"When the term original sin is extended to the imputation of the Adamic sin (which is called original sin *imputed*, as distinguished from *inherent*), that imputation is the basis of native corruption, in which sense it is employed by Ursinus, Zanchius, and others; but otherwise it is restricted to inherent corruption, imputed sin not being excluded, *but supposed as the cause and basis of the inherent*, in which sense Bucer, Calvin, Bullinger, more often speak concerning it, and who especially take this view of it."*

Dr. Hodge very often uses similar language, employing the term *imputation* as equivalent to *antecedent imputation*. But let our readers note the representation aforesaid, and let them decide for themselves whether a more glaring sophism was ever attempted than the above, repeated after Turretin by De Moor. It is well known that Ursinus and Zanchius were Supralapsarians, and that Calvin and Bullinger were Infralapsarians; and that their views differed *toto cælo* in respect to the will of God in reprobation and in the imputation of sin. And it is well known, moreover, that the Synod of Dort, while it in the fullest manner sustained the one hypothesis, utterly condemned and repudiated the other, as inconsistent and irreconcilable therewith. Did, then, that Synod of the ablest and most learned men of the age, know what it was doing in this matter? If they did, what is the meaning of this statement of De Moor and Turretin, informing their readers that on one of the great fundamental points of admitted difference, there is really no difference? And then further, as the whole cata-

* *Extenditur quandoque Peccati Originalis nomen ad Imputationem Peccati Adamici, quod dicitur Peccatum Originale Imputatum, oppositum Inherenti, quæ Imputatio vitii nativi est fundamentum; atque hoc sensu usurpatur ab URSINO, ZANCHIO, et aliis; aliàs verò ad vitium inhaerens restringitur, non excluso, sed supposito peccato imputato, tanquam Inherentis causâ et fundamento; quo sensu BUCERUS, CALVINUS, BULLINGERUS, de eo sæpius loquuntur, quique hîc speciatim spectatur.*" And Turretin adds: "Et hoc sensu à nobis nunc usurpatur."

logue of witnesses unite in declaring, the Reformed Church, except the Supralapsarians, have always explicated the doctrine of original sin without attempting to separate inherent from imputed guilt: but the aforesaid statement of De Moor and Turretin, taking the Supralapsarian ground, represents *that the Reformed Church, and even Calvin and Bullinger, when they spake of original sin inherent, did not exclude, but implied that antecedently imputed sin is the cause and foundation of that inherent sin.* Our readers have now the means (in the forecited testimonies) to know for themselves whether this statement is true, and sustained by the facts of the case; or the contrary. It is just as false (as we have abundantly shown) to say that the Reformed Church held that imputed sin is the cause of inherent sin, as to say that they held inherent sin to be the cause of imputed sin. It is just as false as it would be to say that in the economy of grace they held justification to be the cause of regeneration, or regeneration to be the cause of justification. They held that these existed synchronously both in the one case and in the other. Imputation implies the existence of subjective guilt in the posterity of Adam, and subjective guilt implies imputed guilt. And to charge, therefore, that the Reformed Church has ever so severed what God has thus joined together, as to make imputed sin causal of subjective sin, is to charge what all the facts in the case proclaim to be untrue. And then, finally, the sophism of the statement is further obvious, from considering that the imputation maintained by the school of Zanchius and the Supralapsarians is *solely from without, ab extra*; while that asserted by Calvin and the Supralapsarians is subjective also, and based upon the fact ten thousand times repeated by the divines referred to, that we sinned and fell in Adam, and so became subjectively guilty; and that his sin, along with our own sin in him, is imputed for condemnation. In the former case, *Adam's sin alone* is imputed; and in the latter, the guilt is regarded as common; and Adam's sin is imputed along with our own, we being thus guilty. The distinction is not only of the highest importance in this discussion, but is obvious and plain, seeing that the fact of our having thus sinned, and thus become subjectively guilty in Adam, is accepted by the Church on the Divine testimony, without any endeavor at philosophical solution. The

attempt, therefore, to ignore, in the aforesaid manner, this vital distinction, can not be allowed on any account whatever. And just here, and in this same connection, we will advert to another sophism, on the strength of which Dr. Hodge repeatedly endeavors to sustain the ground he has assumed. For example, the fact that his own corruption of personality in relation to Adam and his descendants, is such as to forbid his attaching any intelligible idea to the proposition that we sinned in and fell with Adam, has led him to suppose, and even to maintain, that our sin in Adam and Adam's own sin are one and the same; and consequently, that we have no subjective desert in the matter, and though we are guilty of the first sin and fall, we are guilty thereof only by imputation; and hence that imputation is antecedent and immediate, and does not in any sense arise from our own subjective guilt. This same sophism is employed in like manner by all who indorse his views. And thus to this extent, human philosophy is to be brought forward to point out what we are at liberty to believe, and what we are not at liberty to believe, of the clear and undoubted announcements of God. Those announcements declare that *Adam sinned*, and that *all sinned*; and that in consequence thereof, judgment and death came upon him and upon all. The meaning of this proposition is as plain and clear as the meaning of the statement of our blessed Redeemer, "I and my Father are one;" or the meaning of the declaration of the apostle, that Christ is "God manifest in the flesh;" or that He is "over all God blessed forever;" or any other Divine announcement whatever.

And now in view of the foregoing speculation of Dr. Hodge and others, let it be considered, that an act of God imputing to us a personal sin of Adam, can only be, in its own nature, outward and forensic, as to us; and that no such act of God can, in its own nature, make us inwardly depraved. Something more is requisite. For otherwise, the imputation of our sins to Christ would have made him inwardly corrupt, and the imputation of his righteousness to us would make us inwardly holy; neither of which is true, or indeed possible. On the other hand, our inward natural pollution, would not necessarily involve and draw after it, or necessarily presuppose, an imputation outward and forensic as to us, of the guilt of any per-

sonal sin of Adam. In the one case, and in the other, the facts being absolute and synchronous and inseparable (as so fully illustrated throughout this discussion), the headship of Adam, both natural and federal, and the headship of Christ, both supernatural and federal, *are always implied*. Considered as of one nature with Adam, and being his posterity, there is no difficulty in seeing that we sinned in him and fell with him; considered as being different persons from him, and yet his descendants and of his nature, there is no difficulty in seeing that he might be our federal head. If Dr. Hodge should still insist that the ideas of oneness of nature and plurality of persons, in the human race, puts the questions of the headship of Adam and the effects upon us of his fall, in a position that renders the idea of our sinning in him incomprehensible, except it mean that we sinned in him *only* representatively (for sinning representatively, and sinning *only* representatively, are not the same), we respectfully request him to bear in mind that the doctrine of oneness of nature, and plurality of persons in the Godhead, *is the very foundation of all that is explicable in the revealed mode of salvation, and of the efficacy of it all, as revealed*. And so, too, the announcement involving an equally incomprehensible principle of oneness and plurality, is the very foundation of all that is explicable in all that is revealed to us of the doctrine of original sin. And why, then, should any Christian man make the incomprehensibleness of this latter announcement a reason for disregarding or rejecting it, and yet aver that the incomprehensibleness of the former furnishes no ground for rejecting that? while, at the same time, he concedes that each announcement rests alike upon the revealed testimony of God. Adam and his race have the same nature and oneness of nature, but many persons: and God is One, and He is Three, and the three persons of the Godhead have one and the same nature; and these are *facts of revelation*, not the discoveries of philosophy. In the latter case, moreover, we are lost, if our salvation is not explicable, consistently, not only with the mode of God's being, but with that mode still farther complicated (if we may so speak) by the Second Person of the Godhead taking our nature, and then renewing us in his nature; these making our union with him mean that we share a common nature with him in a two-fold way. And

now let me ask will all the seriousness which so deeply serious a theme is calculated to awaken, can anything be more idle after accepting these truths as the basis of salvation, than to quibble about the pretended difficulties of our being in Adam, sinning with him, and falling with him, because we are different persons from him? Can there possibly be any more difficulty in believing the testimony of God in the one case than in the other? Was not the Son of God a different person from the Father, and also a different person from us, and yet is He not of one nature with both? Indeed if this were not so, our whole race is lost and undone forever. The truth is, that the essence of the Supralapsarian theory is incompatible with the revealed mode of the nature both of God and of the human race; and therefore it must necessarily terminate in sequences, both ethical and philosophical, which are alike repudiated by the Scriptures, and repugnant to the general and settled convictions of the church in every age.

And now, in conclusion, and in view of the whole matter, we ask our readers' attention to the following lengthy extract from Dr. Hodge's Review of Dr. Baird's recent work, for it is on many accounts important that it be presented in this connection:

"The design of the apostle in Romans v: 12-21, is not simply to teach that as Adam was in one way the cause of sin and death, so Christ was in another way the cause of righteousness and life, *but to illustrate the mode or way in which the righteousness of Christ avails to our justification.* From the third chapter and twenty-first verse he had been engaged in setting forth the method of justification, not sanctification. He had insisted that it was not our works, or our subjective character, but the blood of Christ, his propitiatory death, his righteousness, the righteousness of God, something therefore out of ourselves, which is the judicial ground of our justification. It is to illustrate this great fundamental doctrine of his gospel that he refers to the parallel case of Adam, and shows that antecedently to any act of our own, before any corruption of nature, the sentence of condemnation passed on all men for the offense of one. *To deny this, and to assert that our own subjective character is the ground of the sentence, is not only to deny the very thing which the apostle asserts, but to overturn his whole argument. It is to take sides with the Jews against the apostle, and to maintain that the righteousness of one man can not be the ground of the justification of another.* This doctrine which denies the immediate or antecedent imputation of

Adam's sin, and makes inherent corruption as derived from him the primary ground of the condemnation of the race, was consequently declared, almost with one voice, to be contrary to Scripture, to the faith of the Reformed Churches, and even of the Church Catholic. It was unanimously and repeatedly condemned by the National Synod of France to which Placcæus belonged.* It was no less unanimously condemned by the Church of Holland. The Leyden Professors, in their recommendation of the work which their colleague Rivetus had written against Placcæus, declare the doctrine in question to be a *dogma contrarium communi omnium fermè Christianorum consensui*, and pronounce the doctrine of immediate imputation to be a *dogma verè Catholicum*. The same condemnation of this theory was pronounced by the churches in Switzerland. It was one of the errors against which the *Formula consensus Helvetica*, published in 1675, was directed. In that Formula it is said, 'Non possumus, salva cœlesti veritate, assensum præbere ūs qui Adamum posteros suos ex instituto Dei repræsentasse ac proinde ejus peccatum posteris ejus ἀπέσως imputari negant, et sub imputationis mediatæ et consequentis nomine, non imputationem duntaxat primi peccati tollunt, sed hæreditariæ etiam corruptionis assertionem gravi periculo objiciunt.' It would, however, be a great mistake to assume that the doctrine of the immediate imputation of Adam's sin is a doctrine peculiar to Calvinism. It is as much inwrought in the theology of the Lutheran as in that of the Reformed Churches. It is not even a distinguishing doctrine of Protestants. It is truly a Catholic doctrine. It belongs as much to the Latin Church as it does to those who were forced to withdraw from her communion." †

In this passage are exhibited in brief, Dr. Hodge's *exegesis*, his *theology*, and his *church history* as bearing upon the subject of this essay; and our readers will observe, that the facts presented in the course of our examination have shown, 1. That this exegesis of Dr. Hodge is not only wholly unsustained by the text, but that the Reformed Church has utterly rejected it

* Why should Dr. Hodge repeat this inaccurate averment respecting that Synod's indorsement of antecedent imputation? The very next National Synod after the one which condemned the views charged upon Placcæus, did, in view of his own explanation, reconsider and modify that very act of censure in relation to him; as we have fully shown. Why Turretin and De Moor, in a professed history of the case, should have omitted so important a fact, and one so vitally affecting the reputation of a justly eminent but calumniated man, we can not pretend to say. But we do aver that they were bound in all candor to give it a full expression in the connection.

† Princeton Review for 1860, pp. 344, 345.

from the very beginning as false and unsupported. In proof of this we have cited the testimony of Calvin, Beza, Pareus, Piscator, Chamier, De Dieu, Hyperius, Tilenus, Gomar, Rivet, Turretin, and Owen. 2. It has shown that his theology is false, and is likewise discarded by the Calvinistic Church, and claimed only by the Supralapsarians; and by Bellarmine and Ockham, and other divines of the Papal Church. And it has shown 3. That Dr. Hodge's church history is based upon a thorough and entire misapprehension of the facts to which he refers.* For (1.) Neither the French Synod nor the Leyden Professors, nor the *Formula Consensus*, advocate the view for which he contends. And (2.) Neither do they condemn the view which he condemns. That is, they all unite in condemning the views attributed to Placæus, but they nowhere condemn, but on the contrary sustain the views advanced by Calvin, Edwards, Stapfer, and Breckinridge, as presented in our first Essay. All this is true, and has been abundantly established by facts. And it is moreover true, that the dogma which Dr. Hodge asserts as orthodox, not only never was received by the Calvinistic Church, but has ever been condemned by that Church; and that it has ever been fruitful of the greatest heresies, and most serious disturbances in the Church. So stands the matter.

In contemplating the fact, however, of Dr. Hodge's undesigned attempt (for we are assured that it was undesigned) to introduce Supralapsarianism into the Church, we should do both himself and ourselves manifest injustice were we to lose sight of the circumstances under which the occurrence originally took place. To follow out an illustration referred to in

* We have already shown that though the Reformed Church admitted to some extent the doctrine of immediate imputation as taught by Heidegger, it never, except some of the Supralapsarians, entertained the doctrine as advocated by Dr. Hodge. Weissman, in referring to the Placæan controversy, says, "Si in veteribus et recentibus hujus partis Scriptoribus attendatur—Si, inquam, hæc aliaque attendantur, apparebit, *sententiam istam Imputationis immediate vel mediate esse apud Reformatos liberam, problematicam, variè disputatam, NEQUAQUAM VERO NECESSARIAM ET UNIVERSALEM.*" See Hist. Eccles. Sac. XVII. § 26. This is true of even the low form of immediate imputation claimed to be held by Heidegger; how, then, can Dr. Hodge allege, as he does in the above extract, and so frequently in other places, that the Supralapsarian form of the doctrine as held by himself, was universally received, regarded as fundamental, etc., etc.?

the close of our second Essay, we may remark that when, in an Infralapsarian community the pendulum of its distinguishing tenet (or doctrine respecting grace and condemnation) is made to swing in one direction, it rarely in its return stops at the point of departure; but the backward sweep is likely to carry it beyond that point as far in the opposite direction. On the one side is Pelagianism, and on the other Supralapsarianism. And when, some thirty years since, the pendulum received a sudden stroke which caused it to vibrate in the direction of Pelagianism, it was, perhaps, what might have been looked for (where the mighty magnet of Turretinism was being brought with great labor from the opposite side to be planted at the center), that the return sweep should be in the direction of Supralapsarianism: for, where the balance is not well preserved at the center by a correct appreciation of the principles of Calvinistic theology, it is human nature in such cases and under the excitement of controversy, to meet philosophy by philosophy, and extreme by extreme. So when, especially in 1829-1831, the pendulum began to vibrate, the stupendous illiteracy of Dr. Beecher (notwithstanding his strong native powers) and the helpless incapacity of Mr. Albert Barnes, could have imparted but little force to the movement; yet where a strong effort was made by men of real learning and ability, both in New England and in our own Church, to add force to the movement towards Pelagianism, and to represent its principles as the true theology of Calvinism (as may be seen by perusing the articles in the Quarterly Christian Spectator of that period, to some of which we have referred on p. 390, of our first Essay), it is not surprising that the garrison having in charge our noble old citadel at Princeton, should have put on their harness, and stepped forward into the thickest of the fight; and it was expected, moreover, that her favorite, and at that time youthful, champion should be foremost in the charge; nor is it strange that in the excitement of the scene he should have imparted a force to the pendulum which should drive it to the opposite extreme; nor that it should still incline thitherward, attracted by the Turretinic (almost Titanic) magnet aforesaid. In other words, when subjective desert was claimed as the basis for the imputation of both sin and righteousness, and also (as in the the-

ology of Mr. Finney) of both election and reprobation, it is not strange that, in the circumstances aforesaid, the speculation should have been met by another speculation involving the denial of subjective desert in both. And when such an idea of Divine justice was taught, as to make it recognize human desert in the matter of grace, or subjective merit as the ground of the imputation of righteousness, and of election to eternal life, it is nowise remarkable that (where Beza and Gomar and Turretin had been accepted as the true exponents of Calvinism) the whole matter in relation to both eternal life and eternal death, should be referred to the mere will or sovereignty of God; and that the great fact should be lost sight of that there is an infinite difference in their principles between the theology, which, in the matter of grace and condemnation regards man as unfallen, and that which regards him as already fallen and lost. But in the excitement of controversy, and when human philosophy is allowed to mingle with our theology, it is not remarkable that this difference should be lost sight of. And, therefore, in forming a judgment concerning Dr. Hodge's introduction of the Supralapsarian element into the Calvinistic theology of the Presbyterian communion, we should do him as great injustice to ignore these considerations, as he has done to Placæus by ignoring the like in his case. But when Dr. Hodge, from the high Supralapsarian position thus assumed, insists that they who abide upon the Infralapsarian center should either ascend to his airy castle by the Turretinic causeway, or be exterminated as heretics, he leaves us no alternative but to show that his castle wholly lacks a foundation—that it is a mere balloon; and that the causeway, through its paving shows many a topaz, and jasper, and chrysolite, and many a massive block hewn from the diamond quarries of Heaven, yet rests upon pillars some of which are partly iron and partly clay; and that it can not be safely trusted, even by those who are most agile in leaping over the chasms already formed by the crumbling of those formidable-looking, but frail supporters.

And just here, it may be proper, before closing, to add that though we have referred to Dr. Hodge and his positions plainly and pointedly throughout this discussion (though not with the unsparing severity which he is prone to employ on similar

occasions), it is no part of the design of this discussion to impair his influence or standing in the theological world. Nor need any such result follow of necessity. For if his views can be successfully defended, he can defend them. Or if, on the contrary, he has been laboring under a theological mistake, we do not believe that he is the man to persist in it against his own convictions. It is true that the history of theological discussion rarely furnishes an instance where a gentleman of commanding position and influence, has frankly admitted that he was mistaken on a point in support of which he had consecrated the earnest labor of many years; but it is still true that no one who has done so, has ever forfeited thereby his influence with the Church of God; or has failed to enshrine himself more deeply than ever in its sincerest love and regard. Dr. Hodge has said:

“If we have cited the concurrent opinion of the church improperly; if we have supposed the great body of the people of God to have believed what they did not believe, let us be set right, and we shall be thankful.” (Princeton Essays I, p. 131.)

And believe he meant what he said. And were we capable of indulging an emotion of pleasure in view of fastening a serious error upon a learned and accomplished professor, who is aiming faithfully to serve his day and generation, we should feel that we were a despicable creature. And if it may be here permitted to say a word of a personal nature in this connection, no one knows better than we do how to sympathize with Dr. Hodge in this whole matter. In early life, and even before our ordination to the work of the Christian ministry, we saw the importance and felt the necessity of a more thorough knowledge of the theology of the doctrines of grace, from the times of the apostles to our own day, than we could find in the possession of those who were writing and speaking very dogmatically in relation thereto; and we seriously set out to obtain it. We commenced with the era of the Reformation, as the most frequent references were to the doctrines of the Reformed Church of that period. We first fell in with some things of Beza, and with the Syntagma of Polanus (of Basel), and soon after with the works of Gomar. Calvin, of course, we studied; but we became perfectly enraptured in tracing from

proposition to proposition, and from theme to theme, the logical concatenation running through that huge work of Polanus; but Gomar with his great learning, and wonderful power of analysis, led us completely captive; and had we then been appointed to read lectures on theology, or called into a discussion of the doctrines of grace before the public, we should have viewed them, to a very considerable extent, from the stand-point of these two great divines. And having identified such a position with our literary reputation (whatever that might be) before the church and public, we understand the operations of the human heart well enough to know the power of that influence which must have been brought to bear upon all our subsequent reading; and the tendency which it is calculated to produce in the mind. We have felt all this; and while pursuing the present discussion, have ever had it in memory. And we should have deemed it scarcely worth our while to criticise the earlier productions of Dr. Hodge on the subject before us, had it not been for his recent indorsement and reiteration, and even advance upon the very principles inculcated in those earlier tractates; and for the evidence derived from other sources that these views were becoming current in our church; and in some places even constituted the touchstone of Calvinistic orthodoxy. In such a case, we have felt that silence would be injustice to the cause of God and truth. The truly painful feature of the case, and that which we were not prepared to meet so extensively is the misuse which Dr. Hodge has made of his authorities. But we know how easily, and in how many ways, a mistake may be made here; and we have no doubt that he will correct those errors. No upright mind who has any knowledge of Dr. Hodge can suspect for a moment that they were intentional; nor do we doubt that their occurrence is susceptible of a satisfactory solution.

As to the work of Dr. Baird, to which we have had occasion to refer in connection with the Reviews of it, we hope that nothing which has been said in relation thereto will be so considered as to imply our approval of its main speculations, or our sympathy with the mode of treating the subject as therein exhibited. It has been very harshly assailed by Dr. Hodge, from a Supralapsarian stand-point; and has been criti-

cised by Dr. Thornwell from a stand-point evincing a strong sympathy with the same scheme, and its defenders; and we have felt that whatever may be the merits or demerits of the work itself, some of the grounds upon which it has been assailed are presumptive of its merit rather than otherwise. We are not, however, called upon to give here our own views of this performance, except so far as respects the point before us; and we do not regret it, for Calvinism has no more to do with such philosophical speculations than with the speculations of the Supralapsarian school. And it is quite time that the ministry and the church at large, were made fully to understand this fact. Dr. Baird has done good service by his arguments, evincing that the guilt of Adam and his posterity was a common guilt; and this, after all, was the great point bearing directly upon the subject before us, which his reviewers, if they attempted to say anything against his work, were required to meet. But neither of them make any more allusion to it, as a topic ably treated therein, and in connection with the real theme of discussion, than they do to the contents of the yet unrolled volumes discovered among the ruins of Pompeii. But instead of attempting to meet this the actual issue involved, they assail his philosophy, and absurdities, and what not; whereas, great as are the absurdities of Dr. Baird's speculative system, they, both in weight and measurement, sink into insignificance if compared with the speculative errors involved in the philosophy of his antagonists. And then, moreover, Dr. Baird's vindication of the justice of God, against the speculations by which it is often impugned—speculations with which, as it now appears, his reviewers were in deep sympathy, is complete, so far as he confines himself to the Word of God; but when he departs from this, he is weaker than an infant. His work has also done this good service, that it has drawn forth a fuller expression of the Supralapsarian element than would probably have been otherwise made for some time to come. Dr. Baird's work is on many accounts intrinsically valuable, and will take its place in our theological libraries as a work evincing great industry and ability; and will be remembered, moreover, as the tractate which developed the last great effort of the Supralapsarian scheme to obtain the ascendancy in Calvinistic theology.

In this same connection and in view of the persistent efforts (unkind and uncandid too almost without a parallel) to destroy the reputation of a work of singular merit, to which we have had occasion to refer repeatedly in this discussion, we take the opportunity to say, that the most perfect exposition of the Calvinistic system in its doctrinal and practical details which we have as yet had the fortune to meet with in the Reformed theology, and the most perfect development of the Infralapsarian principle as distinguished from the Supralapsarian, elaborated, too, in all its facts, with a depth and consistency rarely attained and never surpassed, and to the utmost allowable limits of that principle, without the slightest compromise either with Supralapsarianism on the one hand, or Pelagianism on the other, is the treatise of our theological Professor in Danville Seminary, Kentucky. To any one extensively familiar with the writings of the Reformed divines, it must be a matter of surprise how Dr. Breckinridge, in the work referred to, has succeeded in restating with such remarkable clearness the Calvinistic system, so as both to include all the desirable results of past investigation, and to avoid the errors which, through the influence of false philosophies, have sought at various times and by the potency of illustrious names, to associate themselves with the doctrines of grace. To us it appears truly surprising that persons in our own church who claim to possess a reputable acquaintance with Calvinistic theology, should undertake to disparage such a work; a work which we regard as an honor both to our church and country, and one which is calculated, in an eminent degree, to make known the true and saving knowledge of God.

We have now completed our work; one design of which has been to evince by a full presentation of the facts in the case that the whole doctrine of the imputation of sin as taught and insisted on by a portion of our church, requires to be modified. The doctrine of antecedent imputation, as entertained and asserted by Dr. Hodge, never was the doctrine of the Presbyterian Church either in this land or in the British Islands; nor of the Reformed Church on the continent. We might show how Dr. Hodge was led into the mistake which resulted in the opposite conclusion, but this is hardly necessary. His own attempt, or any attempt to reconcile the Supralapsarian scheme

with Calvinism, by occasionally adopting the representations which each presents of the subject before us, while it is calculated only to confuse and mislead, can result in nothing but failure. To say that the imputation of sin is antecedent, and moral corruption consequent thereupon is to utter a sentiment inconsistent with the doctrine that we having sinned and fallen in Adam, God finds us guilty and corrupted by that fall, and treats us as sinful, guilty, and corrupt. The former is Dr. Hodge's views, and the latter the doctrine of the Reformed Church, which has ever taught that *we are exposed to the displeasure of God, not only because Adam sinned, but because we sinned in and fell with him in his first transgression* (though not in his *other transgressions*, as must be the fact, if the philosophical theories of identity are to be recognized). *How we* then sinned, the church has never pretended to say, though some have philosophized hereon; claiming, that antecedent imputation, identity with Adam, traduction, and what not, may solve the problem. BUT LET NO SUCH SPECULATIONS BE CHARGED UPON THE CHURCH HERSELF. She has ever been satisfied with the simple fact announced on the testimony of God; and has held that the doctrine of original sin can be properly explicated only by a full recognition of both the natural and federal headship of Adam. "The sin of Adam is imputed, but never irrespective of our nature and its inherent sin. That is, we must not attempt to separate Adam's federal from his natural headship—by the union of which he is the *Root* of the human race."* This is the doctrine of God's own blessed Word; and has ever been the doctrine of the Calvinistic Church.

DANVILLE, Ky., Dec. 16, 1861.

P. S. As the writer has accepted a chaplaincy in the army of the United States, with which he expects to continue, if his life be spared, until the conclusion of the present struggle on behalf of our Constitution and Government, he would request

* See p. 499, of the "Knowledge of God Objectively Considered," by Dr. Breckinridge.

that, in case any reply is, in the meantime, offered to the foregoing argument, the public will, before pronouncing a final decision on any issue which may be taken, allow to him (if living) a reasonable time and opportunity to give to such rejoinder a proper consideration. L.

ERRATA.

The following errata occur in our article on Imputation published in the September number:

- P. 514, line 12, for *fleshy* read *fleshy*.
- P. 518, l. 2, for *tandum* read *tantum*.
- P. 519, l. 7 from bottom, add an * after *imputation*.
- P. 520, l. 20, for "*they never denied*," read "*it never deemed*."
- P. 522, l. 18, omit the quotation marks.
- P. 522, l. 18, for "*Frigland*" read "*Trigland*."
- P. 522, l. 32, for *were* read *are*.
- P. 522, l. 2 from bottom, for *parable* read *parallel*.
- P. 524, l. 17, after *says*, use a ; instead of a .
- P. 524, l. 28, for *See* read *So*.
- P. 524, first line of note, insert *in* before *Rom*.
- P. 527, note, line 8, after *Adam* read a , instead of a . ; and for *We* read *we*.
- P. 528, l. 6 from bottom, add a ; after *ostendunt*.
- P. 529, l. 24, omit the words "*teach that*."
- P. 530, l. 1, for "*antithesis or analogy*" read "*notion of imputation*."
- P. 531, l. 4, for *first* read *one*.
- P. 531, l. 5, for *second* read *other*.
- P. 538, l. 7 from bottom, read *in propria persona*.

ART. II.—*Mental Science*.

It is a curious and significant fact that the human mind, ever active, takes but little notice of itself. This is the more remarkable, as the mind is not, as the eye, dependent on a reflector for its self-cognition. It is capable of scanning and analyzing its own constitution and operations.

The conceded mystery of its own existence is sometimes assigned as a reason for this reluctance of the mind to self-investigation. There is, however, no more mystery involved in the existence and operations of mind than in the existence and organization of matter. Neither can be defined.

Matter is known only by its properties, mind only by its operations. Mind only is cognizant of matter of material properties, organization, and laws. All science, therefore, must, from the necessity of the case, be mental. Outside of, or apart from mind, there can be no science. The consciousness of its own existence and operations must underlie all knowledge in every department of science. To ignore the existence of mind, therefore, in any of the departments of science, is an absurdity a thousand-fold more monstrous than it would be to ignore space in geography or time in astronomy.

Still the fact remains that the human mind is reluctant to grapple with the mystery of its own existence, to analyze its character and operations. These are the subjects of which the masses of the race are most profoundly ignorant. This may be the cause, or it may be the effect, of another significant fact, that those who have attempted to analyze and exhibit the constitution and operations of the mind have differed widely in their theories on subjects of vast importance and universal interest, as well as in regard to the simplest incidents of daily experience. Still, another fact may be noticed as important. Many of the most popular modern writers on mental science, who differ from each other in their starting point and respective processes, arrive at the same goal, and unite in the same conclusions. Conclusions at war with moral principles, and subversive of the foundations and frame-work of society.

On the existence of the soul these speculations have taken a wide range. On the one hand, we have the atheistic materialism of a fortuitous concourse of atoms. On the other, the philosophically-refined and concentrated blasphemy which represents the soul of man as the most complete personification of Deity. At one time sensation alone is the source of knowledge. At another, the soul is evaporated out of existence by the subtle friction of its own ideas.

The denial of the existence of a living, personal Deity, can not be made by a rational being without inflicting a shock on the fundamental principles of his mental and moral constitution, attested by his own consciousness. The denial of the existence of matter involves a profundity of stupidity to which we may well suppose the rational mind incapable of diving, unaided by some infernal agency. That depth has been

sounded, and still a lower, in which the mind has earnestly and persistently denied its own existence, and the scientific and literary world, instead of assigning these mental mountebanks to Bedlam, where they belonged, and consigning their insane whimsies to oblivion, stood agaze, as though beings of a superior order had incarnated themselves among men. This stupid idolatry of such perversely stupid folly encouraged hosts of minds, whose only hope for fame lay in the wake of some popular name, to go and do likewise. It remains for future ages to wonder that such folly was once dignified with the title of Philosophy, and much more that it has so long and so extensively been allowed to retain it.

Through seventeen centuries Aristotle, with his ten categories, occupied a prominent place in the field of mental science. It is still a question undecided, and likely so to remain, why he designated this branch of science by the compound term which we render *Metaphysics*. In adopting these terms, however, this master confined himself to a living native language. They were no doubt sufficiently definite, and well understood by his countrymen and his contemporaries. It is great cause of regret that his worthy example, in this respect at least, has not been imitated by those who claim to be his successors. An odious, contemptible pedantry, that aims at concealing the facts and principles of science from the populace, by enveloping them in the most unmouthable terms of a dead language, has left a blot on the literature, and an execrable incubus on the science, of the Anglo-Saxon race.

Modern philosophers are no doubt indebted to the speculations of Aristotle in relation to what he calls "primary matter" for the clew to the celebrated theory of Nominalism. The leading dogma of this theory is, that the mind does not come in contact with matter, but is occupied only with the *names* of things. Though long and fiercely opposed, this theory gained ascendancy throughout Europe, and seated itself in the universities of France and Germany. In the meantime, Realism enlisted and mustered many and able advocates. These maintained that matter has a real existence, independent of mental perceptions. On this theory Hobbes planted the germ of materialism, which found a fruitful soil and vigorous growth. His dogma was, that there is nothing in the intellect that is not

first in the sense; that we are dependent on our senses for all our knowledge. Carried out to its legitimate results by the school of Hobbes, man is regarded as wholly material. His mental powers and processes are exclusively sensational. Self-interest is the sole aim and law of his being. The doctrines of responsibility—a future state—a living, personal Deity, are but the day-dreams of an ignorant and superstitious age. Nature only is God. Pantheism is the only true theology.

Voltaire, a disciple worthy of Hobbes, capped the climax of the theory by adopting the motto, "Crush the Wretch." France developed the theory in abolishing the Sabbath, and crowning the Goddess of Reason, and reaped the fruit of her way and her doings through "a reign of terror."

Nominalism had prepared the way for Idealism. The former had not denied the existence of matter: it only asserted that the mind does not come in contact with it, but with the *names* of things. The latter took a step in advance of this, and denied the existence of matter. To Berkely is awarded the philosophic distinction of announcing to the world the nothingness of matter, and the error in which humanity had so long indulged in imagining it to be something. By his philosophy all the external phenomena supposed to be matter and material organization, is but the product of the mind, and dependent on the mind for its existence. Hume completed the descent into this maelstrom of scepticism, and in the unfathomable depths of stupidity reached the conclusion that mind, as well as matter, is but an inference—that this vast fabric is baseless and void as a vision—a succession of impressions and ideas—rising from nothing, resting on nothing, belonging to nothing, connected with nothing, and in themselves essentially nothing. The philosophy of Voltaire would have this universe without a God. The philosophy of Hume would have this universe to be a grand fraud, a universal lie—the very dogma announcing it an effect without a cause, a falsehood without any to utter or to hear. And yet the world pronounces this Philosophy.

Modern rationalism seems to have aimed at a middle ground and a combination of sensationalism and idealism. Under the same influences it, of course, tends to the same conclusions.

Leibnitz may be regarded as its pioneer. Espousing the

Platonic doctrine of innate ideas, he held that the mind contains the principles of certain notions and doctrines, independent of material existence and organization. These innate ideas are waked up in the process of experience, and the mind, in the meantime, is controlled by certain necessary laws, by which it is conducted to all necessary truth in the necessary process of its development.

Systematized and sublimated by Wolf, Kant, and Hegel, this rationalistic scheme may be summed up thus: The human mind is the sole arbiter and determinator of truth. Truth does not rest on external facts, or historical evidence, but on the innate sentiments and convictions of the mind. The human soul is the only personality of Deity. Thus the religious creed of the rationalist is based, not on light from without, but from within; not on historical record, but on personal consciousness. Straus carries out the theory in its bearing on religious belief. He boldly denies the historical truth of Scripture. The well authenticated facts of the Bible record are resolved into mythological representations of great principles, philosophically developed by the human mind. Jesus Christ is a mere idea, not a real historical person. The great question with Straus and his school is not of biblical interpretation, but philosophical possibility. A miracle is an impossibility. The chain of causation must be endless. A living, personal Deity is an absurdity. All things in the universe of mind and matter must submit to the law of necessary development. "A life beyond the grave is the last enemy which a speculative criticism has to encounter, and, if possible, vanquish." Thus do Voltaire, Hume, and Straus, with their respective schools, from different starting-points and by different processes, reach the same goal, unite in the same conclusion, and go down together into the abyss of atheism, with the hope only of annihilation. The literary world has yielded tamely their pretentious claim to philosophy, and quailed before their flourish of the charge of absurdity. But of all possible absurdities, the entire catalogue can furnish no greater than Voltaire, Hume, and Straus.

Such is the fountain from which many of our most popular writers on mental and moral science have drawn; such the character of the streams of modern literature with which Christendom has been flooded through the last quarter of a

century. The effect is deplorable on the most promising intellect of the age. A supercilious, self-conceited scepticism, wrapping itself in the mantle of indifference, takes its seat on the verge of atheism; threatening the final plunge if not allowed to remain in undisturbed repose. The interests of the race demand its dislodgment. Blank atheism, openly avowed, is not half so dangerous as this non-committal, disingenuous, cowardly, skulking position and spirit.

We may be allowed the hope that rationalism is the last ditch of the god of this world. Here he has concentrated the talents and energies of his entire intellectual force with the prestige of literature and science at his beck, for the purpose of sapping the foundations of the Christian system. The survival of historical Christianity is only another added to the many evidences that it is indeed of God, and not of man.

It will be readily perceived that these speculations are largely occupied with three subjects—the existence of matter, the existence of the soul, the existence of God. They become more prominent in the failure of each successive attempt to reason them out of objective existence. Every such attempt can only betray its own utter folly. Till man can be, and not be, at the same time, he must recognize the existence of matter. He must yield to the conscious existence and operations of mind. It is just as impossible for him to escape from the idea of a God, as it is to escape from the consciousness of his own existence. In these speculations the following facts are set forth in clear light and bold relief:

I. The alienation of the human mind from God. In the highest stages of its development, in the exercise of its noblest powers, its mightiest energies, its effort has been to banish from its presence and from its thoughts the Omnipresent and the Holy One. To effect this, it has deliberately and persistently ignored the evidences of design and the grand displays of power, wisdom, and goodness that everywhere present themselves and abound within, above, beneath, around. It has manifested a will, with one fell swoop, to consign itself with this vast universe and its great Creator and possessor to absolute nothingness. It has labored as a galley slave, and begged like a cringing craven, for evidence that it is linked in its origin, character, and destiny to the beasts that perish.

With a pertinacity that betrays to its own consciousness its deathless energy, it has labored to reason itself and the material universe, and the great *I AM*, out of existence. It has called inanimate matter to the throne of the Omnipotent and Eternal, and failing of a response, it has madly mounted the throne and consummated the blasphemous folly of assuming the exclusive personality of Deity. In one word, it has done everything that can be done to offer indignity to Jehovah—to manifest a wayward, restive, determined opposition to his authority and existence. No wonder, indeed, that it is difficult to trace out the character and analyze the operations of such a frivolous, versatile, restless, fickle, determined, degraded, noble, angelic, devilish thing, as this soul of man is.

II. Another fact clearly set forth in these speculations is, the absolute necessity there is for knowledge from some higher source than man. If man, in the highest degree of development, fails to satisfy his own mind in regard to his origin, character, and destiny, if he can not determine whether he is matter or spirit, a fortuitous concourse of atoms, or a mere succession of impressions and ideas, a nonentity or a Deity, it may fairly be taken for granted that he has little claim to infallibility—that the “insight of his reason” is not very clear, not very reliable, and all the less reliable in proportion to its self-confidence and self-sufficiency. That pedantic stupidity which discards Revelation from the investigations of science, is here set in its true light. Wherever it betrays itself it should be regarded as the beacon signal of “breakers ahead.” No man ever has enjoyed or ever can enjoy a knowledge of his own origin, in any other way than by revelation from another. The facts lie beyond the range of his consciousness and his senses. They can be reached only through the medium of his belief exercised on the testimony of others. What is true of the individual is as true of the race. It is as utterly impossible for the race to obtain a knowledge of its origin apart from a revelation by some one who has existed before the race began, as it is for the individual. The idea, therefore, of a “Rational Cosmology” independent of Revelation, is as unphilosophical and absurd as the idea of perpetual motion. The individual who, from the resources of mere human knowledge, assumes to dogmatize in relation to the origin of our globe, or

of our race, writes himself in the assinine category with the astute individual who proposes, from the resources of his own memory and personal knowledge, to inform his companions in relation to the incidents of his own birth and earliest infancy.

Calling no man master, yet duly appreciating light from whatever source it may come, and regarding it as common property, we may take a comprehensive view of the field of human science where the mind operates, that we may, if possible, perceive the mode and order of its operations. Here it may be proper to remark that TRUTH is fundamental and essential to all science. Falsehood vitiates all science to the entire extent of its existence. Even the *knowledge* of falsehood, as such, must be true. Otherwise it is no knowledge, and it may be laid down as an absolute axiom—where there is no truth, there can be no knowledge. But truth is a moral principle—therefore, ALL SCIENCE, of whatever kind, IS BASED ON MORAL PRINCIPLE.

Truth has usually been distributed into intuitive, and demonstrated, or demonstrable. Intuition is the looking on, the seeing into, the perception of truth. Demonstration is that mental process by which the conviction of truth fixes itself in the mind. All truth is intuitive; that is, there is an adaptation of truth to the mind and of the mind to truth, as there is an adaptation of the eye to light and of light to the eye. Every single truth finds its way to the mind through some kind or degree of mental process, called demonstration. The entire field of human science may be regarded as embracing and distributing itself into, 1. Mental existence and operations; 2. Material existence and organizations; 3. Moral principles; 4. Mathematical truth. Each of these has its appropriate demonstration. Mental existence has its demonstration in the uniform and universal attestation of mental operations. And these have their demonstration in the uniform and universal attestation of consciousness. Material existence and organizations have their demonstration in the uniform and universal attestation of the senses. Moral principles have their demonstration in the uniform and universal attestation of the judgment, of the belief, of the conscience, and of the will. Mathematical truth has its demonstration in

the uniform concurrence of numbers as applied to time, space, and quantity.

It has been popular, and to some extent regarded as a test of scientific attainments, to disparage mental and especially moral science, on the alleged ground of want of demonstration. Many minds have inflated themselves into greatness, supposed to be real by some, by blustering about the absolute certainty of mathematical demonstration, and lamenting the want of this certainty in relation to moral principle. It may not be possible to relieve, or even to reach such minds, but if they can be reached or punctured so as to afford relief, the fact that the moral principle TRUTH, always and absolutely, constitutes the essence of mathematical demonstration, ought to do it. Unless it can be denied that truth is a moral principle, or that it is essential to demonstration, it must be admitted that the moral principle is clearer, stronger, and more important, than that which is based and rests upon it. The whole force and certainty of the axiom, that parallel lines can not cut each other, lies in the fact that it is *true*. Apart from this, the cutting, or not cutting, of lines is trifling and insignificant. The demonstration, therefore, that there is such a thing as truth must be clearer and stronger than the demonstration that there are lines, that they are parallel, or that they do not cut each other. The imaginary superiority of mathematical over moral demonstrations is a false conclusion, from a simple fact that there are no moral reasons why they should be questioned or denied. The proposition that there is a God, is as intuitive and as universal as that two and two make four. It is infinitely more important, and is susceptible of an infinitely higher degree of demonstration; and the fact that the former has been denied while the latter is never called in question, is readily accounted for on the ground that there are no moral reasons why the mathematical truth should be questioned, while there are many and strong reasons why individuals may try to reject the idea of a God. If the same reasons existed for denying that two and two make four, it would no doubt have been done with at least equal success. The terms two and four are arbitrary. Their use and signification are conventional. They have no foundation, no natural or necessary lodgment, in our mental or moral constitution. The same

authority and usage which has established; may with truth and justice, change everything connected with the proposition save only the moral principle, *truth*. Everything else is simply and wholly and necessarily conventional. This is true of every mathematical problem. There is nothing, save the moral principle Truth, in the way of establishing the usage of twenty as the symbol of the product of two and two, or the term parallel for cutting—or even substituting the term part for that of whole. Mathematical, therefore, are the feeblest and least important of all demonstrations. Apart from moral principle, they are simply mental processes based on material existence, and carried on through the medium of conventional terms. They derive their perpetuity, their immutability, and all their importance exclusively and wholly from moral principle. Take this away, and the whole superstructure is “baseless” and useless as “the fabric of a vision.”

An error of the same character is indulged in every attempt to disparage the demonstrations of mental existence and operations in comparison with those of what is termed physical science. Every demonstration of physical science is made through, and dependent on, mental processes. If, therefore, the demonstration of mental existence and operations be defective, that fact must to the same extent vitiate and annul the demonstrations of the senses, as these must be made to depend and rest on mental operations and consciousness. The demonstration of consciousness is immediate, that of the senses intermediate, and the latter must, from the necessity of the case, be dependent on, and of course inferior to, the former.

If, then, these views of human science are correct, moral principle is first and fundamental. It not only lies at the foundation of all science, but constitutes the essence of all demonstration. To ignore, therefore, or deny the existence of moral principle, or disparage its importance, is the greatest of all absurdities. Next to this in importance, and first as a demonstration, are mental existence and mental operations. Next, material existence and organizations, and their laws. Next, and last, and least important of them all, mathematical truth. The individual who denies that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles, may be self-willed and

crotchety, but may be far from being a fool. The individual who denies the existence of matter must be a fool. The man who denies the existence and operations of mind must be a knave; but the man who denies the existence of moral principle must be, from the necessity of the case, both a knave and a fool. Truth once fully recognized in its true and only character, as a moral principle, underlying all science and constituting the essence of all demonstration, the idea of a First Cause becomes as intuitive as that all the parts are equal to the whole, or things that are equal to the same are equal to one another. Facts that may seem to conflict with this may be easily accounted for from the determination of the will in opposition to the decisions of the judgment, the belief, and the conscience. The overwhelming force with which the idea of a First Cause is demonstrated, compared with that by which it is demonstrated that all the parts are equal to the whole, is as the broad, brilliant light of noonday compared with the feeble, flickering rays of the lamp amid the darkness of the subterranean cave. Natural organs of vision accustomed only to the rays of the lamp, may prefer that light and see more distinctly certain objects, with which they are familiar, while the stronger light of the meridian sun may be overpowering and painful. So individuals may prefer, as a milder light, the feebler demonstrations of concurrent numbers, and shrink from the painful effulgence of moral demonstration poured around the truths that there is a First Cause—that there is a God. The will may try to close the intuition of the soul against the truth, but the decisions of the judgment, the belief, and the conscience, will cut short the chain of causation by the conviction that “In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth.” The voice which comes from the inner man, from the deep chambers of the soul, in solemn response to the truth, THERE IS A GOD, compared with that which affirms that all the parts are equal to the whole, is as the thunder of Niagara compared with the soothing, sleep-provoking murmurs of the rippling rill. In the consciousness of this lies the secret of the mighty and long-protracted efforts to invalidate the evidences of the existence of a God. The hope to extinguish that voice is foolish in the extreme. It may be smothered for a time, but can not be silenced forever.

The secret conviction that there is a God, gathers strength in spite of the efforts of the will against it. It grows vocal and audible amid the gathering shades of life's dreary evening, and bursts forth with a power often appalling in the hour of mortal agony. And what is most significant, in all such cases the unfolding of this conviction, that there is a God, amid the closing scenes of life, is never, in any case, the result of an intellectual process, but the simple, direct, unequivocal attestation of consciousness.

Around the illumined focus of this intuition gathers an amount of corroborative evidence that belongs to no other subject within the entire range of human intellect. It ranges from the atom to the globe, from the globe to the system, and from the system to the universe—embracing every degree and form of material organization, every stage of mental progress and power, all pointing with definiteness to a designing mind, a great First Cause. The vastness of this evidence, and the utter inability of the finite mind to grasp and weigh it all, is the only shield the human mind ever has found, or can find from a consciousness of absurdity in denying a Creator; an absurdity infinitely magnified and aggravated beyond that of denying an origin or a maker to a time-piece. The denial of the existence of a God is an absurdity so monstrous that it never could have been put forth, or tolerated, save under a desperate determination of the will to have it so. The wish that there were no God is the main-spring of all the intellectual effort that has been put forth through the different philosophical theories to popularize and sustain the monstrosity.

It is much to be regretted that men, who have proposed to defend the truth, have conceded so much as they have to writers who have prostituted their talents to the propagation of such absurdities in the name of science. The source of all wisdom has pronounced that man "*a fool*" that saith there is no God. But many who profess to believe this, have pronounced such fools profound philosophers, and have aped their fancied independence of thought and investigation till decoyed from their own ground into the bogs and marshes of scepticism, they have become an easy prey, and serve as lures to others. Hence, the tendency in many of the scientific productions of the age to ignore entirely the idea of a personal Deity. If the

idea of a Deity is at all admitted, it is only amid the shades of a back-ground—as a far-fetched inference, the advocacy or special presentation of which is unworthy the efforts of a scientific mind. There is evidently, in certain departments of science, a fixed aim and persistent determination to crowd the idea of a Creator away infinitely beyond all eternity, and to shut it out forever from mental cognition, beyond a universe of gas, while the ignoble work of reconciling Scripture revelation with this theory has been assigned to those who fear the Lord, but bow down to the silliest theories that come forth labelled Science. It is high time that the scientific world should fully realize the importance of the truth, that science without a God, is shadow without the substance—a body without a soul. God must be the grand center of all essence, from which all the rays of knowledge radiate. It is only as we enjoy the light which emanates from him as the fountain, that we are able to penetrate the mystery of our own existence, unfold its laws, understand its relationships, and learn its duties and its destinies. Hence, every theory of mental science that leaves out of view, even temporarily, the moral and religious element must, from the necessity of the case, be radically defective. As moral principle rests at the foundation of all science, so is it a fundamental principle in the mental constitution of man, never to be ignored or left out of view. The moral is not only the most prominent, but by far the most important element in human character, infusing itself throughout, and characterizing all the operations of the mind.

In this respect, some of our modern treatises and text-books on mental science are defective. They assume that mental and moral science are distinct subjects, and may be treated and studied separately, while the aim has been in both to exclude as far as possible revelation and the religious element. Different analysis and classification of the mental powers have been given, such as: *cognitive* and *motive*, *contemplative* and *active*, understanding and will, intellectual, *active* and *moral*, *external* and *internal affections*, intelligence, sensibilities, and desires.

The understanding, by some of the fathers in metaphysical science, has been regarded as a faculty of the mind. The term, both in its original signification and common use, designates

the capacity of the mind, and it seems preferable to regard the mind as a unit, performing a variety of operations. Previous to mental operations, the understanding is vacuous. As these operations commence and progress, the understanding assumes its character as feeble or strong, contracted or expansive, shallow or profound. Mental operations may be allowed to distribute themselves into sensational, intellectual, and moral:

I. By sensational are intended such as are mainly, though not exclusively, dependent on the senses. Here we have,

1. Sensation—that operation of the mind which takes cognizance of the existence and operation of bodily organs.

2. Perception—that operation of the mind which takes cognizance of external things through the medium of the senses.

3. Thought—that operation in which the mind lays hold of and dwells on any thing, as an object or a subject. Attention is thought protracted and intensified.

4. Conception—that operation in which the mind forms within itself an idea of things which have been the subject of thought.

5. Consciousness—that operation in which the mind takes cognizance of its own operations, as the deliberative body, duly organized, takes notes, through its secretary, of its transactions.

II. The intellectual, by which are intended such as collect, link together, combine and read off sensations, perceptions, thoughts, ideas, and subjects.

1. Reason—that operation in which the mind interlaps thoughts, and twines ideas, and weaves subjects and systems of thought and science.

2. Memory—that operation in which the mind retains and recalls the subjects of consciousness.

3. Imagination—that operation in which the mind reproduces the subjects of memory in new combinations.

III. The moral, by which are intended such operations as take cognizance of the distinctions of good and evil, of truth and falsehood, of right and wrong.

1. Judgment—that operation in which the mind decides on the fitness of things, and labels them good or evil accordingly.

2. Belief—that operation in which the mind discriminates truth and falsehood, relying on the former and rejecting the latter.

3. Conscience—that operation in which the mind discriminates right and wrong in the conduct and motives of self. The result of this operation is self-approbation in the consciousness of right, and self-condemnation and remorse in the consciousness of wrong.

4. The Will—that operation in which the mind determines its course, tendency, and character, and gives tendency and character to all its other operations. The will has its origin in the emotions and desires. It is the going forth of their subtle energy and combined influence, controlling or aiming at the control of all the other operations of the mind, of all the movements and energies of the body, and of all material organizations and mental powers.

If this analysis of our mental constitution be admitted, we have a complete counterpart to the analysis of human science previously suggested. In that, moral principle is regarded as fundamental to all science. It is not only essential to, but is itself the very essence of all demonstration. First and clearest and strongest in the enjoyment of this demonstration is mental existence, with its operations. Next, material existence with its organizations and laws. Next and last, and least important of them all, mathematical truth. In this analysis of mental operations we have the sensational embraced and controlled by the intellectual; and these again by the moral, giving character, tendency, and destiny to the whole.

This prominence and controlling power of the moral element, developed by analysis of the mental operations, has been fully verified and realized in the history of the race. The universal search and demand for good, for truth, for right, and the universal endurance and infliction of evil, and falsehood, and fraud, and wrong, have literally filled up the entire measure of the history and experience of the race. As it has been in every past age, so it is in the present, written in characters of blood, and attested by the groans and dying agonies of millions. The one grand effort of the race for six thousand years has been to establish the independence and supremacy of the will of man, to sweep away all sense of obligation and

responsibility to a Sovereign Creator. This is the one great aim and leading principle that gives rise to every form and degree of vice and crime that has cursed and scourged our race from the beginning till now.

It has been suggested that all truth is intuitive; that is, that the mind is adapted to truth. Also, that every truth has its lodgment in the mind by a mental process called demonstration. This conflicts with the theory generally received that certain truths are primary, simple, incapable of analysis and demonstration, while others are reached only through a tedious process of intricate reasoning. Thus existence, identity, time, and space are regarded as intuitive, while the truth that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles is reached by demonstration. This is, we think, an error, arising from oversight of the mental process by which we acquire these ideas, and the fact that they are generally acquired before the mind begins to analyze its operations. The truth is, that no other fact requires such a long, difficult, and intricate process of demonstration as the facts of existence and of identity. It is a process of months, perhaps in some instances years, and the truths are intuitive, just as the truth that twelve times twelve are one hundred and forty-four is intuitive; that is, after it has been learned. The idea of space is purely and wholly an inference; yet it is as intuitive and as firmly relied on as the reality of matter from which it is impossible to separate it. Many of the propositions of Euclid are so plain that no process of reasoning can make them plainer, and yet a certain mental process was necessary, in forming the original conceptions and giving expression to them in appropriate terms, and the same mental process is repeated in every mind when it first grasps the proposition. That I see is an intuitive truth, but it fixes itself in my mind by the uniform attestation of sensation. That I think is an intuitive truth, but it requires a continuous demonstration in the attestation of my consciousness.

Of what has been written, this is the sum :

1. Truth is essentially and immutably a moral principle, wherever it exists, whether in a mathematical problem, a historical narrative, a scientific investigation, a promise, or a prediction.

2. It is the living soul of all science, the essence and the sum of all demonstration.

3. It is as essential to the mental constitution as matter is to bodily organization. It is as essential to mental repose, to mental operation and mental development, as matter is to bodily repose, to bodily motion, to bodily subsistence, growth, and development.

4. Every truth, even the truth of its own existence and operation, is apprehended and appropriated by the mind through a mental process, of sensation, perception, thought, conception, consciousness, reason, memory, imagination, judgment, belief, conscience.

5. The emotions and desires concentrated in and constituting the will, may and often do resist and reject the truth, and prompt to the denial of it; but that denial can not change or annul the truth—it only displays its own absurdity.

6. The absurdity of denying that two and two make four is certainly not so great as the absurdity of denying the existence of what is symbolized by two and four, or the existence of that which takes cognizance of both the symbols and the things that are represented by them; but the "*ne plus ultra*" of absurdity is found in the denial of the moral character of truth or falsehood to that denial.

7. The facts of existence, with its modes and laws, are cognizable by the human mind, and furnish the broad fields of human science; but the origin of existence lies beyond the range of human knowledge, and can be reached only through the testimony of a First Cause and the operation of belief in that testimony.

8. The idea of a First Cause has the same relation to cause and effect, as they present themselves to the rational mind, as the idea of space has to matter. The idea of space is a necessity rising from the existence of matter. Its denial is absurd, though the idea is incomprehensible. The idea of a First Cause is a necessity rising from cause and effect. Its denial, too, is absurd, and itself incomprehensible.

ART. III.—*De Ethice.*

It has been disputed much by philosophers concerning conscience in man and the nature of virtue. It has generally been acknowledged that there is an ineffaceable distinction in things which we call right and wrong; that conscience is that faculty of the soul that recognizes this distinction, approves the right and disapproves the wrong. Thus far all are agreed, that is, all who follow what may be called the orthodox school; for the utilitarianism of Hobbes and others, and the sympathetic theory of Adam Smith, may be considered now as thoroughly exploded, and whatever of plausibility there may be in the first, the second is worthy of attention only as indicating the extreme length of folly to which a first class mind may go on one subject that has contributed to the real advancement of human learning on another. Beyond this differences appear, on which different schools are founded—all, however, attempting to build the theory of ethics on the foundation given. We believe this foundation insufficient, and that there is an intuition of our nature which has been overlooked, which has been explained to be not an intuition, but a deduction of reason; which, when once admitted, clears up some difficulties; perfects the demonstration for the existence of God, taking it out of the sphere of reason and placing it in that of consciousness; and alone renders any theory of ethics tenable, or even a moral nature in man possible. We mean *the sense of accountability to a higher power*. In the course of the argument, the posture of this will be indicated, and its truth appear. The elements of ethical science we believe, therefore, to be three: the ineffaceable distinction in the very nature of things—which can never be explained or accounted for, further than that it exists—of *right and wrong*; that department in man's nature which answers to this distinction, which appreciates it, approves of the right and disapproves of the wrong, occasioning certain exercises of the soul after participation in either right or wrong, which is commonly called *conscience*; and the *sense of accountability to a supreme intelligence*, which pervades

the breast of every human being, and is an intuition of our nature. We now address ourselves to the consideration of these in their order.

I. *The distinction of right and wrong, which exists in the nature of things.* It is impossible to account for man's moral nature in any other way than on the basis of such a distinction. It exists in the very nature of things, is eternal and ineffaceable. It is not custom, habit, education, or common consent that make it, neither does the will of God create it, but recognizes it. Some things are right and wrong, not because they themselves are immediately founded on this distinction, but because they grow out of some other relation that is founded upon it, and the tributary mean is so patent that it is immediately recognized, and the conducted force is acknowledged in all its power. These two might be termed the *absolute* and *relative* distinctions. The class of the absolute are eternally and unalterably right and wrong. The class of the relative are not eternally and unalterably right and wrong, but acquire their moral character by reason of their relation to the absolute. Whatever is founded upon the absolute partakes of the character of that upon which it is founded, possessing in itself, perhaps, no moral character whatever. It is chiefly in the latter of these two classes that mistakes occur, and in which a depraved heart exercises its ingenuity in making right wrong and wrong right. A good example of these two classes occurs in the moral and ceremonial laws of the Jews. The moral law, which is summarily contained in the Ten Commandments, is nothing but a restatement of the law which was in the first written on man's heart, but which became dimmed and perverted in the fall, the conscience becoming blunted to keen and remote distinctions, and man becoming such that he did not like to retain God in his knowledge. In order that the law might not be finally lost, it became necessary to commit to tables of stone that which had been originally written on the fleshly tables of man's heart, and which remains with distinctness sufficient to retain the distinction itself between right and wrong, but not sufficiently clear to discern unerringly, under all circumstances, what is right and what is wrong. It is, therefore, eternally and unalterably binding upon all lineages and families of men. On the con-

trary, the ceremonial law was binding upon the Jews only because it was commanded by God, and commended itself to their consciences because, in the very nature of things, it is always right to obey and always wrong to disobey the mighty and all-dreadful God. Those definitions of virtue, therefore, which make it to consist only in conformity to God's will, whilst they are very pious and prompted by a somewhat consuming zeal, are defective, for they leave out of view the eternal and immutable distinction in the very nature of things which is binding upon all beings except God himself, and only not binding upon him because he is related to it by a higher than a binding force, to wit, the same necessity that necessitates it necessitating his own existence, not in conformity to, but co-ordinate with, those eternal principles, neither one being conformed to the other, nor neither one or both beginning to be through a pre-existent necessity that made their existence indispensable, but both of them being co-ordinate and coeternal with the necessity itself, which can not be conceived of as existing antecedent to, or separate from, both or either of them.

The true definition of virtue follows obviously from the foregoing. It is conformity to what is right. Vice is conformity to what is wrong. Now, it is true that God's will is always right, and to define virtue as being conformity to his will is true, as far as it goes, but is not germinal. Neither do we mean that virtue demands of us anything more than God's will. But that, whilst it teaches us to do his will and nothing else, it also teaches us that to do his will is not an arbitrary demand, nor to be done because the renewed man delights in it, but because it is right, and the reason exists in the very nature of things, and not in his will alone. A life of virtue is, therefore, not only well pleasing to God, but is in exact conformity with man's own being and the nature of all things, and is the harmonious and inscrutable working of a high mystery that perhaps none but God can understand. Whilst a life of vice is not only disobedience to God, and draws on us his vengeance and dreadful retribution, and the wrath and curse of his law, but is also violence done to our own nature, and an assault upon the intimate nature and permanent harmony of all things. "He that sinneth against me, wrongeth

his own soul: all they that hate me love death." Prov. viii: 36. The moral law lies, therefore, in the very nature of things, as well as in the will of God, and falls under the head of what is known to us as immediate and absolute right and wrong. The revealed will of God, wherein it has nothing moral in its nature, or wherein it possesses no claim upon our obedience except that he has commanded it, rests upon the relative rather than the absolute class of duties, and though it be fully as binding upon us as the other, was yet never written on man's heart, and could not have been known even to unfallen man without a revelation. There are, indeed, a large class of duties which would never have had any existence but for the fall, and which grow out of our estate of sin and misery—such as benevolence, mercy, and all deeds of humanity and charity. It is likely, too, that if we examine the Scriptures closely, we will find that this class of duties is always meant by the phrase "*good works*." As we are united to our head, Jesus Christ, by faith, so *works*—or a holy life—are the evidences or outgrowth of that faith, and are indispensable to salvation; not that they constitute the righteousness by which we are justified, but are the indispensable concomitants of that faith that receives the righteousness of Jesus Christ. By reason of their union to Jesus Christ, the just are all secondarily united to one another, and as faith is the expression of their union to him, so charity is the expression of their union to one another. Of this charity *good works* are the evidence and outgrowth; and as we are to show our faith by our works, so are we to show our charity by our good works. Now, although both these classes of duties are enjoined upon us by God, and are equally binding upon us, yet we see that they arise differently, and though they had not been directly commanded by him, would have none the less been our duty.

A new question might arise here: Under which of the two classes of duties, the absolute or relative, does gospel obedience or faith in Jesus Christ fall? This question is unlike any other that can be started, and that for the reason that the work of the Lord Jesus is perfectly anomalous. It was undertaken to remedy an abnormal condition of things, and eventuates in that remedy being only the opening portal of mysteries and glories, divine perfections and revelations, creature trans-

formations and expansions, and endless progresses, until it seems as though that which in theory is incidental, is in fact the chief drama of the universe, to which the preceding course of events, interrupted by the event which called for such a remedy, seem as the feeble introductory scenes. In fact, so utterly stupendous is the very conception of such a redemption, that the astonished powers, when attempting to speculate upon it, either sink into insignificance and rebuke, or else dismiss the grandeur of the conception, and with coarse and clumsy tools build in the walls of its structure heavenly pearls and jewels with the cement of an offensive and earthly mortar. In some of its aspects this may be said to belong to both classes of duties. It is not obligatory upon us to believe on the Lord Jesus Christ unless we hear of him. Those, therefore, who perish without having heard his name, are condemned by the law written on their hearts, and not because they have not believed on him of whom they have not heard. In this aspect of it, it belongs to the relative class of duties, but being once made known through revelation, it is the absolute duty of all men to believe on him, not simply because it is commanded, or rests on the will of God, but because it is founded in the very nature of things. For it is our absolute duty at all times to keep the moral law; yet by reason of our fallen nature, we can not keep it out of Christ; it is, therefore, our duty to keep it in him; but we can not keep it in him without believing upon him. Faith in him is, therefore, both the absolute and relative duty of every one that hears his name. The anomalous nature of this duty appears in this, that in all other matters the relative duty only becomes ours because it is founded upon the absolute; here the absolute only becomes ours through the relative; and neither of them are universally binding, but only come to the class of men that hear; and yet upon these it comes with all the force of both classes, so that if it were possible to make any distinction in duties, all of which are infinite, this of faith in Jesus Christ is the most high, solemn, and binding of all duties. And not only do we conceive this to be true, but we also believe that the work of Christ itself, being essential to the entire vindication of the law of God, and to the thorough vindication of right and punishment of wrong, as they exist in the nature

of things, is itself as much a necessity, when the disturbing cause of sin had entered, as that which in the first place necessitates the distinction itself between right and wrong; yet, a necessity that would never have been developed, and consequently never known to exist, if it had not been for the fall of man. For all that we know, there may be infinite millions of other necessities just as great, yet totally unlike each other, lying latent in the possibilities of things, which can only rise into actual existence, something else first occurring. And if such be the case, we have confidence in this, yea, we of a certainty know that the resources of the Godhead are perfectly adequate to the full equipment of all such necessities; yea, as in the plan of redemption, to make infinitely more of them than the plain necessities of the case may demand. And is it hazarding too much to conjecture that these endless necessities, with their endless remedies, shall go on occurring and developing more and more the amazing resources of the Infinite, and adding more and more to his matchless glory, and the ineffable happiness of his creatures throughout the multiplication of eternities that will form the transient and fleeting moments of the world to come?

II. *Conscience in man, which answers to the distinction of right and wrong in the nature of things.* There is an eternal fitness in things, and adaptation of all God's works to the nature of things, to one another, and to God himself. Answering to right and wrong as they have been set forth, is the moral nature in man in which that distinction is inextricably wrought. The index of this moral nature is conscience, and as frequently happens with philosophic terms, the popular meaning of the word is apt to lead us astray. The functions of conscience are various. It discerns between right and wrong; that is, appreciates the distinction itself; it decides what is right and what is wrong; and it bestows approbation on the right, and condemnation on the wrong. This last is a twofold process—abstractly considered, it approves what is right, either *in thesi*, or when enacted by another. When enacted by ourselves, it bestows an internal serenity and peace. And so with the wrong; it condemns that *in thesi*, or when enacted by another. But when engaged in by ourselves, it inflicts inward pangs and lacerations, *with forebodings of a*

judgment to come, which make altogether an unrest and misery the like to which nothing else can furnish, and which if not remedied, succeeding from desperation to torpor, at last eventuates in horrible despair, than which the gnawings of the worm that never dies can be none other. In popular language the term conscience is applied to this last only, and we should be careful in our speculations upon the subject not to permit any partial definitions of this or any other term to warp and deform our opinions. Indeed the only difference between conscience and our moral nature, of which we have said that it is the index, we conceive to be this, that by our moral nature is meant the capacities and susceptibilities of soul when in any manner affected by a moral subject, or in other words, is that phase of our nature which answers to the eternal distinction in things called right and wrong. Conscience we take to be the actual putting forth of these faculties, and movement of these susceptibilities. But inasmuch as these faculties and susceptibilities are nothing more than the soul itself acting or acted upon in a particular way, so conscience is nothing more than the soul itself acting and acted upon in relation to morals. The third function of conscience, as developed above, must not be restricted to acts alone, but to states of the soul also; so that the punishment which it inflicts and the peace which it bestows, do not alone follow perpetration of wrong, or performance of right, but *participation* in them, which covers both the states of mind and the volitions actually put forth. The state of the soul from which a wrong volition proceeds, we suppose to be designated in Scripture by the term *concupiscence*; that is, the conception of a volition. Answering to this there is a corresponding testimony of conscience, which we will again notice when we come to treat of original sin in this connection. To believe that there can be guilt upon the soul without a corresponding testimony of conscience, is to believe that we will be condemned without a trial; to say that there is a sin without a moral character, and that we will be condemned for that which is not moral in its nature, which all men are agreed is not true.

We exist in a twofold capacity: as individuals, and as a race. Our moral nature answers to both these. As individuals we have a personal participation in right and wrong; and as a

race we have a putative one. The whole race sinned at a time when there were but two individuals of it in existence. Inasmuch as the race is made up of individuals, there is a share of guilt attaching to each one; but at the time of the transaction, only two individuals of the race being in existence, none but these two had a personal participation in the crime; yet they being the whole of the race then existing, and the root and germ of that portion of it that was to come after, it had an existence in them at the time, and consequently shared in the crime; but that existence was only germinal, and the share in the crime putative. We are not punished for Adam's sin, but for our own sin in Adam, and the inheritance is not one of *guilt* only, as has been put forth in some quarters, but of *sin and guilt*. The act of imputation does not transfer another's sin to us, but designates our share of the common crime and guilt, and identifies our individuality or personality as part of one stock or race, so that each separate existence, in becoming separate, or personal, or individual, does not become excised from the native stock. The essence of the imputation is not an arbitrary act of God, but the community of existence in a single stock. And so far from Adam's federal headship, alone, rendering the imputation of sin possible, it was only necessary to the transmission of the particular kind of sin that it was, to wit, *breach of covenant*. If God had made no covenant with the race in Adam, and before begetting an individual of the race, that is, when the race were still all in his loins, he had committed some sin, it is clear that the race would have fallen just as it has fallen, and that we would have shared in the sin of the fall. If the fall had been nothing but a breach of the moral law, the natural headship had been sufficient; but inasmuch as it was not only this, but more, that is, the breach of a voluntary and extraneous engagement, which is called the covenant of works, the federal headship was necessary to make us participants in that part of the crime. Now we maintain that conscience covers the whole ground of man's moral obligation. If we are accountable for original sin, then it possesses a moral character. If it possesses a moral character, it is within the domain of conscience. If it be within the domain of conscience, what is the character of those operations of conscience that take cognizance of it?

All are agreed that man is not morally accountable, unless he is a free agent; and that he is a free agent in nothing in which his will does not consent; and that he can have no compunctions of conscience for anything not voluntarily done. But this only applies to the personal individual aspect of man's moral relations, and when applied to the race, as such is not true. If it were to be argued that because we do not feel compunctions of conscience for original sin, that, therefore, we do not have any, the argument does not hold good; or because the original sin was not voluntary on our part, as individuals, that it, therefore, possesses no moral character, and we are not accountable for it, the argument would not again hold good. It may, and it may not be true, that compunctions of conscience do not follow original sin; and if it be true, it is very difficult, perhaps impossible, to show it, for all our actual transgressions so proceed from our corrupt nature, and it is so much the source and fountain of all that is wrong in our actions, that it is impossible for us entirely to separate the two and say how much of the sense of blameworthiness is to be attributed to the actual transgression, and how much to the depraved state of heart from which it issued. Besides this, the depravity itself is so much the result of previous actual transgressions, that it is difficult to distinguish between what is habit and what is congenital. Yet we know this, that the first disposition of heart to evil grew, not out of habit from previous transgression, but had its origin when ourselves were quickened in our mother's womb. The only consciousness which we have of original sin, and the only occasions which we have to lament it, are when it has become the parent of an actual transgression. Who shall say that the compunctions felt for the actual transgression bear no relation whatever to the inherent depravity out of which it grew? And is it not true that our self-upbraidings, at such times, are directed against ourselves, rather as being the wretches capable of such an action, than as the miscreants who have perpetrated it? But even granting that original sin occasions no compunctions, still it is a gratuitous assumption to claim that there may be no other operations of conscience answering to it. One thing is certain, that we will not be condemned at the bar of God for anything that our conscience will not justify.

It will acknowledge the justice of the sentence if nothing more. But still, to pass this by; it may be true, or it is possible that it could be true, that compunctions of conscience relate only to individual personal sins, and that there is another testimony in relation to putative sin; for instance a loathing of it, and self-abhorrence on account of it, and a desire to be freed from it. What is the testimony of God's people in relation to this, and what is the voice of God's word? Beyond a doubt, every candid and humble soul will take up the *miscre* of the Patriarch David, and with him exclaim, Behold, I was shapen in iniquity, and in sin did my mother conceive me. Behold, thou desirest truth in the inward parts; and in the hidden part thou shalt make me to know wisdom. Purge me with hyssop and I shall be clean: wash me, and I shall be whiter than snow. Create in me a clean heart, O God; and renew a right spirit within me. There is one great difficulty, however, that attends all the observation on this point. We are at no time free from original sin, and consequently can not know from experience what is the normal condition of the conscience. It may be said, that we are never free from actual sin either. This is true: but we know what the testimony of conscience is in relation to individual acts; we know how we feel before we have performed them; and we know how we feel afterward. But we can not know how one feels before contamination by original sin; all our observation applies to the period after it, so that we do not know what heavenly peace and serenity the soul, uncontaminated with it, may enjoy. Nor can we judge how much of our present unhappiness, or lack of joy even, is owing to incidental and necessary distractions, nor how much must be placed to the account of original sin. Furthermore, original sin is, itself, twofold—the transgression of the race in Adam, and the depravation of our whole nature. And it might be objected, that the foregoing reasoning applies only to the latter aspect of it. We reply, that it is much more easy to believe that conscience would bear its testimony against a specific act, rather than against a state of the soul; and if the state of the soul which produces actual transgression is bemoaned, the act which produced the state of the soul must be confessed with confusion of face, and with contrition. Lo, this only have I

found, that God hath made man upright; but they have sought out many inventions.

III. *The sense of accountability to a supreme intelligence.* The third fundamental truth in the science of Ethics, we conceive to be a sense of accountability to a supreme intelligence. We believe it to be an intuition of our nature, and are aware that, in making this statement, we incur the risk of being charged with innovation, and by reason of an ill-digested classification of stating that as fundamental which is not so, and of needlessly multiplying first truths. We incur this risk, not heedlessly, and respectfully invite the consideration of all thinking men to what is here advanced, that perchance coming to it with a smile of incredulity, they may go away with the sober and composed expression of thorough conviction. It is of the very nature of ultimate or first truths, that they can neither be proven nor gainsaid, but must commend themselves immediately to the observation of all persons. The axioms of geometry can not be demonstrated, but must be assumed as a starting point from which to reason; so likewise in the sciences of Metaphysics and Ethics; the last appeal that we can make is to consciousness, and there we must leave the matter. But there may be much argument as to whether any given truth does or does not belong to this ultimate class, that is to be referred to this unquestioned tribunal. There may be much done in the way of clearing up the ground and preparing the way for this ultimate decision, as to whether we are driven to this arbitrament, and, being driven, whether we state the case fairly and clearly.

The following reasons, we think, establish the point:

I. *The consciousness of all men.* We appeal to the universal consciousness of the race, and declare it to be true, that there is, in all men, a dread of a judgment to come. It is not so much the thought of having done wrong that torments men, as the belief that they are to render up account somehow, somewhere, and sometime, to a power whose authority is unquestioned, and whose power and intelligence are supreme. The fact can not and, of course, will not be questioned by any ingenuous mind. It may be attempted to be accounted for without referring it to an intuition of our nature. It may be said that it is the force of education, that the idea has been imbibed

from infancy through innumerable generations, and was part of the primeval revelation from God to man. This brings us to the second argument.

II. *The character of the revelations concerning God.* The Scriptures nowhere reveal the fact that there is a supreme being, but that God is *the* supreme being. The revelations address themselves to a ground-work in our nature, without which the religious would be impossible in man. There is nothing more universally known and acknowledged than the religious nature in man. He is prone to worship some superior being, and the character of that worship is always propitiatory, looking to a judgment. This is the only thing which the Scriptures take for granted. They nowhere argue either the existence of God or our accountability to him: I am the Almighty God, walk before me, and be thou perfect. The obligation to the Almighty God is not here taught, nor the existence of God asserted, but there being a God, *I* am he, and because I am that God, you are to obey me. So, in like manner, the command, be ye holy for I am holy. So, also, the preface to the Ten Commandments: I am the Lord thy God, which have brought thee out of the land of Egypt, out of the house of bondage. It may be objected to this, that the Scriptures presuppose that the human mind will gather the idea of the existence of God from his works. To this, the answer is most singularly fortunate, complete, and triumphant, that among the most cultivated nations of antiquity where the idea of the supreme was unquestionably acknowledged, the world was not thought to be the work of His hands, and, therefore, could not be, to them, an evidence of his existence. So strong, indeed, is this idea in the human mind that it is applied to the representatives of God on earth, our parents and our rulers; so that the fifth commandment is founded in man's moral nature and is not dependent for its moral authority on the command of God, though this, of course, adds to it. The foundation of parental authority is naturally in the mind of every child; he may try to evade it, but not on moral grounds; he does not question the right of the authority; all that is necessary, is that it be properly asserted, and the child will obey it; or, if he do not, it will be with a consciousness of doing wrong. The idea extends, also, to God's vicegerents, the rulers of the land, and there is noth-

ing that demoralizes a people so quickly as lack of respect, and consequent disobedience to the magistrate, and the people who indulge in it, though they be great among the nations of the earth, will suddenly topple from the pinnacle of their glory, and become the footstool of other more virtuous nationalities. It is needless to say that all this takes its rise in disobedience in the family relation, of children to their parents and wives to their husbands. Nothing is truer than that those who honor their parents will honor the civil magistrate, and nothing can be more self-evidencing than that where obedience is not inculcated at home, it is impossible for the authorities of the land to exact it. Indeed, one of the instances given in prophecy of the wickedness of the last times is, that they shall be disobedient to parents. The second generation in such times will be invariably worse than the first, for parents who were not, themselves, obedient in childhood, however much they may wish to perform their duty toward their own children, will be impotent to secure obedience, for there is no law more immutable than this, that persons can not govern who have not, themselves, been governed. In the light of these reflections let the patriot view the present condition of our land, and say whether or not disobedience to parents, resulting in contempt of all law and authority, human and divine, falsity toward man, and perjury toward God, has not been the pregnant and hellish womb that, in the midst of pangs, hideous outcry and revolting travail, has given birth to such sore disasters!

III. *The ethical argument for the existence of God.* The form, in which this argument has been presented, is this: That, inasmuch as conscience testifies to a law which is separate and distinct from conscience itself, which is the rule of our life and which we ought to obey, there is, therefore, a lawgiver to whom we are accountable, and this lawgiver, whether or not he be called God, occupies the place of God to us. If, now, the truth of the argument under I, in this article be admitted, it will be seen that this last reasoning is defective. It does not follow that because there is a law of right and wrong, that, therefore, there is a lawgiver, for we have already seen that this distinction does not depend upon his will, but is like his own existence, necessary and eternal, and exists in the very

nature of things. That, this last is true, it does not devolve on us to prove, for it is, so far as we know, freely admitted by all. It is clear that, if this be true, it no more necessitates a lawgiver, or depends upon the will of the infinite, than his existence depends upon the law, both of them being equally infinite and eternal. It might be replied that this holds good, only as far as the absolute class of duties is concerned, and not the relative, or, in other words, that conscience acknowledging revealed duties, or those which confessedly depend on God's will for their moral character, necessitates the inference of a lawgiver. This is, of course, true, and must be acknowledged, but instead of being an argument against what we have said is one for it. Because the duty being propounded to us as God's will, he declares himself in the very act of revelation as the lawgiver, and appeals directly to this very intuition of our nature; that is, the sense of accountability to a higher power. The fact of the law, being a revealed one, robs the objection of all its force.

It might be claimed that this sense of accountability ultimates in the law itself, and does not point out a lawgiver; in fact, that we are not accountable at all to a supreme intelligence, but only to the law itself, and that the conception of the supreme intelligence is arrived at by deduction of reason. Under another form, it is common to teach this doctrine, that we are under no further obligation to do right and refrain from wrong than because we ought. And virtue has been interpreted as the doing what is right, simply because it is right, and refraining from the wrong only because it is wrong, and for no other reason. Now this is true as far as it goes, but is only a partial statement of the case. It is a very fine theory if man were a different being from what he is. But the consciousness of every man tells him a different story, if he will only listen to its voice. The fact that the Scriptures place before us the terrors of the law, and the wrath of an avenging God, to induce us to *flee from the wrath to come*, and place before us the blessedness of the righteous, to induce us to seek God, or what is the same thing, to practice virtue, should be a complete answer to that theory. Even the Lord Jesus himself, for the glory that was placed before him, endured the cross, despising the shame. This universal

benevolence theory once brought forth its fruits in the repulsive doctrine of Hopkinsianism, which taught that our devotion to God's will should be so unselfish as to make us to be willing to be damned to please him. It is, no doubt, true that we are to practice virtue for its own sake, and eschew vice for its own sake; but it is not true that this is the whole statement of the case, for we can never be indifferent to our own destiny, and God has made the degree of our attainments in virtue, the measure of the reward which is at the last to be bestowed as a free gift upon us. If this sense of accountability ultimates in the law itself, then why those apprehensions of the future? If we do wrong we are immediately punished with the upbraidings of conscience, and there is nothing in the nature of these exercises to make us apprehend the future life any more than the future in this life. Besides, by repeated transgression, conscience becomes seared, and the transgressor might felicitate himself in this, that by the time he has attained futurity its voice will have become utterly silenced. Instead, therefore, of having apprehensions of the future, he should look forward to it with gladness.

The moral nature of man is not an appetite or affection simply. Advocates of the disinterested theory make out that we pursue the right for its own sake only, just as the appetite of hunger leads a man to eat, which he does not that he may sustain life which is the object of the appetite, but that he may gratify the appetite itself. They teach that the good to self, which is to result from the practice of virtue, is no part of the motive, but only to gratify the moral appetite, so to speak. Now it is universally admitted that the moral part of man's nature is the crowning glory of his being, rising high above the intellectual. How, then, are we to ignore the intellectual and degrade the moral into a blind appetency? Is it not more likely that it enfolds in its embrace all the other forces of our nature, partaking of the quality of them all, and whilst it regards virtue for its own sake, with the blind affection of an appetite or instinct, it, at the same time, regards virtue's ends with the eye of intelligence, as promoting one's greatest good, by fitting one to stand before that terrible being to whom we are to render up account?

As endeavored to be shown in the first part of this article,

the eternal and immutable law of right and wrong is embodied in the divine law and made part of it; we are subject to it, not only in the nature of things, but because it is God's will as well. Now is there nothing in our moral nature that answers to this aspect of the case? Has God left himself without witness in the human breast? Is there nothing that gives us warning of a divine punishment, or are we transgressing a divine law without knowing it? There are two necessary and eternal things: the law of right and wrong, to which conscience answers, and an infinite intelligence, to which the sense of accountability answers. The moral nature of man answers to both these, and their laws are written on his heart. He can never erase them, though he may pervert and deface them, sear and harden them. It matters not whether they be classed separately, or be both embraced under the one head of conscience, they are both there, and indelibly and eternally there. The law was written upon man's heart; man himself is the image of his maker, and only by obliterating man himself, do you obliterate the stamp of divinity, for he himself is that stamp. The true statement of the ethical argument for the existence of God, we take to be this: there is a law written in our members, and conscience is the testimony of our nature to that law, and acknowledgment of its authority. There is a sense of accountability to an intelligence that will judge us according to this law. This being, whether or not he be God, occupies the place of God to us. The law by which we are to be judged is just and holy. Therefore, the being to whom we are accountable is just and holy. He must be all-wise to judge rightly, all-powerful to enforce it, and so we may add to the chain, link by link, until we have added innumerable attributes. But here, alas, our knowledge ends. Jesus Christ is not written on the heart of the natural man; all our knowledge is to condemn, our accountability but a fearful looking-for of judgment. Christ must be revealed to us, applied to our souls by a divine operation, embraced by faith. This being done, not only is his law written in our members, but our whole man is transformed until we are thoroughly wrought in his likeness, and himself performs our obedience to the law, and assumes our accountability, in lieu of all which he only requires of us unbounded

trust in him. But this trust in him, oh, it is a bounden duty, which, woe be to our souls, if we perform it not. In our weakness and blindness, and distrust of self, what can we do but cast ourselves helpless upon him, and cry with the penitent thief, LORD, REMEMBER ME WHEN THOU COMEST INTO THY KINGDOM!

ART. IV.—*Politics and the Church.*

THERE are no greater differences in sentiment among those of the same general faith, than exist upon certain grave matters where the Scriptures speak with plainness. This may seem remarkable, but it has its solution. Arch heretics, indeed, will arise to vex the Lord's people, even to the end. This we expect, for the Scriptures proclaim the fact and sound the warning. But there ought to be cordial agreement in all things of vital importance where men receive the same formulas of doctrine; and there are some who charitably believe that this is substantially realized, or that the differences which exist are of little moment. Their observations at length dispel the illusion, and they find that circumstances will sometimes develop a radical disagreement among them upon questions in which the interests of the church and the world are deeply concerned. Such a question is now agitating the church in the United States, in all its denominations. It has reference to the civil war in progress, and to the province and duties of the church in relation thereto. It is forced upon public attention under circumstances not very favorable to clear views and a correct judgment. There is so much of feeling and prejudice brought into action, even among good men, when determining their position or that of the church upon the issues involved, that reason for the time is well nigh dethroned. But the interests at stake, sorely affecting society at large, and periling the existence of the nation, imperiously demand that the questions which arise out of the controversy should be tried by the sole standard of truth.

We propose in this article to examine one of these questions. It may be stated in general terms thus: What is the true

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of investigation. The current phrases—"pulpit politics," "mixing politics and religion," "taking political action," all of which are so freely applied to the ministry and to ecclesiastical bodies—present language quite indeterminate in its meaning. They are a sort of masked battery, from behind which the wily combatants may throw shot and shell, grape, canister, and shrapnel, and all the other deadly projectiles of modern warfare, and yet themselves remain quite safe in their shady seclusion. We must attempt to unmask them, that we may measure the foe we have to meet, and may know what is requisite to our own successful defense. We freely admit that to bring politics, in any just acceptation of the term, into the pulpit for discussion, or to make political subjects the basis of action in church judicatories, is a perversion of the functions of the ministry and the authority of the church. That there are ministers who introduce politics into the pulpit in the sense which we condemn, and that there has been church action of a like character, we also grant; though we believe these cases are rare as compared with the entire ministry and church of all denominations in our country. But still we insist that a large range of topics which certain persons under set forms of phraseology would exclude from the pulpit and from church courts, do come within the true province of pulpit discussion and church action; and not only so, but that the church and the ministry are just as solemnly bound by the authority of Him who is made "Head over all things to the church," and from whom the ministry hold their commission, to give the people committed to their care, at proper times, in proper measure, full instruction upon these themes, as they are authorized and bound to preach faith and repentance to the world, and to administer the ordinances and exercise government in the church.

This brings us directly to state the main proposition we wish to elaborate: That it is within the true province of the pulpit and of church courts, to examine and determine all questions upon all subjects, in their religious bearings, which affect the moral, social, and civil well-being of society; the Bible being their guide as to topics and the views to be taken of them, and the providence of God in the exercise of a wise discretion determining the occasions on which they shall be presented.

We sustain and confirm this general proposition, first, from the Scriptures; secondly, from the creeds and confessions of the church of all branches, in its purest portions, in all ages; thirdly, from frequent deliverances of the church, in past times, upon a variety of special subjects, called for by particular exigencies; fourthly, from the published writings of men of various branches and periods of the church, who are acknowledged as among its great lights; and fifthly, from the fact that the negative of this proposition is not sustained by any clear teachings of Scripture, in terms, principle, or any fair deduction, nor by any evangelical creeds or explicit church action of former times, nor by any prominent names in the ministry.

It is scarcely to be expected or desired, that we should exhibit, within the limits of this article, the evidence on these several points in full. We only state them to show what the subject claims, and shall aim to give a sample of this testimony, dwelling, however, at present, on the first point only.

In treating a subject of this nature, the Scriptures are our first, last, and only conclusive appeal. They are a full revelation of God's will to men. They embody and develop the principles by which men as individuals, and mankind as a race, are to be governed, in all their relations one with another, through all the organizations and compacts of society, whether of the family, the church, or the state; and they also set forth the relations which men sustain to God, under all possible aspects and organizations of society, and announce the obligations which these relations imply, and the laws by which God governs men, as individuals, as families, as communities, and as nations. There is, furthermore, no duty under which man rests, as a moral, social, and accountable being, accountable to his fellows, to society, and to God; and there is no moral obligation under which society rests, to itself as a whole, or to any of its organizations, or to the individuals who compose it, or to God; but what is imposed by God himself, and is clearly made known in the revelation of his will. The Scriptures are, therefore, the final appeal in all questions of duty, which may arise out of any of the relations of mankind.

To the church of God, through her divinely-commissioned ministry, and her divinely-appointed courts, is authoritatively

committed the high duty of making known the will of God to men, touching all the relations of life, and upon all subjects, upon which the Scriptures speak, concerning man and society. The church, therefore, by her ministry and her courts, in all her utterances, in so far as they are conformed to the Scriptures, speaks in the name and by the full authority of her Divine Head, who is "King of kings and Lord of lords." But as the church is not infallible, either in her ministry or in her courts; as, according to the Westminster Confession, "all synods or councils since the apostles' times, whether general or particular, may err, and many have erred, and are therefore not to be made the rule of faith or practice, but to be used as a help in both;" and as "God alone is Lord of the conscience, and hath left it free from the doctrines and commandments of men, which are in anything contrary to His word, or beside it in matters of faith or worship;" therefore, "the rights of private judgment, in all matters that respect religion, are universal and inalienable." According to this, each individual is at liberty, and not only so but is bound, to "search the Scriptures," and judge for himself, what are his duties as a man, and a member of society; to determine, in the fear of God, the nature and extent of all obligations which are laid upon him by the word of God, without any interference whatever from the church, whether these obligations relate to his spiritual or to his civil duties. It is thus true to the utmost extent, of each individual of mankind in regard to all the relations and duties of life, that, "to his own master he standeth or falleth." But while this is so, it is no less clear, that it is within the true province of the church not only, but her bounden and solemn duty, as under Christ "the light of the world," to give, through her ministry and her courts, her best powers, her most laborious zeal, and her most fervent prayers, first, to ascertain, as far as in her lies, what God's will is concerning all man's duties, as revealed in the Scriptures, and then solemnly to declare that will, for the guide of the body of Christ, committed to her watch and care, and for the instruction of the world at large.

That this is the duty of the church appears mainly from these considerations: (1.) Mankind, universally, are in darkness. The word of God declares, and the world's history confirms, that even with the Scriptures in their hands, men make, without the ordinances of the church, but little progress

in coming to a proper intellectual, not to say a saving, knowledge of the truth. The Scriptures alone never would accomplish, nor is it God's design that they should, the great ultimate purpose for which they were given. Mankind, therefore, need instruction beyond what they may themselves gain of the word of God, in order that they may understand their varied duties and find salvation. (2.) God has nowhere provided what is needed for these ends, unless it be through and by the church. Even the illumination of the Spirit, essential in every case to understand and improve the truth, is a grace whose operations are almost wholly connected with the ordinances, deliverances, and ministries of the church. And it is on the ground of the manifest necessity of these ordinances and ministries, that the Westminster Confession says of the visible church, which is Catholic or universal under the Gospel: "out of which there is no ordinary possibility of salvation." (8.) We then directly declare, that God has laid this high and solemn obligation upon the church—to make known to men to the full extent set forth in his revealed will their entire moral and social duties, in matters both civil and spiritual, concerning all their relations to one another, to society, and to God; and concerning all the organizations and compacts of society, as divided into families, communities, and nations; and concerning all the functionaries of society, from kings and other chief rulers, down through all grades of magistrates and officers whatsoever, who claim to bear rule over men, whether in the church or the state.

If these positions are well taken—if the Scriptures in this extended sense are the rule of life for mankind, and are thus comprehensive and complete, regarding the moral aspects of all man's relations and duties; and if the church, through her ministry and her courts, is the divinely-authorized public expounder of God's will to men—then we have only to look into the Scriptures with diligence and docility to learn man's entire duties, and to understand what is the true province of the church in her endeavors to expound and enforce them. On examining the Scriptures with this view, we are at once struck with a leading characteristic which stamps them with a divine origin. Their marvelous fullness and completeness upon the duties of mankind, in all the relations of life, public, private, individual, associated, moral, social, civil, and religious; point-

ing out with definite clearness all sins and crimes of men, and announcing laws for their government; this wisdom embodied in records whose canon was completed ages ago, and written within a narrow circle of the space upon the earth now inhabited; and yet the whole adapted to men of all nations and all conditions of society alike, and to be found suited to their wants for the present world as well as for the next, through all the coming ages, no matter what may be the revolutions in society; this prominent feature, stamped upon every page of the word of God, puts the Scriptures out of the range of all comparison with anything within the circle of human knowledge. Under this aspect of revelation, it would be useless to attempt to specify, and indeed impossible, in illustration of this feature, any particular duties in preference to others, of men as individuals, or as members of society. The word of God, with full and equal authority, literally covers the whole ground, embracing their entire duties, touching all the relations of life; and the rules for their government are not announced in general and abstract principles merely, but there is a surprising specification and detail, suited to every possible emergency, which makes the path of duty plain to every honest inquirer after truth. It is upon this characteristic of the Scriptures, a feature recognized everywhere upon their very surface, taken in connection with the object for which they were given and the manner in which God's will in them is to be ascertained and promulgated, that we base our main proposition: that it is within the true province of the pulpit and of church courts, and their manifest duty, to study, elucidate, determine, and set forth God's will in reference to all questions upon all subjects, in their religious bearings, which affect the moral, social, and civil well-being of society.

We have said that this proposition is sustained by the Scriptures. The principles brought out in the general observations already made, clearly and sufficiently show the grounds on which it rests. The proposition may be applied to every particular subject of divine revelation, as bearing upon and illustrating every duty in every relation of life. But as the ministry and the church, as already stated, are charged with going beyond the authority of Scripture in certain matters bearing upon civil affairs, and as we wish to meet the important issue

thus presented, we shall here limit the application of this general proposition to the particular case in hand.

The persons already referred to as censuring the ministry, regard it as a perversion of their sacred functions to bring into the pulpit or into church courts, any of the questions bearing upon loyalty and treason, which are now agitating the body politic, shaking society to its deepest foundations, and covering the land with widowhood and orphanage in a deluge of blood; or to inquire what may have been the cause or causes of this astounding and unprecedented uprising of rebellion against the supreme civil authority; or to pronounce decidedly upon schism, which, by reason of its early agency and close alliance with the measures and spirit of treason, in the persons of prominent schismatics, has given almost superhuman vigor to its gigantic strides in the state, and which has rent the church of God in twain; or even to take the subject, without mincing, in any manner upon the lips, in the worship of God, in preaching, praise, or prayer—even to pray explicitly for our rulers—lest the very atmosphere of the sanctuary should be polluted with the breath! All these and kindred subjects are at the present day ruled out by a certain class of instructors, as not coming within the true province of the pulpit and the church, and to introduce which is a profanation of the service and courts of the Lord's house.

Now, we demand to know, explicitly—by something which is very nearly akin to a "Thus saith the Lord"—on what ground it is claimed that these and similar topics shall be entirely ignored by the pulpit and the courts of the church. Two leading reasons are suggested, and these will probably cover the whole ground. (1.) It is claimed that these subjects are rarely, if ever, properly treated by the pulpit and church courts; that the circumstances under which action is most commonly taken are unfavorable for calm and just views, and lead to erroneous judgments, or to fanaticism and folly, resulting in alienation, strife, and schism; and, therefore, all such exciting and divisive subjects should be excluded from the pulpit and from the judicatories of the church. This is the argument from policy or expediency. (2.) The other reason involves a higher principle, and the position is boldly taken that these subjects are excluded by the very terms and

the whole spirit of the Scriptural charter of the church; that the church, in her ministry and courts, is invested with spiritual functions only, and that her preaching and deliverances must be wholly confined within these limits; while the subjects mentioned, and others of a kindred character, are wholly secular or political, and are therefore directly excluded by the divine constitution of the church under the explicit authority of her Head.

There is, clearly, a broad and palpable difference here involved, between two classes in the ministry and the church, as to what is the law of Christ's kingdom in the premises, touching matters which are vital to the purity in doctrine of the church, and no less vital to the civil and spiritual well-being of society at large; rendered all the more important in its application to the times in which we live, and the stirring events through which we are passing. A brief examination we think will show, that the first of the grounds on which it is proposed to exclude the subjects mentioned, is entirely fallacious, while the other is but a *petitio principii*.

The first would furnish a broad and safe shelter for all errorists, and paralyze freedom of thought and discussion. If the subjects in question, on which the Scriptures speak with great plainness and frequency, must be passed by because they may not be properly treated, then all other subjects must be; for none are revealed with more clearness than these, and all men are liable to err. Every doctrinal truth must be ignored, for men of honest minds widely differ, and vital error must be permitted to run riot over the land unrebuked. Many errorists sap the very foundations of the truth, claiming to speak in the name of Christ. License would be given to all such, and the pulpit and church courts must be mute upon the essentials of the faith, and by their silence bid heretics God-speed, unless the true ministry can claim to speak with an absolute infallibility. If, furthermore, the subjects in question must be omitted because of the prevalence of excitement and partisan feeling in the church or around it, and the danger of alienation and schism resulting, then, on the same grounds, must every question of doctrine and duty be ignored; for when and where, in the history of the church, has there been more strife, leading to division, than has been occasioned by

preaching and action upon the great doctrines of grace, or than has resulted from a plain case of discipline? This argument from expediency, when legitimately carried out, would drive the plowshare of fear and imbecility through every doctrine of the Gospel, and defeat every duty which is solemnly laid upon the church. It would make all her watchmen "dumb dogs," and paralyze her mind and heart. There are, indeed, but two questions here which need be asked as a guide to our duty. Are the subjects on which the pulpit or the church proposes to speak, matters of revelation? If so, the duty is clear, for Christ's ambassadors must declare "all the counsel of God." Are the circumstances of the church or the world such as to show an occasion for speaking at a given time? In this we must be governed by our best discretion, being responsible only to God; and it will often appear, that the very time when the public mind is filled with excitement and alarm and doubt and misgiving, so far from being a time when the church should be silent lest some alienation should result, is the very time when the church should be heard, when hers above all other voices should be uttered, when men justly expect it, when Christ may demand it, that her notes of warning and rebuke, of counsel and comfort, may rise far above the waves of tumult and passion, pointing out to the erring their duty, sustaining the true and the suffering, and guiding all into the haven of truth and peace and rest; the church thus fulfilling only her plain mission.

The other reason for this conclusion, which asserts the fundamental principle that certain subjects are without the true province of the pulpit and church courts from their nature, and must not therefore be touched at all, is of a more radical and serious character. It is, however, but a begging of the whole question in controversy. It is *assumed* that the matters in question are essentially and purely secular and political, and therefore can not be made the subject of pulpit examination or church action. The *onus probandi* is upon our opponents. If this is the nature of these topics, it is incumbent on them to show it. We deny that this is their nature; and we engage to show that they come within the proper range of the church's authority, and that to utter her voice upon them is her manifest duty.

The grounds of this position are clear. (1.) We maintain it upon the general principle that whatever is revealed in the word of God comes within the true province of the ministry and the church for examination and instruction. This is the very letter of the word: "All Scripture is given by inspiration of God, and is profitable for doctrine, for reproof, for correction, for instruction in righteousness; that the man of God may be perfect, thoroughly furnished unto all good works." "Study to show thyself approved unto God, a workman that needeth not to be ashamed, rightly dividing the word of truth." Such scriptures as these, which are a sample of many, cover the whole ground, making it the duty of the ministry to declare "all the counsel of God," without which they can not be "pure from the blood of all men." (2.) Descending from this general principle, we find under this comprehensive phrase, "All Scripture," that every specific subject is embraced and definitely set forth, pointing out man's obligations in all actual relations, positions, and circumstances of life, civil, social, and religious; as ruler and subject, husband and wife, parent and child, master and servant; the duties founded upon or which spring out of these and other relations thus reaching to all the divinely-recognized organizations of society, the family, the church, and the state. (3.) Whatever, therefore, God has revealed touching these relations and their duties, is incumbent on the church to expound and enforce through her ministry and her courts.

Now, upon these obviously scriptural principles, can anything be plainer, than that it is the duty of the ministry and the church to give instruction, according to God's revealed will, upon those subjects which now agitate the mind and oppress the heart of this nation, in every part of the state and in every branch of the church? But here comes in the assumption that these are matters purely political and secular, with which the ministry and the church have nothing whatever to do. And what is the ground on which this assumption rests? Why, simply, that the jurisdictions of the state and of the church are distinct, and may not be confounded. This is the grand position on which all declaimers take their stand when they would exclude certain subjects from the church, and when they would raise the cry of "preaching pol-

itics." They make two separate inclosures to suit themselves, and they then put into each just what suits their fancy or what some passing emergency may suggest. But we can neither admit their assumptions nor sanction the extent to which they press the principle of different jurisdictions. This principle, though a just one, does not meet the demands of the present case. It does not approach its remotest confines. We freely grant that the jurisdiction of the state is distinct from that of the church, and no man can probably find any other man in this country who denies it. And we freely grant, also, that under this principle, all those subjects which are purely secular are excluded from the church. But the precise matter in controversy is concerning a class of subjects of which it is both affirmed and denied that they are wholly secular; and the point is, whether a given subject really is or is not so. Upon this, the proposition of different jurisdictions casts no light whatever; for the state properly legislates upon many subjects concerning which, also, the Scriptures announce principles for the action of the church. The question, then, still presses: What is secular, and what is spiritual? What is the principle, in its last analysis, which places a given subject within or without the cognizance of the church? Who can draw the line between the secular and the spiritual; and what is that line? We maintain that we need only ask concerning any subject in question: Is the will of God revealed upon it? If so, that is the end of controversy, and the church is authorized and bound to declare that will.

But before proceeding to show directly that the essential underlying principles involved in our present national strife are of a moral nature, that they are revealed in the word of God, and therefore that they come under the cognizance of the church, let us pursue a little further this doctrine of separate jurisdictions. While it is a sound doctrine, and if properly applied may be productive of no harm and much good, it may be well to observe how it would work practically, if carried out, as handled by some, to the extent to which their teaching would lead us. Their position is substantially this: that the church has no authority to touch any matters which come under the cognizance of the state, and on which it is conceded the state may properly legislate; and, therefore, that

certain institutions of the state which are recognized by the common law or ancient and general consent, as is alleged, and those which are directly established, altered, perpetuated, regulated, or abolished, by the positive enactments of the civil authority, are wholly without the cognizance of the church. It is upon this very ground, in terms substantially, that certain subjects have been pronounced secular or political, and have, of late years, been resisted when introduced into the higher courts of the church. But let us see where such a principle would carry us, when merely followed out to its legitimate results.

Marriage is an institution of the state, and the civil authority enacts laws for its solemnization, and determines the degrees of consanguinity and affinity beyond which it may be lawful, and within which it is a crime; and these laws greatly vary in different nations. But suppose some of the states of our Union, under the pressure of some modern reformers, should become far more lax than they now are, and sanction by law, marriage within the nearest relationships in life, and other irregularities popular with some, would it not be within the province of the pulpit and church courts to proclaim against such iniquity? Could they refrain from it and be guiltless? So of the law of divorce. It is well known that some states permit the marriage bond to be severed from the most trivial causes. This is allowed by express provision of law, either through legislatures or courts. It is then a matter political. But the laws of marriage and divorce are found, too, in God's legislation. When these are so fearfully trampled upon by the state, is it not the duty of the church to proclaim God's will, and endeavor to bring the state to a right line of conduct, and to rebuke and exhort legislators and rulers to this end? Take another case. The Congress of the United States recently passed a law repealing the statutes of the territory of Utah, which established or sanctioned polygamy. Suppose Congress had taken the opposite course, and had admitted Utah into the Union as a state, with her laws enacting polygamy, as her people desired, thus sanctioning all the abominations of the system; must the pulpit in that event be muzzled and church courts be dumb, and thus tacitly allow all the horrors of Mormonism to become incorporated with our system

of government and spread its pollutions over the land? But why not, on the principle avowed, that institutions of the civil authority, founded, regulated, perpetuated, or abolished, by statute law, are beyond examination in the house and courts of God? And in this case something more might have been or was in fact involved, than a mere matter of civil legislation, as in the ordinary laws of marriage and divorce. Any one who has watched the discussions in Congress for several years past, upon this very question of the admission of Utah, knows that matters of the gravest political moment have been alleged to lie within it, affecting the whole theory of the respective jurisdictions of the federal and state governments, touching the provisions which may be put into the constitution of a state, when seeking admission into the Union; some contending that the people assembled in connection to form a state constitution, are absolutely sovereign as to its stipulations, provided it be republican in its form, and others contending that Congress may supervise the whole; a question, indeed—this conflict of political jurisdiction between federal and state authority—the very and sole question, as it is contended by some, which lies at the bottom of our present national troubles. But can any one, reverencing the word of God, persuade himself that for any such political reason, the church could have been precluded, in case the event supposed had occurred, from pronouncing upon the merits of incorporating polygamy into our social system? Or can it be supposed that the church would have been bound, first to settle the political question, or even to entertain it at all, in order to determine the merits of the social and religious one, and to proclaim by the authority of God in the hearing of legislators of all jurisdictions, the law of God in the premises, by which they were bound on their personal peril and peril to the nation?

And upon the principle we are combating—that civil legislation is necessarily beyond the cognizance of the church—what shall become of the Christian Sabbath? As an institution established on a particular day of the week, with what constitutes its violation and the penalties therefor—a day on which no civil process can issue, a “dies non”—it is a subject of state legislation. But this institution and its laws are also found in the decalogue. The clamors of the populace, in many of our cities,

demand that all prohibitory Sabbath laws of state authority shall be repealed; that omnibuses shall run, and parks be thrown open, and amusements be directly encouraged, by municipal authority; thus opening the way for the demoralizing habits of Europe to become engrafted upon our country and to be stimulated by the sanctions of law. The point here is, not whether human legislation on either side of the question is wise or unwise, but simply whether, when it is openly proposed, practically to set aside God's legislation by such measures, the pulpit and the church must pass by the whole subject as one with which they have no concern. That corrupt monarch, Charles I, of England, authorized what was known as the "Book of Sports," giving thus his royal sanction to a fearful desecration to the Lord's day. But on the principal avowed, the pulpit must be silent because this emanated from a king.*

If the position under consideration is a sound one—and it has been urged by eminent men with great confidence—then there is a vast number of subjects vitally affecting the weal of society, and on which the word of God speaks plainly, which must be totally ignored by the church. The pulpit must utter no warning against drunkenness, if aimed directly at the chief agency of it, the dram-shops which infest all our towns and cities, because, forsooth, they are licensed by law and those concerned are engaged in a lawful business. And when certain modern reformers shall realize their visions of a perfect social state, having persuaded the city fathers of New York that the morals of the people under their municipal rule will be improved by adopting the habits of Paris, we shall be prepared for public institutions where the sanctions of law will be given to systematic violations of the seventh com-

* The king sorely persecuted several ministers, through the instigation of Archbishop Laud, for not reading the "Book of Sports" to the people after divine service. It is related in the history of those times, that "one Dr. Dawson read it"—in church, as commanded—"and presently after, read the Ten Commandments; and then said: 'Dearly beloved, you have heard now the commandments of God and man: obey which you please.'" This sort of "compromise" may suggest to certain ministers of later times how to settle a perplexing question, where their high "spirituality" prevents them from praying specifically for "our rulers," or from observing days of fasting or thanksgiving when recommended by "the powers that be."

mandment; and yet, though such institutions should overspread the whole land, if the pulpit or the church should deign to utter a single note of remonstrance, citing for their authority the very letter of God's word, we shall be told by certain modern divines if they are consistent that we are "bringing politics into the pulpit." Is there in logic a more perfect *reductio ad absurdum* than is thus afforded, when carrying this doctrine out to its legitimate results? And how would it work on heathen ground? If matters of state legislation are of necessity beyond the notice of the church, what authority has the christian missionary to say a word against infanticide, the burying alive of the aged, the burning of widows, or any other horrors of paganism when sanctioned by the state? or even against tyranny, or oppression, or the Inquisition, or any other iniquity of the civil power? If the doctrine is a sound one, it applies to all governments, heathen and christian alike; for the position is, that the church may not interfere with the action of government as such, for this is "mixing politics and religion."

Nor can it be admitted, that the only proper way in which ministers can act upon these subjects, is in their character as citizens. On the contrary, from the nature, constitution, position, and the entire obligations of the church, it is the duty of the ministry and church courts to act in their official capacity in directing the mind and heart of society upon all matters revealed in the word of God. This is one of the very purposes—a prime purpose—for which God has set apart the ministry and organized the church. And it is for the very reason that they, in this official character, and by virtue of their public organization, can exert a mightier power for good, that this high duty is laid upon them. They are thus the divinely-constituted conservators of the morals of the world. The ministry, as a public order of men, are to speak upon all these subjects in the name and by the authority of God; and the church, as such, in the name of her Divine Head, is to instruct saints and sinners, rulers and ruled, and all organizations and compacts of men, communities, nations, and all kindreds of the earth, of every tribe and tongue and people, in every duty and upon every subject on which God's word deigns to speak; and woe be to any mortal man, high or low, who turns a deaf ear

to her voice! It is upon this very ground that we claim—and it is upon this ground solely, that our standards say, in terms—that when it is deemed needful, the ministry and the church by her courts may, in their official capacity, “petition” the civil authority in favor of, and, of course, may protest against, any laws, or measures of state policy, adopted or proposed, where they deem the great interests of society imperiled which they are set to guard.*

The true doctrine in the issue at this point is clear. The Scriptures are the law both for the state and the church. The church is God’s authorized expounder of this law. In regard to that mixed class of subjects, such as have just been mentioned, on which the state legislates and God’s word speaks, the authority of the state, as on other subjects, is complete, when exercised in accordance with, or not contravening, the revealed law. When, however, these limits are crossed, the church, through her ministry and courts, is bound to make her voice heard. In regard, then, to all the moral aspects of those subjects belonging to what may be termed in some sense a mixed jurisdiction, and also the moral bearings of all other questions upon which the state legislates, the authority of the church, “ministerial and declarative” only, though it be, is

* *Vide* Confession of Faith, chap. 81, sec. iv.—When the three thousand ministers of New England memorialized the Senate of the United States against the pending Nebraska bill, whatever may be thought of the expediency and wisdom of the step, they were acting clearly within their official authority as derived from the Head of the church; and just to the degree that they thought the question important, and the case urgent, were they bound in good conscience to do as they did, and remonstrate as ministers of Christ, “in the name of the Almighty God,” against what they deemed a great wrong. Had they been Presbyterians, they could have pleaded our standards in justification. Dr. Palmer remarks upon this, in the *Southern Presbyterian Review*: “After the lapse of nearly a century, since the union of church and state was dissolved at the Revolution, we find three thousand divines in the halls of our National Congress, attempting to arrest the legislation of the country upon matters which concern them not a whit more than any other three thousand equally respectable men in the nation.” On the contrary, by virtue of their office, and just in the degree that the ministry as an order of men have been set to guard the morals of the world, in all that vitally affects the welfare of society, whether in the conduct of legislators or others, did this question “concern them” *castly more* than it concerned other men. We contend for the principle here involved, without passing any judgment upon the particular case. The principle was right, though the act should be deemed a great folly.

above that of the state, in the sense and to the intent that it is her express command and mission from God to make known to all in authority his revealed will on all these subjects, and if need be, to exhort, rebuke, and warn rulers, to the end that they may understand and discharge their duties in the fear of God, from whom their authority is derived.

Vattel, one of the ablest writers on "The Law of Nations," lays down a principle which fully involves what we here claim—that the Scriptures are the rule for the conduct of the state. The opening words of his work, on "Preliminaries," are: "Nations or states are bodies politic, societies of men united together to procure their mutual safety and advantage by means of their union. Such a society has its affairs and interests; it deliberates, and takes resolutions in common; and thus becomes a *moral person*—having an understanding and a will peculiar to itself, and is susceptible of obligations and laws." If, then, the state is "a moral person," what is the supreme rule for the guidance of its moral acts? Manifestly, the law of God; for society, government, nations, are ordained of God. Where is the law found? In the Scriptures; for they as explicitly declare the will of God concerning states as they do concerning individuals. Upon whom, by the Scriptures, is laid the duty of making known the law to all men? The church, through her ordinances, her ministry, and her courts.

To the same effect writes Wayland: "Civil society is an institution of God. * * * * * It must be established upon the same principles which God has established. * * * * * Now, since, as we have before shown, the light of conscience and the dictates of natural religion are insufficient to exert the requisite moral power over man, our only hope is in that revelation of his will which God has made in the Holy Scriptures. * * * * * Government derives its authority from society, of which it is the agent; society, and the relations between society and individuals, are the ordinance of God: of course, the officer of a government, as the organ of society, is bound as such by the law of God, and is under obligation to perform the duties of his office in obedience to this law." The law of God, then, is the law for governments and nations, as that law is found in the Scriptures.

Dr. Stuart Robinson, in his "Church of God," teaches a contrary doctrine. In speaking of the "source or origin," and of the "rule for guidance," of the civil and spiritual powers, he says: "They differ, 1. In that the civil power derives its authority from God as the Author of nature; whilst the power ecclesiastical comes alone from Jesus as Mediator. 2. In that the rule for the guidance of the civil power in its exercise, is the light of nature and reason, the law which the Author of nature reveals through reason to man; but the rule for the guidance of the ecclesiastical power in its exercise, is that light which, as Prophet of the church, Jesus Christ has revealed in his word. It is a government under statute laws already enacted by the King." The distinctions so formally laid down here by Dr. Robinson in regard to the "source" and "rule for the guidance" of these powers, are absolutely without the least foundation in the word of God. We are aware that some other writers make them, and well know the "source" whence he derives them; but we challenge the production of a single explicit text of Scripture which sustains them. In regard to the first point, the civil power derives its authority from the same "source" as the ecclesiastical. The government of the whole universe—the church, the state, all nations, all worlds, angels, men, and devils—is in the hands of a Mediator. The present is a mediatorial dispensation, solely, universally, supremely. "All power is given unto" CHRIST "in heaven and in earth," as Mediator. All authority, therefore, on earth, whether of the state or the church, is derived from Him. Any doctrine in conflict with this deprives the Mediator of his true glory, and contains the germ of all heresy. In regard to the second point, "the rule for the guidance" of the powers is the same—the Scriptures. Dr. Robinson totally ignores the word of God, as containing the law for the state. This is another prime error, and contains, in principle, the essence of the baldest infidelity. Where the Scriptures are known, they are the rule for the civil as for the ecclesiastical power. Where they are not known, man is left in regard to his civil authority and obligations precisely as in regard to his religious—to the light of nature and of reason.

The celebrated Isaac Taylor, in his admirable essay on

"Pagan Usages and the Christian Magistrate," relating more especially to the times of the Emperor Theodosius II, makes this rather remarkable statement: "The Gospel, as it addresses no offer of salvation to nations, so does it preserve an ominous silence concerning their sins." If Mr. Taylor intends to restrict "the Gospel" here to the teachings of the New Testament, then this statement is of very little value to his argument, even if its truth were unquestioned; for his aim appears to be to show what is the mind of God upon the subject in hand, and that can only be ascertained from the whole scope of revelation. We do not, however, admit the correctness of the latter part of the proposition, even when tried by the utterances of the New Testament. But if he means to embrace the entire Scriptures—without which the statement amounts to nothing—then he is confronted with the most palpable facts, all along in the history of God's dealings with his chosen people in their national capacity, and with the surrounding nations. The sins of the nations as such—of the rulers and the people—are frequently stated and denounced by the prophets as against God, against his clearly-expressed will, against his written law; and for these sins the nations were repeatedly and sorely punished, and God's judgments were constantly impending over them. And it is clear, that what so plainly marks a fundamental feature of God's administration over the nations of the earth in former times, has never been abrogated. If so, when and where? What was then his law in the case is his law now. Much more to the purpose is the following paragraph from the same essay, showing, (1.) That the early Christian Fathers denounced the sins of civil magistrates, in their capacity as heads of nations, or subordinate rulers; and, (2.) That the authority they claimed for this was derived from the word of God, and their commission as ministers of the Gospel of Christ: "Well would it repay the labor it might cost, to follow and to exhibit the progress of the Christian energy, regarded simply as a protest against the established injustices and the ritual impurities, the cruelties and the filthiness, of Greek and Roman heathenism. How animated, how firm, how irresistible, was this protest, as we catch the echoes of it, in listening to the early Christian Apologists! Truly, these witnesses for the new faith spoke

as the prophets of the Highest, when in its defense, and when asking for justice, they reasoned with the men of their times, with philosophists and potentates, concerning 'righteousness, and temperance, and the judgment to come.' The sophists were soon silenced, and profligate magnates quailed, and were glad to screen themselves behind their material powers, whenever this scorch of eternal reason was sent in upon their consciences. *They* 'trembled' for an hour only, but their successors in the next age gave way, and acknowledged in the Christian teacher the authentic servant of God."

Now, in regard to the present state of our national affairs—in order to apply the principles laid down to the issue in which, as a people, we are involved—we maintain that all the essential moral elements which enter into the civil questions which are now troubling this land, and without an utter and wicked disregard of which, these national troubles never would have occurred, are developed in the Scriptures and make a part of God's revelation to all men. We maintain further, in order to be more explicit, putting the immediate persons engaged in the contest out of view as much as possible, that the contest itself is no mere difference of political parties or conflict of political theories, upon either side of which one may array himself at pleasure; but it is a contest which essentially and inevitably involves, at the very bottom of it, all the elements of sin and duty—of obedience to lawful authority, ordained of God, and a disregard of it—of an aim to redress alleged grievances by force, without the least movement toward a peaceable solution, though the very form of it was prescribed and the door open—of a bold attempt, by a meagre minority in armed rebellion, to overthrow a free, constitutional government established over thirty millions of people, and an attempt on the other hand to maintain the government by force of arms, with all the consequences resulting—and finally, the agency in this opposition to the government, and in some instances as leaders both civil and military, of eminent men in the ministry of all denominations of the church, and thousands in her membership. In noticing these elements, we invade no political domain, we solve no political problem, we entertain no political theory, we do not touch any political question. We merely mention certain public, notorious facts which every

man in the nation must admit, to which it is impossible to shut our eyes, and concerning which it would be criminal to do so if we could. And now, upon this well known state of the case, will any sane man pretend, who reveres his Bible, that the church may not take notice of these things? nay, that it is not her solemn duty so to do, when her ministry and her members are thus involved? Can her ministry and her courts seal their lips without proving false to the truth and to their commission? Plainly they can not. They must search out the law of God which bears upon the case, and hold it up before the people in all the rigor of its authority.*

The Scriptures show what this law is, and how the ministry

* Rev. Dr. N. L. Rice, in a discourse published within the present year, entitled "The Pulpit: its Relations to our National Crisis," says: "The time is at hand when this great question respecting the limits within which the functions of the ministerial office are to be exercised, must be earnestly discussed." He refers to a previous discourse he had published, where he "took occasion to state the limits within which, according to the Scriptures, the functions of the ministerial office are to be exercised." Here we find this principle laid down and elaborated: "That ministers and churches, as such, can not settle those *moral* questions which depend upon secular, civil, and political questions. In the progress of human affairs, and in the different relations of life, many questions of right and wrong, of duty and obligation, arise, which depend wholly upon secular, civil, or political questions; so that the settlement of these determines the moral questions. Now, since the Scriptures do not instruct us concerning such secular questions, the best men—those who most thoroughly understand the Scriptures, and who do not differ from each other on any important doctrine or moral principle—do differ widely respecting the secular questions, and, consequently, respecting the moral questions which depend upon them." Dr. Rice then gives a variety of illustrations of moral questions which "depend upon" secular questions for their "settlement," and says: "The same principle applies to the questions which have so unhappily divided our country, and involved it in civil war." Among these he specifies the following: "Whether the several states have the right to withdraw from the Union; whether the constitution gives to slaveholders the right to take their slaves into the territories; whether, when a state withdraws, the allegiance of citizens is due primarily to the state or to the United States," etc. And he goes on to say: "But the moral questions, it is perfectly apparent, depend upon the constitutional or civil questions; and what we maintain is—that since ministers of the Gospel and churches have no right to attempt to settle the latter, they can not settle the former." Now, upon all this, we remark: (1.) We do not contend for the right of ministers and church courts even to "attempt to settle" the moral questions which enter into the great issue before the country. But we do insist that they *are* "settled" by the word of God. They are treason, rebellion, open war upon lawful government, on the one hand; and, on the other, the right and duty of the government to defend itself against these measures for its

should handle it. Obedience to that supreme civil government placed over a people by the authority of God—the form of it being of their own free choice—is as plainly enjoined in the Scriptures as are faith and repentance; and it is therefore as much within the province of the pulpit and church courts to expound and urge the one as the other. The Bible makes no distinction between them, nor may we. But in order to elucidate these special doctrines of grace, so as to set forth the duties under them, the pulpit must point out and warn against false views as well as declare the true. The Scriptures do this. We must follow them. With what searching clearness do Christ and his apostles portray the features of false doctrine and its results, and with what withering denunciation do they visit it. This is in order that they may make all the more plain the truth they teach, and enjoin upon men their duties and show the consequences of disobedience with all the more effect. These are our examples. The principles embraced in them apply to the preaching of the entire body of divine truth; as well that which concerns our civil as our spiritual duties. They are all alike from God. If, then, we must urge obedience to the civil authority, as the Scriptures enjoin, we must show the nature and grounds of that obedience, with

overthrow. All that ministers and church courts have to do is to declare God's will in the premises; and this they are bound to do, under peril of the consequences of unfaithfulness. That will is clear. Treason, rebellion, resisting lawful authority, are sins, heinous crimes; while obedience to government is a religious duty. We are simply to declare to the people what God "settled" ages ago, and for all time; and we are to call on them to apply his law to the present case. (2.) These "moral questions" are in no manner hampered by, and can not "depend upon, the constitutional or civil questions" which Dr. Rice specifies, or upon any others. They are wholly independent of them. They have nothing whatever to do with them. On any theory of these "constitutional questions," the acts specified are crimes—the very highest known to the state, in any country. Even though secession be legally right, treason is a crime. If slaves may be constitutionally taken into the territories, still rebellion is a wickedness. And whatever may be true about allegiance, open war upon good and lawful government by its citizens is a monstrous iniquity. Upon any theory of any lawful government under heaven, it is its right and duty to endeavor to maintain its existence, and to this end to defend itself against all attacks from within or without. It is strange that so thick a fog should be conjured up to envelop so plain a matter. You might as well say that these "moral questions," involved in our national strife, "depend upon" latitude and longitude, as to affirm that they depend upon any political theories or civil questions whatsoever.

its metes and limitations. The Scriptures furnish the elements of these principles, and they abound in illustrations of them. But in order to set forth these obligations the more clearly, we must here also follow the Scriptures as in regard to the doctrines of grace; we must show the false in order to make more palpable the true. If we are to urge obedience, we may exhibit the nature of disobedience. If we must delineate and enjoin loyalty, we may delineate and denounce rebellion. The Scriptures do this. They dwell with great force and fullness of statement and illustration upon all the principles here involved. And that we may give the mind of the Spirit upon these as upon any and all other themes of divine revelation, it is just as incumbent on us to portray the sin as against God, in all its elements of thought, feeling, purpose, and act, as it is to exhibit all the characteristics of duty to his will. This is everywhere the direct mode of teaching in the Scriptures. These are the examples set for us by Christ and his apostles. If, then, this class of subjects makes a part of divine revelation, we can no more omit their examination and enforcement than we can pass by the doctrines of grace. Why has God revealed them, and enjoined them, unless they are "profitable for doctrine, for reproof, for correction, for instruction in righteousness?" No other answer can be given to this question. If revealed, the ministry must expound and enforce them.

But when, and where, and under what circumstances, should this be done? Just when, under Divine providence, and just so far, as it may be deemed advisable or necessary. Abstract principles or doctrines are of little worth unless they are applied. Their true value is seen in their application, and often their real character can be known only in this way. Their value is greatly enhanced, and their character all the more palpable, when they are applied to living, vital, pressing issues. When is the time to inveigh against false doctrine, concerning any of the great tenets of the faith? Not when errors are harmless and errorists are asleep. The Scriptures say: "When the enemy shall come in like a flood, the Spirit of the Lord shall lift up a standard against him." So upon the matters in question. When is the time to expound and urge obedience to "the powers that be," and point out the iniquity of treason and rebellion, if not when men league

together for the overthrow of good government? When, indeed, if not upon these very days through which we are passing, would it be "profitable for doctrine, for reproof, and for correction," to read and expound such parts of God's word as this, for example: "This know, that in the last days, perilous times shall come; for men shall be truce-breakers, false accusers, fierce, despisers of those that are good, traitors, heady, high-minded." Or, again this: "Let every soul be subject unto the higher powers; for there is no power but of God; the powers that be are ordained of God. Whosoever, therefore, resisteth the power, resisteth the ordinance of God; and they that resist shall receive to themselves damnation. Wherefore, ye must needs be subject not only for wrath, but also for conscience sake. For, for this cause, pay ye tribute also; for they are God's ministers, attending continually upon this very thing. Render, therefore, to all their dues; tribute to whom tribute is due; custom to whom custom; fear to whom fear; honor to whom honor." Or, again, when can it be incumbent on a minister, if not now, to follow Paul's direction to a minister, upon this very matter: "Put them in mind to be subject to principalities and powers, to obey magistrates, to be ready to every good work."

According to this teaching, it is clearly the duty of men to be subject to the government placed over them by God's authority; and it is just as clearly their duty to support that government by "tribute," and by all other means essential to the ends of its establishment and demanded for its preservation. It is also the duty of the ministry to "put them in mind" of these momentous obligations; on the one hand to point out what constitutes an infraction of these duties, in overt act or sentiment, by commission or omission, as truly as on the other hand to show what constitutes the essence and manner of obedience. It is as obviously the duty of the ministry to give the people, out of God's word, due instruction upon these particular themes, at proper times, and in proper measure, "rightly dividing the word of truth," as it is to urge the doctrine and claims of a Saviour crucified; and it is as plainly the duty of the people, in obedience to their promise at the installation of a pastor, "to receive the word of truth from his mouth with meekness and love" on the one class of

subjects as on the other; and there is no more of politics in the one case than in the other.

Undoubtedly the ministry may, and sometimes do, commit great folly in dealing with such subjects, even when they aim only at expounding the Scriptures, according to their understanding of them. But this is no more than may be said of some, in preaching on faith, regeneration, the atonement, the nature and offices of Christ, and who suppose they are preaching the truth. We do not mean open heretics, but men of evangelical name. It were infinitely better had they never entered the pulpit, for they lead souls astray, and sometimes to their everlasting ruin. But does this weaken the obligation which Christ has laid upon his ministers to expound his entire will? So the church, through some of her courts, may send forth an erroneous or unwise deliverance upon men's civil obligations, for she is not infallible. But can that affect the question of her authority to speak? Or can it in the least impair the obligation solemnly resting upon her at such a time as this, when thousands of her sons and daughters are swept into the most heinous sins and reeking crimes, to give her best efforts and her largest wisdom to know and to make known God's will, that other thousands who look up to her as Christ's representative, may not be swept away into the same condemnation? This is just as plainly within her authority, and just as obviously her duty, as it is to declare and warn against vital errors regarding any of the doctrines of grace, when arch apostates rise up and fill the land with their scandals and lay waste or threaten the fair heritage of God; and there is nothing more of the secular or the political in the one than in the other.

It will be observed that we have not attempted to entertain the question—much less to settle it—as to what is loyalty or treason in the issue now before the country, or in any other given case, except to refer the whole matter to Scripture, where it may be easily settled; nor to determine how far we are bound to go in adhering to any government under which we may live, before we should be justified in open revolution; nor whether, in case of rebellion, we are to be guided simply by the decision of the government, or what, indeed, should guide us, in settling our duty either to aid or not, and how far

and in what way, in its suppression; nor what, in every given instance, amidst the multitude of actual questions which may arise, is a purely political question which may not be touched by the church, or what is an ethical one which the church is bound to examine, further than to indicate the general teachings of the word of God, by which the line between the spiritual and the secular, and the subjects which lie on either side of it, may be determined. We do, however, insist—and this is the grand point we are urging—that, under the scriptural principles developed, those subjects which some would rule out entirely, may and should come under consideration by the pulpit and the courts of the church, in order that the people may be aided in applying the true doctrine involved to the actual cases which may arise; and we also claim, that it is the true province of the ministry and church courts to determine these points for the people, in the light of God's truth and Spirit; and further, that they can no more pass by such subjects, without manifest dereliction of duty, when the times demand their examination, than they can pass over any other subjects upon which God has revealed his will.*

* It may be objected by some readers, that the view we have presented does not bear with sufficient definiteness upon the present issue before the nation. To this we reply, that we have only aimed to look at the scriptural principles which lie at the foundation of the question, and to meet the popular cry, that, when these principles are dwelt upon with any reference to our present troubles, it is a "mixing of politics and religion." This has been our sole design. It may be well to say, however, that those who are haunted with a special abhorrence of this mixture, have a convenient way of reasoning which claims a passing notice. They admit the binding obligation of all we contend for respecting the teachings of Scripture, and the duty of the church to enforce these teachings. The subject becomes political only when it is applied. They freely admit the duty of obedience to civil government, that the Scriptures teach it, and that the church should enjoin it; all this is *religion*. But this duty must not be enjoined upon those now in rebellion against our National Government; that is *politics*. They hold to the abstract principles, and they may be taught as abstractions, but they must not be applied—at least, not to the present case. The church, they say, may urge obedience to Cæsar, but she must not say who Cæsar is; she "can not judge between rival Cæsars." She may preach obedience to the powers that be, but she must not recognize who or which they are. To do this is to "decide a political question." We may easily see the fallacy of such reasoning by bringing it to bear directly upon the subject of religion. The church is bound to preach a Saviour. This is vital, but it is not enough; it is only half the truth. It is just as essential that the church should declare who the Saviour is. There have been, and are now, "rival Saviours," false Messiahs, anti-Christi. "Even now are there

And all this, most clearly, will be seen to involve the further principle, that when any minister is deemed guilty of teaching contrary to the word of God on any of the subjects in question, he is just as liable to discipline for teaching heresy as he would be if he should teach a false doctrine on faith or the atonement. And so, also, any lower court which should take erroneous action upon such topics, would be liable to the censures of a higher, under the general power of review and control. Nor would it be carrying the principle too far, in a case where a minister should studiously ignore, and never bring before the people, the teachings of revelation on this class of subjects, if he should be arraigned for failure in official duty, any more than it would be if he should be arraigned for never preaching on faith, regeneration, baptism, and the Lord's supper. And especially would he justly be deemed derelict, if this duty should be omitted in the face of an injunction from the highest judicatory of the church, sent forth to her ministers

many anti-Christians." The church must leave men in no manner of doubt what Saviour she preaches, either as to his character or identity. It must be Jesus of Nazareth, and no other. The same principle applies in urging obedience to the civil magistrate. Some men seem to be conscientiously troubled, believing the church in danger of making shipwreck, when she enjoins obedience to "the powers that be," provided she specifies our National Administration. This, it is said, "decides a political question," and determines between "rival Cæsars." To this we say: 1. There are no "rival Cæsars" in this land. Those who are contending against the national authority, can not *claim* that acknowledgment *from us*, until they have been recognized as such, and admitted into the family of nations, by other powers. 2. In enjoining obedience to the powers at Washington, the church does not *decide* between them and any rival power, does not decide who is the President of the United States; no question is in issue upon the case, and she decides no question. She simply acts upon her knowledge of a great public fact which nobody denies; and she can not do otherwise. 3. Those who are so fearful about the church meddling with politics, should be the last to assume so eagerly that there are "rival Cæsars" in the United States. It comes with a very ill grace from them. The church should not go before, but follow, the civil powers in recognizing the claim of a people to be a nation; for this is *purely* a political question. But these gentlemen, on the contrary, in hot haste, go before both the church and all the civil powers of the earth, and do "*decide*" a great political question—that the opponents of our National Government are a nation, a civil power, and their head a Cæsar! They do all that which they charge the church with doing, and yet that which neither the church nor any civil power in the world has ventured to do! Whether this is owing to the peculiar enlightenment of a higher spirituality, or to the peculiar state of the sympathies, we will not here attempt to decide.

in times which she deemed to be of great peril to the church and the state; emanating from a venerable court embodying so largely the sentiments of the entire family of believers represented by her, and having a scriptural warrant for enjoying by reason of that very pre-eminence a larger measure of the Divine Spirit.* These several functions are clearly of the general authority with which the church is invested.

The main proposition which we have attempted to elaborate, is, we believe, fully sustained by the Scriptures; and, were it necessary, it might be confirmed and illustrated by citing many examples, showing that patriarchs, prophets, and apostles, all along in the line of the scriptural history of the church have acted upon this principle, in their instructions, counsels, warnings, and rebukes, of families, of cities, of kingdoms, of rulers of every grade, reaching to all the relations of life, and to all the organizations and functionaries known among men and sanctioned of God.

The great marvel is, when examining such a subject, that there should be any occasion in our day for examining it at all; especially that it should be a mooted question in the church, and among her ministry—and this is the whole question—as to what subjects come within the true province of pulpit discussion and church action. We believe it to be an entirely unsustained notion that the church is restricted by the principle we are combating, to the narrow limits assigned it. And this will plainly appear when we come to notice the position of the church in times past, when her scriptural landmarks were settled by wise men, as seen in her elaborated standards. But this and the other points of evidence mentioned, which illustrate and confirm our main proposition, must be reserved for another paper.

* Says an able writer, on "The Church a Spiritual Power," in the Southern Presbyterian Review: "It can not be true that an individual member, or an individual minister, is to be regarded in the same light as a church court, in the matter before us. * * * * The Spirit does, in them (the courts), speak with more authority and more solemnity than He ever utters himself through a ruling or preaching elder, because, among other reasons, their collective wisdom is supposed to be able to contain a larger fulness of spiritual influences, and because to them, as law executors, are given the express authority to hear 'the keys of the kingdom.'" The Scriptures fully sustain this doctrine; so do church formularies, and many able writers.

ART. V.—STUDIES ON THE BIBLE, No. III. *The Wonders in Egypt.**

THE first five chapters of the book of Exodus are occupied with the preparations that were made for the departure of Israel from Egypt. With the sixth chapter the history of the deliverance itself begins. It opens with a divine revelation to Moses, of the principles and methods according to which the redemption was to be effected. The contents of this revelation fully explain the narrative of the Exodus, and disclose the points of view from which the true intent of the whole subsequent history is to be recognized.

Among the particulars here revealed, is the intimate relation which God had established between the redemption of his people and his covenant with Abraham. Ex. vi: 4, 8. One of the main stipulations of that covenant was that, at the end of four hundred years, God would bring the people out of their bondage and plant them in the land of Canaan. Gen. xv: 14, xvii: 8. Now toward the close of those long and weary centuries of exile, their cry rose from the depths of their anguish, of their bondage, of their discouragements, of their despair, and God's answer to their cry was, "I have heard their groaning; I have remembered my covenant." This remarkable instrument holds an important place, not only here, but throughout the scriptures of both Testaments. The history of redemption unfolds itself, even as the tree from its germ, in strict accordance with the inmost sense of that old covenant. It is, also, the *regula regulans*, the formative law of the Church of God in all dispensations. Magna Charta and the Pragmatic Sanction of France are not more obviously the organic potential laws of the great societies, civil and ecclesiastical, which rest upon them. And, moreover, its

* HELPS TO THE STUDY.—Fairbairn's *Typology*, vol. II, pp. 84–57. Macdonald's *Pentateuch*, vol. II, pp. 50–58. Hengstenberg's *Pentateuch*, vol. II, pp. 380–385. Hengstenberg's *Egypt and Books of Moses*, pp. 96–181. Kurtz's *Old Covenant*, vol. II, pp. 245–288. *Biblical Repository*, 1833, pp. 730–748. Oldshansen's *Commentary*, vol. I, pp. 239–246; III, p. 262. Trench on *Miracles*, pp. 24–33. *Princeton Review*, 1856, pp. 266–274. Calvin's *Harmony of Pentateuch*. Rosenmüller's *Pentateuch*, Calvin, Tholuck, Stuart, Hodge, and Oldshansen on Romans ix: 17. Warbuton's *Divine Legation*, vol. II, p. 672.

vital forces will not exhaust themselves until the ideas, which it involves, have obtained their complete expression in the consummate glory of the church.

God also revealed himself to Moses as the immediate deliverer of his people. The Almighty usually employs second causes for the accomplishment of his purposes; his own efficiency remaining in the background, half hidden, half disclosed behind proximate events. He removed Israel into Egypt by a series of complex and inscrutable providences in the family of Jacob. In the after ages, he first procured the Babylonish captivity by the army of Nebuchadnezzar, and at the appointed time terminated the exile by the army of Cyrus. Second causes conceal God—the wonders in Egypt revealed God. He made bare his arm. He said: "I am the Lord; I will bring you out; I will rid you out of bondage; I will redeem you with a stretched-out arm." Chap. vi: 6. Compare chap. vii: 5, 17. This material fact should not be overlooked, else the whole will be misunderstood. Not even the enemies of God were allowed to overlook it; nor the magicians, for they said, "This is the finger of God;" nor the king, for he cried out to Moses, "Entreat the Lord for me;" nor the army, for they confessed at the Red Sea, "The Lord fighteth for Israel against the Egyptians." This circumstance exposes the egregious mistake of Moses, forty years earlier, when he slew the Egyptian, "supposing his brethren would have understood how that God, by his hand, would deliver them." Acts vii: 25, Ex. ii: 11, 15. Moses erred in attempting to enter prematurely on his work—running before he was sent; he gave way also to a rash and impetuous temper; but his most serious error was an arrogant assumption that Israel should be delivered "by his hand," whereas it was an inseparable part of the divine plan that the deliverance should be effected by the "stretched-out arm" of Jehovah. And what is remarkable, the fatal act of his old age, nearly forty years later, was precisely the same in its inmost evil nature. At Meribah, God said to him, "*Speak* unto the rock, and it shall give forth his water." But Moses *smote* the rock twice with his rod and said, "Hear now, ye rebels; must *we* fetch you water out of this rock?" The water came out abundantly, but Moses was shut out of Canaan. Num. xx: 7-13.

The means which God would employ for the redemption of Israel, are also indicated in the series of revelations now under consideration. "I will redeem you with great judgments." Ex. vi: 6. God had, before this, warned Moses of the resistance which Pharaoh would offer to the divine will, and of the measures by which that resistance should be overcome. "I am sure that the king of Egypt will not let you go, no, not by a mighty hand. And I will stretch out my hand and smite Egypt with all my wonders, and after that he will let you go." Ex. iii: 19, 20. Undoubtedly the Almighty might have adopted other and milder measures. Some proposition of compromise, or conciliation, or compensation, or some work of the Holy Spirit on the heart of the king might have induced him to let Israel go. Or the Hebrews might have been invigorated by a divine impulse to win their redemption by force of arms. But it pleased God to accomplish his purpose by a series of terrible judgments. Moses was directed to open the negotiation with the king, in the tone of menace, not of petition or entreaty. He was instructed to say, "Thus saith the Lord, Israel is my son, even my first-born. And I say unto thee, Let my son go that he may serve me: and if thou refuse to let him go, behold, I will slay thy son, even thy first-born." Ex. iv: 22, 23. In all the subsequent interviews the argument was the same; it was drawn from the anger of God, and was addressed to the fears of the king. Chap. viii: 2, ix: 15. From beginning to end, it was a proceeding in the way of desolating plagues, terror swiftly following terror. In them all, the Lord became known by the judgments which he executed.

A material part of the divine word to Moses remains to be considered. The main design of the wonders in Egypt was not the redemption of Israel, but the manifestation of the being and glory of Jehovah. Ex. vi: 3, 7. The state of religious sentiment, both among the Egyptians and the Hebrews, must be distinctly borne in mind. The former were idolaters, worshiping Nature in her various aspects; worshipers of the river Nile, the cloudless sky, the fertile earth. Taught by the religious philosophy of the age, that each people had its own separate gods, just as each nation owed allegiance to its own local king, the Egyptians considered themselves

wholly beyond the jurisdiction of the God of Israel. When Moses told Pharaoh, "Thus saith Jehovah, the God of Israel, let my people go," the reply of Pharaoh was, "Who is Jehovah that I should obey his voice to let Israel go? I know not Jehovah, neither will I let Israel go." Ex. v: 2. The Hebrews had in a great measure lost the knowledge of the God of their fathers; Ex. iii: 13; they worshiped the idols of Egypt, and the mass of them were sinking into heathenism. The one supreme necessity of both peoples was that they should receive a profound and enduring impression of the being and supremacy of the true God. It was the purpose of Jehovah to teach this lesson by the wonders in Egypt. To the Israelites, he said: "Ye shall know that I am Jehovah, your God, which bringeth you out from under the burdens of the Egyptians." Ex. vi: 7. Of the heathen, he said: "And the Egyptians shall know that I am Jehovah, when I stretch forth mine hand upon Egypt," vii: 5. Compare vii: 17, viii: 22, xiv: 4, 18.

To the same end God communicated to Moses his new name, saying, "I appeared unto Abraham, unto Isaac, and unto Jacob, by the name of God Almighty, but by my name JEHOVAH was I not known to them." Ex. vi: 3. These words suggest two inquiries: one in reference to the import of the term Jehovah, and the other to the statement that God was not known, by this name, to the older patriarchs. The term is doubtless derived from the Hebrew substantive verb *to be*, and expresses, in the highest form, the idea of Existence. It is explained, in part, by God's earlier self-revelation, when he said: "I AM THAT I AM." Ex. iii: 14. Many interpreters suppose that other ideas, auxiliary to the notion of existence, are contained in the word; such as necessary existence, an essence necessarily existent and omnipotent, an immutable essence, the source of existence also to other things. Leigh's definition is, "*Ὁ ὢν εἷς, qui est, et revera subsistit vel existit, et per quem facta sunt omnia, quæ sunt et existunt.*" It may be doubted whether all these ideas are embraced by the term, yet nothing less ought to be accepted as its import than the Unbegotten, Uncreated, Unchanging, Unending One. Some eminent scholars of the present day, are of opinion that its characteristic signification is the God of salvation. This they deduce

from the words uttered by Eve at the birth of her first son. She supposed him to be the "promised seed." She, therefore, applied to the Almighty, from whom she had received the child, a new name, expressing the truth that He was the author of the expected salvation. For she said, "I have gotten a man from (with, by the aid of,) Jehovah." Then, again, at the sacrifice of Isaac, Abraham used the same name to convey a similar idea; he called the place Jehovah-jireh. And, once more, the dying Jacob exclaimed, "I have waited for thy salvation, O Jehovah," using the name to describe God in his character as the God of salvation. That the Jehovah of the Old Testament is, furthermore, the second person of the Trinity is made clear, beyond a doubt, by the prophets. In Isaiah it is written, "Prepare ye the way of Jehovah." Is. xl: 3. Compare Matt. iii: 3. Jeremiah writing of Christ, said: "This is his name whereby he shall be called Jehovah, our Righteousness." Jer. xxiii: 6. And by Malachi, the last of the old prophets, God said, "Behold, I will send my messenger, and he shall prepare the way before me: and the Lord whom ye seek, shall suddenly come to his temple." Mal. iii: 1. Compare Matt. xi: 10. The conclusion is, that when God was about to redeem his church from bondage in Egypt, he assumed the name Jehovah, as expressive of his work as the Redeemer of Israel, and of mankind as well.

The true sense of the statement, that God was not known by this name to the older patriarchs, must be, either that the word Jehovah, as a noun substantive, was not in use in their day; or that its full meaning had not been revealed to them. The former sense can not be admitted. The constant use of the term in the book of Genesis may, possibly, be accounted for by suggesting that the book was not written until after this communication was made to Moses. But, as stated above, Eve, Abraham, and Jacob, all pronounced the word. Moreover, the radical syllable of the term entered into the composition of certain proper names, before the days of Moses, such as Moriah, Abiah, and Bithiah. But in the higher sense of the proposition, God was not known by, or more accurately according to, his name Jehovah, or in his character as Jehovah. The full meaning of the title had never before been

unfolded. He would expound that incommunicable name by the redemption of Israel from bondage, the type of the greater redemption to be wrought out by Christ. The name Immanuel was uttered by Isaiah, yet it was not till the incarnation of Christ, that the blessed mystery of Immanuel, as God with us, was fully divulged. In like manner, God had revealed himself to the patriarch as El Shaddai, the Almighty, and therefore able to produce a son from the shrunken loins of Abraham and the dead womb of Sarah. But now in Egypt, and in after ages at Calvary, God would unfold the majesty and grace that lay hidden in the name Jehovah, the only living and true God, the Redeemer of the world.

These preliminary revelations are followed, in the record, by a narrative of the wonders in Egypt. A general view of these phenomena must precede any attempt to expound their true intents and purposes. They were, in the first place, without exception, miraculous. It is a significant fact that no miracles were wrought through human intervention during five-and-twenty centuries after the creation. Enoch had this testimony that he pleased God, but he did no miracle; nor did Noah, who walked with God; nor did Abraham, who was the father of the faithful. The translation of the first of these patriarchs, the deluge in the days of the second, and the destruction of Sodom, in the presence of the last, were supernatural events; yet they were wrought directly by God himself. Through all these ages the Almighty revealed his being and will by immediate visions; hence the portion of time proceeding from the creation to the time of Moses is commonly called the theophanic era. The age of miracles began with Moses. God appeared to him at Horeb, and granted him a commission to deliver the church from bondage; and as a credential of his divine legation, gave to him this power. Under the direction of Jehovah he performed certain acts which were followed by the change of his shepherd's staff into a serpent, and then into the staff again; and the instantaneous pollution of his hand with the leprosy, and then its instantaneous cleansing. On his arrival in Egypt, he exhibited these signs as the credentials of his mission to Pharaoh and to the Israelites. Afterward as the plagues were, one after another, brought upon the land, they took the form of miracles—signs

and wonders wrought by God through the intervention of Moses and Aaron. The power of God visibly connected itself with their instrumentality. In every case he told Moses what sign he intended to show, and what Moses must do by way of bringing it forward. Accordingly he stretched out his rod upon the streams and pools of water; he smote the dust with his rod; he sprinkled ashes toward heaven; he stretched forth his hand toward heaven; or, as in the destruction of the first-born, he simply warned Pharaoh of the impending death; and, moreover, the plagues were removed in answer to his prayers. The wonders were associated with his actions to show that he was a true minister of Jehovah, yet these actions were constantly varied, to show that there was no inherent power in any of them. Here, then, was the beginning of miracles.

Secondly, the plagues themselves were introduced by a harmless sign, the objects of which were to authenticate the commission of Moses, to admonish the king that he was brought face to face with the authority of Jehovah, the God of Israel, and that the battle was to be fought not by armed hosts, but in the sphere of the supernatural. This first miracle was the sign of the shepherd's rod, wrought once in Horeb and now in the presence of Pharaoh. Ex. vii: 10-12.

Thirdly, the number of the plagues was ten. The religious signification of numbers could not be discussed in this place without introducing much irrelevant matter. But it may be stated that ten is one of the perfect numbers of Scripture, or the symbols of completeness. The decimal arrangement of the numerals prevails, almost universally, among the nations, and indeed it is determined by the physical constitution of man, the structure, to wit, of the human hand, as the very term digits indicates. The number of the plagues, like the equivalent number of the commandments, was, undoubtedly, the sign of a work completed.

Fourthly, each wonder differed from all the others. Their variety was adapted to satisfy all the parties concerned that the hand of Jehovah was, in very deed, stretched out over the land. Some would be convinced by one of the ten signs, and some by another of the series; and the proof from the whole was cumulative and overwhelming. Besides, God never repeats

himself, and never exhausts the infinite resources of his mercies or his judgments.

Fifthly, they fell upon the land in swift succession. The narrative shows that several of the wonders occurred at intervals of about a week each. The last four appear to have fallen into a single month; for when the hail fell, which was the seventh, "the barley was ripe and the flax was bolled," a state of vegetation which, in Egypt, occurs early in March. The last plague took place in the middle of Abib, or the first of April; Ex. xii: 3-6, xiii: 4; giving four weeks to the last four of the series. It appears, also, from Ex. vii: 25, that seven days intervened between the first and second. Assuming a week's interval as the rule for the whole, the conclusion is that the series began early in February and closed early in April; the whole occupying a period of about sixty days. Hengstenberg, however, it should be stated, begins the computation with July, the period of the annual overflowing of the Nile, and extends the time through nine months, till the first of April following. But this calculation does not give due weight to the statements of the record, according to which several of the intervals must be estimated at a week each. The shorter computation is, therefore, to be preferred, indicating the fearful rapidity with which the judgments ran their frightful career.

Lastly, three of the plagues fell upon the Hebrews as well as upon their oppressors, showing that, as the people of God partook of the idolatry of the Egyptians, so they must partake of their plagues. After that, the Israelites were severed from the Egyptians and suffered no more; indicating that they were the chosen seed, and that while God would chastise them for their sins, he would not destroy them with the heathen. Such are some of the leading characteristics of these wonders.

It is easy to determine from the record their main designs. In the first place, they were intended to assert the supreme dominion of Jehovah over all the elements and forces of nature at work in the land. The Egyptians held him to be the national God of the Hebrews only, and that their own local deities were the sovereign lords of Egypt. "Who is Jehovah? I know him not," expressed the true sense of the current theology. It was, therefore, the purpose of the Almighty to

show, that although he was the God of the despised and oppressed Israelites, he was also the God of the whole earth, even of the land of Egypt. "To the end that thou mayest know that I am the Lord in the midst of the earth," is the reason assigned to Pharaoh for what God was about to do. Ex. viii: 22. Accordingly all the elements and provinces of nature were involved in these calamities. The waters of the Nile and of all its pools, the dust of the earth, the cloudless sky, the everlasting sunshine, the brute beasts smitten with murrain, boils on man and beast, the hail-storm, thunder and lightning, the wings of the wind, and, finally, the life itself of man and beast, each in its turn was either the vehicle or the object of the divine displeasure. Jehovah proved himself supreme by marshalling into order, and wielding at will, all the elements of nature.

There was, moreover, an established connection between the natural and the supernatural in many of these judgments. What was miraculous stood closely related to evils existing in the country. This fact has been used by the rationalists for the purpose of resolving the ten plagues into purely natural phenomena, intending, by that process, to eliminate wholly from them the element of the supernatural. Eichhorn explains the change of the waters into blood, by the circumstance that the Nile, at the period of its overflowing, assumes a red color. He attempts to show that frogs in vast legions, lice, or as the Hebrew word is now understood, gnats; flies, the murrain, boils, thunder, lightning, and hail, and the flight of locusts not unfrequently distress the country; that darkness attends the storms of wind and sand from the desert, and that a pestilence, corresponding to the tenth plague, sometimes lays waste the land. But this explanation is reduced to its true value by applying to it the obvious facts in the case. The plague of blood did not, it is probable, occur in July, the time of the annual swelling of the Nile, but in February; the water that was taken from it in vessels, before the miracle was wrought, was also changed to blood; the river stank; the fish died; the people loathed to drink of its waters; circumstances none of which are incidental to its usual overflow. In the tenth plague all the first-born of man and beast among the Egyptians were struck dead; none but the first-born were smitten;

and not one, either of man or beast, that was in the houses of the Israelites perished. The eight other judgments were, as to the matter of them, evils natural to Egypt, yet the element of the supernatural appeared in their intensity; in their concentration on the land within so short a period; in their breaking out at the word of Moses and their removal at his prayer; and to crown all, in the entire exemption of the Hebrews from every one of them after the third in the series. The remarkable fact is stated that during the prevalence of the murrain, Pharaoh ascertained for himself, by sending special messengers, that not one of the cattle of the Israelites died; and in the time of thick darkness, "all the children of Israel had light in their dwellings." Ex. ix: 7, x: 23. So unmanageable are these particulars, that the naturalists are compelled to prop up their theories, by imputing to the record the vice of unnatural exaggeration, after the manner of the pettifogger, who attempts, by traducing the witnesses, to make out a case which he has failed to gain by the perversion of their testimony.

Now this connection, which God was pleased to establish between his almighty power and the evils which were natural to the country, served a most important purpose; a purpose which could not have been gained by the concentration upon the land of strange and exotic terrors. It demonstrated the truth, which God set himself to establish, the very proposition denied by the scoffing king and the dissembling priesthood, that Jehovah was the true and actual God of Egypt. To this end, he not only grasped all the active agencies of nature which are common to Egypt and other lands, but he seized upon evils which were native-born, which were intensely and exclusively Egyptian, and wrought out of them all a complete and irresistible demonstration of his sovereign dominion over all the land of Egypt. Ex. ix: 29.

But a further proceeding was necessary, in order to show that Jehovah was the only living as well as the true God; for the Egyptians might conclude that the God of Israel held, with their national deities, a joint lordship over the land. Hence, in the second place, the plagues were judgments upon the gods of Egypt. Jehovah said, "against all the gods of Egypt I will execute judgments." Ex. xii: 12, Num. xxxiii: 4. The

particular form, which the idolatry of Egypt assumed, was nature-worship. The details of this mythology are involved in the obscurity which hangs over every other department of Egyptian archæology. But it is the received opinion of the best Egyptologers, that both the good and evil principles were worshiped, the first in gratitude for his blessings, and the last in deprecation of his anger. According to Hengstenberg, who has diligently examined the authorities, the river Nile was an object of supreme worship. A temple was devoted to the Nile-god, at Nilopolis; a distinct order of priests was consecrated to his service; he was adored as identical with Osiris, the supreme god, and was called the father of the gods, the life-giving father of all existence. The ancient monuments and paintings represent kings in the act of paying divine honors to the Nile. The statements in Ex. vii: 15 and viii: 20, are supposed to describe Pharaoh himself in this very attitude of worship. So delicious were these waters that the Egyptians, when in foreign lands, long for nothing so much as to drink from the stream. The Turks eat salt to quicken their thirst for the waters, and they say that if Mohammed had tasted them, he would have prayed for immortality, so that he might enjoy the luxury forever. But under the rod of Moses this delightful and sacred river became a stream of blood, the fish that were in it died, its waters stank, and finally it sent forth legions of slimy and disgusting reptiles, until it became a loathsome and putrid torrent of blood and frogs. Such was the judgment against one of the chief gods of the land.

The goddess of the earth was Isis. The fertility, which the soil derived from the overflowing of the Nile, was represented in the mythology by the marriage of Isis to Osiris the Nile-god, who was also her brother. From the happy results of this marriage, as it is said, the Egyptians took their custom of joining together brother and sister as husband and wife. But the bosom of this goddess, who was so prolific in the kindly fruits of the earth, was instantly polluted by the touch of Aaron's rod, so that "all the dust of the land became lice throughout all the land of Egypt." Ex. viii: 17.

From the form of the record, also, it is certain that there was a close connection between the destruction of the first-born and the infliction of judgments on the gods. Ex. xii: 12,

Num. xxxiii: 4. The precise nature of this infliction can not, perhaps, be determined from the knowledge of Egyptian archæology accessible to the student. It is, however, commonly supposed to refer to the destruction of the first-born of the sacred animals. The number of these may be inferred from a saying, which, according to Mr. Gibbon, was anciently applied to them: That in Egypt it was less difficult to find a god than a man. Chief among them were, according to the authorities, the sacred bullocks Mnevis and Apis, sons of the creative Nile, installed and worshiped in many a holy temple. The golden calf at Sinai was an image, perhaps, of one of these idols. The first-born of this whole immense herd of gods were destroyed.

Typhon was the evil principle. Although the tradition to the effect that human victims were sometimes burned on his altars, may not be trustworthy; yet it is certain that the Egyptians diligently sought his protection against national and personal calamities. But now Jehovah brought the plagues upon his worshipers, also, in quick succession and unequalled fury. Water turned to blood mocked their thirst; myriads of frogs, lice like clouds of dust, and swarms of divers kinds of flies tormented them; boils on man and beast degraded them to a fellowship of suffering with the brutes; a storm, horrid with hail, destroyed the herbs and fruit trees; locusts devoured the residue that had escaped the hail; the lightnings fell, and the fire ran along upon the ground; the brilliant and translucent sky, the special glory and wonder of the climate, was enveloped in thick darkness; and finally, the first-born of man and beast miserably perished. The curse of God, which was laid upon the heathen, smote the god Typhon with impotency and exposed him to public contempt. So thoroughly were judgments executed on all the gods, that Pharaoh, himself a boasted demi-god, fled in despair from their altars, and cast himself upon the mercy of Jehovah. "Entreat Jehovah," said he to Moses, "that he may take away the frogs from me and my people." Twice he came to Moses with the humiliating confession, "I have sinned this time; Jehovah is righteous, and I and my people are wicked. Entreat Jehovah, for it is enough, that there be no more mighty thunderings and hail." Ex. ix: 27, 28. Comp. x: 16, 17.

In the third place, a leading design of the plagues was to expose the system of Egyptian magic. This system entered, as an integral element, into the false religion of the country, and the sorcerers belonged to the sacerdotal order. The purpose of Jehovah to execute judgments on the gods, brought, unavoidably, the miracles of his servants face to face with the enchantments of the magicians. Accordingly the first three signs wrought by Moses and Aaron, the rod changed to a serpent, the water turned into blood, and the production of frogs, were imitated by Jannes and Jambres; for such, probably, were the names of the chief among the magicians. 2 Tim. iii: 8.

Various solutions of the problem, emerging from these counter-wonders, have been proposed. It has been suggested that the works of Moses were reproduced exactly by the magicians, they being "wise men" in science beyond their age, and working by some occult laws of nature. Thus the chemist, setting on fire a substance immersed in water, might appear to the ignorant to work a miracle. But this suggestion is liable to two exceptions. The first, which will be fatal in the judgment of the Christian scholar, is that the solution concludes to the proposition that the wonders, wrought by Moses himself, were not necessarily supernatural, but were within the competency of a man of science, and to the further proposition that Moses, who was "learned in all the wisdom of the Egyptians," may have been, after all, only a more clever artist than the magicians. The second, which will, at least, embarrass the rationalist, is to the effect that the progress of science, during the thirty-five hundred years which have elapsed since the days of Moses, has not enabled men to change a dry stick of wood into a serpent and back again into a stick, nor to turn all the waters of Egypt into blood. Such things can hardly be put along with the Greek fire, in the category of the "last arts" and the irrecoverable.

Another solution is obtained by supposing that God was pleased to bestow miraculous powers on the magicians, to the limited extent indicated in the record; the divine purposes, herein, being to try the faith of his people, to grant a temporary triumph to the wicked, and then to inflict upon them a more signal defeat, by the sudden withdrawal of his aid. This is

tenable only by those who consider it not unworthy of the Almighty to set miracle against miracle; to seal as true, with divine credentials, a system of fraud and imposture; to use his infinite power, at one and the same moment, in verifying and exposing a lie; and to arm the emissaries of Satan against his own kingdom, God also bearing them witness both with signs and wonders and with divers miracles. The analogy drawn from the gift of prophecy to Baalam and the gift of miraculous powers to Judas Iscariot, does not hold in the case now in hand, for the reason that these men were, in no one instance, allowed to use their divine endowments to the prejudice of the truth. Baalam, although he attempted to curse Israel, could do nothing but bless them; and Judas wrought no miracle on the side of the Scribes and Pharisees.

The opinion most commonly received is, that the magicians were adepts in the art of legerdemain, and their enchantments were nothing more than cleverness in sleight of hand. This opinion rests on the well-known skill of the Orientals in jugglery; on the circumstance that Moses, in the miracles of the blood and the frogs, had supplied them with abundant materials for imposture; and especially on the singular art of serpent-charming, even to this day practiced in Egypt. The experts in this art form a separate guild, and they boast the most wonderful exploits in handling venomous reptiles with impunity. They are able, as they say, to throw a particular species of serpents into a torpor, by spitting into its throat and closing its mouth, so that it lies stiff and motionless on the ground. They revive it again by seizing it by the tail and rolling it vigorously between the hands. Hengstenberg appears to rely on this explanation. But it proceeds from a view far too superficial of the conflict then pending between heathenism and true religion. Besides, it can hardly be supposed that Pharaoh and his courtiers were imposed on by the ordinary and vulgar tricks of snake-charming and jugglery.

A better solution is found in the suggestion, that the magicians were ministers of Satan, with power from him to deceive the heathen with their enchantments, and that the wonders wrought by them, though spurious as miracles, did yet far transcend the products of the most consummate legerdemain. The analogies point in this direction. The kingdom

of Satan, as it is to-day represented by Paganism, Moham-
medanism and apostate Christianity, is made manifest, not less
plainly than the kingdom of Christ, by its sanctuaries and
altars, its ministers and priests, its mysteries and sacraments;
prayers, fastings, alms-givings, and holy days abound in its
ritual; saints and martyrs adorn its calendar; and what is of
special importance to this discussion, signs and wonders,
exceeding in number all human calculation, and surpassing in
the marvellous any ordinary power of the human imagination,
crowd the pages of its history. To the same effect is the
testimony of God's word. False prophets, false Christs, false
teachers privily bringing in damnable heresies, deceitful
workers transforming themselves into apostles of Christ, men
who say they are apostles but are not, but are liars, another
gospel which is not another, Satan transforming himself into
an angel of light, the Man of Sin, sitting in the temple of God
and showing himself that he is God; such are some of the
agencies used by the kingdom of darkness. That kingdom,
it may be presumed, will produce, also, its signs and wonders.
Where there are counterfeit Christs, counterfeit angels, coun-
terfeit apostles, counterfeit gospels, there will be, according to
fair presumption, counterfeit miracles, filling up the measure
of the iniquity.

But the argument does not deal with analogies alone. The
Scriptures directly teach that the kingdom of darkness, like
the kingdom of Christ, is manifested by its signs and wonders,
and that Satan is allowed, under the limitations imposed on
him by his own finite powers and the restraints of the
Almighty, to produce effects closely resembling genuine
miracles. Our Lord said that "false Christs and false prophets
shall arise, and shall show signs and wonders." Mark xiii: 22.
Paul predicted that the coming of the Wicked One should be
"after the working of Satan, with all power, and signs, and
lying wonders." 1 Thess. ii: 9. John also represents the
second beast as doing "great wonders," and as "deceiving
them that dwell on the earth by the means of those miracles
which he had power to do." Rev. xiii: 13, 14. Again, of the
"unclean spirits," he says they are "the spirits of devils,
working miracles." Rev. xvi: 14. Finally, he states that
"the beast was taken, and with him the false prophet that

wrought miracles before him, and were cast alive into the lake of fire." Rev. xix: 20.

This testimony becomes conclusive on careful examination. In the first place, the terms employed should be considered. The Greek words most commonly used to describe the miracles of Christ and his apostles are *δυναμεις*, *τερατα* and *σημεια*. The first of these terms designates the supernatural source of the miracle, the second its intrinsic wonderfulness, and the third its use as a credential. Now, the remarkable fact is, that each of these terms which describe the genuine miracles of our Lord and his apostles, are applied to the works done by Satan and his emissaries. In 2 Thess. ii: 9, *δυναμεις*, or powers, are ascribed to the Man of Sin; in Mark, xiii: 22, our Lord speaks of *τερατα*, or wonders wrought by false Christs; and in Rev. xvi: 14, it is written, "They are the spirits of devils working *σημεια*, signs." And the fact, still more remarkable, is that there are only four places in the New Testament where the three terms are grouped together; and one of these is applied to God, another to Christ, the third to an apostle, and the fourth, *iusdem verbis*, to Anti-Christ. Of God it is written, "God also bearing them," the apostles, "witness with *signs* and *wonders*, and divers *miracles*;" Heb. ii: 4; of Christ, "Jesus of Nazareth, a man approved of God among you, by *miracles* and *wonders* and *signs*;" Acts, ii: 22; of Paul, "Truly the signs of an apostle were wrought among you in all patience, in *signs* and *wonders* and *mighty deeds*." 2 Cor. xii: 12. Nothing less than this is said of the Man of Sin, "whose coming is after the working of Satan, with all *power* and *signs* and lying *wonders*." 2 Thess. ii: 9.

Still further, some of the mighty works wrought by the adversary, are specified in the Scriptures. The raising of Samuel by the witch of Endor is in dispute, and may be laid aside in this discussion. But the demoniacal possessions of the New Testament are instances in point. The work of Christ in casting out the devils was unquestionably supernatural; so the work of the devils entering into their victims was undoubtedly superhuman. One other mighty work of the adversary is described by John. He writes of the second beast, that "he doeth great wonders, so that he maketh fire come down from heaven on the earth, in the sight of men." Rev. xiii: 13.

Finally, the convincing power of these pseudo miracles, points in the same direction. In some places they are said to deceive all mankind. Of the great dragon it is said, "he deceiveth them that dwell on the earth, by means of the miracles which he had power to do." Rev. xiii: 14. In other places they are said to deceive the wicked: "The beast was taken, and with him the false prophet that wrought miracles before him, with which he deceived them that had received the mark of the beast." Rev. xix: 20. Compare 2 Thess. ii: 9. And more than this; the spurious miracles resemble the genuine so closely as "to seduce, if it were possible, the very elect." Mark, xiii: 22. This mass of evidence concludes irresistibly to the existence, in the kingdom of Satan, of lying wonders.

If, however, the inquiry be started, wherein does the pseudo miracle agree with the true, and wherein do they differ, the answer is, that they agree in so far as each is a manifestation in the same form of the spiritual kingdom to which it pertains. They differ in this: the one is a genuine, and the other a sham miracle. The latter is a *mirabile*, not a *miraculum*. It is, in strictness of speech, a lying wonder; not only in respect of its source, the father of lies, and of its belongings, which are to the kingdom of lies, and its use which is to uphold a system of lies, but in its intrinsic quality, for it is in fact, and if one had an intuition of its inmost nature it would appear to be a pseudo miracle, a sham beyond the wit of man to contrive or detect, but essentially a sham; a dangerous counterfeit indeed, but a counterfeit at last.

Or, if the inquiry be into the nature of the enchantments whereby Satan produces these extraordinary effects, the answer must be conjectural. Perhaps they are sometimes wrought by a deeper insight into the laws of nature than is possible to the human intellect, sometimes by traversing these laws by virtue of higher capacities than ours. Possibly, among his high endowments, Satan has received from the Creator some small power to suspend these laws; or, more probably still, his success in deceiving men herein is largely due to his skill in blinding their minds; taking them captive by first putting out their eyes. Some one of these conjectures, or some combination among them, or some other not yet suggested to the human mind may, at least, solve the problem; or, finally, in the total

silence of the Scriptures upon the subject, the problem may be insoluble.

To the inquiry, what are the criteria of the true miracle, the first reply is found in the moral character of the doctrine purporting to be attested by it. The demonstration of divine things is by a threefold concurrent method; an appeal to the understanding through the senses, an appeal to the reason, and an appeal to the spiritual mind. The miracle offers the first element in this complex method, and the moral excellency of the doctrine offers the second or the third or both, as the case may be. The miracle and the doctrine are inseparable parts of one complete argument; they must be taken together; the validity of the first and the truth of the last impenetrate each other; they support one the other like the members of an arch, they strengthen one the other like the interwisted strands of a cable. Hence, in the demonstration of divine truth, the moral excellency of the doctrine verifies the genuineness of the miracle, and the miracle verifies—not the moral excellency, for that would be the vicious circle of artificial logic—but the divine origin of the doctrine. Such is the method according to which the matter is expounded in the word of God. In Deut. xvii: 20, the Jews were required to determine whether the doctrine was of divine inspiration, by observing whether the sign given by the prophet came to pass; that is to say, the miracle, if actually wrought, proved the doctrine to be revealed from God. In Deut. xiii: 1–5, the case is put of a prophet attempting to support idolatry by a miracle. In this case, even if the sign or wonder should come to pass, the Jews were not to accept either the evil doctrine or the miracle, but to put the false prophet to death; that is to say, the bad doctrine proved the miracle to be spurious. By this rule, the righteousness of the cause of Moses was one criterion of the miracles wrought by him. The second criterion is the number, variety, and greatness of the works themselves. The superiority, in all these respects, of the works of Moses over those of the magicians, is made perfectly obvious by the record. His rod turned to a serpent, swallowed up their rods; Moses changed the river of Egypt into blood, and they did so upon only a little water; he produced myriads of frogs, they a few only; he removed all the plagues, they removed none—not

even those which they pretended to imitate—they could only aggravate the evils inflicted by the Almighty. His word was invariably followed by the appearance of the wonder—at the third plague they utterly failed with their enchantments, and confessed, “This is the finger of God.” The magicians themselves became the helpless victims of the subsequent visitations, “for the boil was upon the magicians;” Ex. ix: 11; and, doubtless, their fields were ravaged by the hail and consumed by the locusts; their houses were filled with the thick darkness, and their children perished in the destruction of the first-born. The conclusion from the whole is, that in this proceeding the art of magic was thoroughly defeated and exposed, and judgment was executed on the gods of Egypt in the persons of the sorcerers who were their ministers.

In the fourth place, the manifestation of the divine glory, through the humiliation of the kingdom, represented in the person of Pharaoh, was a leading design of the wonders. Egypt being an absolute monarchy, and that, too, of the oriental type, its dignity was identified with the person of the king to a degree which can hardly be appreciated by one of western habits of thought. The saying of Louis XIV, The king is the State, was true of the Pharaohs, to an extent little imagined by the French monarch himself. Besides, the kings of Egypt, if the authorities may be relied on, were held to be incarnations, or at least sons of the gods. His position, therefore, as an autocrat and a demi-god, in some sort a god-king, accounts for the minute details contained in the record of what Pharaoh said and did in the progress of affairs. The three particulars requiring most attention in this part of the inquiry, are: the prominent part assigned to Pharaoh in the controversy, the test of character and temper proposed to him, and the peculiar influence exerted by the Almighty on his heart.

Pharaoh everywhere appears as the daring and insolent adversary of the Almighty. He it was who oppressed the chosen seed. God sent Moses and Aaron directly to him; they exhibited to him, personally, the credentials of their divine legation, and demanded from him, and from no one else, the liberation of the people. The approaching plagues were, one by one, announced to him; some of them were produced in

his presence; they were removed at his entreaty, and on his promise to let Israel go. The magicians were put to open shame before his eyes; and his courtiers besought him to terminate his disastrous resistance to the will of God. But more than this: In the moment of respite between the sixth and seventh plagues, God warned the king of a coming pestilence which should cut him off from the earth, adding these words: "And in very deed for this cause have I raised thee up, for to show in thee my power; and that my name may be declared throughout all the earth." Ex. ix: 16. This message has been differently interpreted by the critics. Beza and Gomar receive it in the Supralapsarian sense: "I have created thee, O Pharaoh, to make of thee a vessel of wrath, by whose perdition I may display my omnipotence." By Glockler, the expression, "I have raised thee up," is explained thus: "I have raised thee to the throne." By Tholuck, "I have set thee up, brought thee forward (in history)." By Wolfius, "I have caused thee to remain alive in the midst of the plagues." By several others, "I have placed and continued thee as my adversary." By Vanema, "I have roused thee up." By Dr. Hodge, "For this purpose have I raised you up, and placed you where you are; and instead of cutting you off at once, have so long endured your obstinacy and wickedness." The last of these explanations best expresses the meaning of the message; although the inmost sense of it might be obtained by a combination of all these expositions, the first being excepted. God raised him to the throne, brought him prominently forward, preserved him alive, selected him as his adversary, and long endured his disobedience, and even roused up his evil spirit, that he might become a monument of divine power and justice before all mankind. The position of Pharaoh as the head of a godless empire, possibly as a reputed demi-god, his impiety and insolence toward Jehovah, his animosity toward the church of God, designated him as the representative of heathenism in its desperate struggle to suppress the true religion. God not only accepted, but raised him up and roused him up as his adversary.

The peculiar form which the controversy assumed, is the topic next in order. Under special instructions from God, Moses opened his mission with a demand which was intended

to test the temper and purposes of Pharaoh. "Thus saith the Lord God of Israel, Let my people go, that they may hold a feast unto me in the wilderness." The king met the demand with a contemptuous refusal. Moses, by way of persuasion, limited the extent of the proposed journey to a three days' march, explained the object to be an act of sacrifice, and the motive a desire to avert the divine anger in the form of pestilence or the sword. The king, by way of reply, administered a violent reprimand to Moses and Aaron, ordered the elders present to get them to their burdens, and commanded the taskmasters to withhold the straw, and yet require the full tale of bricks; uttering the insulting taunt, "for they be idle, therefore they cry, saying, Let us go and sacrifice to our God." Ex. v: 1-19. During the plague of the flies Pharaoh offered, by way of compromise, to allow the proposed act of worship to be performed in Egypt. To this Moses replied, "Lo, shall we sacrifice the abomination of the Egyptians before their eyes, and will they not stone us?" Whether this intolerance rested on the selection of animals, or some other peculiarity in the Hebrew ritual, is not explained; but the reply was conclusive. Afterward, during the flight of locusts, the king, by way of further compromise, offered to permit the men of Israel to hold the festival in the wilderness, provided they would leave their families and possessions in Egypt as hostages for their return; and again, while the wonder of darkness was over the land, the king made a further concession, saying that the whole Hebrew population might go, but not their flocks and herds. Moses and Aaron declined both of these propositions, and then Pharaoh drove them from his presence, and threatened them with death should they return. Now the peculiar form assumed by what may be called these side negotiations, answered several important ends. It disclosed the nature and extent of Pharaoh's disobedience. He would not grant this one poor boon to the bondmen at the divine command, much less would he allow them to return to Canaan. His contempt for God, in that which was least, shows what it was in that which was greatest. Again, the experiment revealed the oppressive nature of the bondage; and it demonstrated the certainty that so long as Israel remained in Egypt, it would be impossible to resume the worship of Jehovah; since

that could not be attempted in the land, and the Hebrews would not be allowed, from time to time, to retire into the wilderness for the purpose. Finally it was made clear, that the only alternative to a total defeat of all the divine purposes and promises, respecting the seed of Abraham, was its deliverance from Egypt.

Some of the critics have endeavored to put this transaction in a light disreputable to Moses. They allege that his original demand was a mere pretext, that he did not intend to return from the proposed festival, and that Pharaoh's penetration detected the fraud. But the truth is, that the Egyptians distinctly understood, when Jacob brought his family into Egypt, that it was with the expectation of a temporary sojourn only in that land. Accordingly his remains had been transferred to Hebron for burial with the consent of the king; and it was notorious that all the traditions of the Israelites, and even the unburied bones of Joseph, pointed to Canaan as their future home. Forty years before this demand was made, the Egyptians attempted to prevent the departure of the Hebrews, by an indiscriminate slaughter of the male children, and by increasing the burdens of the people. Ex. i: 10-20. Neither Moses nor Aaron concealed their real purposes; and when the people finally departed, neither Pharaoh, nor Moses, nor the most ignorant of the Hebrews, nor the meanest of the Egyptians expected them to return. The demand was intended merely to test the disposition of the king; instead of obscuring, it cleared the issue of all doubt, by showing that the continuance of the Hebrews, under the rule of the Pharaohs, was no longer an open question.

The process, known in biblical history as the hardening of Pharaoh's heart, falls also within the direct range of this inquiry. The main elements of the problem are these: First, the number of places in which this subject is brought forward in the book of Exodus is twenty, indicating the prominence given to the matter in the narrative. Next, the agencies by which this process was carried on, are distinctly and repeatedly mentioned. In some places, God is said to have hardened his heart; in some, the king is said to have hardened his own heart; and in others, the case is stated impersonally; that is to say, his heart is simply said to have been hardened,

without designation of the agent. At the beginning, the hardening is ascribed twice to God, Ex. iv: 21, vii: 3; next, once to Pharaoh, vii: 13; then, impersonally twice, vii: 14, 22; afterward, once to Pharaoh, viii: 15; and once impersonally, viii: 19; once again to Pharaoh, viii: 32; and impersonally once, ix: 7; then once to God again, ix: 12; to Pharaoh once, ix: 34; once more impersonally, ix: 35; four times to God, x: 1, 20, 27, xi: 10; once more only to Pharaoh, xiii: 15; and, lastly, three times to God, xiv: 4, 8, 17. The census of these scriptures exhibits several remarkable results. In ten places out of the twenty the hardening is attributed to God; in five only to the king himself; and in five the term is used impersonally. Besides this, the first and the last instance is ascribed to God, so that, as Hengstenberg remarks, "Pharaoh's hardening is inclosed by God's." "It also appears," continues the same writer, "to proceed from design, that the hardening at the beginning of the plagues is attributed, in a preponderating degree, to Pharaoh, and toward the end to God. The higher the plagues rise, so much the more does Pharaoh's hardening assume a supernatural character, so much the more obvious is it to refer it to its supernatural causality." It is clear, therefore, that no solution of the problem is to be received that does not accept the fact of the divine agency in the process as its main condition.

The various solutions which have been proposed by the schools of theology are extremely interesting as disclosures, singularly accurate, of the peculiarities of the schools themselves. Dr. Nathaniel Emmons ascribes the hardening of the king's heart to the direct operation of divine power on the heart itself; a work no less direct, by a divine efficiency no less immediate, than the work of regeneration. These are his words: "It is often thought and said, that nothing more was necessary on God's part, in order to fit Pharaoh for destruction, than barely to leave him to himself. But God knew that no external means and motives would be sufficient, of themselves, to form his moral character. He determined, therefore, to operate on his heart itself, and cause him to put forth certain evil exercises in the view of certain external motives. When Moses called upon him to let the people go, God stood by him and moved him to refuse. When Moses interceded

for him, and procured him respite, God stood by him and moved him to exult in his obstinacy. When the people departed from his kingdom, God stood by him and moved him to pursue after them with increased malice and revenge. And what God did on such particular occasions he did at all times. He continually hardened his heart, and governed all the exercises of his mind from the day of his birth to the day of his death. All this was necessary to prepare him for his final state. All other methods, without this, would have failed of fitting him for destruction." (Works, Vol. IV: p. 327.) Certain sceptical writers, among whom Mackey is the most recent, have attempted to show that the God of Moses is "an unconquerable Cyclops, who created men in the form of dwarfs for the purpose of breaking them to pieces again, for his own amusement." If the paragraphs cited above had appeared in the pages of one of these malignants, what impression would they have made on the reader?

The opposite extreme is represented by those who resolve the divine agency in these premises into something merely incidental. The analogy from nature is drawn from friction in machinery; it appears, in spite of the mechanician, as an incident to his most perfect models. The analogy from moral government is the injury done to the son by excessive indulgence or excessive severity on the part of the father; his intentions are all good, but his methods lead incidentally to the ruin of his child. The analogies drawn from the Scriptures are the conduct of Joseph's brethren, meant for evil but resulting in good, and the gospel of Christ designed to produce peace on earth but incidentally bringing about wars and dissensions. It is held, accordingly, that Pharaoh's heart was hardened, not by any act of God looking to that result, but as an event purely incidental to what God did in Egypt with other intents. To this the reply may well be, that the analogies cited are unsound, and the explanation, instead of explaining, crowds out the causality of God, ten times distinctly asserted. It may therefore be summarily dismissed.

The Lutheran divines teach that God simply permitted Pharaoh to harden his own heart. They rely, in argument, on the Scriptures, five in number, in which the king is said to have hardened his heart, and on the well-known usage of the

Bible, according to which events are ascribed to God which in his wisdom he allows to come to pass. But this solution does not satisfy the conditions of the problem. Ten times out of twenty the active agency of God is affirmed, in terms as precise as those used in the five places which set forth the active agency of the king. The idea of bare permission, moreover, aggravates the difficulty by making the divine plans dependent on the human will; perverting thereby the relations between the Almighty and Pharaoh. It is expressly stated, in the record, that God had important ends to accomplish through this induration, and these ends are specified. In Ex. vii: 3-5, God declares that his purpose in hardening the king's heart was to furnish an occasion for the display of his wonders in Egypt, to bring forth Israel out of the land, and to make Jehovah known to the Egyptians. In chap. x: 1, 2, he reveals to Moses his further purposes in these words: "Go in unto Pharaoh: for I have hardened his heart, and the heart of his servants; that I might show these signs before him: and that thou mayest tell in the ears of thy son, and of thy son's son, what things I have wrought in Egypt, and my signs which I have done among them; that ye may know that I am the Lord." Comp. xiv: 4. The proposed explanation is wholly inadequate.

The solution commonly adopted by the Calvinistic divines, is found in the doctrine of judicial abandonment. According to this idea, God, as a punishment for the previous sins of Pharaoh, withheld from him the influences of the Holy Spirit, withdrew the restraints of his grace, and abandoned him to the unresisted dominion of his own evil and malignant passions. This is undoubtedly the basis of the true explanation. The fact that God does, by way of punishing the wicked, give them up to their own vile affections, and the fact that a hard and impenitent heart is both the result of this mode of retribution and a further and aggravated form thereof, are clearly stated in the word of God. Rom. i: 24-32. This solution is supposed to meet the three aspects presented by the problem. God hardened Pharaoh's heart by giving him over to a reprobate mind; Pharaoh hardened his own heart by obeying his evil impulses; and his heart was hardened by the joint agency of God in abandoning him to sin, and the king in going on in sin.

But this explanation does not, apparently, cover the whole case. The active causality of God, so often asserted in the record, implies somewhat more than a mere passive abandonment of the king to his own corrupt propensities. Another and further idea must be introduced, the hypothesis, to wit, of a judicial, active agency. That is to say, God, in punishment for his sins, not only withheld gracious restraints from Pharaoh, but he arranged and ordered certain events which made his heart, already disposed to evil, still harder; although these events were of such a nature that they would have led a well-constituted mind to do right. Here the order of thought should be strictly observed. First, Pharaoh had oppressed the chosen seed, and so incurred the just anger of God. Next, God resolved to punish the transgressor. Then, the particular punishment awarded was hardness of heart. Then, again, this punishment was inflicted by the withdrawal from the king of the restraints of Providence and grace; and, furthermore, by placing him in circumstances which, while his heart ought to have been softened by them, did, however, owing to his own perversity, serve only to harden his heart. It is to be distinctly borne in mind, that the induration did not precede, but followed after, the impiety of the king, and was its fruit and retribution. Still further, this obduracy is to be contemplated under two aspects; under one of which it was a grievous sin, and under the other a grievous punishment. As a sin, it was the act of Pharaoh; as a punishment, it was the act of God. Looking at the real author of the sin, one must say that Pharaoh hardened his own heart; looking at the avenger of his previous crimes, one must say that God hardened his heart. Guilt and wrath were mingled in the bitter cup; the guilt was Pharaoh's, the wrath was God's wrath. Toward the close of this wonderful controversy, as the insolence of the king became insufferable, this hardening, under its aspect as a judgment of God, came out in bolder relief, for in the last eight places in which the hardening is mentioned, seven times out of the eight it is ascribed to the Almighty.

The circumstances which were arranged by God, and were fitted to produce this result, are stated in the narrative. One of these was the selection of the first three miracles to be wrought by Moses. They were precisely such as the

magicians were able to counterfeit. It is written that when the king had witnessed the success of their enchantments, his heart was hardened, and he turned his back in contempt on Moses and his demands. Ex. vii: 13, 22, 23. Another circumstance, attended by a like effect, was the character of certain of the plagues which annoyed and exasperated the king to a degree. When the dust of the earth became lice or gnats on man and beast, Pharaoh probably included, "the magicians said unto Pharaoh: This is the finger of God, and Pharaoh's heart was hardened," viii: 19. So also when the boils "were upon the magicians, and upon all the Egyptians," and upon Pharaoh probably as well, it is added: "The Lord hardened the heart of Pharaoh," ix: 12. Thirdly, the respites from the plagues were followed by the same result. When he saw there was a respite from the frogs, "he hardened his heart;" when the flies were removed, "he hardened his heart at this time also;" and "when he saw that the rain and the hail and the thunders had ceased, he sinned yet more, and hardened his heart, he and his servants." Ex. viii: 15, 32, ix: 34. He took umbrage, fourthly, at the exemption of the Hebrews from the visitations. During the prevalence of the murrain, "Pharaoh sent, and, behold, there was not one of the cattle of the Israelites dead. And the heart of Pharaoh was hardened," ix: 7. Not less offensive to him, fifthly, was the refusal of Moses to accede to any compromise respecting the proposed festival in the wilderness. When Moses, having before declined two propositions, peremptorily rejected the third also, it is said that "the Lord hardened Pharaoh's heart and he would not let them go," x: 27. Finally, when the king ascertained that the people, on their way out of Egypt, were shut in between the wilderness and the deep sea, his heart was hardened once more, so that he followed after them with his armed hosts and chariots of war; xiv: 4, 8. Two of the elements necessary to this explanation, are the Divine appointment of all these circumstances, and their specific influence upon the depraved nature of the king. But the third element is not less vital to the case. This is found in the fact that all these events would, but for his ungodliness, have inclined his heart to obey the commands of God. The course pursued by the magicians ought to have convinced him

that they were the ministers of Satan; the annoyance he experienced from the gnats and the boils should have humbled his pride; the goodness of God, in the respites from the terrors, should have led him to repentance; the protection of the Hebrews against the plagues, should have rebuked his unbelief; the refusal of Moses to grant any concessions as to the festival, ought to have persuaded him to yield to the necessities of the case; and the exposed position of Israel at the Red Sea should have taught him, in connection with what had already taken place, that Jehovah of Hosts was surely encamped not far away.

The results of the foregoing inquiry may be summed up in a few words. The wonders in Egypt introduced a new era in the development of the plan of salvation. Israel had been slowly maturing, as a distinct nationality, in the womb of Egypt, and at the Exodus the nation was born in a day. The era, of its birth was marked by the self-revelation of the Almighty, according to his new name, Jehovah, as the only living and true God, and the God of salvation; and by the introduction of the miracle as the credential of the divine mission whether of Moses, or the prophets, or Christ, or the apostles. And still further, just as when the Sons of God came to present themselves before the Lord, Satan came also among them, so now the miracle was instantly fronted by its counterfeit. As Principal Hill remarks, the introduction of both the Jewish and Christian dispensations was marked by a certain display of the power of evil spirits—in the works of the Egyptian magicians and the demoniacs of the New Testament.

In this controversy the real adversary of the true religion was not Pharaoh, as a man, or as a monarch even, nor Egypt as centralized in him, but heathenism itself, entrenched in its stronghold on the Nile, and represented in the person of its monarch, its armed warriors, and its system of magic. In its inmost sense, it was an attempt, in the interest of idolatry, to strangle the church of God while hidden in the womb. The severity of God toward the king was both an act of justice and an act of necessity. It was just, because he had cruelly oppressed the people of God, and had met the Almighty, coming to the rescue, with derision and defiance; necessary, because

the king stood forth as the representative of heathenism, the minister of Satan's kingdom in its fierce onset on the kingdom of God, and indeed, for the time being, the very head of the conspiracy against the seed of the woman.

With regard to the wonders themselves, it is to be observed they were not, as the naturalists teach, phenomena of nature, and nothing more; they were not, as the superstitious might imagine, terrors cast forth from the stars when they turn earthward their malignant aspects; they were not, as the sceptical philosopher might conjecture, the effects of an unexplained outburst of tumultuous forces; nor even were they, according to what may be the rapid impression of the reader of the narrative, a series of miracles, selected at random, for the mere purpose of delivering the Hebrews from bondage. There was in them a discipline, a legislation, a theology, a power, a revelation. They moved over the land like an army, squadron following squadron, all in deadly array; they imposed on nature the law of obedience to the immediate behests of the lawgiver; they taught the truth that all the gods of the heathen are vanity and a lie; they detected and exposed the lying wonders of Satan's kingdom; and they revealed the Almighty, both to the church of God and to the heathen, according to his new and incommunicable name, JEHOVAH.

NOTE.—The foregoing observations on the hardening of Pharaoh's heart indicate the proper method of interpreting Isaiah vi: 9, 10, and its paraphrases in the New Testament. The ninth verse draws attention to the agency of the Jews in hardening their own hearts: "Go, and tell this people, Hear ye indeed, but understand not; and see ye indeed, but perceive not." If the Hebrew verbs translated *hear* and *see*, be taken as futures, the place is a prophecy; if they be taken as imperatives, it is a solemn ironical rebuke in the form of an exhortation to inflict spiritual insensibility on themselves, and it resembles the remark of Christ to the Jews: "Fill ye up the measure (the iniquity) of your fathers." Matt. xxiii: 32. The tenth verse directs attention to the agency of the prophet in their induration: "Make the heart of this people fat, and make their ears heavy, and shut their eyes," etc. The guilty causality of the people and the instrumental causality of the prophet in this process are, therefore, the two aspects of the case here presented. Christ

in Matt. xiii: 15, and Paul in Acts xxviii: 27, by way of showing that the words in Isaiah were fulfilled in the Jews of their day, dwell on the first of these aspects, to wit, their personal agency in the premises: "For the heart of this people is waxed gross, and their ears are dull of hearing, and their eyes have they closed," etc. Finally, in John xii: 40, Christ paraphrases the same words in such manner as to reveal the third aspect, namely, the agency of God in the process: "He hath blinded their eyes, and hardened their hearts," etc. It appears, therefore, from the original passage in Isaiah and from the interpretation put upon it by Christ and Paul, that the three parties concerned in this induration are the sinner himself, God, and the prophet. On the part of the sinner it is an act of aggravated guilt; on the part of God it is an act of retribution, and on the prophet's part an instrumental act. Michaelis states it thus: *Deus sic præcipit judicialiter, populus criminaliter, propheta autem ministerialiter*. J. A. Alexander thus: "In this fearful process there are three distinguishable agencies expressly or implicitly described: the ministerial agency of the prophet, the judicial agency of God, and the suicidal agency of the people themselves." A fine instance this of the way in which the Scriptures exhibit, successively and harmoniously, the various phases of a many-sided truth, and of the divine wisdom with which Christ, in quoting the words of the prophets, developed their most profound spiritual meaning. See J. A. Alexander's Notes on Isaiah vi: 9, 10, and Acts xxviii: 27.

Rom. ix: 18 is to be interpreted by the same rule: "Therefore hath he mercy on whom he will have mercy, and whom he will he hardeneth." The discrimination here indicated is explained by the distinction existing between the dealings of God, which are judicial and those that are sovereign. The reason why he punishes any man is to be found in the bad conduct of the man, and the act of punishing is judicial. The reason why he punishes one sinner rather than another, is to be sought, not in that other, but in God himself, and that discrimination is sovereign. The hardening itself presupposes the existence of sin in the subject of it, and is the fruit and punishment of sin. The order of thought to be observed in the explication of this form of retribution, and the means by which it is inflicted, are indicated in what is said on a preceding page respecting the case of Pharaoh. See above pp. 665, 666.

ART. VI.—*Negro Slavery and the Civil War.*

THE President of the United States devotes about two-fifths of his annual message to the Congress now in session, to the direct consideration of questions immediately involved in the subject indicated by the title of this article. And other important portions of that State paper appear to be so related to the same immense and perilous topic, that hardly less than half of the message can be said to be inspired by it. He has shown, on many previous occasions, and in the most emphatic manner, how deeply he participated in the anxiety, with which all thoughtful men regarded the connection of the whole question of the black race in America with the rebellion, the civil war, and the future destiny of the country. He has constantly avowed his conviction that he had great duties to perform, as President, connected with the subject; and has as constantly declared that the ends to which he was resolved to discharge them, were the preservation of our national existence, the maintenance of our Federal Union, and the enforcement of the Constitution and laws of the Government and Nation whose executive head he was. Nor did he conceal the fact that he was subjected to a pressure from without, at once ceaseless and severe, pointing to a course of extreme policy which he was most reluctant to adopt, but which he might, as he apprehended, be compelled at last to pursue, in order to crush the rebellion and insure the triumph of the nation. Taking all the public utterances and all the public acts of the President together, from his inaugural to his present annual message—so far as they illustrate the progress of his thoughts, and the successive conclusions he has reached, touching his own official duty with regard to slavery and its relations to the origin, the progress and the result of the civil war—there is, probably, no considerable party in America which cordially adopts *all* that he has recommended, and probably no considerable party in the loyal States which does not cordially approve *some portions* of what he has advised. Respect for the President himself, and respect for his great office, equally forbid us, in discussing a subject so deeply involving the

character of the war, and the fate of the country, from even appearing, on the one hand, to overlook what he has said and done with regard to it—and from dealing, on the other hand, with his reasonings and conclusions, as we might, without offense, if they were those of a private person. Loyalty to the country would carry us great lengths in supporting a patriotic Administration, in times like these, even when we might suppose there was a policy wiser than that they pursued, and principles sounder than those they adopted. But loyalty to posterity, to truth, and to God—no less than to our country, even in a case like that—should forbid us from concealing the real ground of our support; and should oblige us to lift up our voice of warning—however unheeded it might be—in proportion as we saw that the way taken for triumph led only to ruin. And if the worst must come, in defiance of whatever efforts we could make—the deep and sharp distinction between devotion to our country, and support of any particular party or administration, remains as a rule of duty to loyal and virtuous men. And such, we are persuaded, will prove to be the sentiment and rule of conduct of the great majority of the American people, in all the loyal States, upon this question of the black race in America, as well as upon all other questions connected with the suppression of this atrocious revolt.

It is proper to say here, and to say it with emphasis, that however we, with the mass of the American people, might find ourselves unable to agree with Mr. Lincoln in all the successive and various recommendations he has made, as to slavery and the black-race, we heartily participate in the leading sentiment out of which they have all sprung. They all represent phases of his judgment concerning the best manner of crushing the rebellion, and preserving the nation; they all spring from his resolute, and, we trust, unalterable purpose, to achieve that grand object. We share, with all the power of our being, the conviction that the rebellion should be crushed, and that the national existence should be preserved. We but feebly express our deliberate judgment, when we say, it would be far better for us to fight both England and France, if they oblige us to do so, on this quarrel, than to agree to a division of the nation, in any way whatever: better for us to risk all, frankly and manfully, on the field of battle, and against any odds that the

whole earth could array against us—yea, better lose as well as risk all, in that manner, than to incur the ruin and the infamy to which any other course would infallibly subject us. We are not able to see that some of the most material recommendations of the President about the black race, can have any tendency to secure the great object which the nation has in view. We are not even able to see that the securing of that grand object depends upon any question that in any way involves or affects the black race. The nation is fully able—irrespective of all questions about the black race—yea, is better able without than with most of those most intricate questions—to conquer its rebellious citizens, restore peace and public order, and put an end forever to the doctrine and the practice of secession. So that it is the farthest possible from being true, that any feeling like indifference to the fate of the war, or like doubt of our ability to maintain the American Union, underlies the profound conviction we have that the anti-slavery policy and principles of the President's proclamation of September 22, 1862, and of his annual message of December 2, 1862, can have no beneficial effect whatever, of the kind which he designed. This is far from being the only ground of exception to the anti-slavery principles and policy of those State papers—as we regret to be obliged to point out; no more being required to be said just here, than is necessary to illustrate the disclaimer we have just made.

We have already expressed the belief that a great majority of the American people would unite with us, both in the sentiment we have just expressed, and in the disclaimer with which we have accompanied it. We will add a second disclaimer, which we feel assured all loyal slaveholders of the nation, and especially of the Border States, would share with us. It is not at all, that we are unwilling to share the burdens and take the risks of a righteous war—even to the uttermost—let those burdens and risks fall where they may, so that they are fair and just; if need be our life, and land, and slaves, and all; that we fail to approve the late extreme recommendations of the President. But as far as we can understand the purport and necessary effect of the proclamation of September 22—even supposing its principles and purposes to be otherwise lawful and wise—it limits the possibility of the restoration of the

Union as it was, to a certain and early day, a little over three months after its date—by which time it was impossible that one person in every hundred in the revolted States could be made aware of its real contents; and then, on and after that early day, it promises to do that which will necessarily create, just so far as it has any efficacy, a revolution far more portentous, in all the seceded States, than the one they have sought to create in the nation at large. How far the entire Border Slave States may be immediately involved by that proposed dissolution of society in the ten States south of them, it is not possible to say at present. But it is perfectly obvious to every sane man who lives in either of the fifteen Slave States, and who is not an ultra Abolitionist, both in the general and in the technical sense, that neither *the Constitution as it is*, nor yet *the Union as it was*, is compatible with the state of things which the effectual working of the President's proclamation would produce. And we feel perfectly assured that the majority of people in the Free States, will concur in the same judgment whenever, and as often as, that question is fairly submitted to their decision. If the Abolition party, as such, had been left to its own power and resources, to conquer the Secession revolt—they never could have done it. The *nation* can do it; and we trust and believe it will do it. But it will do it upon national, and not upon party grounds. It will not permit a party at the South to create a new nation, with new aims and institutions: nor will it, as we confidently trust, permit a party at the North to destroy the Constitution under the pretext of maintaining the Union—and defeat, at the same time, the possibility of restoring the Union, by destroying immense portions of the very elements of which the Union is composed. Disclaiming, therefore, all sympathy with the principles and aims of the Secessionists on the subject of negro slavery, we assert that neither the Constitution as it is, nor the Union as it was, is possible, if the Federal Government allows itself to be used to enforce the principles and aims of the Abolitionists. The election of Mr. Lincoln to the presidency, was a protest of the American people, against the use of the Federal Government by the Slave States, in the interest of Slavery, to an extent beyond what the American people would endure. It is now to be determined whether Mr. Lincoln will persist in

requiring that Government to be used for the destruction of slavery, far beyond what it was ever used in its support and extension : and whether the American people will endure this, beyond what is fair, right, and necessary : and if they do so—what is to be the result as regards the black race, as regards the Slave States, and as regards the nation, after this complete destruction of slavery.

To a certain extent we have already seen some of the effects of Mr. Lincoln's proclamation of September 22, 1862. In the Border Slave States—all of which are loyal, except Virginia east of the Alleghany mountains—and which unitedly contain about a million of slaves, and as many white inhabitants as all the rest of the Slave States—the abolition part of the proclamation does not appear to have been designed to have any effect—with the exception already stated. And yet, misunderstood by the slaves—as it could hardly fail to be—it created amongst them a deep and still extending impression, that they were all to be free on the 1st of January, 1863. Under this impression, diffused over four loyal Slave States and the loyal portion of the fifth, where the slaves are brought into perpetual contact with Federal troops, and under the purview of acts of Congress which appear to have been ingeniously framed with a view to their demoralization ; it is easy to imagine the further effects of the proceeding which is designed to liberate indiscriminately, all the slaves of ten additional States and the disloyal part of Virginia. Considered as a mere question of enormous property, it is mere insult to tell ruined loyal men, that after the war is over, the General Government ought to be responsible to them for the value which it may see proper to fix upon their slaves taken from them to be set free along with those of traitors. Considered as the measure of the appreciation which a just government puts upon services, which, low as it may suit a certain class of politicians to value them, have been of a character that the national cause had been lost if they had been thrown into the opposite scale ; it is not difficult to understand, how deep and conscientious that loyalty of a brave and proud race must be, which refuses to forsake the representatives of the nation, even when they are dealt with as a conquered people. The nation will never approve such treatment of loyal States or loyal men ; will

never ratify principles or acts looking in that direction : it will never say this is what is meant by the Constitution as it is, and the Union as it was. Long ago we pointed out that a revolution in opinion throughout the North was one of the necessary and certain elements of the restoration of the Union, and the salvation of the country ; and step by step, during the past two years, we have pointed out the successive proofs as they became obvious, that it had set in, and that its movement was more and more powerful. But for the proclamation of September 22, we do not believe that the late elections in the Northern States would have resulted in throwing the Federal Administration into a minority, in the lower house of the next Congress. Personally it was no gratification to us, but much otherwise—that the public sentiment of the great Border Free States, found it impossible to make itself felt, without taking the exact direction it did : but we never had a doubt that the new policy avowed in Mr. Lincoln's proclamation, would be repudiated by those great States. Our only surprise was, that other Northern States were not yet ready to condemn it. And it is a grievous error to suppose that the emancipation feeling in the Border Slave States—has any sympathy with the extreme doctrines of the September proclamation. Of all the Slave States, Missouri alone has any abolition element that is appreciable ; and that is confined to certain localities and to comparatively small numbers. Missouri will, we presume, soon provide for the liberation of her slaves : we think she is in a condition to do so, and would act wisely in so doing. But she will never do it on principles in sympathy with those of the proclamation ; and a reaction produced by any attempt to act on such principles, may prevent its being done at all, under the present movement.

The President has strongly and repeatedly expressed the opinion, that but for slavery the civil war would never have occurred, and that if it was universally abolished the civil war would immediately cease. And he appears to have no doubt that these things being true, slavery ought to be abolished, and that he, as President of the United States, ought officially to labor for its destruction. Undoubtedly it is true, that whoever is strong enough to abolish slavery by force, is also strong enough to conquer the States that tolerate slavery ; and in

that sense accomplish both the objects of the President at the same moment. But it can not be conceived that States said to be in rebellion chiefly, or exclusively for the sake of slavery, could be induced by a menace from those who find it difficult to conquer them, to sell their slaves at valuation by the opposite belligerent, under terror of his setting them free; so that the whole case, as stated, looks far more like war against slavery than war for the maintenance of a Constitution that allowed and protected slavery. The President might be correct in his judgment on the first point stated, or he might be mistaken in that judgment, as we think he is in some degree; for however much danger and bitterness may be imparted to the war by the connection of slavery so largely with it, as long as there are five loyal Slave States, and as long as other momentous causes of the war undoubtedly exist, and are openly avowed; we can not be justified in proceeding with violent and ruinous measures, because we condemn slavery as an institution. Moreover, the President has repeatedly and truly avowed, that he has no power under the Constitution as it is, to disturb slavery in any State in which it exists; and it is equally certain that Congress can give him none—and that it has none itself. As a right of war, slaves, considered as persons, may be destroyed if they take part in the war against us—not otherwise; considered as property, which the President admits they are, they may be captured, and put to any appropriate use by the captor, consistent with humanity, like other property. But, in every case, the use which a wise and just and generous conqueror will make of his power to injure and destroy, is strictly limited, first by the necessities, and secondly by the objects of the war. In this case, are we sunk so low that we are ready to resort to the false pretext that twenty-three millions of freemen can not subdue five millions of rebels, unless we first deprive them of their slaves, and set those slaves free? Or are we content to practice the enormous hypocrisy of professing to fight for the restoration of the seceded States to the Union as the grand object of the war, and at the same time pursue the war upon principles which, if they could be effectually reduced to practice, would make those States a perpetual desolation? We admit that treason and rebellion are just grounds upon which every species of

property may be forfeited to the State; and we venture to hold the opinion, that the construction put on the Federal Constitution, generally, by the lawyers of our day, limiting the power of forfeiture, as to real estate, to the life-interest of the transgressor, is ill-considered and erroneous. But by the forfeiture, the title to the property passes to the State, in trust for the general good, as so much means. And we would like to understand by what authority of law—actual or possible—the Federal Government can bestow the title of a forfeited estate upon himself, any more than upon a third party: or upon what pretext of authority under the Federal Constitution, captured slaves can be set free, any more than captured or forfeited slaves can be given to the officers and soldiers of an invading army. In civilized war private property is sacred, unless it is put to military uses by the enemy; and treason and rebellion are not offenses under the articles of war, but are crimes against the State. If the public conscience revolts from the idea of selling captured or forfeited slaves, there are various ways of escaping from the necessity of doing so—any one of which would be unspeakably better than their indiscriminate and simultaneous liberation in the revolted States: better for the slaves, better for the Slave States, better for the nation, better most especially for the hope of restoring the Union and preserving the Constitution.

When this terrible war became inevitable, it seemed to us that no man of common sense in the Slave States could fail to understand that the slave interest in every part of the country, and especially in the States which revolted, must incur the most serious danger, and receive an immense shock. We labored with great earnestness to make this plain to the people of the Slave States; because it was our opinion, and still is, that in all the conditions of slavery which exist in this country, there are possible modes of destroying it, more deplorable by far than its continuance; and that there are possible failures in the attempt to destroy it, whose fruits are bitter beyond all it can bear in awaiting the course of Providence. Such of these influences, detrimental to the slave interest, as necessarily attend a great war in the midst of it, or as are inflicted in pursuit of the lawful objects of the war, are no more proper subjects of complaint by those who made

the war, than the killing of their soldiers in battle is. But even in regard to such as these, loyal Slave States, and even loyal men in disloyal Slave States, had as clear and perfect right to the protection of their property—including slaves—by the Federal Government, as they had to the protection of their lives. Long ago, Simon de Montfort, leader of one of the exterminating Papal crusades against the Albigenses, stormed a city in which a certain number of Roman Catholics dwelt amongst the heretics, who were devoted to destruction. Kill all—said the fierce crusader—God knows them that are his. God's judgment was, that even ten righteous men should save even Sodom. The ground of just complaint is so clear that the nation can not fail to see it, and so serious in every aspect of it that our confidence is unshaken that the nation will sustain it. If it were a question of first instance whether Free States and Slave States could live together in peace, under the same Federal institutions, it seems to us that nothing but the most frantic fanaticism could doubt that a common Government over them all was not only the best, but the only effectual provision for as permanent peace amongst them as it is possible for human institutions to secure. After the most successful experiment in human progress, ever made under a human government, and that upon the very basis which solves the insane problem now started; we are presented with the shocking phenomenon of portions of many States, embracing multitudes of people, struggling upon principles, and for ends directly opposite, yet both sides agreeing in principles which condemn our glorious system as a failure, and our unparalleled success as a delusion. The Rebels in the South insist on making a new nation, which shall be composed of Slave States only; the Abolitionists at the North insist on the extirpation of slavery, as the condition of the preservation of the old nation. There is a fatal ground in which they both agree, and from which they both start in opposite directions. They both agree that our system is a failure, and must be abandoned or greatly modified; they both agree that the ultimate and fatal evil is a common Government over both Slave States and Free States; they both agree on that which amounts to repudiating the Constitution as it is, and the Union as it was. That it belongs to the office of President of the United States to form and

urge schemes of the most radical and immense social and political revolution—or to his functions, as Commander-in-Chief, of the Armies and Navy, to attempt the universal destruction of slavery in America—it seems to us can never be shown, either as matter of right or matter of necessity. That it belongs to the Congress of the United States, either to establish slavery or to abolish slavery in any of the States, is what we suppose no man in America, competent to form an opinion on the subject, will assert. That the revolted States shall never be restored to the Union, except as Free States, is a conclusion which no rational man can believe the National Government has any right, legal or moral, to adopt, or to attempt to enforce, without believing, at the same time, that the National Government has an equal right to decide in an opposite manner, if it sees fit, and thus, both as to all future States, and as to all existing Free States, oblige them to create slavery, or exclude them from the Union. Whether the new policy of the President is to be considered free from all immediate danger of conducting those who adopt it to such extreme results, or whether it is to be considered as containing in it all that is necessary to give the General Government unlimited and despotic control, directly or indirectly, over slavery in the States; there is enough, and the time has come that the people of the United States must decide how far this civil war is to be restrained to the direct and effectual, and immediate accomplishment of its own great national and constitutional objects—or how far it is to be allowed to be directed to partisan and revolutionary objects, out of which may arise evils which no mortal can adequately estimate.

The black race, in a state of slavery, was brought to America almost simultaneously with the first white settlements made by English emigrants at the North. For nearly two and a half centuries, the two races have dwelt together on this continent, until the white race composing this nation has reached the number of about twenty-eight millions of souls, and the black race, hanging upon it like a parasite upon a noble oak, has reached about four and a half millions. Of these blacks about four millions were slaves at the breaking out of this civil war, all of them residing in fifteen States of the Union; and the free blacks, amounting to about half a million, were

scattered over all the thirty-four States of the Union—the larger part of them in the Slave States—and the old States containing a larger proportion of them than the new States. Without accepting as strictly just the disparaging representations which are almost universally made concerning the free blacks, as a body; and repudiating absolutely, the extreme principles of both Pro-slavery men and Abolitionists, with regard to almost every topic connected with the question of slave emancipation; we think we speak with truth and moderation, and that we utter what the great mass of the American people will ratify, when we say that the past history, from the beginning, and the present condition of this free black class, do not encourage us, as a matter of either humanity, of wisdom, or of patriotism, to desire that the slaves of the *whole country* should change their present lot for that of the free blacks. During a period of more than one hundred and fifty years, preceding the Declaration of Independence in 1776, negro slavery had extended itself throughout all the colonies—had witnessed and shared almost the entire colonial existence of our thirteen revolutionary States. The thirteen colonies which issued the Declaration of Independence in 1776, were all slaveholding colonies: and by the same act that constituted them States, they were constituted slaveholding States; and by the same act that constituted a new nation out of these States, a nation holding slaves was created out of slaveholding States. So they fought the revolutionary war: so they created the old Confederation, and lived and prospered under it: so they adopted a more perfect Union and Government, by means of the Federal Constitution which still exists, and at the formation of which, one hundred and seventy years after the introduction of slavery into America, every State which took part in its formation was a Slave State. It is true that the number of slaves in the nation at the adoption of the Federal Constitution, was small in comparison with its present number: but that is equally true with regard to the white population. It is also true that the number of slaves in some of the States was small in comparison both with the number of whites and with the number of slaves in other States: but both of these facts are true at the present moment. Of the original thirteen States, seven have abolished slavery since the adoption of the

Federal Constitution; and six still retain it. Of the twenty-one States added to the Union, in the same period, twelve came in as Free States, and nine as Slave States. Of the fifteen Slave States now existing, ten have seceded, four have adhered to the Union, and the remaining one (Virginia) is divided under two State governments, one of which seceded, while the other adheres to the Union—leaving twenty-three and a half States to deal with those that have seceded. Nothing could prove more clearly than this naked resumé proves, that any state of opinion, whether moral or political, which may lead the nation at this time, to make the abolition of slavery a condition of the admission of a State into the Union, or of its status in it; is in direct conflict with the history, the institutions and the temper of the American people, from their first planting on this continent two and a half centuries since to the present time. Assuredly it was in no such spirit that this nation passed its youth, and its sturdy manhood; in no such spirit that its glorious institutions had their birth, their growth, their development, and their complete and final consolidation; in no such spirit that its vast power has been acquired, and its unparalleled advance, both material and moral, been achieved. The triumph of such a spirit is a great catastrophe, in the life of a nation—far, very far from being compensated by bestowing a qualified freedom upon several millions of an inferior and subject race, or even by exterminating their guilty and unhappy owners. There is a righteous and terrible Nemesis that broods over nations. God forbid that the time should be now come for this nation to render account of the wrongs of this black race, during two hundred and fifty years! God forbid that the nation, in its madness, should become its own executioner!

From the period of the first settlement of English Colonists in this country, to the date fixed by the Federal Constitution (1808) before which the African slave-trade could not be abolished, that frightful traffic was allowed in America, and carried on in her sea-ports. For two centuries the negro race was thus replenished *legally* amongst our people; and long after the trade was abolished by law—nay even up to the commencement of the present civil war, cargoes of African slaves continued to be occasionally brought illegally into the United

States. There does not appear, however, to have been any particular earnestness in favor of the continuance or extension of slavery in this country—nor any wide difference of opinion in regard to it between the different sections, during the first two centuries of its existence. The purchase of Louisiana and the subsequent immense development of the cotton culture, and the vast increase in the value of slaves and of the products of their labor, no doubt laid the foundation of that change in the general temper of the Slave States, which, of late years, has become more and more decided and intense. Simultaneously a corresponding change of temper in the opposite direction, manifested itself in the Northern States; and rapidly organizing itself as a moral fanaticism, proclaimed slavery to be the highest of national sins, and its destruction the first of national duties. On the application of Missouri for admission into the Union as a Slave State (1819–1821), the first serious attempt was made to give public and legal efficacy to the political apprehensions of Northern politicians concerning the renewed growth of the slave interest in the nation, and its probable increased influence in the government. In the original and traditional temper of the nation, there would have been no more difficulty about admitting Missouri as a Slave State in 1820, than about admitting Kentucky in 1793. Every Free State in the Union has the right, as clear and as indisputable, to create and to maintain slavery in her borders; as every Slave State has to abolish it; and absurd as the suggestion may appear now to heated partizans, there are existing laws against free blacks, in many of the Free States, and there is manifest a popular tendency, which strongly indicate that the reduction of that class to slavery, in those States, is far from being an impossible result of the accomplishment of schemes now urged upon the nation. Up to 1820, the settled temper of the nation, like its fundamental law and its previous universal practice, was to leave to each State to decide as it saw fit. The attempt, at that period, to make the Federal Constitution an instrument of directly arresting the increase of Slave States, and thus of indirectly abolishing slavery by smothering it, was evaded by a compromise—admitting Missouri as a Slave State, and creating on a line of latitude ($36^{\circ} 30'$) a division in effect of the

unsettled national territory. For thirty years, this adjustment gave comparative outward peace. But evil had been done, and revelations had been made, which gave a new aspect to the whole mutual relations of the free and the slave States, and the whole relations of the General Government to both classes. An extreme party became organized in the South, and one equally extreme in the north ; extreme principles, opinions, and claims, diametrically opposite to each other, and thoroughly digested into two utterly hostile systems of morals and of politics, gradually insinuated themselves into the mind of the extreme Northern and the extreme Southern States ; and the great central States on both sides of the slave line, in whose hands, in every contingency, the fate of the nation must forever rest, found themselves incompetent by their own divisions, when the crisis came, to put forth their united and irresistible strength, both moral and political, in a degree sufficient to crush the factions in both extremes. The terrible explosion came : it was inevitable as the result of what had gone before. And now, after the lapse of forty years, we find in the midst of rebellion and civil war, those fatal ideas which led a party at the North to initiate, in 1819-21, the first attempts to organize a crusade against slavery, through the agency of the Federal Government—matured into a vast scheme for the complete execution of which it is proposed that the whole wealth, and the whole military power of the loyal States shall be put at the disposal of the President of the United States. For ourselves, we have never ceased to desire, from the bottom of our heart, the possession of true, just, and complete freedom, by every human being ; and we never saw the day when we were not ready to do and to risk all, whereunto God would call us, in the faithful discharge of our whole duty thereunto. It is out of such a spirit as that ; it is in the closing period of a life passed in that manner, that we lift up our voice to warn our country against such schemes ; and to point out, as we may be able, that it is wholly impossible for them to be so executed as to result in anything beneficial to the black race, advantageous to the white race, or promotive of the safety, the prosperity, or the glory of the country.

Few impartial men will deny that the administration of Mr. Buchanan was by far the most disastrous that the nation had

ever endured. Its mistakes and its misdeeds with relation to the slave interest alone, were beyond measure shocking and ruinous: and the concentrated folly and venom of the influence from that quarter, under which it fell, might almost extenuate a portion of the frantic violence of the reaction against it. Its conduct could hardly have been worse, if Mr. Buchanan had purchased the presidency from the most extreme party of the South, at the price of prostituting it to the maintenance of the most preposterous claims it was possible for the South to make; nor could it well have been more fatal, if he had expressly selected, as the organs of Southern desires and opinion, men whose special object it was to make an incurable breach between the North and the South, and then tear the nation in pieces. Mr. Lincoln is the successor of Mr. Buchanan—and whatever else his election may be thought to signify, we have already said it was a protest of the American people against the extreme pro-slavery doctrine and policy which culminated under Mr. Buchanan's administration—and absorbed the National Government as thoroughly in a national attempt to extend slavery, as there is manifest danger of its being now absorbed in a national attempt to abolish it. We are in the midst of the extreme reaction of the nation, against the conspiracy to make the National Government a special organ for the maintenance and extension of slavery—and for the destruction of this nation and the erection of a new nation if the conspiracy should fail. The conspiracy exploded—and we are now measuring our strength with the conspirators on the question of the new nation. But does it follow that we must fly to extremes as violent on one side, as those conspirators rushed to on the other? Must we subvert and abuse the Constitution in one direction, because they subverted and abused it in the opposite direction? Because they chose to see no just, wise, and safe condition except that in which slavery predominated, shall we refuse to see any such condition except where slavery no longer exists? Because, under their inspiration, the Supreme Court said something which the conspirators professed to believe established slavery as a constitutional right in all the National Territories, shall we follow the spirit of their horrible example, and claim that slavery in the States where it exists shall be abolished by the

General Government, which confessedly has no power over it in those States, because there are some vague phrases, somewhere, about the rights of war—and because we suppose we can conquer them more readily after abolishing slavery? Because they, in their madness, sought to force slavery on Kansas, by fraud and violence, shall we, more frantic, attempt to abolish slavery in ten States—probably before we are done in fifteen States—and that upon pretexts hardly more manly or legal, and certainly not more safe or wise, than those resorted to by them? Independently of the more recent policy indicated by Mr. Lincoln, which we so much deplore, the National Government, under his lead, or with his approbation, had exerted, if not exhausted, the power possessed by it, under the Federal Constitution, so far as there seemed to be any occasion to do so, according to any commonly-accepted view of the doctrines of the Republican party. Slavery had been abolished in the District of Columbia: slavery had been forever prohibited in the National Territories: a series of legal enactments and general orders had offered such security to slaves, whether seduced or fugitive, in the lines of every Federal command—that even in the loyal Slave States the slaves of the stoutest loyal men, by the score and the hundred, have been carried off from their owners: effectual proceedings had been taken to enforce the laws, both at home and abroad, against the accursed slave-trade, and a convention with England, and possibly some other foreign powers, to that end, had been concluded on mutual concessions that would promote the object: the black republic of Liberia had been recognized as an independent nation, and a commercial and consular treaty concluded with it: and the President, by a special message, had urged upon Congress a plan for compensated emancipation, and subsequent colonization of the slaves of the loyal Slave States, with the consent of those States respectively, which plan had received the indorsement, as we remember, of that august body. We are not able to see that much, if any thing, remained unsecured, that any portion of the Republican party, except the extremest technical Abolitionists, have ever desired, or dreamed of demanding. We deem it to be a national calamity, that the President could not rest content with having thus, and very early in his term of service,

accomplished all that his party had proposed—all probably that the mass of them desired—more, we have no doubt, than many thousands who voted for him cordially approved—more assuredly than great multitudes of loyal men who did not vote for him, but who zealously supported his endeavors to maintain the Union and the Constitution, judged to be necessary, or altogether proper. What he had done, independently of his proclamation of September 22, involved the most immense change in the principles, the policy, and the relations of the Government, to slavery, as they all stood at the close of Mr. Buchanan's administration. A new direction was given to everything; many things were set at rest which it was of the last consequence to quiet in some way. If the nation accepted that much, which it probably would have done as to most parts of it, almost without a struggle; the triumphant conclusion of the war, in the grand sense of the resolution of Mr. Crittenden as to its true objects, which, if our memory serves us, was passed by an almost unanimous vote of the lower house of Congress, would have given back to us our glorious country, baptized indeed in blood, but purged, united, and safe. Alas! who can even conjecture, how much beyond the scope of the things we have enumerated, the proclamation of September may, if it is vigorously enforced, sweep this nation, already convulsed, into new convulsions, the depth of which no modern sufferings of nations have fathomed, and the end of which no living creature need hope to see!

For our own part, it is due to candor, and perhaps it is not presumptuous to add that it is due to the President—when it is considered how great and how important the mass is whose principles we share, to be somewhat more explicit touching those acts of the Government and the President, which we have distinguished as independent of his proclamation of September 22, 1862—and which, as it appears to us, are founded upon principles not only different from the principles of the proclamation, but entirely inconsistent with them. We therefore say, that the abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia was completely within the competence of Congress—was not seriously objectionable in the mode adopted—was a concession proper to be made by the slaveholding States to the principles and wishes of the vast majority of the American

people—and was an act proper to be done, in any fair and national view of the subject. Whatever has been done in the matter of the suppression of the slave trade, and with regard to the black republic of Liberia—so far as we are informed—seems to us to be worthy of the approbation of all wise and just men. As to the use to be made of slaves by the military forces of the nation, and the protection given to fugitive slaves within the lines of those forces; we think a great error was at first committed in dealing with a weak leniency with the property—including slaves—of Rebels in arms against the Government; and that afterward a line of policy has been adopted, confounding loyalty with disloyalty, in a manner at once cruel and insulting, and having much appearance of being designed rather against slavery than against traitors. The act of Congress prohibiting slavery in all the National Territories, is the opposite extreme of the decision of the Supreme Court, declaring, virtually, that slavery exists, by the Constitution, in them all. To us, both the decision of the Court, and the act of Congress—both the extreme claim of the South and the extreme counter-claim of the North—appear to be alike fanatical, unjust, and contrary to the dictates of sound morality and true statesmanship. But we so fully argued this whole question in one of our previous articles, called forth by the state of the country during the two past years, that we forbear to do more here than express the substance of what we published before this act of Congress was passed. The special message of the President to Congress, proposed to the Border Slave States a system of compensated emancipation, either immediate or gradual—the slaves to be emancipated by the legal and voluntary action of the States respectively—to be paid for, at a fair rate, out of the national treasury, and to be colonized, with their own consent, in some country foreign as to the United States. Congress went a certain length, if we remember correctly, in giving its approbation to the plan proposed in this message; and the President, if we rightly understand the statements of his late annual message, considers this plan, as well as that proposed by immediate abolition, in his proclamation of September, 1862, and as well as that proposed by way of amendment to the Federal Constitution, in his annual message of December, 1862—to be still depending

before the country; and this plan, by way of compensated emancipation and colonization, to be still within the acceptance of any State that may close in with it. Passing by what seems to us, as we have already intimated, the incongruity of any propositions of this sort, on this subject, emanating from the head of a government which has no constitutional power in the premises—unless it be the extremely dubious and curious one of making great donations of public money to particular States for objects foreign to the nature and ends of that Government; passing by, also, whatever difficulty might arise in the mind of any State, as to taking serious steps toward *compensated* emancipation, on the *condition of colonization*—before either the compensation or the colonization was put in a form considerably in advance of their present aspect; it is our opinion, that but for the subsequent proclamation and message of the President, this plan, considered as a finality, and cordially backed by Congress, would have produced many, if not all the results, contemplated by the President. In our judgment, the Border Slave States will not embark in any scheme of voluntary slave emancipation, in their own borders respectively, which is to be considered part and parcel of a policy intended to achieve, by other and violent means, the entire abolition of slavery in America. Amongst many reasons for this state of mind, one is so obvious and so universally prevalent, that we need not state any other: namely, the conviction, that although some or all of the Border States may be in a condition, now or soon, to enter upon a system of gradual emancipation—the bulk of the remaining Slave States are in no such condition; and that there is no earthly power that can, legally, oblige them to attempt it, or that ought to do it by military force. This judgment we believe to be just; but, assuredly, it will be found to be almost universal in the Border Slave States; and we venture to predict that the more the subject is agitated, the more decided will be the refusal of the Free States to stake the existence of the nation upon the successful execution of any such scheme, whether as a measure of peace, or a measure of war. We have already said that we considered Missouri to be in a condition to adopt a system of gradual emancipation, and that it would be wise in her to do it. We have the same opinion concerning Maryland: and as

to Delaware, we suppose that the slave interest there is so small, and in a condition so peculiar, that it offers no special obstacle to any action the State might think desirable, at any time. Western Virginia, if admitted as a separate State, as it seems probable it will be, may be considered virtually a Free State: and we know too little of the present condition of Eastern Virginia, connected with this subject, to hazard any statement. Kentucky is the only remaining Border Slave State. She has refused, on three different occasions in her history—the last occasion as late as 1850—to take any step looking toward the emancipation of her slaves. We have always thought she erred in this. Under the plan of the President which we are considering, we think that as the first, or even as an early mover in it—she would have rejected it; while as a mover in it, after Missouri, Western Virginia, and Maryland—and considering this plan a finality as touching the interference of this Administration with slavery as an institution—it is not improbable she might have adopted it. It is difficult to conjecture what effect the idea of compensation might have in Kentucky, or in any other Slave State: because the fate of slavery is in the hands of non-slaveholders, especially in all the Border States, and they have resisted, as a body, all tendency toward emancipation, upon peculiar views of their own respecting slavery, considered as an institution, and not as an interest. It is extremely fortunate, however, that the President has tenaciously held to the idea of compensation for liberated slaves, in all his earlier plans and suggestions; because in that, he separated himself absolutely from the fanatical principles of the Abolition section of his party. The same statement, precisely, may be made concerning the condition annexed to his plan, requiring the manumitted slaves to be colonized. No wiser, or nobler, or more fruitful charity characterizes this century than that which planted and still sustains the black republic of Liberia in Africa: and we might reasonably hope that other colonies planted under the plan of the President—if he would have allowed it a reasonable chance of being adopted, might have been productive of results similar to those the world confidently expects from Liberia, through all coming time. But we ought not to deceive ourselves. When it was ingrafted in the plan of the President, that the

colonization of the manumitted slaves should depend on their own consent; that might secure a select body of emigrants—but it rendered it certain that the great bulk of them never would emigrate. The experience of the colonization societies, during more than forty years, is conclusive on this point. Indeed the entire experience of the human race is to the very same intent. The world has been everywhere peopled by colonies: but it has nowhere been depopulated by them. The black race has not been very sensibly diminished in Africa, by the horrible traffic which has scattered her children over the earth, ever since the dawn of history: and the black race in America will never be very sensibly diminished, by colonies of blacks removed from the country, with, or possibly even without, their consent. The plan of the President might, perhaps would, we think ought to, have had a favorable influence, in the Border Slave States, if time had been allowed, and the course of events had not been particularly adverse. But in conceding this much, we differ from multitudes of as loyal men as live, and amongst them many, perhaps most, of the conspicuous statesmen in the States proposed to be influenced.

The proclamation of the President, to which we have often alluded, we now print in full, from one of the most respectable newspapers of the day :

I, Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States, and Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy thereof, do hereby proclaim and declare, that hereafter, as heretofore, the war will be prosecuted for the object of practically restoring the constitutional relation between the United States and the people thereof in which States that relation is or may be suspended or disturbed; that it is my purpose at the next meeting of Congress to again recommend the adoption of a practical measure, tendering pecuniary aid to the free acceptance or rejection of all the Slave States, so-called, the people whereof may not then be in rebellion against the United States, and which States may then have voluntarily adopted, or thereafter may voluntarily adopt, immediate or gradual abolishment of slavery within their respective limits, and that the effort to colonize persons of African descent with their consent upon this continent or elsewhere, with the previously-obtained consent of the Governments existing there, will be continued; that on the 1st day of January, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixty-three, all persons held as slaves within any State, or any designated part of a State,

the people whereof shall then be in rebellion against the United States, shall be then, thenceforward and forever free, and the Executive Government of the United States, including the military and naval authority thereof, will recognize and maintain the freedom of such persons or any of them, in any efforts they may make for their actual freedom; that the Executive will, on the first day of January aforesaid, by proclamation designate the States, or parts of States, if any, in which the people thereof respectively shall then be in rebellion against the United States; and the fact that any people or State thereof shall on that day be in good faith represented in the Congress of the United States by members chosen thereto at elections wherein a majority of the qualified voters of such State shall have participated, shall, in the absence of strong countervailing testimony, be deemed conclusive evidence that such State and the people thereof have not been in rebellion against the United States; that attention is hereby called to an act of Congress, entitled "an act to make an additional article of war," approved March 13, 1862, and which act is in the words and figures following:

"Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That hereafter the following shall be promulgated as an additional article of war for the government of the army of the United States, and shall be obeyed and observed as such:

"ART.—All officers or persons in the military or naval service of the United States are prohibited from employing any of the forces under their respective commands for the purpose of returning fugitives from service or labor who may have escaped from any persons to whom such service of labor is claimed to be due, and any officer who shall be found guilty by court-martial of violating this article shall be dismissed from the service.

"SEC. 2. And be it further enacted, That this act shall take effect from and after its passage."

Also to the 9th and 10th sections of an act entitled "an act to suppress insurrection, to punish treason and rebellion, to seize and confiscate property of rebels, and for other purposes," approved July 17, 1862, and which sections are in the words and figures following:

"SEC. 9. And be it further enacted, That all slaves of persons who shall hereafter be engaged in rebellion against the Government of the United States, or who shall in any way give aid or comfort thereto, escaping from such persons and taking refuge within the lines of the army, and all slaves captured from such persons, or deserted by them and coming under the control of the Government of the United States, and all slaves of such persons found or being within any place occupied by rebel forces and afterward occupied by the forces of the United States shall be deemed captives of war, and shall be forever free of their servitude, and not again held as slaves.

"SEC. 10. And be it further enacted, That no slave escaping into any State, Territory, or the District of Columbia, from any of the States, shall be delivered up or in any way impeded or hindered of his liberty, except for crime or some

offense against the laws unless the person claiming said fugitive shall first make oath that the person to whom the labor or service of such fugitive is alleged to be due, is his lawful owner, and has not been in arms against the United States in the present rebellion, nor in any way given aid and comfort thereto; and no person engaged in the military or naval service of the United States shall under any pretence whatever assume to decide on the validity of the claim of any person to the service or labor of any other person, or surrender up any such person to the claimant, on pain of being dismissed from the service."

And I do hereby enjoin upon and order all persons engaged in the military and naval service of the United States to observe, obey, and enforce, within their respective spheres of service, the acts and sections above recited, and the Executive will, in due time, recommend that all citizens of the United States, who shall have remained loyal thereto throughout the rebellion, shall, upon the restoration of the constitutional relations between the United States and their respective States and people, if the relations shall have been suspended or disturbed, be compensated for all losses by acts of the United States, including the loss of slaves.

In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the United States to be affixed.

Done at the city of Washington, this 22d day of September, in the year of our Lord 1862, and of the independence of the United States the 87th.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

By the President :

WM. H. SEWARD, *Secretary of State.*

The portion of this important State paper which relates to the plan of the President previously recommended to Congress, we need not speak of particularly, after having already spoken at some length of the plan itself. It will, moreover, be necessary to say a few words when we come to speak of the amendment proposed to the Federal Constitution in the annual message, in fulfillment, we suppose, of the promise implied in the forepart of the proclamation. The section of the act of Congress of March 13, 1862, and those of the act of June 17, 1862, to which the President specially calls attention, and which he publishes as part of his proclamation; we have also alluded to in general terms on a previous page. In recapitulating what had been done before the issuing of the proclamation, in directing the power of the General Government against negro slavery—we omitted, as we now perceive, to state the modification of the fugitive slave law, made by the tenth

section of the latter of the two acts cited in the proclamation. As the President was known to be of opinion that the Constitution absolutely required Congress to provide, by law, for the rendition of slaves escaping from one State to another—this modification of the existing law, limiting the rendition to the fugitive slaves of loyal citizens, probably took its present form to satisfy his scruples. The wisest and best men are liable, like the common mass of humanity, to hold opinions which sometimes appear difficult to be laid happily together. It will be a queer thing—though likely enough to happen, that loyal men in disloyal States, shall have all their slaves emancipated under and by virtue of this proclamation, *except* such of them, as having escaped into a loyal State, are allowed to be reclaimed by this very act to which special attention is called by the liberating proclamation. There is another statement, which an event made public while we are writing, obliges us to make. By the penalty annexed to the section of the Act of March, 1862, cited by the President, any person in the military service who shall deliver up a fugitive slave—and *who shall be found guilty by a court-martial*—shall be dismissed from the service. By the tenth section of the Act of July, 1862, which is also cited—and which by its express terms relates *only* to slaves escaping from one State to another—the trial, by court-martial, of the offending person is not necessary—but he shall be summarily dismissed the service. Now we shall not stop to point out that such laws, even if they were, in reality, laws against rebellion, instead of being laws against property in slaves—have a thousand times more effect in weakening the Government in the whole cordon of Border Slave States, and amongst the whole loyal population of the disloyal States—than they ever can have in weakening the rebellion. And one such fatal mistake as the dismissal of *Col. John McHenry* of the 1st Kentucky cavalry, without court-martial under the penalty of the Act of July—when his offense, if he committed any—was of such nature that it could not be punished even under these laws, except by court-martial, under the Act of March; will do more harm to the cause of the Union, in Kentucky, where this early, active, able, heroic young officer is known and honored—than the stealing of ten thousand slaves from Kentucky, whether under or

without Act of Congress, could ever do any righteous cause good. In the Border Slave States there are over four millions of white people, more than half of whom are as loyal as any population of the same extent on this continent; and these, taken as a mass, have proved their devotion to the Union and the Constitution by incomparably greater sacrifices, and in manifold more perils, than have fallen to the lot of populations north of them. Now is it wise, is it magnanimous, is it just, is it safe to drive such a population to phrensy? And is there a living man, who has a better right than the writer of these sorrowful lines, to put that question, in all honor, and love, and devotion, to his erring country? Can we not, for the sake of a glorious common cause, fight it out like true men to complete triumph? And then ruin us afterward, if you have the heart to do it.

The immediate object of the proclamation, however, undoubtedly was, to make known, officially, the conviction of the President that slavery in the obstinately rebellious States ought to be abolished, as a means of conquering them; and to abolish it, on a fixed, future day, by this proclamation. His words are, "that on the first day of January, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixty-three, all persons held as slaves within any State, or any designated part of a State, the people whereof shall then be in rebellion against the United States, shall be then, thenceforward, and forever free, and the Executive Government of the United States, including the military and naval authority thereof, will recognize and maintain the freedom of such persons, or any of them, in any efforts they may make for their actual freedom." And then, as part of the same sentence—he proceeds to say, that he will by proclamation, on the first day of January, 1863, designate what States, and parts of States, if any, are then in rebellion; and adds that representation in Congress, shall be taken as sufficient ground of exemption from the special effects of his proclamation. So far as this proclamation has efficacy of itself, or as future efficacy may be given to it, the matter stands thus: 1. In every State, and part of any State, in rebellion at the date of the proclamation—all persons held as slaves are set free—with a limitation till January 1st, 1863, of their actual freedom: 2. On the 1st of January, 1863, the President will

designate by proclamation, the States, and parts of States, being then in rebellion, in which the limitation of the freedom before declared shall be removed, and the slaves therein "shall be then, thenceforward, and forever free:" 3. The slaves in the States that were in rebellion on the 22d of September, 1862, but which shall cease to be in rebellion by the 1st of January, shall continue slaves thereafter, so far as the proclamation of September is concerned—the failure to designate a State, or part of a State, in the second proclamation, working a defeasance of the freedom given in the first proclamation: 4. If no proclamation is issued on the 1st of January, 1863—or if any one that may be issued fails to designate any State, or part of any State, as being then in rebellion, the condition of the freedom given in the September proclamation having failed, the slaves remain, in all the States, and parts of States, that were in rebellion when the first proclamation was issued, in the same condition as if that proclamation had never been issued: 5. After the 1st of January, 1863, the President will recognize and maintain the freedom of all the slaves, in the States, and parts of States, designated in his proclamation, proposed to be issued on the 1st of January, 1863: 6. And he will use the military and naval force of the United States, in support of any efforts which those slaves, or any of them, may make, after the 1st of January, 1863, for their actual freedom. We understand this portion of the September proclamation, and this plan of immediate and forcible abolition to apply—in the first instance—exclusively to the States, and parts of States, which were in rebellion on the 22d of September, 1862, and to apply, finally, exclusively to such States, and parts of States, being in rebellion on the 1st day of January, 1863, as the President may designate, by a proclamation of that date. We also understand clearly, that the slaves of all loyal persons scattered throughout the rebellious States, to be designated by the President, are intended expressly to be embraced and treated exactly as if their owners were traitors; and that the only protection or redress they are allowed to expect, is contained in the promise of the President, that he "will, in due time recommend" that they "shall, upon the restoration of the constitutional relations between the United States and their respective States and people," "be compensated for all losses by Acts of

the United States, including the loss of slaves." But even this recommendation of a redress, at once remote, contingent, and inadequate, is closed by the condition, that the ruined friends of the country, must never have wavered or doubted in the midst of horrors of which the Government seems to have no conception. No matter how fatally the Government may withdraw its protection—or how sternly it may inflict deliberate—as it may suppose necessary, injuries; they alone, "who shall have remained loyal thereto throughout the rebellion"—shall be recommended for any redress at all! Upon such principles as these, they who have in their hands the fate of this nation, may discern through the bloody cloud that envelops us, the early "restoration of the constitutional relations between the United States" and the Rebel States and people. Victory may come, even in that way. Hitherto it has not *so* come. But even victory is not *all* that we need.

Whoever has sought to convince Mr. Lincoln that he ought to issue this proclamation—and whoever may hereafter seek to convince him that it ought to be enforced; is not, in our poor judgment, either his wise or his safe friend. Whoever supposes that any considerable portion of loyal Americans, who are not warmly and technically Abolitionists, will *cordially* support its execution; is, according to our fixed conviction, utterly deceived. Whoever imagines, that, by concerted clamor against all men, as disloyal and pro-slavery, and democratic, who disapprove this proclamation, who object to the principles it contains, and the policy to which it points, with energy far beyond what the extreme peril of the nation will allow them to make manifest, they can secure to the Republican party the permanent possession of power; have, as it seems obvious to us, totally failed to comprehend the real character of the American people—their true temper and designs in the prosecution of this war—and all the signal manifestations, which, during two years, they have constantly given, of their real aims and desires. Sincerely regretting the duty which has fallen upon us, we will state as briefly as we can, and with a heavy heart, some of the leading grounds on which we judge that this proclamation should never be enforced.

It will convulse the loyal party throughout the nation: an objection to it, which, if true, ought to be fatal, by itself, to

every wise statesman. Never having belonged to the Republican party, we are not one of those who need express deep sorrow at its overthrow—if that should be the result. But at the present moment the highest interests of the nation forbid divisions amongst those who share the oft-repeated desire of the President, to maintain our national life, and our noble institutions. Measures of transcendent importance ought not to be proposed and urged upon the nation—which are confessedly extreme—and certainly neither clearly constitutional, nor absolutely necessary—where it was known and could not fail to be known—that whatever their effect might be on the enemies of the country, there was immense risk of their doing incalculable harm to it, and to its friends. Now, at any rate, no one can be blind to the peril of prosecuting these measures any further.

From a point of view, still more palpable, an equally fatal objection arises. Tens of thousands of loyal men—probably the great majority of them—embracing, we may believe, the mass of those most competent to judge; believe that there is not a shadow of power, in or under the Federal Constitution—whereby the President, or Congress, or both united—can perform any such act as to set several millions of slaves, scattered over many States, free by proclamation—and then maintain them in that freedom by the military power of the nation. We are not aware that any one has claimed that the Constitution gives the President or Congress any such power; or denies that the exercise of it is wholly illegal, and subversive of public liberty if drawn into precedent. Can it be said that the Rebel States have less right to secede, in order to prevent encroachment on their slave property, than the Federal Government has to take their slaves from them, in order to make them return? But the maintenance of the Constitution, is one of the grand and universal grounds on which we are bound to wage this war. We have no organized national life, but by means of this Constitution. There is no Congress—there is no President except by means of it. Except in and under it, there is no organized national security, for any man's life, liberty, or property. But here is a proclamation, purporting to run in the name of the United States—and to perform an act of unparalleled power, upon a subject where no power at

all existed by, or in, the Federal Constitution; and then to uphold the act by military power, held only under the same Constitution, as Commander-in-Chief, *because* he is President. Whatever else may prompt us to such acts, or lead us to support them; it is a contradiction in terms to say, that *loyalty to the Constitution* does it.

And yet one of the highest authorities in the nation, Mr. Seward, Secretary of State, has said in a dispatch to the American Minister in England, giving account of the proclamation, a few days after its date, for the information of that government; that this matter, though earnestly discussed, "as a question of morals or humanity, has all the while been practically only a *military question*, depending on time and circumstances;" and he adds, as the conditions preliminary to the exercise of this great power of liberating millions of slaves by proclamation, that "the President must have not only the exigency, but the general consent of the loyal people of the Union;" and then asserts that this general consent must be both that of the Border Slave States, and of the Free States. In the same paragraph this sentence occurs: "At the same time the emancipation of the slaves could be effected only by Executive authority, and on the ground of military necessity."—(*Dispatch to Mr. Adams, September 26, 1862.*) See how many questions are here, in order to get to the "*War Power*," of which we hear so much; and how very far any of them are from making out a clear justification for a stupendous revolution, which nothing but the very clearest justification could excuse. For our part, we would be obliged to take issue with the Secretary, either upon matter law, or matter fact, or matter of reason, touching nearly all these questions. We do not agree that there is, or ever will be, "the general consent of the loyal people of the Union in the Border Slave States * * * * * as well as in the Free States," to the President's proclamation emancipating, in a body, all the slaves in the Rebel States—and pledging the military support of the nation to those slaves. We do not admit that the morality and humanity of human actions can ever cease, under any exigency, to be absolute rules of human conduct; and we feel perfectly assured, that both morality and humanity forbid the doing of what has been set on foot, in this matter—under any such

exigency as has existed hitherto. We are confident that no "military necessity" for what has been done in the premises, existed: that the American people are perfectly competent to achieve all the proper and avowed objects of this war, without resorting to extremities which would be even allowable as moral, humane, and legal: and that this indispensable result, so far from being promoted, will be seriously obstructed, by every attempt to carry on the war upon the new principles and policy, avowed in the proclamation. So far from admitting that the emancipation of slaves, in this country, and under any possible circumstances, can be effected *only by Executive authority*; it seems clear to us, that from the very nature of government, of laws, and of property—to say nothing of our own Constitution and its particular provisions, such an apothegm as this one of Mr. Seward, is incapable of being true, except under an unrestrained despotism. To make the despotism military, is so far worse. The most dangerous part of the case, indeed, practically considered, is that which meets us in so many ways, under the assumption that "military exigencies" justify the exercise by a Republican President, of vast and revolutionary powers, called *war powers*, which have no other source but war itself, and no other rule but the will of the commanders of armies, and no other limitation but the success of the operations. We undertake the accomplishment of the designs we have formed, and the gratification of the desires we cherish. The President has no *war power* except that he derives from the Constitution and laws of the United States—and from the law of nature and nations, as understood and practiced by civilized nations; and these latter can be a source of power to him, only so far as they do not conflict directly with the former. If the President, in a great public emergency, shall see fit to exercise powers that clearly do not belong to him, or that are very doubtful—for the purpose of supporting the institutions of the nation—it might be, that the nation, and posterity, would honor him for it, or would pass it over in silence and doubt, or would sharply condemn him. But all this is widely different, from avouching a necessity which does not adequately exist, for the accomplishment of a terrible and wide-spread revolution, not germane to the war—and not in the direction of the Constitution and laws—

and then avouching this *code of war*, as an adequate defense for the exercise of more than regal *civil* power.

But for the abhorrence of the institution of slavery, cherished by a large portion of the party which brought Mr. Lincoln into power; but for the universal indignation of loyal men, at the conduct of the Rebel States; but for the impression on the public mind, which has been so diligently, and in some instances so ably, nourished through the press, that slavery was rather the cause than the occasion of all our recent national troubles; we do not suppose that any such plans for the universal destruction of slavery in America, as those urged by Mr. Lincoln, more especially that are contained in his proclamation, could ever have emanated from the Chief Magistrate of the nation. If we admit that all these motives to violent proceedings, on our part, are just and well-founded, it is still of the last importance that we should consider, whether the particular course which we are urged to take is right or wise, and whether the particular end we are to obtain by that course is competent to us—or if competent, whether it does not necessarily defeat the possibility of one of the grand objects of the war, namely: the restoration of the Union. Are the Free States prepared to say, they will not tolerate a Slave State in the Union? If they are, this war is not only cruel and useless, but is prosecuted on false pretexts. If they are not, then these schemes of abolition, which are attempted to be made national, the moment they invoke force, become wholly mischievous, and probably incapable of success. Or shall we say, that the disloyal Slave States have forfeited their right to be members of the Union, and that we will readmit them on condition of the abolition of slavery in them all, and as they will not do this voluntarily, we will do it by force? But the war itself proceeds on the fundamental idea, that the States *can not* dismember the nation by seceding from it, and that the nation will not allow them to do so. But by that, do we mean that we will recover the territory embraced in those States, abolish so much of their laws, institutions, rights, and property, as we disapprove, and then create new States, on a different foundation, out of the conquered territory? Or do we not rather mean, that this nation, Union, and Constitution, having embraced those States, as they were, as integral

parts of all, and they, with us, having constituted the glorious unity which we will not see destroyed; their right to return is exactly as indestructible as their right to go off was unfounded; and our obligation to receive them is exactly as broad as our right to force them back? This very proclamation of the President, admits that all the States in arms on the 22d of September, 1862, who would lay down their arms by the 1st of January, 1863, should escape the forcible manumission of their slaves; and all his proposals to the loyal Slave States, are addressed to their sovereign discretion. And Mr. Seward says to our Minister in England: "We deplore the sufferings which the war has brought, and are ready and anxious to end the contest. We offer the simple terms, of restoration of the Union, and oblivion of the crimes committed against it, as soon as may be compatible with the public safety" (August 18th, 1862). What, then, can we say, if not that this forcible abolition of slavery is wholly incompatible with any right we possess to restore the Union at all—besides being eminently destructive of all rational hopes of restoring it as it was—or even of retaining the territory of the revolted States, in a form capable of being of any value to us, even if we can conquer and hold it by the utter ruin if not destruction of the white race in those States. There are rights that can not be called in question, without abolishing society; and amongst these are the mutual rights of the nation and the States which constitute this nation. There are vested rights, which can not be legally divested at all—nor forcibly divested without inflicting more misery and injustice, than can ever result from their continuance; and amongst these are the rights of property. In the sight of God, much may be said truly against the institution of hereditary slavery; but in the sight of the Federal Constitution, of the American Union, of our national life, of this terrible war, and of its conclusion in a manner the least fatal to us—nothing can be said about it, more entirely to be rejected, than that it can be legally abolished by force, or that either in good faith or in true wisdom, any such attempt should be made.

Let us, however, consider for a moment, the practical working of this belligerent right of ours, put in full exercise. It is extremely probable, if not certain, that the slaves actually

set free under this proclamation, will be only such as can come into personal contact with our military or naval forces—while the war lasts. That is, the proclamation, instead of freeing the slaves and ending the war by that means, will only be efficacious so far as our arms can practically enforce it; and this great belligerent right, instead of promoting the success of our cause, will only embitter our enemies, and dangerously divide us. Let us suppose, however, that our overwhelming comparative force, with God's blessing on it, will presently free all the slaves in the Rebel States, crush all opposition from the white race, and completely restore the Union to its former integrity and peace. Is there any power in the Constitution, whereby all the Southern States could be prevented from afterward re-establishing the institution of slavery, as sovereign States of the Union? Nay, is there any power that could legally, or peacefully prevent them from dealing with the very slaves we had taken from them in such a way, as to make the freedom we had forcibly established, at least as horrible as the bondage we destroyed? Or let us suppose the result will be a mixed population, in the ten or eleven Rebel States, of whites and liberated slaves, not very unequally divided; or that the black race will greatly predominate, or even that ultimately it will exclusively occupy many States of the far South. Is there, in this country, a party respectable in point of numbers, or intelligence, that seriously believes, such a result would be one we can constitutionally procure, or that after we have done it, we shall have done a thing advantageous to ourselves, to our country, or to humanity at large? But there are other, and far more probable results. Do we not understand that this pledge of armed support to three millions of slaves, dwelling amongst less than four millions of whites, has a terrible significance, which the whites will comprehend at once, and which the blacks will not be slow in interpreting? Suppose the whites take the initiative, who can guarantee even the lives of the adult male blacks outside of the lines of our armies? Or suppose the blacks take the initiative, who can guarantee the safety of the white women and children scattered over a region as extensive as all that embraced in all the Northern States? And who shall be able after these horrors, on either side, or both, to prove that they went much further in the

exercise of belligerent rights than — but no: God forbid that the fearful conclusion of that logic, should ever be obliged to be written down against us! It is impossible to exaggerate to us, the fearful calamity that has already fallen upon our country; impossible to express in terms stronger than our desires, the necessity of restoring the Union of that country, and of preserving its free and true national existence. But there are proposals, whose acceptance must aggravate all the horrors of our present condition, and cloud every hope of the future. There are things which a nation can not do, and live a glorious life afterward.

The plan for emancipation proposed by the President in his late annual message, by way of an amendment to the Federal Constitution; agrees essentially, in its leading features, with that proposed at first in his special message—and differs in all its principles and remedies, from his proclamation. We suppose he would account for this agreement and difference, by considering his first and last plans peaceful remedies—and the plan of his proclamation a belligerent remedy: and, to a certain extent, that explanation is just. It also, to a certain extent, explains why all three of the plans might be considered as depending at the same moment; for some of the Slave States are at war, and some at peace with the States of the North—and some of those at peace, it might be supposed, might accept the first plan of the President when indorsed by Congress—while others, it might be supposed, might refuse to accept it, unless they had constitutional security for its faithful execution on the part of the Government; and moreover, it might be supposed to be possible, that some States, or parts of States, might escape the fate denounced in the proclamation, by laying down their arms—and then the proposed amendment of the Constitution, if it should be adopted, would apply to them, without any new action on the part of the General Government. We may be permitted to observe, that unless the character of the President is much misconceived by those whose good opinion is of far more value to him, than the clamorous applause of partizans, who desire to use him for their own purposes; he will, probably, extend considerably beyond the 1st of January, 1863, the time allowed to all the Rebel States; or, he will, in his proposed proclamation of that

date, carefully discriminate, and designate, at first, only those States, or parts of States, in which the fate of the war will, probably, be decided. And we venture to add, if the peril to his administration and his party, which his proclamation has unquestionably produced, and his respect for public sentiment which has strongly pronounced against it, and which is steadily organizing in that direction; should lead him to abandon altogether—or even to omit for the present—the enforcement of his proclamation; he would do more for his own fame, for the triumph of the national cause, for the future peace and glory of his country, and for securing a fair, and to a certain extent, perhaps, a favorable consideration of his other plans of slave emancipation, than he can ever achieve by any use he can make of that proclamation.

— The plan of the annual message while essentially agreeing, differs from the original plan of compensated emancipation, in some particulars, which, on one hand might facilitate, and on the other might obstruct both its adoption and its execution. It proposes an amendment to the Federal Constitution—whereby the greatest attainable certainty would be secured, that whatever Slave States adopted the plan, would be paid for their manumitted slaves. But is there any probability that *two-thirds* of each house of Congress, will vote for this, or any similar amendment of the Constitution; even though a *majority* of each house might pass an act to pay a comparatively moderate amount, if by so doing emancipation would be promptly secured in some particular State, or perhaps in several, whose position was important, and whose slaves were not very numerous. But if Congress should propose the amendment asked for by the President, is there any probability that *three-fourths* of the States (twenty-seven States) would adopt it? We think not the slightest. The President, we believe, was an old Whig; and probably his nomination and election were due, in a great degree, to the power of that element in the Republican party. In some of his principles he seems to coincide fully, with those of the Abolitionists, pure and simple, who constitute the destructive element of the Republican party: while in many of his principles, he seems to differ entirely from this active and numerous portion of his supporters. These can cordially support the proclamation; but without a

total abandonment, not only of some of their fundamental principles, but of the very germ of all their principles, they can never vote for such an amendment of the Constitution as that proposed by the President. On the other hand, the question of compensation at a low rate for manumitting slaves, so far as it is to influence the slaveholding States, has a delusive importance in the eyes of the President. As a mere question of money, the market of the South would, in ordinary times, compensate the slave-owners of any Border State, that abolished slavery, at least three times, if not five times as liberally, as the General Government ever would, under the proposed plan; and, at the same time, nearly all the other questions that embarrass the subject, would be solved of themselves. Thus, suppose Kentucky, twelve years ago, had prospectively abolished slavery—operating exclusively on the after-born—giving half the time the President proposes for the finishing of the process, and beginning five years after the passage of the act of emancipation. In those five years all the slaves in the hands of pro-slavery men, would have been sold out of the State, at very high prices, or removed with their owners farther South: at the end of the time limited, Kentucky would have been a Free State: and the increased number of free negroes left in the State, would have been only such as had been slaves to persons who favored their liberation. This is a real case; and Kentucky, we regret to say, decidedly refused to do, or to allow, anything looking toward the destruction of slavery in her borders. And it may be confidently relied on, that she is nearer to emancipation than any of the States, except, perhaps, Delaware, Maryland, and Missouri. And, therefore, we presume it may be positively asserted, that there are other and far weightier considerations, than any question connected with compensation by the General Government; which render it morally certain, that if all the Free States were to vote for this amendment to the Constitution, the number of Slave States necessary to its adoption (*seven*) could not be secured. But there is a third class of persons, great in point of numbers, and powerful by their influence—found in every part of this nation, who habitually revere the institutions of the country as the growth of many generations—and the product of ages of wise and successful training—and the safeguard

of a high and peculiar civilization. Such men see no human hope for our country, higher than is couched in the phrase—which is already beginning to be reviled—“*Our Union as it was, and our Constitution as it is.*” Whatever the Constitution has embraced and secured, from its birth, it is still competent to embrace and secure; and whatever inheritance it received from the past, and has kept till now, it can transmit to the future. It was a growth, not a creation; as the Union was also a growth and not a creation; and as all that is permanent and useful and safe, in all nations, and amongst all races, always must be. Such men would, at no time, have changed the Constitution, or tampered with our civilization, in the interests of slavery; such men will not now change the Constitution, in order to give freer scope to a national effort to destroy slavery, and to centralize and endow with national power, a permanent pressure against the peculiar form of society and civilization, which covers nearly half the populated territory of the nation. We feel confident, that the proposed amendment will not be adopted into the Constitution. And we trust that the President will see therein, proof that the nation does not consider negro slavery, as it exists in many of the States, in any proper sense, a national institution; that it does not recognize any duty on its part to extinguish it; and that it feels perfectly competent both to restore and maintain the Union, and to preserve and enforce the Constitution and the laws—wholly irrespective of slaves and slavery.

There is one more topic, of the highest practical importance, with regard to which the mind of the President seems to have wavered somewhat, between the time of writing his special message, and that of writing his annual message. We allude to the disposition proposed to be made of the slaves liberated, whether by voluntary compensated action of the States, or by the exercise of the belligerent rights of the Federal Government. We suppose, that even if both these plans should be abandoned, the chances of war, as well as its necessities, and even duties, would cause a large number of slaves to accumulate on the hands of the Government, during the existence of hostilities. While we are well convinced, that the number of these persons would have been very much smaller, if the Government had caused the slaves of loyal citizens to be

treated exactly as if they were free and white—that is, had excluded them from the lines of the armies—and that by this means, the whole matter would have been greatly and justly simplified: and while we are fully satisfied, that a very different line of conduct should have been adopted toward loyal and disloyal masters respectively; we admit—nay, we assert—that it is inconsistent with the honor and dignity of the nation, that slaves once accepted and used in its military service, or given the protection of its flag, should afterward be returned to slavery. Upon supposition of the full success of the proclamation—there would be about three millions of emancipated slaves in the territory of the Rebel States. Upon supposition of the complete success of the plan of compensated manumission, whether under the special, or the annual message, there would be about one million more of free negroes scattered through the territory of the Border Slave States. Upon supposition of the failure of all the plans suggested by the President, there would still be many thousands of negroes removed from the control of their masters, by the chances of the war. Whatever the number might be, by any or all of these means, there must be added about five hundred thousand free negroes already in the country—the greater part in the present Slave States. The point upon which the mind of the President seems to have wavered, concerns the removal of these persons, and their colonization in some foreign country. In his last statements, contained in his annual message—that point seems to be greatly, if not intentionally weakened. It is to be left as before to the voluntary choice of each negro, whether he will leave the country; but it is to be left also to the discretion of Congress, whether any appropriation shall be made to colonize even those who may desire to emigrate. And the drift of the observations of the President on the subject, clearly implies that as a body they are expected to remain where they are liberated. That this would be the result, unless they were forcibly removed, need not be doubted.

We will not, at the close of a paper like this, go into the proof and illustration of the utter ruin which would overwhelm the black race under such circumstances, nor of the indescribable shock which such a result would produce to every element of prosperity—nay, even of civilization, throughout every region

where the black race approximated the whites, in numbers, with tolerable nearness. No ingenuity of vengeance armed with irresistible power, could inflict upon any civilized country, a more consummate destruction. And even if any have brought themselves to believe that it is a fate due indiscriminately to rebels and traitors, and to all dependent on them, and all connected with them; we beseech them to reflect, whether it is *worthy of us* to inflict such a fate on an immense portion of our own race, for the supposed benefit of an alien and inferior race, under the pretext of loyalty and patriotism, or worthy of our arms to commit the slaughter otherwise needless, which must precede such a fate, before any race with Saxon or Norman or American blood in their veins, will submit to it! Under the ordering of Providence, acts of extreme wrong often defeat themselves. What if the armies under their fierce teaching, take up the parable concerning this mighty code of war—before which constitutions and laws are silent? What if they interpret for themselves, this code already so fearfully interpreted by others; and it teach them the immeasurable difference of a war to restore the Union, and maintain the Constitution, and enforce the laws; from a war to establish the freedom and supremacy of the black race in the South, and confer on free negroes, whether as individuals, or as States, that perfect equality with ourselves, whether personal, social, civil, or political, which has been, for a whole generation, the abolition cry, wherever its voice has been heard? What then about belligerent rights, supreme over the Constitution? What about the fate of a great people, with a million of its citizens in arms—divided against each other—as to the *real* cause for which they took them up—and the proper object for which they should be used? After that comes a Dictator! Let it be well understood, that we expressly except the President—of whose patriotism we have no doubt, from any intimation, more serious, than having been betrayed into a grave and dangerous mistake, upon a subject of extreme peril to the country. And let no one imagine that we have any other design than to prevent, as far as our poor efforts can, the abuse of that mistake, to irreparable injury, at a period to the last degree critical, and yet not without the power of early and signal triumph.

From discussions so protracted, in which so many and such vast interests are involved, we return with clear conceptions, whether they be just or not, upon the two immediate topics, which pervade the whole—*Negro Slavery and the Civil War*.

We have no doubt, that God, in his own good time and way, will give to the human race that freedom, which it lost before the dawn of history, which it has always sighed for, which it never understood, and which but a small portion of it now possesses. We have no doubt it is the duty of all men, each according to his place and his degree, to strive that this, and every other real blessing, should be obtained by every one competent to enjoy and use it aright. But we believe in the providence of God; and it seems to us a folly, if not a sin, to attempt to frustrate the course of Providence—whether by hastening, or by retarding it—or in any other way. And we believe in the binding obligation of ten thousand duties, higher than the special one, of striving to set free all the slaves in America who are fit to be free; and do not believe it is anybody's duty, to set those free who are unfit to be free; and after much experience, we greatly doubt whether it is best, by *individual* cases, to set a few negroes free in States where the blacks generally remain slaves. Moreover, both from instinct, and from a sense of duty, we prefer our own country far before all others—and our race far beyond all besides; and we will never consent to endanger, much less to ruin, the one or the other, upon consideration of the advantage thereby to African slaves. The emancipation of slaves in America, beginning at the North with small numbers, has gradually proceeded South, and to larger numbers. It will go forward, in our opinion, in the same way; by a process certain in itself, but liable to be disturbed and retarded. From our earliest manhood, long ago, we have thought and said Kentucky would consult her interest, her duty, and her fame, by proceeding with the work. She thought not; and she has loved and trusted us too much for us to rebuke her, even when we thought she erred. We do not believe that the slaves, generally, in a single cotton or sugar State of this nation, are now qualified to use or enjoy freedom; or that any of those States are in a condition to set them free. We do not believe that the Federal Government has the least power, of peace or war,

to abolish slavery in any State; nor that the pretext set up to justify such an attempt, ought to have any influence upon just and enlightened men. We believe that servitude, in all its forms, is an incident of the fallen condition of man—like poverty, or sickness—and not a sin of itself: that hereditary slavery is the worst form of servitude; and that all men ought to do what they can to alleviate the evils and miseries of slavery, poverty, sickness, and every badge of our fallen state. In the question of vested rights to property, under the Federal Constitution, we do not believe that the inquiry concerning the moral character of the property, is one competent for Congress or the President to make: but if they will make it about slavery, their decision ought to be as stated above. The difference in color, of various races of human beings, we believe to have been intentionally brought about by God, for righteous ends, which are unknown to us; and that God will finally give to each of these races that portion of the earth best fitted for them. We do not believe, that any two of the three great races—black, yellow, and fair, can, if anywhere near equal as to number, live contentedly together, in peace and equality—except where all are equally slaves—or where polygamy is permitted: and therefore, that in Slave States, where the slaves and masters are of different races, and the slaves numerous, emancipation should always be followed by the colonization of the slaves: and we believe that the founding of black Free States, within the tropics, is one of the highest necessities of the human race. We believe, that this civil war, will probably, in a legitimate prosecution of it, greatly weaken the political power of the Slave States relatively considered; that it will demoralize the institution of slavery to a fearful extent; and that results from it may be reached concerning slavery, in opposite directions, far beyond our ability to foresee. And finally we do not believe that the existence of slavery, is so serious an obstacle to our triumph, as to justify any apprehension, or any resort to unusual or illegal acts; while, on the other hand, its total destruction, in the due, vigorous, and legal prosecution of the war, to complete success, ought not to hinder us, from putting the doctrine and practice of secession forever at rest.

And now a few sentences with regard to the other topic

Those rights which are called belligerent, can mean, amongst civilized nations, nothing more than such as are conferred by such nations on their own troops engaged in actual war, together with such in addition as by the common consent of such nations, arise out of the law of nature and nations, applied to the condition of actual war. In this country the power to make war resides in Congress—in the law-making department of the Government—and not in the Executive—who is a President, and not a sovereign. But in no country, and under no form of government, can belligerent rights be supposed to be conferred by the intention of the sovereign power, *against itself*. They are rights, so far as by actual war they reside in our President, as Commander-in-Chief—which *he* is to exercise for and not against the nation—under and not against the Constitution—for the more effectual accomplishment of that which the Constitution allows to be accomplished by war: it is the *opposite party*, if anybody, whose belligerent rights would increase any other rights they might have, to condemn and override *our* Constitution. Upon supposition, that neither Congress nor the President, nor both—have any power to abolish slavery in any State, in time of peace; it is as certain as truth, almost self-evident, can make it—that a state of war can confer no such power upon either of them; and least of all, as we have before shown, upon the President. If it is denied that the Rebel States are States, in the sense of this argument; the cavil would not help the denier at all—because the idea of our President permanently abolishing slavery in a *foreign* State, by proclamation, under the laws of war, is too futile to require particular reply; but if the fact assumed in the cavil is true—and the Rebel States are not States appertaining to this nation, owing obedience to our Constitution and laws, and entitled to return to that obedience, in the unimpaired exercise of all the rights they ever had—why, then, our war on them is a war of passion and aggression, and not a war of duty and national preservation. No belligerent right confers on anybody, anywhere, the power exercised in the portion of the proclamation here spoken of. If it were otherwise, the exercise of that power would belong to Congress, and not to the Executive Department. Even if both these statements were erroneous, and

such a power did result from civilized war, and was vested in the President—he would be prohibited from its use, by the supreme law of this country—by the tenor and enactments of which he is supremely bound. We have already attempted, at considerable length, to show that little else than evil, and that manifold and terrible, can result from any serious attempt to exercise this enormous and baseless power.

The fate of nations, like that of individuals, is in the hands of God. His dealings with the American people have been wonderful, from their first settlement on this continent, nearly two and a half centuries since. And his dealings with the American *nation*, since the thirteen colonies, nearly eighty-seven years ago, led by his providence, became a nation composed of Sovereign States—or if any prefer it, became Sovereign States composing a nation; have never ceased to be full of mercy—full also of the promise of mercies still in store. Here we plant ourselves with confiding faith in God. We can not see that his use of this great nation is done: we can not construe his providence toward us, and understand that he has achieved all he designed by creating such a nation, and leading it as he has done. He is trying us, to reveal our fitness for a higher destiny; he is punishing us for our unthankfulness, our unprofitableness, our manifold sins; he is purging us thoroughly, for a more glorious career, to be achieved through coming ages. So we understand the calamities that have come upon us; so we understand our duty, in the midst of them all. To this fundamental and decisive ground of confidence—let us add one more, which fortifies and establishes our right to trust as we do. God, in his great goodness, kept back the nation from giving just provocation, for this frightful war; and in his adorable mercy, he has abundantly laid to our hands, all that is needful to bring it to a speedy and triumphant end. Our clear and imperative duty lies before us. Let us discharge it in the fear of God—and reap, as a nation, the great reward. What we are called to do—first of all—is to break the military power of our rebellious countrymen. In doing this, instead of being phrenzied by their stubborn opposition—let us frankly honor the heroism of our race displayed by them. The brave, love the brave: and these men are worthy to die at our side—rather than by our hands. Of all wars,

those like this, tend to the greatest ferocity; yet of all wars, the grand objects we propose in this, ought to be effective in keeping us the most carefully from all injustice or barbarity. It is not to exterminate—but it is to restore, that we have put forth such amazing force. It is impossible to withhold our hand—or turn aside from the battle, till the work of war and death has achieved its indispensable object: but after that, comes a work of life and peace, which we must perform as thoroughly as the work of war and death. And—with God's blessing—that work of life and peace can be achieved as perfectly, if we keep ourselves in a temper fit for its performance, as we are sure the preliminary work of war and death can be, if we quit ourselves like men. Great as is our confidence that this rebellion can be conquered—it does not exceed the strength of our conviction, that a failure, afterward, to restore the Union as it was, would be attributable at least as much to our own folly, as to the phrensy of the Southern people. What should be the fate of men and parties who seek to bring out of the most costly triumph, only ignominy and ruin?

